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Abstract 
In 1918, the signing of the armistice at the end of the First World War, brought about 
the return of the region known as Elsaß-Lothringen, Alsace-Lorraine, to France after 
47 years of German rule. This thesis examines the problems which the integration 
process created for the heterogeneous population of the Moselle (annexed Lorraine), a 
population which included those who were indigenous to the region, Germans from all 
over the German Reich, and immigrants from elsewhere in Europe. In this integration 
process, the French authorities attempted to undo the effects of Germanisation on all 
levels: linguistic, cultural, political, economic, administrative, and demographic. 
However, the manner in which they attempted to achieve francisation, soon alienated 
large sections of the indigenous population. This sense of unease and dissatisfaction 
manifested itself within weeks of the entry of French troops to the region and became 
known as the malaise lorrain. Sacrifices forced upon the region by integration 
included a disappointingly sluggish economic recovery. Equally, whilst a process of 
epuration, or ethnic cleansing, deported three quarters of the Moselle's German 
community, many --. Hong the indigenous population were obliged to prove their loyalty 
to France at specially created tribunals to allow them to remain in the region. 
This thesis brings to light the region's experience which the historiography has 
hitherto treated as less controversial and less problematic than that of its neighbour, 
Alsace. Mosellan particularisme, which sought a middle ground between separatist 
regionalism and complete assimilation into France, was not as radical, reactionary, or 
well publicized as Alsatian autonomism. However, it was, in the long-term, far more 
successful. 
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Notes on Usage 
While virtually no terminology which can be applied to the regions discussed in this 
thesis is free from ambiguity, controversy, or confusion, consistency has been deemed 
the most satisfactory solution. The choice of terms, therefore, should not be read as an 
indication of any value judgement of the validity of French or German sovereignty over 
the regions. 
The French and English term Alsace-Lorraine is used here to refer to the 
regions annexed by Germany during the periods 1871 to 1918, and 1940 to 1945, 
regions known in German as Elsaß-Lothringen. Outwith these periods, this collective 
term is dropped and the regions are referred to separately. However, the part of 
Lorraine which fell within the annexed territory is referred to throughout as annexed 
Lorraine during periods of annexation and as the Moselle for the inter-war and post- 
Second World War periods. Otherwise, the term Lorraine refers to the French region 
which, during periods of German annexation, contained three departments (the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle, the Vosges, and the Meuse) but also included the Moselle in the 
inter-war and post-Second World War periods. See chapter one for further 
explanations regarding frontier changes. 
The inhabitants of this region, although often known as Lorrainers, 
Lothringers, or Lorrains, are referred to here as Mosellans, meaning inhabitants of the 
Moselle according to its 1871 boundaries, in order to distinguish them from inhabitants 
of the region of Lorraine as a whole. The term indigenes is used here to denote those 
who, prior to 1871, held French nationality and were resident in the region, as well as 
their descendants. They are also referred to in certain documents as Mosellans de 
V 
vieille souche or as autochtones. During the period of annexation, 1871 to 1918, large 
numbers of Germans from other parts of Germany emigrated to the region. These 
individuals are referred to here as German immigrants, even though they originated 
from other parts of the same country and considered themselves Elsaß-Lothringer. 
The term Francois de 1'interieur refers to French arriving in the regions after the 
armistice of 1918 from elsewhere in France, at that stage still thought of as the 
`interior'. 
Throughout this thesis, current, and therefore French, names of towns and 
villages are used even though they may be known locally by their German or dialectal 
equivalents. This is in order to avoid cumbersome translations and to assist the reader 
in locating them on national or international maps. It is also a reflection of the fact that 
during the period addressed by this thesis, they were officially known by their French, 
rather than German, names. See appendix I which contains a list of towns with their 
French and German names. 
As far as possible, spelling, punctuation, and grammar mistakes in primary 
documentation from French, German, and English language sources have been left 
uncorrected in order to remain faithful to the original sources. In some cases, such 
errors were made when documents were copied by clerical staff. In other cases, errors 
resulted from authors' lack of familiarity with a particular language. 
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Map 1: The Moselle and Alsace 
at the crossroads of Europe, 
1871 to the present day. 
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Map 2: The Moselle, 1871 to present day. 
udun-le-riche " 
J. ge 
" Aumetz 
Thionville 
Knutange " "Yutz 
"" Hayange 
" Serrmange 
" Uckange 
Rombas "Amniville 
ondange * "" 
Petite-Rosselle 
g Moyeuv -Gran de " ýgtiring-Wendel 
"Boulay "Forbach 
Scy-Chazelles " Oeung "" St Julien-Its-Metz 
METZ 
Freyming-Merlebach 
"Sarreguemines 
Montigny-lts-Metze " Peltre 
" St Avoid 
" " Bitche 
us-sur Mosellee 
M" ypouilly Hambacil 
(\ 
" Jouy-aux-Arches 0 Faulquemont ( "ýý 
" Delme " Morhange 
"Chateau-Satins 
" Sarrebourg 
Walschied 
viii 
Abbrieviations 
ADBR Archives departementales du Bas-Rhin 
ADM Archives departementales de la Moselle 
ANSBV Bulletin de liaison de 1'association nationale du souvenir de la 
bataille de Verdun et de la sauvegarde de ses haut lieux 
CARAN Centre d'accueil et de recherche des archives nationales 
CEH Journal of Central European History 
EAU Espace Archives Usinor 
FO Foreign Office papers 
JCH Journal of Contemporary History 
LPF Ligue Patriotique des Francaises 
PRO Public Record Office 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
UNRD Union Nationale Republicaine Democratique 
UPRA Union Populaire Republicaine d'Alsace 
URL Union Republicaine Lorraine 
ix 
Figures 
Figure 1: Plaque commemorating Marshal Foch's 
entry to Metz, 26 November 1918 p. 65 
Figure 2: Telegram from Marshal Foch 
to Mirman, 29 November 1918 p. 79 
Figure 3: Postcard showing the delivery of the first 
French-language newspapers to Metz, November 1918 p. 85 
Figure 4: Identity card A awarded to indigenes in 
the Moselle and Alsace p. 160 
Figure 5: Voluntary repatriation form, issued 19 April 1919 p. 175 
Figure 6: Expulsion form, issued 19 April 1919 p. 176 
Figure 7: Extract from K's diary, 11 November 1918 p. 216 
Figure 8: K's photograph of Li, e departing German soldiers, 
taken on 15 November 1918 p. 217 
Figure 9: K's photograph of the first French troops 
arriving in Peltre, 17 November 1918 p. 218 
Figure 10: Extract from G's Deutsche Schrift jotter 
showing the transition from German to French rule p. 224 
Figure 11: Publicity for a new publication on 
how to celebrate 14 July p. 235 
X 
Tables 
Table 1: Total population of the Moselle, Bas-Rhin, 
and Haut-Rhin, 1910,1921, and 1926 p. 42 
Table 2: Percentage changes in total population of the Moselle, 
Bas-Rhin, and Haut-Rhin, 1910-1921 and 1921-1926 p. 42 
Table 3: Population of the Moselle, Bas-Rhin, and Haut- 
Rhin in 1910 and 1926 according to religion as a percentage 
of the total population p. 43 
Table 4: `Foreigners' living in the Moselle, Bas-Rhin, 
and Haut-Rhin, 1910-1926 (percentage of total population 
in brackets) p. 44 
Table 5: Marriages between indigenes and Germans and 
total number of marriages between indigenes and foreigners p. 45 
Table 6: Changes in population according to nationality p. 177 
Table 7: `Foreigners' living in the Moselle, 1910-1926, 
by nationality p. 259 
Table 8: Breakdown of the 1919 electorate p. 296 
Table 9: Results of general elections, 16 November 1919, 
in the Moselle p. 309 
Table 10: Results of general elections, 11 May 1924, 
in the Moselle p. 312 
xi 
Maps 
Map 1: The Moselle and Alsace at the crossroads of Europe, 
1871 to the present day p. vi 
Map 2: The Moselle, 1871 to the present day p. vii 
Map 3: The Departments of the Moselle and the 
Meurthe, 1815-1871 p. 4 
Map 4: The Departments of the Moselle and the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle, 1871 to present day p. 4 
Chapter I 
The Moselle 
in Historical Context 
In 1976, the publication of Francois Roth's La Lorraine annexee (1870-1918)' marked 
a turning point in the historiography of the Moselle. In his introduction, Roth explains 
the origins of his study, which began as his doctoral thesis, and which today still forms 
the backbone of scholarship on the history of the Moselle in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
Peu ä peu, j' ai acquis la conviction qu'il fallait donner ä 
cette region un instrument scientifique pour lui permettre 
de reconnaitre un passe recent qui pese sur les 
generations anciennes et que les nouvelles ignorent, 
rejettent ou approchent ä partir de cliches deformants. Z 
Whilst the thesis presented here does not claim to provide a study on the scale of 
Monsieur Roth's magnum opus, it has nonetheless applied these comments to the 
immediate post-war period 1918 to 1925, a period which has suffered its share of 
`cliches deformants' and which, hitherto, has escaped the in-depth scrutiny of the 
historian. 
' Roth, Francois, La Lorraine annexee. Etude sur la Presidence de Lorraine dans I'Empire allemand 
(1870-1918), Nancy, 1976. This work was originally Roth's doctoral thesis submitted to the 
University of Nancy II in 1973. 
2 Ibid., p. 9. 
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The backdrop 
Authors of books and articles on the recent history of annexed Lorraine often choose 
as their opening statement the surprising or even shocking fact that within the space of 
74 years, potentially the lifetime of one healthy individual, the people of the regions of 
the Moselle and Alsace witnessed four changes to their nationality. This fact is all the 
more shocking because these changes took place in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in Western Europe. 3 However, the history of these regions did not simply 
become remarkable from 1870 onwards with the onset of the Franco-Prussian War. 
Indeed, the events surrounding the Franco-Prussian War, the subsequent annexation of 
the regions by Germany, the retrieval of the regions by France at the end of the First 
World War, their reannexation by Germany in 1940, and finally their return to French 
rule in 1945, are largely the result of French and German interpretations of several 
centuries of spectacular historical events. Such momentous turning points often found 
the regions at the heart of the rise and fall of kingdoms and empires. 
In 451, what became known as the city of Metz, the current administrative 
capital of Lorraine and chef-lieu of the Moselle department, was almost entirely 
destroyed by Attila the Hun as he and his army set about dismantling the Roman 
Empire. In the sixth century, Metz became the capital of the Merovingian kingdom of 
Austrasia, which included the north-eastern territories of ancient Gaul and was the 
birth-place of the Carolingian dynasty. By the eleventh century, the region of 
Lotharingia, which included the regions now known as Lorraine as well as Alsace, 
found itself entirely contained within the Holy Roman Empire, allowing German 
control over the region to dominate. For the next five centuries, the region was fought 
over by various French dukes to the west and the German Empire to the East. In 
1552, French armies occupied the areas around Metz, Toul, and Verdun known as the 
Trois Eveches, areas which were finally ceded to France by the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648. However, in 1738, the complexities of marriages among the various European 
dynasties, meant the region of Lorraine found itself under the rule of the Polish King 
Stanislaw Leszczynski, father-in-law of Louis XV of France. Upon his death in 1766, 
Lorraine fell, for the first time, under French sovereignty. It retained, however, a high 
degree of autonomy over its own affairs. It is this chequered history, spanning the 
centuries from the Roman Empire right up to the French Revolution and beyond, 
which provided the justification for French and German nationalist claims to the region 
in the nineteenth century, in particular the area which falls to the north of the linguistic 
frontier containing the region's Germanophone population. Such arguments, based on 
cultural, linguistic, as well as historical factors, were similar to those applied to Alsace, 
even though the two regions had always been separated geographically by the Vosges 
mountains and historically by entirely different histories. 
The creation of the system of departments in 1790, at the time of the French 
Revolution, divided the Lorraine region into four: the Moselle, the Meurthe, the 
Vosges, and the Meuse. The loss of the Saarland from the Moselle department to the 
German Confederation in 1815 and, half a century later, alterations to regional 
boundaries made by the Treaty of Frankfurt, mean that the period of greatest stability 
for the department's boundaries has been from 1871 to the present day, despite the 
frequent changes to French and German national frontiers which have crossed from 
one side of the Moselle to the other with alarming frequency. 
3 For the populations of the Balkans or Poland, for example, such a state of affairs is equally common. 
4 Chapter two passim, elaborates on the need to differentiate more clearly between the Moselle and 
Alsace. 
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Map 3: Departments of the Moselle 
and the Meurthe, 1815-1871. 
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Whilst annexation of Alsace involved taking the region's departments of the 
Bas-Rhin and the Haut-Rhin more or less intact, 5 annexed Lorraine did not reflect the 
pre-1871 departmental boundaries of the Moselle, as can be seen in maps 3 and 4 on 
the previous page. The arrondissement of Briey to the west of the Moselle remained 
French and became part of the Meurthe, which resulted in the renaming of this 
department as the Meurthe-et-Moselle. To the south-east of the Moselle were added 
the arrondissements of Sarrebourg (with the exception of 11 communes) and Chäteau- 
Salins (with the exception of 9 communes), both formerly of the Meurthe region. At 
the preliminaries for peace, the territory of Belfort was offered by the Germans in 
exchange for eleven communes in the arrondissment of Briey. Although the region's 
total population and land mass were almost unchanged by these alterations, the 
elongated shape of what had been the Moselle was lost and a new, plumper region had 
been created. 6 
These changes were the result of Bismarck's careful consideration of 
Germany's requirements of the annexation process. The position of the linguistic 
frontier' dictated the minimum area to be annexed, in line with popular opinion within 
Prussia which was increasingly in favour of the annexation of Alsace, with its 
seemingly Germanic culture. This obliged Bismarck to annex the Germanophone 
sector of Lorraine where the majority of the annexed populations either spoke German 
5A small stretch of land, previously part of the department of the Vosges, was included with the 
whole of Bas-Rhin, while the territory of Belfort, to the south, was lost from Haut-Rhin. Annexation 
of Alsace, therefore, left the region largely unchanged. 
6 See Roth, La Lorraine annexee, p. 40. Roth's description of the peace negotiations and extent of 
annexation as it affected Lorraine is very detailed and helpful. 
See map 1, p. vi. 
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or a Germanic dialect, even though the dialects varied from area to area. 8 However, 
more importantly, Bismarck had to ensure that annexation of French territory would 
serve as a means of preventing further French aggression across the weakest point of 
the Franco-German frontier, turning the annexed regions into a military buffer zone. 
This meant venturing far enough into Lorraine to take the garrison town of Metz, 
without accumulating too much of the Francophone sector which would undoubtedly 
prove difficult to integrate into the Reich. 
The next consideration facing Bismarck was economic. The further into the 
Moselle department he went, the greater the rewards from the region's coal and iron 
ore deposits and factories. During the period of Prussian occupation of Alsace and the 
Moselle, German specialists investigated the potential which lay in the Moselle's coal 
and iron ore fields. They were careful to include, therefore, the iron and steel factories 
at Ars, Moyeuvre, and Hayange in the annexed territory. 9 However, the signing of the 
Treaty of Frankfurt by no means marked the end of the negotiations to decide the 
territorial limitations of annexation, and, among others, the de Wendel industrialists did 
their best to persuade Bismarck to listen to their demands. 1° Nevertheless, as Roth 
states, economic factors do not appear to have been placed high on Bismarck's list of 
priorities either, in terms of his war aims or in his expectations for the peace 
settlement. It was perhaps more of a happy coincidence, therefore, that the bulk of 
Lorraine's mining and industrial potential fell on the German side of the new border, in 
an operation which was otherwise based chiefly on military strategy. 
8 See Levy, Paul, Histoire linguistique d'Alsace et de Lorraine, 2 vols., Strasbourg, Paris, 1929. Also, 
Toussaint, Maurice, La frontiere linguistique en Lorraine (fluctuations et delimitations), Paris, 1955. 
And more recently, Simmer, Alain, L'origine de lafrontiere linguistique en Lorraine. La fin des 
myths?, Knutange, 1995. Also, Loew, Guy, `Vers la disparition des frontieres? L'exemple des 
frontii res du departement de la Moselle', in Cahiers Lorrains, No. 3, September 1996, pp. 227-232. 
9 Roth, La Lorraine annexee, p. 37. 
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With the ratification of the preliminary peace on 2 March 1871, Prussia, soon 
to be at the head of a unified Germany, officially took up the reins as sovereign of the 
Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen, a so-called imperial territory which was treated as 
something between a fully fledged federal state in the Second Reich and, as its 
indigenous populations were to see it, as a form of colony. It was from that date 
onwards that Prussia was legally allowed to extend its authority beyond ensuring 
security and order among the regions' populations. In fact, Silverman argues that, 
during the period preceding ratification of the peace treaty, Prussia had overstepped its 
mandate by regulating education and religion in the provinces. Another criticism of 
Prussia's handling of annexation stems from the right of option of nationality granted 
to the populations. Annexation brought with it the automatic bestowal of German 
nationality on all Mosellans and Alsatians living in the regions. Those who wished to 
retain French nationality could do so, but were obliged to transfer their domicile to 
France before 1 October 1872.12 Whilst there was at least an element of choice 
implicit in this, the reality of being obliged to leave homes, livelihoods, friends, and 
family, was harsh indeed. 
The movement of population which resulted from the right of option saw 6.5 
per cent of the population of Lower Alsace (equivalent to the current department of 
the Bas-Rhin) and 6 per cent of the population of annexed Lorraine opt for French 
nationality, whereas 20.3 per cent of the population of Upper Alsace (equivalent to the 
current department of the Haut-Rhin) became optants. This massive difference was 
10 In the end, the de Wendels resolved their problems by setting up companies in both French and 
German Lorraine. See chapter seven p. 257 on the economy. 
11 Silverman, Dan, P., Reluctant Union: Alsace-Lorraine and Imperial Germany, 1871-1918, 
Pennsylvania, 1972, p. 31. Similar accusations were to be made against the French in the lead up to 
the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, 47 years later. See chapter three, p. 75. 
12 See Wahl, Alfred, L'Option et l'emigration des Alsaciens-Lorrains (1871-1872), Paris, 1974. See 
also Roth, Francois, La Lorraine annexee, Nancy, 1976, chapter 3, pp. 93-124. 
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due to the successful efforts of the Ligue d'Alsace, a group whose enthusiastic 
propaganda promoted opting for French nationality as a matter of principle. However, 
the overall figure for Upper Alsace was almost equalled by that of the city of Metz 
which saw the departure of 20.5 per cent of its total population, in stark contrast to the 
smaller towns and rural regions in the Germanophone sector where only between 1.9 
per cent and 5.8 per cent of the populations chose to leave. This movement of 
population, which fell outside the pre-existing patterns of emigration already apparent 
prior to the Franco-Prussian War, involved the departure of much of the region's 
largely Francophone classe des notables from Metz and was to have a seriously 
damaging effect upon the ability of the Francophile community to resist Germanisation 
of the region's politics, society, educational and religious institutions, culture, and, 
most importantly, language. For many middle class professionals, the right of option 
forced them to choose between two evils: remain in the region and be obliged to adapt 
to a new and alien way of life, or depart and be forced to sell homes, businesses, and 
property, leaving behind family and friends. The statistics show a preponderance of 
young males leaving the region, many of whom considered the prospect of embarking 
upon their national service in German uniform unacceptable. However, as Paul Smith 
points out, the role of national identity in dictating an individual's behaviour in such 
circumstances is more evident among the bourgeoisie, whose education, prosperity, 
and greater mobility permitted them the luxury of choice which was not always 
available to the rural or industrial classes. 13 The Catholic Church appears to have been 
left largely intact and it provided continuity in terms. of leadership which bridged the 
gap between French and German rule. But even its hierarchy, over the half century of 
13 Smith, Paul, `A la recherche d'une identite nationale en Alsace', in Vingtieme Siecle, No. 50, April- 
June, 1996, pp. 23-35, p. 26. 
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Germanisation, was unable to deflect entirely the influence of German Catholicism on 
its younger priests, educated in German schools and later in universities across the 
German Reich. 14 
In other areas, Germanisation was to have a similar, creeping success. The 
introduction of German as the official language was clearly the benchmark for success 
elsewhere, and was made by way of a period of transition in the Francophone regions, 
whereby, according to the progress of individual communes, delays could be 
negotiated to allow the populations time to adapt. '5 To the north of the linguistic 
frontier, German was immediately introduced. Certain communes which lay on the 
frontier protested, asking permission for a bilingual system, but without success. Over 
the period of annexation, the number of communes permitted to continue using French 
as the official language had only been reduced from 372 in 1872 to 266 in 1914, an 
indication, perhaps, of the flexibility and long term nature of the period of `transition' 
in the minds of the German civilian authorities. 16 However, the nature and manner in 
which overall Germanisation policy was applied varied throughout the period, at times 
showing leniency towards the indigenous populations and allowing the use of French 
and the maintenance of French practices. At others, the regime indulged in an 
unfortunate authoritarianism, notably in 1887, which inevitably set the process back 
rather than advancing its cause. Initially, on the political scene, annexation aroused 
furious opposition around the provinces. Their deputies, elected to the French 
parliament during the war, made their famous and indignant protest on 17 February 
14 See Roth, Francois, Les Lorrains entre la France et L'Allemagne, Nancy, 1981, p. 209. 
IS Linguistic Germanisation also affected the names of towns and villages around the region, and 
those to the north of the linguistic frontier were officially changed to German equivalents. During the 
First World War, Germanisation of place names was extended to all towns and villages in the 
Francophone sector as the policy was stepped up by the military authorities. See appendice I for 
examples of these changes and translations. 
16 See Roth, La Lorraine annexee, pp. 84-85. 
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1871 to the assemblee nationale in Bordeaux, '7 renewed in 1874 at the German 
Reichstag, against the cession of part of the Moselle, the arrondissements of the 
Meurthe, and Alsace to Prussia. This initial protest developed in the early years of 
annexation into a political movement of protestation, decrying the fact that the 
populations had not been consulted by way of a plebiscite on the question of a change 
to their sovereignty. However, as time passed, and the likelihood of a plebiscite or a 
return to French sovereignty receded, so protestation was replaced in the region by the 
1890s with a more accommodating political movement, which looked increasingly to 
the influence of German political parties such as the socialist SPD (the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and the German Catholic Centre Party (the 
Zentrum). 
This political adaptation to life in the German Reich reflected a more general 
acceptance of the status quo in the regions. Economic prosperity, special concessions 
granted to the provinces to limit the impact of Bismarck's Kulturkampf, and social 
legislation, which was ahead of its time, sweetened what was otherwise the bitter pill 
of Germanisation for large numbers of indigenes. More than anything, the realisation 
gradually dawned on the more Francophile indigenous population that international 
and diplomatic moves, designed to bring about a reunification of Alsace-Lorraine with 
France, were becoming increasingly rare. The future was unmistakably German. 
Aside from passive resistance, more evident in rural areas where German influence was 
less inclined to penetrate and therefore more obvious when it did, what was a tacit 
acceptance of German rule, developed into a more evident sense of positive 
accommodation. By the turn of the century, the younger generations in particular, 
17 As a result of the siege of Paris during the Franco-Prussian War, the French parliament was forced 
to re-house itself temporarily in Bordeaux. 
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were increasingly willing to work with, rather than parallel to or even against, the 
German authorities. '8 
By 1890, the unprompted arrival in annexed Lorraine of large numbers of 
German immigrants, who were enthusiastically welcomed by the authorities, included 
largely urban professionals, military personnel, and civil servants. The second wave, 
arriving after 1890, brought more formally recruited miners and factory workers, 
especially to the areas surrounding Thionville and Forbach. '9 By 1895,22 per cent of 
annexed Lorraine's population was German, compared to 14 per cent for the whole of 
Alsace-Lorraine. Yet German immigration was unevenly distributed around the 
region. Metz provides the most remarkable statistics: by 1895, the indigenous 
population of 21,061 was outnumbered by the German immigrant population of 
21,305.20 
Many of these immigrants genuinely liked Lothringen and quickly set about 
making it their home. However, assimilation with the indigenous populations was, on 
the whole, patchy. In the towns and cities around the region, German communities 
were large enough for them to be self-sufficient, whilst religion played its part in 
widening the gap. Most of the arriving German immigrants were Protestant, and their 
large numbers boosted that community in the region from roughly 7,000 before 
annexation to 74,000 by 1910.21 The vast majority of the indigenous population, 
though, was Catholic. The assimilation process was also affected by Germany's 
unwillingness to treat Alsace-Lorraine in the same way as other German states. This 
was despite federalism, which, in theory, ought to have been able to cope with the kind 
IS See Roth, Les Lorrains entre la France et I'Allentagne, p. 209. 
19 Roth, La Lorraine annexee, Nancy, 1976, p. 116. 
20 Ibid. p. 119. 
21 Ibid. p. 140. 
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of diversity presented by Alsace-Lorraine's multi-cultural population. 22 It was as late 
as 1911 that Germany finally granted the Reichsland its own constitution providing an 
elected regional parliament, a Landtag, which gave the regions representation in the 
Bundesrat. However, this constitution still did not give Alsace-Lorraine the status of a 
fully fledged federal state. The unelected Statthalter, or imperial governor, nominated 
the Bundesrat representatives and continued to share power with the Landtag. 
Germany was clearly unwilling to entrust to its Reichsland the autonomy so many 
within its population desired, despite the major signs of progress in the Germanisation 
process. 
The declaration of war in 1914 saw annexed Lorraine and Alsace fall under the 
authority of martial law, replacing the civilian administration which had employed 
other, often gentler, means to Germanise the provinces. Six days at the end of July 
1914 provided the German regime's adversaries in annexed Lorraine a last opportunity 
to leave the region, notably Jean-Pierre Jean23, the chanoine Collin24, and the 
industrialist de Wendel brothers. Those left behind were subjected to the strictest 
measures including the suspension of individual liberty and freedom of the press. 
French newspapers were suspended, and censorship of German language newspapers 
was introduced. The police and military authorities were permitted to arrest and 
imprison those considered to be French sympathisers or opponents of the German 
regime, raiding homes and businesses as required. Political parties were all but banned, 
with mobilisation of the region's male population draining the life out of most 
institutions and organisations. More than anything, this period saw the greatest efforts 
22 Smith, `A la recherche d'une identitd', in Vingtieme Siecle, No. 50, April-June 1996, pp. 23-35, 
p. 28. 
23 Founding member of the Souvenir Franfais, a group set up to erect and maintain monuments to 
Mosellan and Alsatian war-dead of the Franco-Prussian War, but also, unofficially, to sustain the 
memory of France throughout annexation. 
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to suppress the use of the French language. Such efforts focused on preventing its use 
in public, particularly in Metz, and stepping up Germanisation of communes still 
permitted to use French. Such measures meant that the consequences of the 
declaration of war in 1914 were far more demoralising for the Francophone population 
of the Moselle than for the rest of the indigenes living in the Reichsland. 
Four long years of war were to have a profound effect on the outlook of the 
populations and, as detailed in chapter three, were to play a crucial role in dictating the 
population's reaction to a German defeat. As the armistice signalled the return of the 
provinces to France, attention turned to the reunion of two peoples which had spent 
almost half a century apart, and which were each to confront the moment of reunion 
with almost diametrically opposing expectations. There was little indication, therefore, 
that what lay ahead would provide a break in the notoriously complex and traumatic 
history of these provinces. 
The historiography so far 
The subject of the disputed territories of Alsace and the Moselle has for well over a 
century encouraged the widest possible debate encompassing the regions' culture, 
administration, politics, identity, religion, education, language, and folklore. As far 
back as the notorious clash between the German historian Theodore Mommsen and the 
French medievalist, Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges in the 1870s, the problems and 
ambiguities of the subject have been apparent. 25 Yet this clash said far more about the 
24 Political editor of the French language newspaper Le Lorrain. 
25 Mommsen argued that ethnology and linguistics provided the necessary justification for including 
Alsace in a united Germany. Fustel de Coulanges, on the other hand, dramatically discarded the use 
of history and proposed the `principe moderne' of self-determination. See Smith, 'A la recherche 
d'une identit6', in Vingtiente siecle, No. 50, avril-juin, 1996, pp. 23-35. 
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ideological gulf which lay between German and French definitions of the nation than it 
did about the rightful sovereign of the region of Alsace or the Moselle. 
Out of this vast literature, various observations can be made and problems 
identified. Firstly, the assumption that sentiment automatically follows language is to 
be guarded against. The use of German does not automatically imply pro-German 
sentiment, and, likewise, the use of French does not automatically imply pro-French 
sentiment. For example, on the one hand, the massive three-volume study on Elsaß- 
Lothringen, 1871 to 1918, edited by Georg Wolfram, was written by Germans writing 
from a German perspective in the German language. 26 On the other hand, Joseph 
Rosse and his co-authors, also writing in German were, in fact, staunchly Catholic 
Alsatians, who were also autonomists, presenting their specifically Alsatian 
perspective. 27 Likewise, the mosellan, abbe Nicolay, published his defence of the 
concordat, Elsaß-Lothringen im Kampfe um seine Religiösen Einrichtungen, 1924-26, 
28 in German. However, not all Alsatians or Mosellans chose to write in German and 
Pierri Zind, also an Alsatian with a distinctly autonomist axe to grind, published his 
work in French. 29 The difference, therefore, between `German' literature, written by 
those of German origin, and `German language' literature, written by those from the 
regions who simply chose to write or publish in German, is an important one. 
26 Wolfram, Georg, (ed. ), Das Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen 1871-1918,3 vols., Frankfurt, 1931- 
1938. This work was compiled by Germans who had worked as civil servants in Alsace-Lorraine but 
who were expelled in 1918. It was published through the Wissenschaftliches Institut der Elsaß- 
Lothringer im Reich based in Frankfurt-am-Main in the 1930s. 
27 Ross6, J., Sturmel, M., Bleicher, A., Deiber, F., Keppi, J., Das Elsaß von 1870-1932,4 Vols., 
Colmar, 1936-1938. These works by Rosse and Wolfram, although presenting very particular 
perspectives on the subjects they treat, still contain a good deal of information which is indispensible 
to the historian. Rosse's Das Elsaß, in spite of its title, contains information relevant to annexed 
Lorraine/the Moselle. 
28 Defensor, Elsaß-Lothringen im Kampfe um seine Religiösen Einrichtungen, 1924-26, Schwerdorf, 
1926. The abbe Nicolay wrote under this pseudonym. 
29 Zind, Pierri, Elsaß-Lothringen, Alsace-Lorraine, une nation inierdite, 1870-1940, Paris, 1979. 
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Despite the misleading aspects of language, literature on the subject of 
mosellan and Alsatian history is by no means devoid of bias. Works produced by 
French patriots in the 1920s flooded onto the market. Frederic Eccard, 30 Georges 
Delahache, 31 Anatole Perier, 32 and Jacques Fonlupt-Esperaber33 were among many 
who, with varying degrees of nationalist and regionalist emphasis, presented 
annexation as a mere parenthesis in centuries of French sovereignty over the regions, 
exaggerating the indigenous population's resistance to Germanisation, and excusing 
any French ineptitude in the early stages of desannexion. 34 Such an exercise in the 
aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles is entirely understandable. French patriots living 
in the regions were, after all, participating in an essential propaganda exercise already 
embarked upon by the French authorities. However, their interpretation of the return 
of the provinces to France, has made a lasting impression on historiography written 
since then. As recently as 1995, Alfred Wahl expressed his exasperation with German 
historians such as Karl-Heinz Rothenberger'35 Felicitas von Aretin36, and even Lothar 
30 Eccard, Fri dr ric, 'L'Alsace et la Lorraine sous le Commissariat Gdn6ral et apres sa suppression', in 
Revue politique et parlementaire, November 1925, pp. 197-237. This work is largely sympathetic 
towards Alsatians, but Eccard's patriotism towards France, rather than Germany, is also evident. His 
comments are directed, therefore, at those who were perhaps having difficulty understanding the 
malaise alsacien. 
31 Delahache, Georges (ed. ), Les debuts de ! 'administration francaise en Alsace et en Lorraine, Paris, 
1921. Delahache provides a version of events which is rather too upbeat and too optimistic for the 
circumstances and which is distinctly pro-French. 
32 Pdrier, Anatole, Sequestres et liquidations des biens allemands en Alsace et Lorraine, Paris, 1925. 
This is a defence of the French government's actions as well as an attack on Germany's criticisms of 
the liquidation process, written, not surprisingly, by the Directeur du Service des liquidations 
d'Alsace et de Lorraine himself. 
33 Fonlupt-Esperaber, Jacques, Alsace et Lorraine. Hier, aujourd'hui, demain, Paris, 1945. 
34 The Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris also contains numerous patiotic publications from the 
immediate post-war period on the subject of the returned provinces. For example, Batiffol, Louis, 
L'Alsace est francaise par ses origines, sa race, son passe, Paris, 1919. Leblond, Marius-Ary, 
L'Alsace et la Lorraine glorifiees par nos ecrivains et nos artistes, Paris, 1919. Halff, S., La fidelite 
des Israelites d'Alsace et de Lorraine (1871-1918), Paris, 1919. Madelin, Louis, Les heures 
merveilleuses d'Alsace et de Lorraine, Paris, 1919. 
35 Rothenberger, Karl-Heinz, Die elsaß-lothringischen Heimat-und Autonomiebewegung zwischen den 
beiden Weltkriegen, Frankfurt, 1976. 
36 Aretin, Felicitas von, Die Schulpolitik der obersten Schulbehörde im Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen 
1871-1914, unpublished PhD thesis, Florence, 1992. 
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Kettenacker37 and Hermann Hiery38 all of whom, according to Wahl, have insisted 
upon writing `revisionist histories' of Alsace-Lorraine's experience in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Such `revisionism' involves presenting Germany's sovereignty 
over the regions as largely justified, Germanisation as broadly successful, and French 
actions in 1918 as far more brutal than German actions had been half a century before. 
Wahl suggests somewhat disingenuously in his closing remarks, `Encore faut-il que ces 
historiens 6vitent de se laisser trop guider, eux aussi, par le sentiment national. i39 In 
fact, German historians can be forgiven for wishing to `set the record straight' in the 
light of the French historiography highlighted above. The Wissenschaftliches Institut 
in Frankfurt began the task with works regarded as the German equivalent of 
revanchist, but was interrupted by the second annexation of the provinces. And, only 
since the 1970s has the process been tentatively resumed, following German difficulties 
in dealing with its history in the light of the Nazi era. 
A second feature of the literature dealing with these regions is the domination 
of Alsatian history over that of the Moselle. This is not to say that there is no literature 
concentrating on the Moselle. Experienced and respected academics such as Francois 
Roth, Francois Reitel, and Francois-Yves Le Moigne, have written extensively on the 
region. The problem lies, rather, in publications which, in their titles, purport to deal 
with Alsace-Lorraine, Elsaß-Lothringen, in other words, both Alsace and annexed 
Lorraine. A brief glance at secondary and primary sources used by many of these 
studies reveals the very limited use of the Moselle's archives, newspapers, authors, and 
statistics. Irmgard Grünewald, for example, in Die Elsaß-Lothringer im Reich 1918- 
37 Ketternacker, Lothar, Die nationalsozialistische Volkstumpolitik im Elsaß, Stuttgart, 1973. 
38 Hiery, Hermann, Reichstagswahlen im Reichsland: Ein Beitrag zur Landesgeschichte von Elsaß- 
Lothringen und zur Wahlgeschichte des Deutschen Reiches, 1871-1918, Düsseldorf, 1986. 
39 Wahl, Alfred, `Les historiens allemands et ('Alsace', in Saisons d'Alsace, no. 128, ete 1995, pp. 117- 
122. 
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1933 consulted only the Archives departementales du Bas-Rhin situated in Strasbourg, 
despite the fact that a disproportionate number of Elsaß-Lothringer were forced to 
leave the Moselle compared with either of the two Alsatian departments. 40 Likewise, 
the use of secondary literature often omits a basic reference work, Roth's La Lorraine 
annexee. Similarly, Stephen Harp, in an otherwise comprehensive and useful study of 
primary education in Alsace and the Moselle, does not always highlight the differing 
experiences of the three departments involved. 4' And John E. Craig, in his Scholarship 
and Nation Building, states in his note to the reader, `The term "Alsatians", unless 
modified, refers to ... those 
from the ceded portion of Lorraine as well as to those from 
Alsace. '42 
The forth-coming and long-awaited publication of Stefan Fisch's Habilitations 
thesis, Wiedervereinigung von Fremdgewordenem which will deal exclusively with the 
constitutional and administrative integration of Alsace in the inter-war period, follows 
a more satisfactory trend in the historiography in dealing with Alsace on its own 
43 
Samuel Goodfellow4°, John E. Craig, and Paul Smith45 have all contributed to this 
trend indicating a growing recognition of the need to separate the two regions, even 
when studying the periods of German annexation, 1871-1918 and 1940-1945, when 
40 Grünewald, Irmgard, Die Elsaß-Lothringer im Reich 1918-1933: ihre Organisationen zwischen 
Integration und "Kampf um die Seele der Heimat", Frankfurt, 1984. 
41 Harp, Stephen, Learning to be loyal: primary schooling as nation building in Alsace and Lorraine, 
1850-1940, Illinois, 1998. 
42 Craig, John E., Scholarship and Nation Building. The Universities of Strasbourg and Alsatian 
Society, 1870-1939, Chicago, 1984. 
43 Fisch, Stefan, Wiedervereinigung von Fremdgewordenem Studien zur Verfassungs- und 
Verwaltungsgeschichte des Elsaß zwischen deutschem Kaiserreich und französischer 111. Republik, 
Habilitationsschrift, Munich, 1993/1994. 
44 Goodfellow, Samuel, Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine: fascisms in inter-war Alsace, 
Illinois, 1998. 
45 Smith, Paul, `The Alsatians and the Alsace-Lorraine Question in European Politics, c. 1900-1925', 
in Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, 
Volume V, Ethnic Groups in International Relations, Smith, Paul, ed., Dartmouth, 1991, pp. 59-83, 
and 'From the Reich to the Republic: Alsace, 1918-1925', in France: Nation and Regions, Kelly, M. 
and Böck, R., eds., Southampton, 1993, pp. 182-189. 
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the two merged into one. In fact, in the current climate of research into national 
identity, borderlands, and European regionalism, Alsace is enjoying celebrity status at 
many conferences and in certain journals. The region undoubtedly provides a very 
convenient focus for a case-study of subjects such as identity, culture, language, and 
education. But what of the Moselle? Surely their shared history qualifies the territory 
for a share of the limelight? Is the comparative lack of interest in the Moselle simply a 
reflection of its inferiority both in terms of land mass and population? Or is it merely 
that the Moselle's history has been deemed less dramatic and less easily circumscribed 
than that of its neighbour? What will become apparent in the following chapters, is 
that the Moselle does indeed deserve a place alongside the better-known Alsace. The 
Moselle's history is the site of a distinctive history, by no means identical with that of 
Alsace, yet just as ambiguous, just as complicated, and just as problematic. 
In 1986, the Archives departementales de la Moselle published its repertoire 
numerique de la serie M which contains documents concerning administration and the 
economy, 1918 to 1940, and included an excellent orientation bibliographique for the 
inter-war period. 46 The authors are quick to point out that whilst the period 1800 to 
1870 has received the attention of the historian Henry Contamine in his Metz et la 
Moselle de 1814, i 1870,4' and in the same way, the period of annexation has been ably 
covered by Francois Roth's La Lorraine annexee (1870-1918), `il n'en est pas de 
meme pour la periode suivante de 1918 ä 1940' 48 Although these comments were 
made in 1986, the situation has altered little in the intervening years. Existing literature 
includes a number of general works on the region and its history, including those by 
46 Hiegel, Charles, and Colnat, Jean, Repertoire numerique de la serie M (Administration generale et 
Economie du departement), 2eme section: 1918-1940, Metz, 1986, pp. 15-26. 
47 Contamine, Henry, Metz et la Moselle de 1814 ä 1870,2 vols., Nancy, 1932. 
48 Hiegel, Repertoire numerique de la serie M, p. 15. 
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Claude Gerard, 49 Francois-Yves Le Moigne, S° Jean-Claude Bonnefont, 51 as well as 
Francois Roth's more recent compilation of the modern and contemporary editions of 
the Encyclopedie illustree de la Lorraine. 52 Although all of these authors touch on the 
inter-war period at one stage or another, the research is seldom in-depth or 
comprehensive and most do not provide references to their primary or secondary 
sources. Equally, most of these general surveys cover all four departments of 
Lorraine, thereby limiting even further the coverage of the Moselle's inter-war 
experience. 
If the general surveys tend to pay too little attention to the inter-war period, the 
specialised literature provides only a partial corrective. It tends to focus on specific 
topics or places, again, merely touching on events following the 1918 armistice. For 
example, industrialisation and the workforce of the region have been capably addressed 
by authors such as Claude Precheur, 53 Adrien Printz, 54 and Serge Bonnet, 
55 and more 
recently by Pierre Schill, 56 Piero-Dominique Galloro, 57 as well as Francois Baudin's58 
three volumes on Lorraine's economic and social history. Equally, the University of 
the Saarland's historians have been responsible for an ambitious programme on 
urbanism in the frontier regions of France, Germany, and Luxembourg. This 
impressive project has produced numerous publications under the direction of Rainer 
49 Gerard, Claude, La Lorraine contemporaine de 1870 a 1970, Wettolsheim, 1977. 
50 Le Moigne, Francois-Yves, Histoire de Metz, Toulouse, 1986. 
51 Bonnefont, Jean-Claude, La Lorraine, Paris, 1984. 
52 Roth, Francois, Encyclopedie illustree de la Lorraine. L'epoque contemporaine, 2 vols., Metz, 
1992 and 1994. 
53 Precheur, Claude, La Lorraine siderurgique, Paris, 1959. 
54 Printz, Adrien, Les immigres, Hayange, 1970. Also, Printz, Adrien, La vallee usinie re, Florange, 
1985. 
ss Bonnet, Serge, L'homme du fer. Mineurs defer et ouvriers siderurgistes lorrains, 1889-1930, 
Metz, 1975. 
56 Schill, Pierre, `Le mouvement ouvrier dans les mines de charbon de Moselle au lendemain de la 
Grande Guerre (1918-1919)', in Cahiers Lorrain, No. 2,1999. 
57 Galloro, Piero-Dominique, Ouvriers dufer, princes du vent. Les flux de main-d'oeuvre dans la 
siderurgie lorraine (1880-1940), Metz, October 1999. 
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Hudemann and Rolf Wittembrock, including Stadtwicklung im deutsch französisch- 
luxemburgischen Grenzraum (19 und 20 Jahrhundert). 59 One of the project's 
collaborators, Annette Maas60 has also worked on monuments and commemoration of 
the war dead in the Moselle, an interest shared with William Kidd61 whose most recent 
research is soon to be published. More localised studies feature prominently in the 
literature including works by Pierre Brasme62 on the town of Woippy and Francois 
Reite163 on Montigny-16s-Metz, whilst Metz itself has attracted considerable attention 
with works by authors such as Francois-Yves Le Moigne. 64 Often, however, many of 
these studies still show evidence that Roth's `cliches deformants' exist for the inter-war 
period just as they did for the period of annexation, as authors shy away from a head 
on confrontation with the 1920s patriotic version of events. 
Other, collaborative publications, such as Le Moigne's Protestants, Messins et 
Mosellans XVIe-XXe siecles65 contain useful and relevant articles. Among others who 
focus on events in the inter-war period, Chantal Metzger has written about the 
relationship between autonomists in the Moselle and Alsace. 66 However, despite 
evidence of an abundance of local interest and of ongoing research, there is no 
58 Baudin, Francois, Histoire economique et sociale de la Lorraine, 3 vols., Metz, 1992-1997. 
59 Hudemann, Rainer, and Wittembrock, Rolf, Stadtentwicklung im deutsch französisch- 
luxemburgischen Grenzraum (19. und 20. Jahrhundert), Saarbrücken, 1991. According to Wahl, 
Wittenbrock is the only German historian to have taken `une position distanciee et neutre' in his 
dissertation on town planning, published in 1989. 
60 Maas, Annette, `Zeitenwende in Elsaß-Lothringen. Denkmalstürze und Umdeutung nationaler 
Erinnerungslandschaft in Metz (Nov. 1918-1922)', in Winfried Speitkamp ed., Denkmalsturz, 
Göttingen, 1997. See also, Maas, Annette, `Les monuments aux morts de la guerre franco-allemande 
autour de Metz (1870/1871-1914/1918)' in Annales de fest, No. 4,1991, pp. 303-306. This article 
provides a summary of Maas' masters thesis. 
61 Kidd, William, 'War, Memory and Commemoration of War in Lorraine, 1908-1988', in War and 
Memory in Twentieth-century Europe, Evans, Martin, and Lunn, Ken, eds., Oxford, 1997, pp. 143- 
159. 
62 Brasme, Pierre, Woippy, 1871 b nos fours, Metz, 1994. 
63 Reitel, Francois, and Arz, Lucien, Montigny-les-Metz, Metz, 1988. 
64 Le Moigne, Histoire de Metz. 
65 Le Moigne, Francois-Yves, (ed. ), Protestants, Messins et Mosellans XVIe-XXe siecles, Metz, 1988. 
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indication that a sequel to Roth's highly successful thesis, La Lorraine annexee, is on 
its way, either under his or anyone else's authorship. Various doctoral and masters 
(maitrise) theses have pointed the way to the gap in the historiography, such as Gerard 
Diwo's work on communism in the Moselle between 1925 and 1932,67 Thibault 
Charmetant's research into the departure of thousands of Germans from the region at 
the end of the First World War, 68 and Chantal Thiebault's study of the Moselle in the 
context of Lorrainer politics, 1919-1929.69 Whilst all of these works can be read to 
advantage by the student of the Moselle's inter-war history, none has set out to 
provide a comprehensive, critical, and thorough account of the region's return to 
French sovereignty. 0A variety of reasons can account for this. Certain primary 
sources for the inter-war period were, until more recently, unavailable due to the 50 
year rule making the distant period of annexation a more obvious choice. Equally, the 
absence from the departmental archives of certain key documents from the papers of 
the prefect's office, including those which dealt with the period of integration between 
1919 and 1925, will have undoubtedly diverted some researchers from the task. " 
More important than the problems of the availability of primary source material, is, 
however, the nature of the history itself in accounting for the historiographical gap, as 
the inter-war period in the Moselle's history contains certain aspects with which many 
66 Metzger, Chantal, `Relations entre autonomistes lorrains et alsaciens de 1919 ä 1932', in Actes du 
103e Congres National des Societes Savantes Nancy-Metz, 1978, Section d'histoire moderne et 
contemporaine, Tome II. La Lorraine de 1610 ä nos fours, Paris, 1979. 
67 Diwo, Gerard, Le communisme en Moselle (1925-1932) a travers les elections legislatives d'avril 
1928 et de mai 1932, masters thesis, Metz, 1982-83. 
68 Charmetant, Thibault, Expulsions et rapatriements d'Allemands de la Lorraine 'desannexee' 1918- 
1921, masters thesis, Metz, 1996. 
69 Thiebault, Chantal, La Moselle dans le contexte politique lorrain de 1919 a 1929, PhD thesis, 
Paris, 1977. 
70 Joseph Rohr, a school teacher from the Moselle, has compiled a book of Notes et Documents 
concerning the Moselle, 1918 to 1946. His work is heavily reliant on Rosse et al. and, although 
interesting, contains some errors and few references to source material. Rohr, Joseph, La Lorraine 
Mosellane, 1918-1946, Sarreguemines, 1975. 
71 See section on sources later in this chapter, pp. 26-35. 
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members of the indigenous population, especially among the older generations, have 
had great difficulty dealing. These aspects are dealt with in the following chapters of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, the success and quality of foreign language literature 
published to date suggests that a `vue de 1'etranger' is a useful and valuable starting 
point for dismantling the myths and gathering together the primary sources for this 
subject and period. 
Scope of chapters 
This thesis addresses the years 1918 to 1925, rather than the entire inter-war period, 
because this period covers the lifetime of the provisional administrative body, the 
commissariat general, which functioned in place of the prefecture and was set up 
specifically to deal with the integration of Alsace and the Moselle into France. Indeed, 
it was largely during these years that the major difficulties of integrating the Moselle 
emerged. This was not strictly the case in Alsace, which experienced political turmoil 
well into the late 1920s as its autonomist movement clashed with the French 
authorities, and again in the 1930s as certain autonomist groups and leaders turned to 
the German National Socialists for support. 72 This and the many other differences and 
contrasts between the Moselle and Alsace are explored in chapter two, as well as the 
nature of the relationship the Moselle had with the rest of Lorraine, notably the 
department of the Meurthe-et-Moselle, Luxembourg, and the Saarland, all countries 
and regions which share borders with the Moselle. 
Although there is no strictly chronological structure, chapter three is devoted 
to the crucial days and weeks which surrounded the armistice in November 1918: the 
impact of the German Revolution upon the Moselle; the departure of the German 
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army; the arrival of French troops; the reaction of the region's inhabitants around 
whom these events of national significance unfolded. 3 Thereafter, chapters follow a 
more thematic structuring. Chapter four, `Administration and the malaise lorrain', 
defines the short-term and long-term administrative forms put in place to deal with 
integration of the Moselle into France in the context of post-war difficulties 
experienced throughout Europe. Whilst this process was, in many ways, highly 
successful, with most aspects of the region's administration controlled by Paris by 
1924, the key issues of education, language, religion, and certain legislative questions, 
caused so much dissatisfaction among the population that major shifts in government 
policy became necessary in order to resolve the situation. Chapter four, therefore, 
contains an assessment of how and why these shifts occurred and the way in which 
dissatisfaction manifested itself in the malaise lorrain. 
Such criticisms of French policy also extended to the treatment of German 
immigrants living in the regions at the end of the war. Chapter five examines the 
manner in which the French authorities set about dealing with these `foreigners' and 
seeks to identify the formation and execution of a policy designed to remove them 
from the region. For the historian, this is the most sensitive issue of the period, and 
one which few have hitherto examined in any detail. 74 By way of contrast, chapter six 
provides a micro-study of the lives of a small community of indigenes, individuals who 
were native to the region and therefore able to remain following the armistice. The 
72 See Goodfellow, Between the swastika and the cross of Lorraine. 
73 An earlier draft of chapter three has been published under the title, Scott-Grohmann, Carolyn, 
'Cause for Celebration? The return of annexed Lorraine to France, 1918', in Studia Historica 
Nitriensia VII, 1998, pp. 233-255. 
74 Pierre Brasme's research on the subject was originally published in 1991 in a journal with a 
remarkably small readership in the Moselle or Alsace and has seldom been referred to in subsequent 
publications on related periods or subjects. Brasme, Pierre, 'Expulsions et rapatriements d'Allemands 
de Moselle au lendemain de la Premiere Guerre Mondiale (1918-1921), in Bulletin de liaison de 
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principal source used in this chapter is the diary of a young woman, a document which 
covers the period from the end of the war up to the suppression of the commissariat 
general in 1925. 
Chapter seven, whilst principally concerned with the problems of economic 
integration of the Moselle into France, also looks at the industrial and mining 
workforce and the mass of immigrant labour working alongside indigenes. This 
chapter also charts the rise of the malaise economique which ran parallel to a social, 
administrative, and, some would say, psychological malaise which afflicted the 
region's populations in the aftermath of a return to French sovereignty. The extent to 
which this trail of unease and dissatisfaction was carried into the political arena is the 
basis for the final chapter of the thesis. This provides an attempt to understand the 
population's reaction to, and accommodation of, French rule in the Moselle region 
through voting patterns, political movements, and the emergence of new political 
parties. 
Running through all chapters, are themes relating to broader issues, such as the 
complex questions of identity and sentiment among the Moselle's population. The 
fluidity of identity and the difficulty in pinning down a definition of an identite 
mosellane quickly become apparent, especially in chapter two. In the Moselle's case, 
fragmentation of the population is evident where language, religion, class, and ethnicity 
are concerned. Urban, rural, and industrial divisions compound the problem. And then 
there is the artificial union with Alsace to address, as well as the difficulty of building 
the greater identity of Lorraine, so abruptly dismantled by the Treaty of Frankfurt in 
1'association nationale du souvenir de la bataille de Verdun et de la sauvegarde de ses haut lieux 
(A. N. S. B. V. ), No. 18,1991, pp. 53-59. (Copy held in the ADM, pages numbered pp. 1-23). 
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1871. National, and even regional, identity, perhaps as a consequence, lie unevenly 
over these divisions in the Moselle's case. 
A further recurring theme is the centre versus periphery debate: the authority of 
the nation state exercised through its capital city in all decision-making processes, 
versus regional autonomy over specific affairs. For France in particular, the Third 
Republic's policy of centralisation was a source of immediate conflict as the regions 
were suddenly faced with forfeiting the degree of regional autonomy which they had 
struggled to retrieve and retain under German rule. How this affected the population's 
perceptions of its new centre and, in turn, how peripheral demands impinged on the 
sensibilities of the French authorities, is returned to repeatedly in this thesis. Yet 
perhaps the most fundamental theme of the whole integration process, is that of 
expectation. Historians have long debated the successes and failures of Germanisation 
in these provinces, attempting to assess the extent to which Alsace-Lorrainers, Elsaß- 
Lothringer, were assimilated into the German Reich prior to 1918. Almost all the 
chapters of this thesis show that individuals, organisations, companies, and even 
political parties, all function according to that which they anticipate will happen, rather 
than according to what they may wish will happen. This thesis shows how expectation 
is interwoven into almost all decision-making processes, into the development of 
sentiment, into the extent of acceptance of the status quo, as well as the lengths to 
which individuals will go in order to change the status quo. 
Finally, this thesis aims to address not only the official, administrative, and 
constitutional implications of integrating and reintegrating the Moselle into France, but 
also the implications of these events as they affected the individual inhabitants of the 
region: women, as well as men; German immigrants, as well as indigenes; Francais de 
l'interieur as well as immigrant workers. And within these groups, are sub-groups: 
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Catholics, Protestants, and Jews; rural, urban, and industrial populations; Francophone 
and Germanophone indigenes; communists, republicans, and particularistes, and so 
on. The available sources for this period are by no means complete thereby inhibiting 
anything more than a sampling of these groups and their experiences. Nonetheless, this 
thesis seeks to draw on as wide a range of documentary evidence as possible. 
Primary sources 
The principal body of primary sources used in this thesis are those which relate to the 
civil and military administrations of the Moselle and Alsace in the early inter-war 
period. Papers from the various archives mentioned below include correspondence 
between civil servants, the military, and the general public, and a wide variety of 
reports, surveys, lists, as well as police reports. In the early stages, the military 
authorities were heavily involved in running the regions and their presence in 1918 and 
1919 is evident throughout the documentation. Municipal, regional, and national 
archives have all been consulted, the most important of which have been the Archives 
departementales de la Moselle. They house various relevant series, notably the M 
series, which covers general administration and the economy of the department, 1918 
to 1940, including collections of documents from the various divisions of the 
prefecture de la Moselle. However, at the beginning of the Second World War, the 
archive itself was caught up in the drama of historical events in the Moselle. It had 
been decided by the French authorities, that in the event of a German occupation of 
Metz, all papers belonging to the prefect's office (dating from 1918) should be 
destroyed. And so, in the summer of 1940, as the German army advanced on Metz, 
the order was given to begin burning these papers, a process which was only partially 
completed when the operation was brought to a halt as the Germans took control of 
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the prefecture buildings. It was later realised that the sheer quantity of the papers ear- 
marked for incineration, as well as the slowness of the incineration process, had 
prevented their complete destruction. However, the drama was by no means over. In 
May 1944, the then director of the state archives in Metz, Dr. Eugen Ewig, decided 
that parts of the M, L, and Q series, for reasons of security, should be taken from the 
archive buildings in Metz and transported to the nearby fortress at Mont Saint- 
Quentin. Once again, catastrophe struck, and the documents involved were 
systematically destroyed, this time by the German army during the American offensive 
in the area. 75 
Among the papers destroyed were the collections of papers concerning the 
prefect's office (initially the commissaire de la Republique 's office) for the department 
of the Moselle, documents which would undoubtedly have contained an invaluable 
record of the integration process of the Moselle into France. In general, though, not as 
much was destroyed as was originally thought, and the numerous documents, which 
can be accessed today in the M series, are testimony to their survival. Despite this, it 
seems many historians may have decided that the Moselle's archives were incomplete 
and have preferred to look at what is more readily available in Strasbourg. Those who 
have done so, will have overlooked the voluminous Z series, Fonds des sous- 
prefectures for the period 1918-1940 in the ADM, extensively used in this research. 
Both Thionville and Metz-Campagne are particularly rich in documentation, but all 
dossiers contain numerous reports from the arrondissements around the department 
concerning, among other things, public morale, mining and industry, as well as political 
reports, notably on communist and socialist meetings and public disorder. The Tp 
series contains valuable documents on the press, reporting on individual newspapers, 
s Details of this account are to be found in Hiegel, Repertoire numerique de la serie M, pp. 3-10. 
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journalists, and editors, as well as the handling by all newspapers of crises and key 
issues. Also in the Tp series is documentation from the service de propagande which 
dealt with the distribution of patriotic French material in schools, including postcards 
and photographs of French wartime heroes such as Marshal Philippe Petain and 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch. Private papers in the J series, an excellent newspaper archive 
(sous-series 6T and 7T), as well as numerous contemporary publications and printed 
primary sources, including the census results from 1910 (under German 
administration), 1921, and 1926 (under French administration), all complement the 
official, administrative papers and have been used extensively below. 76 Naturally, all 
archival dossiers have been subjected to the sifting and discarding process which all 
archives are obliged to operate due to the limitations of space. However, despite this, 
primary source material consulted in the ADM for this thesis has gone a long way to 
providing a clear picture of events in the 1918-1925 period. 
A survey of material held in municipal archives around the region produced 
useful, if somewhat limited, results. As with the ADM, such archives house 
documentation relating to administrative matters: municipal councils, the sous-pre, fet's 
office, and correspondence with the commissaire and prefect in Metz. However, in St. 
Avoid, for example, material gathered for a recent exhibition commemorating the 1918 
armistice includes eye-witness accounts of the final days of German rule in the town, 
the arrival of French troops a few days later, speeches made at ceremonies held in 
honour of the end of the war, and memories of the first contact with the new French 
authorities. Much of the material held in these municipal archives for the inter-war 
period has not yet been catalogued. There are three reasons for this: limited resources 
76 Printed primary source material has also been obtained from the Section des Alsatiques in the 
Bibliotheque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg. 
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at the municipal level; complexities created by the cataloguing of material dating from 
the German era, (1870-1918)"; and a lack of demand from historians for material on 
the inter-war period compared to the preceding period, as has been indicated in the 
review of the relevant literature above. 
Although the combination of documentation found in the ADM and the 
region's municipal archives provides the bulk of the source material for this thesis, the 
Archives departementales du Bas-Rhin (ADBR) in Strasbourg are home to an 
indispensable source of information for the study of the Moselle. The administrative 
structure, the commissariat general was put in place in March 1919 and sustained the 
Reichsland formula of governing the three departments from Strasbourg with an haut 
commissaire in charge of three departmental commissaires generaux. Of roughly 80 
metres of shelf space devoted to this collection concerning the three departments under 
German and French rule, a significant number of dossiers include material relating 
directly to the Moselle, such as weekly reports on the mosellan press. Reports by both 
the civilian and military authorities on the department in general and documents which 
include sections on economic, industrial, and mining problems, as well as social, 
political, and administrative issues, help to give an overview of the administration's 
impression of how integration was progressing, as well as the haphazard manner in 
which policies were created or adapted as situations developed. Equally, interest in the 
surrounding border regions of the Saarland and Luxembourg feature regularly in 
correspondence. 
The national archives in Paris, CARAN, hold various collections of documents 
in its sub-series, AJ 30, which are of crucial importance for research on this period and 
"This material is almost exclusively in German which has caused some problems for French 
archivists, making the task of sifting and cataloguing more time-consuming. 
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topic, including papers concerning the Service general d'Alsace-Lorraine, an 
administrative body which answered to the President du Conseil and which was 
created 15 September 1918. Again, reports from the departmental commissaires 
generaux and later from the prefect, are of special interest. Papers belonging to 
Alexandre Millerand78, commissaire general in 1919, are also to be found at the 
national archives (470 AP 46), along with documentation concerning the industrial and 
political de Wendel family. In the F7 series, useful police reports from the Moselle and 
Alsace augment primary sources. 
A particularly rewarding archive is that of the Armee de terre at the Chateau de 
Vincennes in Paris. Not only does it contain numerous files specifically concerning the 
military administration of the Moselle and Alsace between 1918 and 1919, but the 16N 
series contains reports of the contrble postal set up on 25 November 1918 in Metz. 
Clearly, such a source is problematic. The reports were written by French officers, 
most of whom relied heavily upon translators in order to understand letters written in 
German. Their interpretations of the contents of letters were, inevitably, highly 
subjective, and, the existence of a contröle postal appears to have been public 
knowledge. Assessing how many of their authors truly `spoke from the heart', is 
almost impossible. Yet, despite this, the reports remain useful to the historian as a 
means of measuring reaction to the new regime in the absence of many alternative 
sources. 
Material from another public archive and also prepared by civil servants, was 
used in the research for this thesis, again as a means of gaining an overview of the 
progress of integration of the provinces into France. The British Foreign Office papers 
78 Alexandre Millerand was Minister for War from 1914 to 1915. He became commissaire general of 
Alsace and Lorraine in 1919 but left the post becoming Prime Minister of France in 1920 and then 
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held in the Public Record Office (PRO) in London contain a good selection of the 
weekly and monthly reports compiled in Paris during this period and later in 
Strasbourg following the creation of a British consulate there in the early 1920s. 
Generally, the Foreign Office reports provide an alternative general survey of the 
situation, their authors often sensitive to such issues as the differences between the 
Moselle and Alsace, and more sympathetic than their French counterparts to the plight 
of Germans living in the regions. The purpose of these reports was to monitor the 
economic, social, and political situation in the provinces which lay at the centre of one 
of Europe's more turbulent areas in the post-war era, but with an eye firmly on the 
opportunities for British trade in the area. As such, these reports have been of much 
use. 
The sources mentioned above, authored largely, although by no means 
exclusively, by French, as well as British, civil servants, provide the broad basis of 
primary source material consulted in this study. They do not, by any means, constitute 
an exhaustive list of documents which could be considered relevant to the broad topics 
of the thesis. German archives, for example in Bonn, Frankfurt, and Koblenz, contain 
documents relating to those German immigrants who left the provinces in the early 
years of French sovereignty. These refugees formed support groups and organisations 
in towns and cities around Germany. 79 And the Quai d'Orsay in Paris, home to the 
French Foreign Ministry papers, contains records of the Conference d'Alsace- 
Lorraine, 80 set up during the war in order to debate the manner of integrating 
assimilating the provinces into France. However, time and word limits have obliged 
the author to make certain sacrifices and to draw certain boundaries. For example, 
President of the Republic between 1920 and 1924. 
79 See Grünewald, Die Elsaß-Lothringer im Reich. 
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although the expulsion and voluntary repatriation of German immigrants from the 
region is examined in chapter five, there is no attempt to document the difficulties 
these individuals and families experienced as they attempted to rebuild their lives in 
Germany. Likewise, although wartime preparations by France for its reunion with its 
`lost children' are of great importance in understanding the early approach to 
integration, it is largely the final conclusions of these preparations which are examined 
here, rather than the lengthy discussions and debates themselves. This said, three other 
primary sources have been used to help balance the methodology of this thesis. The 
first is the remarkable collection held in a private archive, the Espace Archives Usinor, 
housed in the former administrative buildings of the de Wendel company at Seremange 
near Thionville. Its resources include valuable documents concerning industry and 
mining in the region. For example, complete dossiers of comptes rendus, produced by 
the Comite des forges for the inter-war period, sum up methods of production and 
output and make comparisons with pre-war production under German management. 
Also to be found are reports on the morale of the workforce, information on the nature 
and extent of strike action, personnel registers, and records of workers' clubs and 
societies. These resources are referred to in chapter seven which deals with the 
Moselle's economy. 
The second additional source worth highlighting, is the region's press. 
Complete collections of almost all newspapers published during this period are held in 
both the ADM and the municipal Mediatheque in Metz81 and a comprehensive study of 
the Moselle's press, 1860 to 1940, is to be found in Francois Roth's Le temps des 
B0 See also Ministere des Affaires Etrangers, Serie Z, Europe, France, Alsace et Lorraine, 1918-1929. 
81 Collections in the Mediatheque in Metz complement the ADM and University of Metz library with 
an excellent collection of journals, reviews, newspapers, as well as primary and secondary literature 
relevant to the historian. 
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journaux. 82 Strict control of the press, rather than censorship, was applied to the 
region's newspapers from November 1918 until autumn 1919. Editors were obliged, 
on a daily basis, to submit their copy for appraisal by the authorities. Sometimes, 
certain topics were banned altogether. For example, in March 1918, any advice on 
profiting from the exchange of currencies was forbidden, and in August 1919, all 
mention of federalism or autonomism was banned. Newspapers which disobeyed these 
orders were threatened with suspension. Although control of the press was eventually 
lifted, the French authorities still retained control over foreign newspapers, particularly 
those printed in a foreign language, which, of course, included German. This meant 
that almost half the newspapers read in the Moselle were still subject to the scrutiny of 
the new French regime during the 1918 to 1925 period. Inevitably, this process had an 
important impact on the content of newspapers, making it harder to judge the extent to 
which they accurately reflect opinion in the Moselle in the first few years of French 
rule. Despite this, the press has still been used in the course of this study, although, at 
times, it is the treatment of newspapers and their editors which is more revealing, 
rather than their actual content. 
The final primary source used in this thesis is the unpublished diary of a young 
woman, referred to here as K. The diary is used along with documents and 
photographs belonging to her family. 83 The diary is analysed in chapter six where it is 
treated as a very specific case-study of how integration affected one family, offering a 
12 Roth, Francois, Le temps des journaux, presse et cultures nationales en Lorraine mosellane, 1860- 
1940, Metz-Nancy, 1983. 
83 K's diary is certainly not the only form of memoir or personnal account, published or unpublished, 
to be found on the inter-war period. Published memoires, diaries, as well as autobiographical fiction, 
have been used thoughout this thesis. Ernst-Moritz Mungenast and Maurice Barres fall into the latter 
category. However, unlike so many others, K's diary was not written for posterity but purely as a 
personal record of family events and occurances. Local historians are often in the best position to find 
and to benefit from such invaluable documents. Other sources have been referred to here, for 
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glimpse of ordinary life in amongst the official and semi-official documentation referred 
to elsewhere in the thesis. Of equal importance is the fact that this diary gives a rare 
chance to examine the experiences of a woman in a subject which is otherwise 
furnished with sources written by and about men. Some form of oral history might 
have been useful in overcoming this problem whilst allowing an assessment of 
individuals' experiences rather than those of communities or of the population as a 
whole. However, any eyewitness accounts gathered now, more than eighty years after 
the armistice, from the few remaining survivors of the period, are likely to be highly 
unreliable, firstly due to the problems of memory and, secondly, due to the difficulty of 
separating memories of the First World War from those of the Second. And even if 
the memories are clear, the effect upon individuals' attitudes of the period of 
Nazification in the Moselle and Alsace, cannot simply be peeled away. The daily 
entries in the diary give the author's almost instantaneous response to events. Like 
oral history, though, the diary itself is still problematic. The original, hand-written 
diary remains in the possession of the author's sister who has asked for the family to 
remain anonymous, thereby limiting verification of material used here. The diary's 
author, as a member of the Francophone, Francophile community within the Moselle, 
provides only one perspective of events whilst the Germanophone community's 
experience remains more difficult to gauge. Nonetheless, the diary has proved rich in 
other respects, not least in depicting the struggle of everyday life during the war and in 
demonstrating the efforts of small communities to retrieve stability and security in the 
midst of the social, political, and economic upheaval which continued throughout the 
example, Ernst-Moritz Mungenast's novels which can be read as a form of autobiographical fiction 
(see chapter five). 
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inter-war period. The judgement here is that difficulties associated with this diary are 
clearly outweighed by its very great benefits to the historian. 
Concluding remarks 
Problems with the nature and availability of primary sources for the inter-war period 
have, perhaps, been responsible for the very obvious gap in the historiography explored 
above. Likewise, the comparative wealth and continuity of sources available for 
Alsace make Alsatian history a far simpler, and perhaps more appealing, proposition 
for prospective scholars. Yet, as the following chapter shows, there are good reasons 
for enduring these methodological inconveniences. This study seeks, therefore, to 
open the debate on the Moselle's inter-war history as a way of broadening 
understanding of how populations, communities, and individuals behave in situations 
which are not always of their own making. 
Chapter II 
The Moselle 
in Regional Context 
One of the most striking features of the Moselle, apart from its heavy industrial skyline 
juxtaposed with rich rural landscapes and vast forests, is the number of countries and 
regions it bordcrs. To the north, lie Luxembourg and Germany's Saarland. To the 
cast, the Mosclie's arrondissements of Sarrcgucmines, Forbach, Chateau Salins, and 
Sarrcbourg all border Bas-Rhin, the northern department of Alsace. And to the south, 
the Moselle meets the hicurthe-et-Mosclle and the rest of Lorraine. Belgium is only a 
matter of kilometres from Audun-le-Tiche which lies on the most westerly tip of the 
department. Long before the days of the European Union with parliaments in Brussels, 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg, connected by autoroutes and autobahnen, the Moselle 
lay at the crossroads of Europe. Robcrt Schuman, one of the founding fathers of a 
united Europe, born in Luxembourg in 1886, was nonetheless considered to be a 
'Lorrain dc bonne souchc' because his father was originally from Evrange in the 
Mosclic. ' His mothcr. on the other hand, was from Luxembourg, but had been 
brought up in Alsacc. As a child, Schuman spokc throe languages: Luxembourgish, 
French, and German. Ile died in 1963 at Scy-Chazelles just outside Metz, in the 
region he considered home. His life provides an intriguing case-study of the influence 
of the border in shaping and influencing opportunitics, attitudes and identity. Similarly, 
it was the relationship of the Moscllc's population with these next door neighbours 
1 Tr bout dc hlcurmbcrt. IIcnri. llomnus illustres de Lorraine. Colmar, 1982. 
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which was to play the most crucial part in the inter-war development of its identity. 2 
This chapter assesses these relationships and asks what distinguished the Moselle from 
its neighbours in terms of historical experiences, economic factors, demographic 
patterns, and cultural distinctions. It also examines the common interests shared by 
these regions and the impact such links were to have on the formation of an idenrite 
mosellau. 
Lejoug alsacien 
Upon arriving in Alsace in 1789, the Englishman Arthur Young remarked, 'I found 
myself to all appearance veritably in Germany ... here not one person in a hundred has 
a word of French. ' Ile went on to describe how striking it was 'to cross a great range 
of mountains (the Vosges); to enter a level plain, inhabited by a people totally distinct 
and diffcrent from France, with manners, language, ideas, prejudices, and habits all 
different. " Young's impressions at the time of the French Revolution, neatly sum up 
the dramatic differences between the populations either side of the Vosges mountains. 
By 187 1, thcsc diffcrcnccs had hardly altered and annexation of Alsace by Germany 
was, on a supcrficial lcvcl at least, easy to explain. What was less easy to justify, was 
the uniting of this culturally distinct rcgion with part of Lorraine thereby creating one 
rcgion, the Reiciuland EI aß-Lothringen. Bismarck's linguistic and military grounds 
for extending annexation beyond Alsacc were logical enough. However, few could 
havc imagincd the cxtcnt of the mutual distrust, dissatisfaction, and friction which was 
to develop between the inhabitants of these neighbouring regions over the following 
_ This thesis tkics not sock to enter the broader debate on regionalism and regional identity in France 
during the inter-war period. I Iowcvcr, the Moscllc's particular brand of regional diversification will 
hopefully scr`-c ai an extreme and unusual case. 
'Young. Arthut. rmºYls in France during the Years 1787,178S. and 1789, Cambridge, 1979. p. 180. 
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half century. In 1920, the French language newspaper, Le Asessin, defined, in no 
uncertain tcrnu, the antagonism created by this unnatural cohabitation, prescribed by 
the Treaty of Frankfurt. 411 n'y a pas d'Alsacc-Lorraine; ce mot n'existe que Bans le 
trait6 de Franctort. 11 ya une Alsace et une Lorraine, deux pays aussi dissemblables 
quc la Bretagne et le Languedoc... '. 4 Alexander Hohenlohe-Schillingsftirst also noted 
in his memoirs. "L'Alsacicn-Lorrain' itait une entite qui n'existait que sur le papier... 
Le soul lien qui Ics unissait Etait artiticicl'. ` 
The differences which sct thcsc two peoples apart are numerous. 
Geographically, Alsace lies almost entirely between the Vosges mountains to the west 
and the Rhine rivcr to the cast. These natural frontiers have provided the region with a 
degree of stability over more recent centuries of the kind woefully lacking in Lorraine, 
which has relied on the politics of nation states, rather than nature, to define its 
boundaries. The linguistic frontier winds its way through the Vosges mountains, 
corresponding somewhat to the western boundary of Alsace, allowing the bulk of the 
Alsatian population to fall on the Gcrmanophone side. " However, this same frontier 
continues into the Moselle, dividing it almost equally in two, cutting up to the south of 
Sarrebourg. to the north of Chateau Salins, climbing steeply to the south of Thionville, 
and then on up into Luxembourg. In 1910, following nearly forty years of linguistic 
' Quoted in the Uulletin de presse Alsacienne, I April 1920, ADBR 121 AL 162. 
` Quoted in Roth. La Lorraine annexee. p. 677. Alexander I tohcnlohe-Schillingsfürst was a German 
politician and civil servant and was the son of Prince Clovis von Ilohcnlohe-Schillingsfürst, 
Statthalter of AIxacc-Lorraine. I US to 1894. 
6 See map 1. p i't. Those on the Germanophonc side of the linguistic frontier in Alsace and Lorraine 
speak various dialects which are considered Germanic and arc sometimes referred to as 
Aluttersprache. This dote not automatically imply that they speak Flachdeutsch or High German, 
although the step frum dialect to German is. in many cases, a relatively small one. Likewise, on the 
Francophone side of the linguistic frontier, many, particularly rural populations, speak a French 
dialect. sometimes referral to as patois. During German annexation, and again during the inter-war 
period of t=rench rule. local dialects were increasingly used as a means of defying the authorities of the 
day and excluding Ger ans and french who came from 'the interior'. The strength of the Alsatian 
Germanic dialect is that it also has a written form, which is not the case for the various Alosellan 
dialects. 
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Gcrmanisation. 3.8 per cent of the population of Lower Alsace and 6.1 per cent of 
Upper Alsace still considered French to be their mother tongue, compared with 22.3 
per cent of annexed Lorraine. ' Whilst these rather bald statistics leave no space for the 
complexities and nuances of language in all three provinces, they give some indication 
of how things looked to the German authorities, who sought the establishment of the 
German language in its own right by pushing French and its dialects back to the 
political fronticr. ' 
From the earliest stages of annexation, a social hierarchy emerged in the 
provinces. Germans found their place at the top, Alsatians followed some distance 
behind. and Ataullans brought up the rear. Where Alsatians, in particular Protestants, 
were able to make progress up the career ladder in the civil service, the same could not 
be said for the largely Catholic indigenes in annexed Lorraine. Increasing numbers of 
Alsatians found themselves posted to Dietz and other towns around the region, to the 
dismay of the local inhabitants. This comparative distrust of the German authorities 
vis-A-vis Moselfans. resulted from the misgivings Germans felt towards the large 
Francophone community to be found among the populations of annexed Lorraine. 
Throughout annexation. many Germans considered language and sentiment to be one 
and the same and were therefore hostile towards those who spoke French. 9 In any 
case, only German spcakcrs wcrc able to make much progress either in the more 
advanced positions of the civil service or in other, liberal professions. The 
Gcrmanophonc xcctor of annexed Lorraine. with its preponderance of rural and 
' Figures trenn the cm us of 1910 do not reflect those who considered themselves to be bilingual, 
office de Stattsnque d'Alsoce et de Irrraine, 1921, p. 22, ADM BA 260. Any question concerning 
language and the mnthcs tongue was only included in census results from 1900 onwards so it is not 
I siblc to corn pare these figures with the initial period of annexation. See chapter four, p. 125-130. 
Sec Vogler. Remand. 11ar1oirr rulturrllr de I'Alsare. Du moyen age d nos fours. ! es Ws riches 
heurrs dune rs'tron fronttire. Strasbourg. 1994, p. 305. 
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industrial populations, could not supply large numbers of ambitious, educated 
candidates. Likewise, the Francophone sector had been largely drained of its 
intellectual and professional elites by the demographic rupture of the 1870s, with the 
result that indipcnes in Metz were unable to maintain their numerical superiority over 
the Germans. During the early stages of annexation, a whole generation of the 
Moselle's Francophone youth, on the brink of university careers at French institutions, 
were denied the opportunity because of their inability to speak German. 
Strasbourg, like Dietz, suffered as a result of the departure of its Francophone, 
professional middle classes following annexation. However, it quickly grew in stature 
as the years of German rule passed. In 1871, it had immediately become the 
administrative and political centre for the newly formed Reichsland. The French 
system of departments was replaced with three Bezirkspräsidium corresponding to 
annexed Lorraine and Lower and Upper Alsace, all led by Bezirkspräsidents who took 
the place of French prcfects. 1° Between 1871 and 1879, an Oberprasident or 
chancellor was created to preside over the affairs of the Reichsland. Under this 
system, decision-making took place both in Strasbourg and Berlin. However, changes 
brought about in 1879 meant this chancellor was replaced by a Statthalter or governor 
in Strasbourg, who presided over all three provinces. At the same time, a 
Ministerium für Clxc i-Lothringen was created in Strasbourg, thereby dispensing with 
the need to refer to Berlin and, in turn, increasing the power held in the region's 
administrative and political capital. On an economic level, Strasbourg also dominated, 
' Ibid. Scc ahoi Wahl. Alfred. and Richer Jean-Claude, L'Alsace entre France et Alleniagne. 1850- 
1930. Parts. 1991. pp 22b-227. 
10 Scc Rixh. La bi, rarne anneiot. pp. 72.75. 
" [bid. pp S9-x2 
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becoming home to the commercial and banking interests of the whole of the 
Reichsland. 
Strasbourg's favoured position as the capital of the three regions meant Metz, 
and to a lesser extent Colmar, lost much of the prestige and status they had enjoyed 
under French rule. As Lc Atoignc points out, 'C'est a Strasbourg et ä Berlin que se 
rtglcnt desonmats Ics affaires mcssincs. ' 12 Among other things, Strasbourg gained a 
prestigious new university, although Lujo Brentano, a political economist who was 
professor of political theory at universities around Europe, did comment, 'the 
university was the only institution established by the Germans that the Alsatians 
appreciated'. " Despite the fondness expressed by Kaiser Wilhelm II for annexed 
Lorraine on his numerous visits to Metz and to the chateau he acquired at Courcelles- 
Chaussy. no institution on the scale of Strasbourg's university was created there. " In 
the strained circumstances which surrounded the change in sovereignty over the 
regions. compared with Dietz and Colmar, Strasbourg looked like the cat that got the 
cream. " 
The domination of the Reichsland's capital city, whilst obviously damaging to 
1lloscllan independence, was not the sole or main reason why, by 1918, the region's 
indigenous population was ready to see le jault alsacien thrown out along with the 
German military regime. '' In all walks of life, the Moselle consistently showed signs of 
developing in very different ways from its Alsatian partners, in particular Bas-Rhin. 
't Lc Wipe. Ilürdt e do Atka. p:; 43. 
" Quoted in Craig. Scholarship and Nation Building, p. 339. 
" Roth. In Ii rrasnv unnesft, p 70. 
s Those among the indigenous populations who voiced objections to the change in sovereign did so 
not so much b«au+c they were against becoming German. but rather because of the manner in which 
the change had taken place with no consultation in the form of a plebiscite. 
" It is also worth quc tsoning the extent to which ordinary citizens were truly affected or concerned by 
such issues Sec chapter six. l Lu 01. 
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This can be seen most clearly in figures for the population in the Moselle, as the 
following tables demonstrate- 
Table 1: Total population of the Moselle, the Bas-Rhin, and the Haut-Rhin, 
1910,1921. and 1926. " 
Department 1910 1921 1926 
Moselle 655,211 
Bas-Rhin 700,938 
589,120 
651,986 
633,461 
670,985 
haut-Rhin 517,865 468,943 490,654 
Table 2: Percentage changes in total population of the Moselle, the Bas-Rhin, 
and the Iinut"Rhin, 1910.1921 and 1921.1926. 
Department 1910-1921 1921-1926 
1ltosclic -10.1 +7.5 
tins-Rhin -7.0 +2.9 
haut-Rhin -9.4 +4.6 
Results from the 1910.1921. and 1926 censuses indicate that a higher proportion of 
the Moscllc's population lived in rural, rather than urban, areas compared to the Das- 
Rhin and the flaut-Rhin. " Likcwisc, the military presence in the Moselle was 
consistently greater than in ncighbouring departments. Table 3 below highlights 
another marked difference between the regions with a higher proportion of Catholics in 
" All figurc% in the remvndcr of this chaptcr havc bccn takcn from the Annuaire Statistique. (Bas- 
Rhin. Hai -Rhin. Jtlaj4Ue). Prrrnur Volume - 1919 4 19.11. ADM, BA 863. 
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the Moscllc's population compared with cithcr of the other departments. Equally, the 
Moselle cxpcricnccd the most marked change in the percentage of Protestants within 
its population which fell from 13 per cent in 1910 to 4.8 per cent in 1926.19 
Table 3: Population of the Moselle. Bas-Rhin, and flaut-Rhin in 1910 and 1926 
according to religion as a percentage of the total population. 
Department Catholics Protestants Jews 
Moselle 1910 85.7 13.0 1.1 
1926 92.4 4.8 1.1 
Bas-Rhin 1910 61.9 35.5 2.2 
1926 61.9 28.4 2.0 
flaut-Rhin 1910 83.7 14.3 1.5 
1926 86.0 10.5 1.1 
Perhaps the most dramatic contrast can be seen in the figures for the number of 
forcigncrs in each department according to nationality and the changes which occurred 
in thcsc figures between 19 10 and 1926. As shown by table 4, the number of 
inhabitants classified as 'foreign' living in the Bas-Rhin came in 1910 to 96,505, in the 
flaut-Rhin there were 55,117, but in the Moselle, there were 208,499, accounting for 
nearly a third of the population. Amongst these foreigners were 90,696 Germans in 
Bas-Rhin. 40.238 in haut-Rhin, and 164.502 in the Moscile. These figures were all to 
fall by about 70180 pcr cent between 19 10 and 1926, as a result of the war and with 
" The urban population of Straihourg. Mulhouse, And to a lesser extent. Colmar, account for this, 
even though the tnduttnat wtwJ nrcc, which was much larger in the Mosclle compared to Alsace. was 
included in Cigurr+ tot the urban population in each region. 
" Sec chapter eight. M+ 297. %OO. for a further examination of the religious pmfile of the region. 
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the consequences of the change in sovereignty over the regions. This change was to 
have a far greater impact upon the Moselle than upon the other two regions, as it 
involved the departure of 119,603 inhabitants following the 1918 armistice, a fifth of 
the total population. 20 
Table 4: `Foreigners' living in the Moselle, Bas-Rhin, and flaut-Rhin, 1910-1926 
(percentage of total population in brackets). " 
Department 1910 1921 1926 
Moselle 208,499 (31.8) 
Ras-Rhin 96,505 (13.8) 
Ilaut"Ithin 55,317 (10.7) 
85,685 (14.5) 
24,850 (3.8) 
20,199 (4.3) 
111,049 (17.5) 
27,013 (4.0) 
26,158 (5.3) 
I Iowcvcr, dcspitc the departure of such significant numbers of Germans, a sizeable 
number remained. Table 5 indicates that this last factor had a very noticeable impact 
upon the number of marriages bctwccn indigenes and Germans in the 1920s. For 
example. in 1920, there were 1,314 such marriages in the Moselle, accounting for three 
quarters of all unions between indigenes and foreigners. 
22 In Bas-Rhin there were 807 
such marriages, whilst in Flaut-Rhin there were only 364. 
m See chapter five. passim, and chapter seven, pp. 260-271, which deal with both the departure of 
Germans and the nature of the immigrant population in the Moselle. 
" These figures include all those who were not members of the indigenous population and therefore 
include Germans who. in 1910, were not, strictly speaking. foreigners. Nonetheless, French statistical 
uhlications from the l920s refer to them as 'Etrangcrs'. ýy'` 
German men were twice as likely to marry indigenous women as German women were to marry 
indigenous men. This is largely because there were more German men living and working in the 
region during this period compared to women. 
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Table 5: Marriages between indigenes and Germans and total number of 
marriages between indiglnes and foreigners. 
Department 1920 1925 
Moselle Germans 1,314 526 
Total 1,790 895 
Bas-Rhin Germans 807 326 
Total 924 467 
haut-Rhin Germans 364 57 
Total 592 223 
Even strike action taken by workers in the different departments in the 1920s show 
that workcrx responded to different crises and different social pressures. For example, 
strike action pcakcd in the Moselle in 1923, compared with 1921 for both Alsatian 
departmcnts. 
Many of these differences affecting population figures in the Moselle and 
Alsace arisc from the divergence of industrial activities in and around the respective 
regions. The Moselle's principal industrial activities stemmed from the richness of iron 
ore and coal deposits around the region along with iron and steel foundries. Coal 
deposits form part of the basin around Forbach and Petite-Rosselle which extends into 
the Saarland. Iron ore mining to the west of the region, from Ars to the south of Metz, 
to Moycuvrc. I Iayangc. and Aumctz in the north, form part of the basin which extends 
into the hicurthc-ct-Moselle. Luxembourg, and Belgium. These abundant mineral 
deposits crcatcd links bctwccn the Moselle and the Ruhr valley, which supplied the 
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most suitable kind of coke for use in the processing of iron ore, and to Luxembourg 
and the Saarland rather than to Alsace. In fact, a successful textile industry was to 
Alsace what mining, iron, and steel industries were to the Moselle and, upon the 
region's return to France, Alsatian wool and cotton processing factories were able to 
produce nearly a quarter of the total output for the whole of France. However, the 
contrasting industrial activities of the Moselle and Alsace were to place them in entirely 
different economic contexts in the inter-war period. Equally, the impact of these 
various industries on the movement of population helped to widen the gap between the 
two regions from early annexation through to the inter-war period. Heavy industry in 
the Moselle required ever increasing numbers of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled 
workers. Indigenes from the Moselle and Alsace supplied the initial workforce and 
recruitment also began throughout Germany in the 1880s and 1890s, but demand soon 
outpaced supply and so recruitment offices were set up elsewhere, notably in Italy. 23 
The textile industry in Alsace did not have the same manpower requirements, and so 
most of its workforce was recruited from local areas. 
It was not, however, this multitude of differences and contrasts distinguishing 
the Moselle from Alsace in the eyes of these regions' inhabitants which prompted the 
French authorities to issue the following order at the end of December 1918; 
Faire disparaitre ä bref delai de touter pieces officielles 
etc... la denomination d'Alsace-Lorraine qui est 
purement allemande et n'a jamais correspondu ä aucune 
division territoriale francaise. 24 
23 See Galloro, Ouvriers dufer, princes du vent. 
24 Ordre du Sous-Secretaire d'Etat du 28 Decembre 1918, ADM 301 M 52. It proved remarkably 
difficult for this change in title to catch on. The term `Alsace-Lorraine' had been used for almost half 
a century, and it tripped off the tongue rather too easily for it to be quickly erased from everyday 
speech. In fact, the continuation of the Reichsland-style administration in Strasbourg and the 
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This order merely marked the end of the policy of Germanisation and heralded the 
beginning of its replacement, francisation, which sought to erase all symbols of 
German rule and replace them with French equivalents. This was not, therefore, an 
expression of compassion or understanding for the harassed Mosellan population. The 
Moselle still had to wait until 1925 to be free of le joug alsacien. Even as late as 
1928, Andree Viollis lamented the extent to which the Moselle had lived in the shadow 
of Alsace, 
Voici beau temps dejä que I'Alsace tient 1'affiche. 
Parfait. Mais la Lorraine? Car il existe bien une Lorraine 
desannexee. Que dit, que fait cette soeur trop discrete de 
1' Alsace? 25 
From Paris, the question d'Alsace-Lorraine looked very different. The 
preoccupations of the immediate post-war period were exercising the minds of the 
politicians: the approaching peace conference; the need for security against further 
German aggression; demobilisation of the country's soldiers; the re-establishment of a 
constant food supply; and the drive to overcome the threat of a socialist revolution. 
The concerns of the centre could only accommodate the most general of impressions 
of what was happening at the periphery. In any case, it seemed that the Moselle and 
Alsace had an abundance of common interests, not least of which was the shared 
historical experience of German annexation. Some even felt the Moselle now had 
maintenance of a statut local to this day in the provinces mean that in many situations, it has been far 
easier retaining the term rather than dropping it altogether. Likewise, as has been pointed out in the 
Notes on Usage p. iv, to refer to `Alsace and Lorraine' is ambiguous as `Lorraine' is the proper term 
for the region made up of four departments, three of which were not annexed in 1871. The solution, 
in recent times, has been to refer to the region of `Alsace-Moselle' whenever issues concerning laws 
and legislation peculiar to the three departments arise. In fact, the institute set up (in Strasbourg) to 
deal with specific legislative questions arising from the statut local is called the Institut du droit local 
alsacien-mosellan, hence the decision to refer to `the Moselle' throughout, rather than to Lorraine or 
the more clumsy, Lorraine desannexee. 
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more in common with Alsace than it did with the rest of Lorraine. Indeed, a closer 
look at the geography of the regions shows that where the Vosges mountains extend to 
the north of Alsace and into the most easterly tip of the Moselle, a small region of Bas- 
Rhin, known as Alsace bossue (the hunchback of Alsace), is separated from the rest of 
its region. This area, and its inhabitants, have historically been linked with the 
populations of the Pays Bitche and Sarregueminois. Indeed, a certain cultural, social, 
and, in some cases, political communality, between Mosellans and Alsatians of these 
areas can be easily identified, and the few pockets of autonomist activity in the Moselle 
can often be linked to the ties formed between these areas. 
For the regions as a whole, however, common interest in one particular area 
stood out from all the rest. This was the desire to see the maintenance of the 
concordatory system which Germany, in true federal style, had left intact whilst it had 
been completely dismantled elsewhere in France with the laic laws of 1905. The 
mosellan and Alsatian people demonstrated, and were proud of, their staunch 
allegiance to their religion, in particular the Catholic faith, and both populations 
expressed their outrage at the proposals of Edouard Herriot's government in 1924, 
when he attempted to bring the provinces in line with the rest of France by suppressing 
the concordat. However, as will be discussed below, the two regions reacted 
separately, united in their opposition to Herriot's plans, but choosing different ways to 
express that opposition. The same was true in the realm of politics, and the stark 
differences between the regions are once again illustrated in the emergence in the post- 
war period of different political parties in the two regions. Furthermore, the 
autonomist movement, which has attracted so much attention in political and historical 
25 Viollis, Andree, Alsace et Lorraine au-dessus des passions, Paris, 1928, p. 153. 
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research on Alsace over the years, had a far smaller impact on the Moselle as a whole 
and became yet another important factor in setting the two provinces apart. 
It may be that lejoug alsacien will never quite be lifted from the shoulders of 
the Moselle's people as long as the local statute continues to bind them together. 
Certainly, a certain unfriendliness between the provinces can still be detected today, 
illustrating the extent to which a supposedly shared history will not always bolster a 
common identity. However, difficult though it has been for the Moselle's inhabitants 
to separate themselves from Alsatian dominance, were they to find comfort and 
understanding elsewhere, for example, among their fellow Lorrain? After all, the oft 
repeated saying of the chanoine Henri Collin, `Francais hier, Allemands aujourd'hui, 
Lorrains toujours', 26 expressed the kind of spirit which had helped sustain the morale 
of many Francophile Mosellans throughout annexation. Were the two populations to 
discover that absence had indeed made the heart grow fonder, or did the Moselle and 
its erstwhile regional partners merely find they had gradually drifted apart in the 
intervening years? 
The local Derby: Metz versus Nancy 
The events of the early 1870s brought dramatic changes to the department of the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle. Following the Franco-Prussian War, peace had come at a high 
price with the loss of the region's northern districts. However, as a sense of 
permanency about annexation grew within the `lost province', so it grew in the rest of 
Lorraine over the decades which followed the signing of the Treaty of Frankfurt. The 
26 Quoted in Roth, Les Lorrain entre la France et I'Allemagne, p. 7. The chanoine Collin was one of 
the more prominent figures in the Catholic Church responsible for sustaining the memory of France in 
the Moselle during annexation. A similar saying of the time ran, 'Francais ne puis, Allemand ne 
daigne, Lorrain suis', quoted in Schillinger, Philippe, 'Metz de I'Allemagne ä la France 1918-1919', 
in Annuaire de la Societe d'Histoire et d'Archeologie de la Lorraine, Metz, 1974, pp. 123-131, p. 124. 
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population of French Lorraine gradually accustomed itself to the new geography of the 
region, its new contours, its new, more immediate border with Germany, accepting, 
almost as a kind of recompense, Nancy's new-found dominance in the north east of 
France following the elimination of both Strasbourg and Metz from the struggle for the 
title of capitale de l'est. 27 Neither Epinal nor Bar-le-Duc, the chef-lieux of the Vosges 
and the Meuse departments, posed a threat to the title. Nancy also benefited from the 
right of option granted to the inhabitants of annexed Lorraine and Alsace in 1871, as 
many opting for French nationality, especially from Metz, chose to move there, 
prompting the saying, `Metz n'est plus dans Metz mail toute ä Nancy'. 28 
In 1871, therefore, Nancy found itself at the heart of a `new' Lorraine and went 
from strength to strength. The demographic boost from annexed Lorraine revived 
demand for property, schools, and local facilities, all of which attracted further 
investment, increased employment, and generally raised the morale of the city. New 
suburbs haphazardly emerged, and diversification of the region's economy, combined 
with the benefits of gaining the rich iron ore fields previously attached to the Moselle, 
though not yet exploited, all brought new banking and commercial opportunities to the 
city. But such prosperity and optimism came at a price. The weak north eastern 
Franco-German border had lost its military buffer zone which had included Metz, one 
of the most heavily fortified towns of Europe, if not the world. The price for this was 
to be paid during the First World War with four years of trench warfare fought in and 
27 See Roth, Francois, `Metz et Nancy: le role des facteurs nationaux de 1830 ä 1930', in Le Moigne, 
Francois-Yves, ed., Urbanisme et architecture en Lorraine, 1930-1930, Metz, 1982, pp. 173-195, 
p. 189. 
28 Quoted in Le Moigne, Histoire de Metz, p. 348. 
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around the Meurthe-et-Moselle region. Overall, though, by 1914, Nancy had grown 
accustomed to its new role, prosperity, and borders. 29 
During the same period, Metz had, initially at least, been less fortunate. In the 
1870s and 1880s, it had been demographically drained, its morale broken, with the 
tutelle de Strasbourg firmly in place. However, with the arrival of large numbers of 
German immigrants, the town quickly lost its empty, forlorn atmosphere and 
improvements in the quality of life gradually filtered through. Bismarck's policies of 
modernisation of public services and facilities brought significant advances in housing 
and sanitation, and electric street lighting was also introduced. The greatest progress 
of all came in the realm of town planning. Metz had been a fortress town since the 
days of the Roman Empire. Strict laws, restricting the construction of buildings of any 
kind in close proximity to the fortress walls, set out areas known as `zones de 
servitude'. The result for the inhabitants of Metz was that living accommodation was 
cramped and outdated, with an ever increasing population occupying a limited, and 
increasingly squalid, space. The incoming Germans were, not surprisingly, quick to 
recognize the problem and plans were soon made to remove the fortress walls. 
Changes in the style of warfare allowed them to dispense with the `zones de servitude' 
and German architects and town planners were set the task of expanding the city. 30 By 
the turn of the century, work had begun dismantling the old limitations, and building 
had begun to the south of the town centre . 
31 Even if many of the city's indigenes were 
saddened by the dramatic changes to the city's skyline and the loss of a symbol of the 
region's ancient heritage, the sound basis of the proposed changes was broadly 
29 See Roth, 'Metz et Nancy: le role des facteurs nationaux de 1830 ä 1930', in Le Moigne, Urbanisme 
et architecture en Lorraine. 
30 See Reitel, Francois, `Le developpement des villes lorraines aux XIXe et XXe siecles', in Le 
Moigne, ed., Urbanisme et architecture, pp. 17-36. 
31 The fortress walls took seven years to dismantle. Work began in 1902 and was completed in 1909. 
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recognized. On the eve of war, the new, and distinctly bourgeois German quarter, was 
by no means complete. However, there was little doubt that Metz, as a town, had 
benefited immeasurably from the careful, well thought-out urban planning of the kind 
so lacking in Nancy since the destruction of its fortress walls in 1697. Furthermore, by 
1918, on the eve of the armistice, Metz was largely intact, elegant, although about to 
endure yet another demographic rupture. Fifty kilometres to the south, Nancy, on the 
other hand, lay in ruins following the bombardments of four years of war. 
The politician Paul Durand commented in 1969, `s'il ya aujourd'hui une 
Lorraine geographique, cette Lorraine n'a aucun passe historique commun'. 32 This 
lack of a common history in the region does not simply reflect the break in continuity 
caused by German annexation of the Moselle in both the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. It also reflects `une vieille rivalite' which separated Metz and Nancy and 
which had been festering long before annexation in 1871. According to Barral, 
`Chaque ville temoigne une mauvaise humeur jalouse ä 1'egard de l'autre'. In some 
cases, even the lorrain identity came under fire, as can be seen in Paul Vautrin's 
pronouncement of 1927. `Allemands? jamais! Messins, certes toujours! Lorrains, 
qu'importe, pourvu que ce soit la France! '. 
33 In the context of this rivalry, Metz rated 
itself on its military importance, its heroic past, and ironically, its role in the future 
defence of France. 34 Nancy, on the other hand, sustained its self-image as a `ville 
d'art', a cultural and intellectual haven, far from the brutality of wars and the austerity 
of fortress towns. From 1871, Nancy had, until 1918, enjoyed the growing 
concentration of administrative and political power hitherto shared with Metz and 
32 Quoted in Barral, Pierre, L'esprit lorrain: Cet accent singulier du patriotisme francais, Nancy, 
1989, p. 175. 
33 Quoted in Barral, L'esprit Lorrain, p. 174. Paul Vautrin was the mayor of Metz at this time. 
53 
Strasbourg. It is not surprising, therefore, that no amount of revanchist enthusiasm 
and joy following the successful return of annexed Lorraine and Alsace to France could 
compensate for the loss of the title capitale de fest. However, whilst Nancy could 
almost endure relinquishing the title to Strasbourg, any loss of status to Metz seemed 
intolerable. 
Nowhere is resentment more clearly stated than in an address by the conseil 
municipal of Nancy to the French government entitled `Defense des interets de Nancy' 
issued on 11 January 1919.35 The address explains the need for Nancy to safeguard its 
interests in view of the return of annexed Lorraine and Alsace to France. Whilst it was 
recognized that everything should be done to ensure the smooth integration of these 
provinces into France, the rest of Lorraine, and Nancy in particular, should not be 
made to suffer as a consequence. `Depouiller une region francaise au profit d'une 
autre, ce serait une solution bien simpliste, une politique non seulement sterile mais 
inique et nefaste, contre laquelle nous devrions protester de toutes nos forces'. Nancy 
feared, more than anything, that the French authorities might see fit to move the 
town's major institutions to Metz, `Nos Instituts, nos Facultes, nos grandes Ecoles'. 
Nancy also questioned the fairness of the proposal (in fact, merely one suggestion 
among many) to return the arrondissement of Briey to the Moselle department with its 
factories and mines, many of which had only become operational during annexation. 
`Mais qu'etait cet arrondissement il ya 45 ans, en comparaison de ce qu'il est 
aujourd'hui... Pourquoi toucher ä ce qui existe et qui fonctionne fort bien?... sous 
pretexte de rendre ä 1'ancienne Moselle des richesses qui n'ontjamais ete siennes'. It 
34 After all, Metz has repeatedly failed to prevent invading armies from the east reaching Paris. See 
Roth, Francois, `La frontiere franco-allemande, 1871-1918', in Annales de fest, no. 1,1992, pp. 35- 
52, p. 36. 
35 Chateau de Vincennes, 6N 154. 
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is hard not to feel a degree of sympathy for the inhabitants of Nancy and the Meurthe- 
et-Moselle in the light of their demotion caused by the return of the lost provinces. 
However, the authors of this address were elected councillors, safeguarding their own 
positions as much as those of the citizens of Nancy. The main question which arises, 
however, is what kind of homecoming did this provide for the Moselle? In the light of 
the bitterness and resentment expressed by the councillors of Nancy with regard to 
Metz, it is clear that reunification of the Moselle with the rest of Lorraine was to be a 
far more arduous task than many had predicted. Even Raymond Poincare's optimistic 
rallying cry in 1921 could not even begin to paper over the cracks which now set the 
Moselle and the rest of Lorraine apart, `Messins, Nanceiens, Barrisiens, Spinaliens, 
nous sommes tous Francais et tous Lorrains... Verdun a ete detruite pour Metz 
reconquis'. 36 Not everyone was convinced. 
L'espace Sar-Lor-Lux 
In 1918, the Moselle's relations with its immediate neighbours in la mere patrie were 
uneasy to say the least. But what of the ties formed during annexation with the 
remaining neighbours to the north: the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Saarland? 
How strong were these connections, what did they involve, and how would they 
develop following the Moselle's return to French rule? L'espace Sar-Lor-Lux (Region 
Saar-Lor-Lux) is the name which has gradually come into use since the Second World 
War for regions considered to be at the cross-roads of Europe, including the Saarland, 
36 Quoted in Bonnefont, Histoire de la Lorraine, p. 109. Poincard was born in Bar-le-Duc in the 
Meuse department of Lorraine in 1860. 
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Lorraine (primarily the Moselle and the Meurthe-et-Moselle but also the other two 
departments) and Luxembourg. 37 
The espace Sar-Lor-Lux is an informal union of regions which scholars 
increasingly describe as a form of pays, a region without clearly defined borders or 
limits. 38 The links between these three areas arose primarily out of common economic 
interests, stemming from the development of mining and industry from the late 
nineteenth century onwards, which created massive movements of cross-border 
workers (travailleurs frontaliers). 39 Even though these regions cannot claim to have 
inhabited the same national context, they have certainly earned the right to compare 
notes on shared experiences. For example, over recent centuries all three have suffered 
numerous changes in sovereignty. The Saarland, or Saargebiet, was invaded by 
France in 1792 and annexed, but then became part of Prussia in 1815 after the defeat 
of Napoleon. Following the Treaty of Versailles the region was administered as a 
League of Nations territory, its mines controlled by France. It was returned to 
Germany following a plebiscite in the region in 1935 but again found itself under 
French administration at the end of the Second World War. It was as late as 1955 that 
a further plebiscite was held which brought about the region's final return to Germany, 
stability coming a full ten years after the Moselle and Alsace. Luxembourg, on the 
other hand, was ruled by the Hapsburgs from the early modern period, as was that part 
of the Netherlands which was to become Belgium in 1830, but both the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg were within the Holy Roman Empire until they were annexed by 
France in the 1790s. In 1815 both territories were given to the king of Holland, but 
37 See Burtenshaw, D., Saar-Lorraine. Problem Regions of Europe, Oxford, 1976. 
31 See Rolland-May, Christiane, Les espaces geographique flous, PhD thesis, Metz, 1984. 
39 History conferences and collaborative research projects between the universities of Metz, Nancy, the 
Saarland, and Luxembourg are increasingly common. 
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Luxembourg (unlike Belgium) was placed within the German Confederation, and in 
1842 Luxembourg joined the Prussian Customs Union. The personal union between 
Holland and Luxembourg lapsed when a queen succeeded to the throne of Holland, as 
under Salic law, which still operated in the nineteenth century, the Grand Duke of 
Luxembourg had to be a man. In 1867 an international treaty recognized Luxembourg 
as a sovereign, neutral state, and the garrison that Prussia had maintained there since 
1815 was withdrawn. However, although Luxembourg ceased to be a member of the 
German Confederation at that point, it continued to be linked to Germany through a 
customs union until 1919. At that point, this tiny country of 261,000 inhabitants (half 
as many as the Moselle), over whom Germany, France, and Belgium felt they could 
still lay claim, had an uncertain future and a plebiscite was held in order to offer its 
inhabitants Wilson's policy of self-determination 40 
For the period examined here, the Moselle continued to find itself economically 
linked to the Saarland, but changes to the national frontier meant the two regions had 
to adjust to functioning in two different national contexts. Whilst the Moselle 
underwent a reversal of the Germanisation process, the Saarland lived more or less as 
an occupied territory. Differences in politics and administration set these two regions 
apart, as did the national allegiances of their inhabitants after many centuries of 
conflict. Although the Saarland was largely controlled by the French in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, it still considered itself to be part of Germany and French border 
controls between the regions were maintained, needless to say, encouraging the use of 
40 This was despite the failure to offer the populations of Alsace-Lorraine such a referendum. 
Germany was removed from the race by its defeat in the war, leaving French and Belgian options for 
the people to choose from. See Trausch, Gilbert, `Le poids de la Lorraine dann la question du 
Luxembourg: le referendum du 28 september 1919', in Cahiers Lorrains, first trimester, 1983, pp. 85- 
106. 
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forged papers and travel documents. 41 However, many of the mines and factories 
employed Saarlanders who continued to live in the Saarland and cross the border each 
day to go to work and commercial links also persisted. These two regions had lived 
for almost half a century as part of one nation. As Roth puts it, `La frontiere etait un 
milieu particulier, tres permeable oü les echanges etaient constants'. 42 
On the other hand, links with Luxembourg were certainly easier in the 
aftermath of war, in view of the wartime allied connections between Luxembourg and 
France as a whole. However, Luxembourg turned to Belgium, rather than France, in 
1921 in order to form an economic union which was later to develop, with the 
inclusion of the Netherlands, into the Benelux Economic Union in 1948, the first free- 
trade area in Europe. 43 In fact, the referendum of 1919 in Luxembourg had shown 
that 73 per cent of the population was in favour of economic union with France. 
However, support in France for such a move was weak, and negotiations failed to 
bring about a union which would have undoubtedly strengthened and encouraged 
Lorraine at a time when recovery was proving sluggish and problematic. 44 Despite 
this, both Luxembourg and Belgium, like the Saarland, continued to have economic 
links with the Moselle through mining and industrial companies, some of which bought 
up sequestered mines and factories which had previously been under German 
ownership (many of them part of the Thyssen dynasty). 
These kinds of informal relationships in the inter-war period clearly were no 
substitute for the kind of cultural or sentimental ties which were proving so 
troublesome between the Moselle and the rest of Lorraine, to say nothing of Alsace. 
41 See chapter five p. 166. 
42 Roth, Francois, `Les relations economiques entre la Lorraine et le territoire de la Sarre, 1918-1935', 
in Revue d'Allemagne, October-December, 1993, pp. 507-522, p. 521. 
43 See Trausch, `Le poids de la Lorraine', in Cahiers Lorrains, first trimester, 1983, pp. 85-106, p. 104. 
44 See chapter seven passim. 
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Nor did the Saar-Lor-Lux area form an ensemble economique with any formal 
structuring or recognition. Political frontiers constantly hindered any such 
development. Where they were separated by national borders, customs regulations 
applied as they did elsewhere. In fact, the Saarland and Luxembourg had never 
represented anything more to the Moselle than neighbouring regions with similar 
geographies, industrial bases, and economic interests, which, in times of peace, neatly 
and logically drew them closer together. Equally, a long-term feature of the espace 
Sar-Lor-Lux is the easy rapport between the regions' populations which have 
successfully lived side by side over the centuries, in spite of the competing nationalisms 
which have striven to keep them apart. 
Borders and identity 
Entre Joeuf (Meurthe-et-Moselle) et Moyeuvre 
(Moselle), pourtant dans la meme vallee de 1'Orne, entre 
Longwy et Thionville, entre Belfort et Mulhouse, il a 
subsiste longtemps et peut-etre peut-on le ressentir 
encore aujourd'hui, une subtile difference 
d' atmosphere 45 
The ghost of the 1871 Franco-German frontier seems to have lingered between the 
Moselle and the Meurthe-et-Moselle long after the Treaty of Versailles had returned it 
to its pre-1871 position. Beyond the new, post-war, departmental boundaries of the 
Moselle, lay the French interior, a land which on the one hand represented, to those 
who could remember, la mere patrie, but which also contained Francais de 1'interieur, 
a population with a different self-image, with different experiences, and different 
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expectations of what the future was to hold. But how did the Moselle's indigenous 
inhabitants see themselves? What was their self-image? With whom did they identify? 
And what role did the various frontiers or borders which surround the region play in 
the creation of an identite mosellane? 
According to one of the Moselle's most respected historians, Adrien Printz, 
`Etre Mosellan n'ajamais ete facile. C'etait souvent connaitre un sort contrecarre par 
avance, comme par une naissance bätarde'. 46 But among the 1918 population, who 
considered themselves to be mosellan or indigene? The remarkable history of the 
region, briefly sketched in the previous chapter, has brought numerous ethnic groups 
to the region and its charm and wealth of natural resources have persuaded many of 
them to remain. Much of the `indigenous' population, therefore, is made up, not of 
truly vieux Mosellans, a term which implies a long line of ancestors born and bred in 
the Moselle, but of individuals who chose to define themselves as vieux Mosellans. To 
define oneself in such terms, however, only became necessary in certain situations, 
notably upon annexation of the region in 1871 and upon its subsequent desannexion in 
1918. Yet, by 1918, the definition of an indigene was becoming less clear. In the 
1870s, the massive movements of population away from the Moselle had reduced the 
size of the indigenous population, along with power and control over its own affairs. 
Germanisation, for all its limited success, affected and altered the lives of the region's 
younger generations with their slow but progressive assimilation into, or acceptance of, 
German culture and German life. The growing trend of marriages between indigenes 
and German immigrants, which continued beyond the end of annexation, gives one 
illustration of the extent of this assimilation or acceptance. The problem this created 
as Roth, 'La frontiere franco-allemand', in Annales de fest, no. 1,1992, pp. 35-51, p. 51. 
46 Printz, Les immigres, p. 2. 
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for the French authorities can be seen in their attempts to define the ethnicity of 
individuals through classification of the population, implemented by the arriving French 
troops in November 1918.47 This system of classification defined an indigene as an 
inhabitant of the region who had been French prior to 1871, or whose parents had been 
French before they had been awarded German nationality. 
Identifying exactly who was an indigene within the 1918 population still reveals 
very little either about the identity or about the sentiment of these people, a problem 
neither the German nor the French authorities themselves had much success 
resolving. 48 In general, it has been assumed that the vast majority of Mosellans or 
Lorrains within Alsace-Lorraine remained, throughout their separation from France 
between 1871 and 1918, unequivocally French compared with Alsatians who were 
seen to be more culturally and politically ambiguous. This assumption seems to stem 
from the fact that the Moselle was, until 1871, an integral part of the Lorraine region, 
which, more than almost any other French region, epitomizes the very essence of being 
French. Joan of Arc, born in Domremy-la-Pucelle in the Vosges and canonized in 
192049, the Cross of Lorraine, later adopted as the symbol of the French resistance in 
the Second World War, the Trois Eveches of Toul, Metz, and Verdun, even the 
wrought iron supplied by the region's mines and factories to construct the Eiffel 
Tower, have all become regional as well as national symbols of patriotism. Such 
symbolism evolved despite the suspicion, voiced by many within the region as a whole, 
°' See chapter five, pp. 158-168. 
48 See chapter five, pp. 180-187. 
49 The image of Joan of Arc is very flexible as it stood for victory in war as much as for Catholic 
royalism. 
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that the French have a tendency to love the image of Lorraine more than they love 
Lorrainers. 5° 
Yet the clarity of the image of Lorraine was superficial. Even in the 1860s, 
there was little evidence of an identite lorraine with strong cultural, linguistic, or social 
connections between the peoples who made up this sprawling, and rather cumbersome 
region. As if to draw attention to the disparate nature of the populations of Lorraine, 
Alsace, just across the Vosges mountains, was turning the concept of identity into 
something of an art. But automatically attaching or linking the Moselle to the artificial 
image of Lorraine following desannexion, thereby ignoring the changes which had 
occurred in the intervening years, is unfortunate and misleading. Indeed, the 
populations in the Francophone sector appear to have remained largely loyal to France. 
However, there is little evidence to suggest that those to the north of the linguistic 
frontier felt strongly one way or the other prior to 1871, when efforts to introduce the 
French language had been met with reactions varying from indifference to outright 
resentment. Furthermore, where an easily defined identite lorraine was not in 
evidence in the 1860s, the same could also be said for the region which became 
annexed Lorraine in 1871. Not only was it hard for annexed Lorraine to define itself, 
but the annexed area did not even correspond to what had been a complete 
departement prior to 1870. What occurred during the half century of annexation, 
therefore, is of crucial importance in understanding the attitudes and expectations of 
the indigenous population as it was in 1918, teetering on the edge of reunification with 
France. Few referred to an identite mosellane during that period, and indigenes 
50 Maurice Bares played a key role in reinforcing a romantic image of Lorraine and annexed Lorraine 
through his novels and writing. For example, his novel, Colette Baudoche, tells the story of a young 
girl living in Metz during the period of German annexation. Barres, Maurice, Colette Baudoche, 
Paris, 1908. Raymond Poincare also used his Lorrainer roots to good effect during the initial period 
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tended to consider themselves lorrain rather than mosellan. Even then, the 
fragmentation of the region into smaller communities and groups meant that individuals 
were often inclined to call on local identities, such as messine, and sarregueminoise, 
rather than a more general regional identity. 5' This web of identities is recognized by 
Anthony Smith who writes, 
Regions easily fragment into localities, and localities may 
easily disintegrate into separate settlements. Only rarely 
do we meet a powerful and cohesive regional movement, 
as in the Vendee during the French Revolution... In most 
other cases `regionalism' is unable to sustain the 
mobilization of its populations with their separate 
grievances and unique problems. Besides, regions are 
geographically difficult to define; their centres are often 
multiple and their boundaries ragged. 52 
Smith's comments are entirely relevant to the Moselle with its lack of natural frontiers, 
its ever changing political borders, and regional centres, from Bitche to Metz, and from 
Sarrebourg to Thionville. To the fragmentation of identity must be added the constant 
modification of identity brought about by historical events themselves. It was 
therefore with an identity which can best be described as slippery that the Mosellans 
returned to France, `une et indivisible', at the end of the First World War. 
of integration after the war, especially in speeches he made during formal visits and celebratory 
parades. 
S' Those who considered themselves Alsace-Lorrainer tended to be German immigrants who had 
settled in the regions. These were, of course, the only members of the regions' populations likely to 
recognise Alsace-Lorraine as a real, rather than artificial, concept. 
52 Anthony Smith, National Identity, London, 1991, p. 4. 
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Concluding remarks 
There is little doubt that in the early stages of integration into France, the Moselle and 
its population struggled to come to terms with new relationships in both regional and 
national, contexts, based, as these relationships were, on negative external pressures, 
rather than on a positive self image. Within the region, the population was divided by 
culture, language, class, politics, and even geography, as well as by urban, rural and 
industrial divides. In the end, however, any identity depended upon the pressures of 
the moment. An inhabitant could call upon national, regional, or local identities. He 
or she could be French, Lorrain, Mosellan, or even Messin, but never German and 
certainly not Alsatian. There is nothing unusual in this diversity of identity over a 
broad spectrum within a small, border region. However, it is the chameleon-like 
behaviour of identity on this most localized level which blows apart any secure 
definition of national identity upon which nation states relied so heavily in order to win 
wars and construct peace. 
This chapter has shown that the Moselle was, to a large extent, defined by its 
immediate neighbours. The purpose of the following chapters is to show what was 
distinctive about the Moselle in the crucial period, 1919 to 1925, and to examine the 
historical factors which were to continue shaping the region's identity. The historical, 
demographic, economic, and geo-political vulnerability of the Moselle is what dictates 
the structure of the rest of this thesis. 
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Summary 
The geographical context of the Moselle shows a region caught between the identities 
of numerous regions and countries. In particular, Lejoug alsacien, the dominance of 
Alsatians and Strasbourg over mosellan affairs, merely created animosity rather than 
comradeship between those who had shared the experience of annexation. However, 
tensions between the Moselle and the Meurthe-et-Moselle were not much better. A 
new, `invisible' border, setting Mosellans apart from other Lorrainers, had emerged 
during their time apart which did not disappear with the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles. Fellow Lorrainers quickly merged with other Francais de 1'interieur and 
were viewed as outsiders. In fact, relations among the Moselle, the Saarland, and 
Luxembourg, based principally on informal economic factors and a cultural 
compatibility, appear to have been less problematic than other relations in the post-war 
period. Yet, the outcome of these developments in regional relationships was not to 
strengthen a pre-existing identite mosellane, but to force the region's fragmented 
indigenous population to call upon an identity which had never really existed before. 
Chapter III 
Armistice, Liberation, 
and Occupation: 1918 
ý. 
-_ ý'.. 
Figure 1: Plaque commemorating Marshal Foch's entry to Metz, 26 
November 1918. ' 
"Ah! Voir defiler des troupes francaises sur la Place de l'Hötel de Ville de Metz c'est 
ma plus belle recompense". Marshal Foch, with these emotional words, delivered after 
the official entry of French troops into Metz at the end of the First World War, 
reflected the sentiments of many thousands of Moselfans who welcomed, with open 
arms, the return of French sovereignty to their region after 47 years of German rule. 
Yet, even as the armistice was being signed, and the regions' return to France after 47 
1 This plaque is situated on the wall of the Saint-Etienne Cathedral in Place d'Armes, Metz. Photograph, 
C. Grohmann. 
66 
years of German rule was being effectively sealed, fragmentation of sentiment among 
the region's inhabitants had already begun. As the reality of a German defeat and 
Allied victory slowly sank in, only those who found themselves on `the winning side' 
could publicly express their emotion. Despair and disbelief had to be nursed in private. 
This chapter examines the closing months of the First World War when last minute 
German efforts to retain sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine took on an air of 
desperation, and when the threat of the German Revolution hung over the civilian 
population. This chapter also examines the `no-man's land' between the armistice and 
the arrival of Allied troops, as well as the immediate measures taken by the French 
army command and the first representatives of the French administration to arrive in 
the region. Was there a cause for celebration during this period? If so, what exactly 
was being celebrated, and by whom? And how did the new beginning unfold in the 
Moselle from the point of view of the new administration, as well as of the inhabitants 
themselves? 
An autonomous Elsaß-Lothringen? 
As late as September 1918, Germany's leaders finally acknowledged the need to win 
over the indigenous populations of Alsace and the Moselle, as the Reich faced certain 
defeat and the regions' return to France appeared increasingly likely. A plan was 
therefore thrown together to grant the Reichsland autonomy, putting it on an equal 
footing with other German regions. By mid-October however, events and opinions 
within the provinces forced Max von Baden's government to go one step further, to 
discard autonomism and suggest a neutral state -a buffer zone between France and 
Germany which would safeguard German economic interests which had been so 
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carefully developed and nurtured throughout annexation. Loss of the regions' 
industrial and mining output, as well as the inevitable psychological scarring which 
would result from a reversal of the Treaty of Frankfurt, were to be avoided at all cost. 
Germany was not about to relinquish the provinces without a struggle. ' 
Admittedly, Philippe Scheidemann's proposals to the German cabinet on 16th 
October 1918 for the creation of propaganda favouring neutrality in Alsace-Lorraine 
came far too late in the day. His plan was to indicate German willingness to grant 
independence to the regions, and follow this up with a plebiscite. Yet such a plan was 
transparent both to the regions' populations and to interested nations, such as 
Switzerland and the United States of America, who saw it for what it was -a last- 
minute salvage operation. The proposed plebiscite presented three options: German 
rule, French rule, or neutrality. By the end of October, Germany had put all its 
resources and attention into neutralist propaganda. Only a matter of days later, to the 
extreme irritation of the French, tracts, posters, and newspaper articles were circulated, 
advertising public meetings and advising the population to demand a plebiscite, 
ironically the very thing they had been denied by Germany 47 years before. Equally 
ironic is the fact that before and during the war, Germany had fervently resisted calls 
from the regions' elected representatives and the press to grant the Reichsland 
autonomy over its affairs. In any case, as far as the Moselle was concerned, hardly any 
of the plebiscite propaganda issued prior to the signing of the armistice reached the 
region. Perhaps there had not been sufficient time to distribute it 
2 Adamthwaite argues that in 1917, it was not possible to negotiate peace because, among other 
things, Germany was still unwilling to relinquish Alsace-Lorraine. And for the French, peace without 
the return of Alsace-Lorraine was unthinkable. Adamthwaite, Anthony, Grandeur and Misery. 
France's Bid for Power in Europe, 1914-1940, London, 1995, p. 38. 
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beyond Strasbourg and Colmar. Perhaps the authorities saw no point in distributing it 
in what they perceived to be `Francophile' Moselle. 
As events gathered momentum, Germany's chances of success with an 
eleventh-hour `liberation' of the provinces faded. On 21 October the mayor of 
Strasbourg, an Alsatian, Rudolf Schwander, was appointed Statthalter, whilst Karl 
Hauss, also an Alsatian, became his prime minister. 3 The appointment, for the first 
time, of Alsatians to these high-ranking posts was merely a token gesture from the 
German authorities, who had treated the Alsatian people as second class citizens for 
the duration of annexation. Nonetheless, Schwander was given a free hand to propose 
numerous radical measures in order to draw in support from the population's 
representatives in the regional parliament: these included an amnesty for all political 
offences, an end to military interference in civilian affairs, the lifting of censorship of 
the press and post. However, even Schwander quickly realized that he was fighting a 
losing battle, later admitting that from that moment on, the political future of Alsace- 
Of his fourteen points, the eighth Lorraine was exclusively in Wilson's hands 4 
referred to the provinces, and stated that the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 
with regard to Alsace-Lorraine, should be righted. 
5 Schwander failed to rally any 
significant support behind the German government's offers among Alsatian, let alone 
Mosellan, deputies. For the latter, neither autonomism nor the creation of a neutral 
state on Alsatian terms was appealing. As Germans living in the region began to sell 
3 Both Schwander and Hauss were deputies in the regional parliament for Alsace-Lorraine created in 
1911. At the end of the war, they had little choice but to leave Alsace and opt for 'voluntary 
repatriation' to Germany because of what was seen as their collaboration with the German authorities. 
See Igersheim, Francois, L'Alsace des notables (1870-1914). La bourgeoisie et le peuple alsacien, 
Strasbourg, 1981, pp. 258 & 292. 
Roth, La Lorraine annexee, p. 644. 
5 Baechler, Christian, 'L'Alsace-Lorraine dans les relations franco-allemandes de 1918 ä 1933', in 
Bariety, J., Guth, A., Valentin, J. M., La France et l'Allemagne entre les deux guerres mondiales, 
Nancy, 1987, pp. 69-109, p. 70. 
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their property and leave, it was clear that the Reich's days of sovereignty over its 
Reichsland were over. The newspaper Le Messin - Le Lorrain - Le Courrier pointed 
out, 
A Berlin, apres le remplacement du comte de Hertling 
par le prince Max de Bade, on songea enfin ä doner [sic] 
plus de liberte ä l'Alsace-Lorraine. Il etait trop tard. 
L'autonomie in extremis qu'on accorda aux provinces 
annexees ne pouvait plus avoir aucune influence sur les 
sentiments de la population. 
6 
Such outright rejection of German influence in the provinces was a reflection of 
Germany's tarnished image, the insincerity of its plans to award the regions autonomy 
plain for all to see, including Scheidemann himself. 
' Even a mischievous rumour, one 
of many at that time, suggesting that the French Government had been toppled by 
French revolutionaries forcing Clemenceau, his Cabinet, and Marshal Foch to flee (if 
they had not already been assassinated), failed to impress the Moselle's inhabitants. ' 
By the autumn of 1918, there was a general feeling that Alsace-Lorraine had turned the 
page, leaving German rule behind whilst tentatively waiting to see what the future held 
within a French context. 
A passing phase: Revolution and Republic 
It is often forgotten that Alsace-Lorraine, still part of the German Reich in early 
November 1918, witnessed the `muted echo' of the socialist revolution which swept 
6 `Les derniers jours du regime allemand ä Metz et en Alsace-Lorraine', in Le Messin - Le Lorrain - le 
Courrier, 19 November 1918. 
7 Roth, La Lorraine annexee, p. 654. 
I `Les derniers jours du regime allemand', in Le Messin - Le Lorrain - le Courrier, 19 November 
1918. 
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across Germany. 9 Few sources remain of those days when soviet-style councils were 
set up by soldiers and workers. In the Moselle, on the night of 8th November, a 
number of delegates from the Soldiers Council in Cologne, as well as sailors from Kiel, 
disembarked at Metz station. Revolutionary committees were then created over the 
next few days, mainly in the Germanophone towns of Sarrebourg, Sarreguemines, 
Forbach, Saint Avold, and Hayange. Activity was also in evidence in industrial areas, 
for example around Knutange, and a mosellan marine presided over the workers' 
council of Thionville. 10 The Revolution, which had its greatest effect in Strasbourg, 
certainly lacked the force or impact of its Russian equivalent. According to Rosse, the 
astonished population watched in disbelief, finding it hard to take the Revolution too 
seriously. Anticipating the fall of the German Empire, they had expected something 
rather more dramatic. Instead, as Rosse put it, `Den Zusammenbruch des Reiches und 
der Militärdiktatur hatten sie unter sensationelleren Umständen erwartet. Nun rieselte 
das ganze Riesengebaude, das für Jahrhunderte errichtet schien, wie ein Haus aus 
Sand. ' 12 
One of the first revolutionary posters to appear stated, `An die Bürger und 
Soldaten der Stadt Metz. Ruhe ist die erste Bürger- und Soldatenpflicht. 
Plünderungen werden mit dem Tode bestraft'. 13 However, it was often the 
9 See Smith, 'From the Reich to the Republic', in France: Nation and Republic, Kelly, M. Böck, R., 
eds. See also Rosse, Das Elsaß, which gives a more detailed account of revolutionary events but again 
covers mainly Alsace. 
10 Roth, Francois, 'Metz et la Moselle au lendemain de la premiere guerre mondiale', in Cahier du 
Cercle Jean Mace, No. 31,1990, no page numbers. 
11 Rossd, Das Elsaß, p. 490. 
12 Ibid. Author's translation: `With the fall of the German Reich and military dictatorship, they had 
expected something more dramatic. Instead, this giant structure, which had been erected to last for 
centuries, crumbled like a sand-castle. ' 
13 A. Bellard, 'Comment, en 1918, Metz a rompu ses chaines (la mission Houpert-Christmann)', in 
Memoires de 1'Academie Nationale de Metz, Nancy, 1956 (no page numbers). Author's translation: 
'To the Citizens and Soldiers of the City of Metz. Calm is the priority for citizens and soldiers. 
Looting is punishable by death. ' 
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revolutionaries themselves who were guilty of disturbing the peace, by antagonising 
the population with sporadic looting, petty crime, and generally boisterous behaviour. 
More positively, the Councils set up commissions to deal with ensuring the food 
supply, bread rationing, public transport, the demobilisation of soldiers, and the release 
of political prisoners. They also brought an end to martial law, and the wartime 
restrictions on the indigenous population. Despite the fact that during the last months 
of the war there had been fewer arrests by German military authorities and a general 
relaxation of martial law, these measures came as an enormous relief to the inhabitants 
of the regions, in particular to the Moselle's Francophone population which had been 
forbidden to use French in public for the duration of the war. 14 
In Strasbourg, on the same day as the armistice was signed, a red flag was hung 
by the revolutionaries marking the creation of the Republic. A red flag was also hung 
from the Hotel de Ville in Metz, and any soldiers sent by their commanding officers to 
suppress the rebellious activity simply joined with the revolutionaries, tying red ribbons 
to their buttonholes and flamboyantly tossing aside their weapons, fittingly, in the Place 
d'Armes in Metz. The revolutionary movement had little or no communication with, 
or control over, those soldiers still fighting at the front who only became aware of the 
Revolution once the withdrawal began. It was only those on leave and residing in 
barracks around Metz or those in transit, therefore, who were in a position to defy 
their officers and join the `rebels'. ' 5 Elsewhere in the Moselle, industrial workers, in 
particular those who were German immigrants, added strength to the socialist 
movement and a series of strikes was called in factories and mines. In fact, the 
14 'Les derniers jours du regime allemand', in Le Messin - Le Lorrain - le Courrier, 19 November 
1918. 
15 See chapter six, p. 215. K's diary describes how one officer was terrified to travel to Metz as he 
feared being attacked by his own soldiers. 
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workers' councils were to remain in the region long after the soldiers had been forced 
to withdraw under the terms of the armistice, causing the incoming military and civilian 
authorities some considerable problems over the months which followed. 16 
According to Andre Bellard, writing in 1955 about the Revolution in Metz, 
`1'autorite normale, on le voit, n'a pas perdu la tete; la Revolution de 1918 glisse sur ce 
monde alsacien-lorrain comme 1'eau sur les plumes d'un canard. '" But despite this 
relative calm, another symbolic event was simultaneously unfolding - the creation of 
the National Assembly of Alsace-Lorraine. The elected representatives of the 
Landtag, the regional parliament set up by Germany upon the granting of a 
constitution to the regions in 1911, announced on 9 November the transformation of 
the Landtag into a National Assembly, taking advantage of the opportunity presented 
by the imminent German defeat to create an independent administration. Dr Eugene 
Ricklin, '8 hitherto president of the lower chamber of the Landtag, was nominated 
President of the National Assembly and, in a chamber otherwise dominated by 
Alsatians, Nicolas Jung, leader of the Parti Lorrain, became head of finances. 
On 10 November, having recognized the hopelessness of the situation they 
faced, Schwander and Hauss sent letters of resignation to Chancellor Friedrich Ebert, 
leader of the new German Government in Berlin, leaving Alsace-Lorraine in the hands 
of the National Assembly and the Revolutionary Councils. But, despite the confusion 
16 See chapter seven, p. 260-271. 
17 Bellard, 'Comment, en 1918, Metz a rompu ses chäines', in Memoires de l'Academie Nationale de 
Metz, Nancy, 1956 (no page numbers). Again, K's diary confirms this point and shows how the 
indigenous population appeared almost as on-lookers as discipline in the German army disintegrated 
around them. See chapter six, p. 215. 
Is Ricklin, an Alsatian, enjoyed a successful political career under the German regime but was 
expelled to Germany by the French in 1919. He was able to return to the region the following year 
and played a leading role in the Alsatian autonomist movement. He was one of the accused in the 
infamous trial of 1928 of Alsatian autonomists. See Igersheim, Francois, L'Alsace des notables, 
p. 284. 
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of governments all vying for control of the provinces' future, there was no undignified 
rush to seize power. The Assembly considered its role during the period between the 
signing of the Armistice and the entry of French troops to be no more than transitional, 
maintaining public order and providing essential supplies and services. This they 
achieved by instructing all civil servants to remain at their posts, which, it seems, the 
majority of them did. There were divisions among the deputies, though, within the 
Assembly. Dr Ricklin and Charles Didio headed those who considered it the 
Assembly's duty to seek a return to French rule by negotiating guarantees from the 
French Government for the safeguarding of Alsace-Lorraine's traditions and culture. 
The second group, lead by Nicolas Delsor and Joseph Pfleger, sought an unconditional 
return to France with full integration into la mere patrie. They believed it was their 
duty to ensure `La rentree de 1'Alsace et de la Lorraine dans le droit, leur attachement 
ä la France indiscutable et definitif. 19 The remaining deputies were undecided. 
Ultimately, it was the second of the three groups which achieved its goal, for the 
simple reason that, as the French military swept into Alsace-Lorraine, the newly 
formed Assembly was almost completely ignored. 
Meanwhile, the revolutionaries, although successfully pulling on board soldiers 
and workers around the regions, were having a good deal less success with the civilian 
population. Admittedly, the Councils worked hand in hand with the National 
Assembly during that crucial period following the armistice when, above all else, what 
was required was peace and stability. Some socialist deputies in the National 
Assembly also sat on the Councils, which encouraged the two to work together. 
19 Declaration made by the Assembly 5 December 1918 at its final meeting, quoted in Redslob, 
Robert, 'Le changement du regime en Alsace-Lorraine apres la Waite allemande', Revue politique et 
parlementaire, No. 104,1920, pp. 387-399, p. 392. Redslob was a Professor of Law at the University 
of Strasbourg. 
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However, the Central Revolutionary Council in Strasbourg, whilst not neglecting its 
main objective, the promotion of international socialism, failed to bring on board many 
of the region's inhabitants. By the time French troops entered the provinces, the 
relevance of international socialism, as well as that of the national assembly, was 
negligible. With the exception of a number of industrial `hot spots', the withdrawal of 
German troops marked the end of revolutionary activity in Alsace-Lorraine, as well as 
the end of the `transitional government', and its imagined role in the future running of 
the region. 
As far as the civilian population of the Moselle was concerned, news of the 
imminent German defeat eventually filtered through. Censorship of the press during 
most of the war, had severely limited the flow of reliable news. However, during the 
summer of 1918, military developments had been reported in the Swiss press, notably 
the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, some copies of which had found their way to the reading 
room of the Municipal Council in Metz. 20 Reaction to the news was varied. Many, 
though by no means all, German immigrants had already begun leaving, anticipating the 
application of Wilson's fourteen points and a return to French rule. The Francophile 
population, on the other hand, had quickly begun preparing for the arrival of French 
troops. Yet, for others among the indigenous population, a French future held many 
potential hazards, including the suppression of local dialects and changes to the 
region's religious statute. Some believed French leaders' promises to respect the 
culture and traditions of the indigenous population and, optimistic of a French 
accommodation of the regions' particular laws, traditions, and culture, also began 
festive preparations. Others, less bound by political or national sentiment, clearly 
20 Roth, La Lorraine annexee, p. 642. 
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chose to play a game of `wait and see' in the knowledge that Mosellans and Alsatians 
had never been masters of their own destiny. Sentiment within the Moselle's native 
population, however, was mixed, and was to remain that way through the turbulent 
years which followed. 
Armistice, liberation, and occupation 
At 5p. m. French time on 11 November 1918 an armistice agreement was signed at 
Compiegne, bringing to an end the First World War. The agreement instructed 
Germany to withdraw all its troops from Belgium, Luxembourg, France, as well as 
Alsace-Lorraine, by 26 November. Following on the heels of the retreating German 
soldiers, France was able to make its long-awaited entry into its lost provinces, 
achieving, by its way of it, the `liberation' of the regions after 47 years of injustice, 
paving the way for the `reintegration' of their populations into the French nation. 
Despite French views on the matter, the entry of troops into the regions did, in fact, 
mark the beginning of a military occupation by France, which was to last until the 
ratification of the peace treaty over a year later. Until that date, France was bound by 
international law, set out at the Second Conference at the Hague, which stated that 
occupation of an enemy territory permits the occupying force to act according to the 
necessities of war. Once these necessities are dealt with, the existing laws in the 
occupied territory must remain intact until a peace treaty is agreed. 
The withdrawal of German troops began immediately the armistice was 
announced. The German Chief of General Staffs, Freiherrn von Obberhausen stated, 
.. Bewegten Herzens trennen wir uns von diesem 
schönen, bisher deutschen Lande, das auch so vielen 
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anderen Deutschen eine neue Heimat geworden war. 
Aber, Kamaraden, es gibt sich mit Würde in das 
Unvermeidliche zu fügen. Lasst uns dieses Land so 
herausgeben, wie wir einen liebgewordenen Privatbesitz 
abgeben wurden. Lasst uns keine Zerstörungen daran 
vornehmen! Vergesst nicht die alte deutsche 
Manneszucht beim Abzug aus dem Lande. Begegnet der 
Bevölkerung des Elsaß mit Achtung, unterlasst alle 
Krankungen ! 21 
It was a slow and miserable procession of defeated soldiers which passed through the 
Moselle, some of them buoyed up by revolutionary events of the previous few days. 
But the majority were exhausted by the fighting, defeat, and lack of food. From the 
region of Verdun poured thousands of bedraggled German troops heading for the 
German frontier, now to the north and east of the Moselle and Alsace, passing through 
Moulins and Metz on their way. 22 Many defiantly wore red ribbons in their 
buttonholes. Andre Bellard cites Albert Houpert who witnessed the disorderly retreat, 
"les troupes de 1'arriere et du service des etapes faisaient franchement une mauvaise 
impression: leur tenue etait debraillee, les soldats ne saluaient pas ou saluaient tres mal 
leurs superieurs; aux voitures pendaient des loques rouges". 23 
21 Rosse, Das Elsaß, p. 501. Author's translation: 'It is with a heavy heart that we leave this beautiful 
and, hitherto German, land which has also been a home to so many other Germans. But, comrades, 
we must accept the inevitable. Let us hand over this land as if it were a cherished home. Let us 
refrain from destroying it! Do not forget your old German breeding as you retreat! Treat the 
population of Alsace with respect and bear no grudges! '. 
22 Even those among the local population, impatiently awaiting the arrival of French troops, felt some 
sympathy for the young German soldiers. 
23 Bellard, 'Comment, en 1918 Metz a rompu ses chäines', in Memoires de l'Academie Nationale de 
Metz, Nancy, 1956 (no page numbers). 
77 
The entry of French troops into towns in the Moselle occurred, in some cases, 
a matter of hours after the Germans had vacated their posts and barracks. The Mayor 
of Boulay's hand-written report of 25th November 1918 was proudly entitled, 
`Rapport No. I du maire au commissaire de la Republique A Metz'. The report began, 
Le 19 novembre ä quatre heures de 1'apres midi les 
derrieres troupes allemandes quittaient Boulay. A peine 
etaient-elles sorties de nos murs, que les drapeaux 
francais, precieusement caches jusqu'alors - on craignait 
une vengeance allemande quelconque - sortirent comme 
par enchantement. 24 
The mayor's report was one of many sent to the Republic's commissioner in Metz, 
Leon Mirman, which transmitted accounts of the undoubtedly heart-felt joy of a 
`population enthousiasmee', celebrating the departure of Germany's spent military 
force as much as the prospect of welcoming French troops to their towns and villages. 
It took some days before the whole of the Moselle had been evacuated allowing allied 
forces to enter. 25 Indeed, some impatient mayors even sent letters complaining that 
their towns had not been properly `liberated' by French soldiers. And Marshal Petain's 
triumphant entry, leading the 10th Army into Metz on 19 December, riding in on a 
white stallion, must have been a stirring sight, if only for the Francophile sections of 
the population. 26 
Other reports from around the region, on a more practical level, called for 
reinforcements to help deal with what remained of workers' councils in industrial 
24 ADM, 301 M 88. 
25 Allied forces carried out this task, and, in the case of the Moselle, they were made up largely of 
American and French soldiers. 
26 Pdtain's entry into Metz had, in fact, been delayed due to an unfortunately timed riding accident. 
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areas. A letter from the de Wendel company to the haut commissaire in Strasbourg, 
Georges Maringer, demanded that troops be permanently stationed at Hayange and 
Moyeuvre in order to dissolve the workers' councils, which had been formed by the 
Soldatenrat in Thionville. The letter stated that only American troops had been 
temporarily posted in Moyeuvre, and that gendarmes had not yet arrived. Without a 
sufficient army presence, a return to work could not be guaranteed. 
II est urgent d'etablir un poste ä Moyeuvre et d'en 
maintenir un ä Hayange pour pouvoir dissoudre les 
Comites ouvriers qui ont ete formes par le Soldatenrat de 
Thionville. 27 
This letter is one of a number which illustrate that the tasks facing French troops 
arriving in the Moselle went beyond simple celebration parades and that the region had 
first to be properly secured. The military were the first to encounter the complexities 
of the multi-ethnic population in the region. Only certain sections of that population 
were prepared to take to the streets with tricolours, secreted away since 1871. A very 
sizeable immigrant population, not all of whom were factory workers or miners (or 
German, for that matter), greeted events with nervousness and uncertainty. 
On 28 November 1918, Marshal Foch sent a telegram, the telegram paper still 
bearing the title `Telegraphie des Deutschen Reichs', to Mirman in Metz (see Figure 
2). It stated that the anarchy which had accompanied the departure of German troops, 
as well as the difficulties of maintaining supplies to the metal industries in the regions, 
had fostered agitation in industrial areas. " Sufficient troops were therefore required 
particularly in the region around Thionville. Clearly, French army officials believed the 
27 ADM, 301 M 74. Letter of 25 November 1918 sent from Joeuf, Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
28 ADM, 301 M 74. 
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Germans had deliberately left behind well organized soviet-style councils in industrial 
centres in the Moselle. `Le but poursuivi serait, grace ä une propagande savamment 
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Figure 2: Telegram from Marshal Foch to Mirman, 29 November 1918.1 
organisee, de contaminer 1'Armee Francaise et de provoquer la Revolution en France 
dans un delai de trois mois'. As Foch went on to show, of equal concern to the French 
army were the presence and attitudes of the many American soldiers present in the 
Moselle immediately following the armistice. They appeared either to find it difficult 
to distinguish between indigenes and Germans, or were more inclined to be friendly to 
1 ADM, 301 M 74. 
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those Germans they encountered than the French would have liked. A Note marked 
secret from Chef d'etat major Baille noted, 
La section de la population Lorraine au contact des 
troupes americaines serait vivement impressionnee par 
les bruits colportes par des soldats et meme des Officiers 
americains et relatifs ä la possibilite d'un plebiscite pour 
trancher la question d'Alsace-Lorraine au moment de la 
paix. 3o 
The question of a plebiscite was indeed highly sensitive for the French 
authorities. Having spent considerable time during the war persuading their allied 
partners to agree to the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, they had also been 
extremely careful to deny any need for a plebiscite. Wilson, Lloyd George, and even 
the Pope, had, at various stages during the war, voiced their concerns about Alsace- 
Lorraine's future sovereignty. The French feared that support in Switzerland and the 
United States for a plebiscite was growing. This was thanks to an enthusiastic 
propaganda campaign, fought internationally by the regions' autonomists, demanding 
that Alsace-Lorrainers be granted the right to be masters of their own destiny. 31 What 
France now had to contend with was a sudden surge in autonomist propaganda, 
emanating, they claimed, from German sources, and also calling for a plebiscite. 
30 ADM, 301 M 74. 
31 Poor translations of autonomist tracts were distributed in the United States, Switzerland, and Great 
Britain and were signed Ley, Muth, and Rapp, three Alsatian autonomists. However, in the 
atmosphere of 'self-determination' in the immediate post-war period, those lobbying for a plebiscite 
received more press coverage than the French authorities might have hoped. However, France had 
also fought an enthusiastic international propaganda campaign during the war years to bolster support 
for French sovereignty in the regions. For example, a lecture given by Whitney Warren (member of 
the Institut de France) at the Aeolian Hall in New York on 14 March 1917, presented a passionate 
case for the swift and unquestioned return of the provinces to France. PRO, FO 395/175. 
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The French had formed their case against a plebiscite on the following grounds. 
Firstly, what France had sought to gain from Germany's defeat in November 1918, 
was the return of its lost provinces. Their integration into France amounted to 
desannexion, which, as Wilson's eighth point in the armistice stated, undid the wrong 
committed by Germany 47 years previously. 32 There had been no plebiscite in 1871 
and so there should be no plebiscite in 1918, as France was merely annulling the Treaty 
of Frankfurt. Secondly, the French regarded the protest of Alsace-Lorraine at the 
National Assembly of Bordeaux, delivered 17 February 1871, as plebiscite enough. 
That protest had stated, 
L'Alsace et Lorraine ne veulent pas etre alienees... Tous 
unanimes, les citoyens demeures dans leurs foyers, 
comme les soldats accourus sous les drapeaux, les uns en 
votant, les autres en combattant, signifient ä 1'Allemagne 
et au monde l'immuable volonte de 1'Alsace et de la 
Lorraine de rester franraises. 33 
This statement, the French claimed, had been made by deputies elected by the people 
of Alsace and the part of Lorraine, which was about to be annexed and therefore was a 
true reflection of their will. The French authorities were also quick to use the 
celebrations in the provinces in November and December 1918 which greeted the 
French army, as further proof of the populations' desire to be returned to France. In 
fact, the magnitude of these celebrations was even greater than the French had 
expected, thus enabling the likes of Robert Redslob to dismiss calls for a plebiscite. 
32 Baechler, Christian, 'L'Alsace-Lorraine dans les relations franco-allemandes', in Bariety, J., Guth, 
A., Valentin, J. M., La France et 1'Allemagne entre les deux guerres mondiales, Nancy, 1987, pp. 69- 
109, p. 70. 
33 The entire text of this protest can be found in, Jean, Jean-Pierre, Le livre d'or du Souvenir 
Franfais, Metz, 1929, pp. 398-402. 
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Le plebiscite etait fait par des sacrifices de 50 annees. 11 
a 06 fait par les parents qui ont envoye leurs fill a la 
France et qui ont ainsi detruit la vie familiale de leurs 
propres mains. [... ] Le plebiscite n'a pas dure un jour, il a 
dure cinquante ans. Il n'a pas ete fait par un suffrage, il a 
ete fait par des larmes"3a 
Redslob went one step further and argued that a plebiscite itself was, in fact, a 
most unreliable way of establishing the will of the people. Circumstances at the end of 
the war, including, `difficultes de la vie faussement attribuees au gouvernement 
nouveau, des impatiences, des deceptions causees par une vision trop belle du regime ä 
venir, la tendance ä embellir le passe', 35 meant simply that the people of Alsace- 
Lorraine were not in a position to know their own minds or to vote reliably in a 
plebiscite. Patronising though Redslob's comments are, he accurately put his finger on 
the problem of inflated expectations from which both France and the returned 
provinces were to suffer throughout the early period of integration. In fact, the same 
argument of inflated expectations was used by Francais de 1'interieur who sought to 
gloss over their own unskilful handling of the integration process in the first few weeks 
and months and which quickly produced what became known as the malaise lorrain. 
Those in favour of a plebiscite also presented three simple arguments. Firstly, 
the denial of a plebiscite in 1871 was no reason to deny one in what were very different 
circumstances, 47 years on. Secondly, Alsace-Lorraine had a right to self- 
determination like any other state or territory in 1918. Finally, Alsace-Lorraine had 
34 Redslob, 'Le changement du regime', Revue politique et parlementaire, No. 104,1920, pp. 387- 
399, p. 399. 
35 Ibid. 
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been a pawn in French and German war games for long enough. From an Alsatian 
viewpoint, the creation of a neutral buffer state could partially solve the problem of 
competing nationalisms in the region, something a plebiscite could offer as an option. 
But the truth of the matter was, of course, that France could not trust such an 
ethnically and politically mixed population with such diverging views on the subject of 
its future sovereignty. In the event of a plebiscite, French politicians felt they could not 
risk failing to achieve the resounding support needed to maintain the myth which had 
emerged through revanchism since the 1870s, and which had been all but written in 
stone by the French government during the war. They had claimed for too long, it 
seemed, that Alsatians and Mosellans were staunch French patriots patiently awaiting 
their deliverance from German dominance. That a plebiscite might expose a less than 
patriotic population, was too great a risk to take. 
Yet, what wisdom was there in France resisting so vigorously the possibility of 
a plebiscite, risking in the process its credibility in the eyes of its wartime allies? Was it 
really the case that a plebiscite might not go in favour of France as some feared? 
Undoubtedly, any vote had the potential of being very close indeed, especially if, as 
some people proposed, the ballot paper presented three options: French rule, German 
rule, or a neutral state. However, it is very unlikely that German immigrants would 
have been allowed to vote in a plebiscite on the future of Alsace-Lorraine, thereby 
limiting considerably the damage to French credibility. Timing was another important 
factor. If a vote had taken place immediately after the signing of the armistice, it is 
fairly certain that France would have won more than enough support as Germany's 
poor treatment of the indigenous population was still fresh in their minds and 
disillusionment with the new French administration had not yet taken hold. As it was, 
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there would have been no way of telling if the result from a plebiscite represented a 
vote of confidence in a future French administration or a vote of no confidence in the 
outgoing German administration. In any event, France was taking no risks and it was 
the role of the now occupying French military forces to quash all calls for plebiscites, 
to suppress all pro-German activity, and to begin the process of creating French 
sentiment in two provinces whose populations had little or no idea what it was to be 
French in the Third French Republic. 
Cause for Celebration? 
A sense of jubilation and overwhelming excitement infected the Moselle's indigenous 
population as their `liberation' day drew close. Committees had been set up by the 
National Assembly, as well as by local municipal councils, to organize the official 
celebrations to welcome the French troops, negotiating with the French authorities 
where possible, how and when they would take place. Many of the accounts of the 
days leading up to and including their arrival describe feverish preparations to mark 
this most momentous occasion. Bellard describes how the streets were adorned with 
tricolours, `la plupart humbles emblemes de circonstance faits hätivement des tissus les 
plus inattendus, mais quelquefois reliques pälies par le temps, soigneusement 
conservees depuis 1870'. 36 Francois Reitei shows how it was the responsibility of 
municipalities around the region to pay for the street decorations to welcome the 
French troops. In Montigny-16s-Metz, the sum of 750 francs was set aside for the 
37 purpose. 
36 Bellard, `Comment, en 1918 Metz a rompu ses chäines', in Memoires de 1'Academie Nationale de 
Metz, Nancy, 1956 (no page numbers). K's diary also notes that in the final days before the arrival of 
French troops, it was almost impossible to find blue material in Metz, so much having been used up 
making tricolors. See chapter six, p. 215. 
37 Reitel, Montigny-Ii s-Metz, p. 338. 
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The arrival of French generals and their armies was celebrated around the 
region during the days and nights from 17 to 23 November. 38 Picture postcards were 
printed in their thousands of the scenes. One in particular shows of a long line of local 
girls entitled, `La Delivrance de Metz, 18 novembre 1918'. 39 Another postcard, 
reproduced below, captured a moment of great excitement for the Francophone 
population and shows the first delivery of French newspapers to Metz since they were 
banned in 1914. 
ii 
Figure 3: Postcard showing the delivery of the first French-language 
newspapers to Metz, November 1918 40 
Postcards were also printed showing the damage to German monuments around Metz, 
monuments which had been felled like trees and which soon became symbols of 
38 Joseph Rohr gives a detailed chronology of the liberation of the Moselle's major towns and the generals present 
at each ceremony. Rohr, La Lorraine Mosellane, p. 2. 
39 See Berrar, Jean-Claude, Memoire en images: Metz, Joud-16s-Tours, 1996, pp. 109-114. 
40 Postcard courtesy of K's sister. 
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revenge, a backdrop for celebrating Messins 41 Plaques and bits of stone were broken 
off and taken home as souvenirs 42 Another postcard had the title, `Metz - le cortege 
passant devant la Statue renversee de Frederic Guillaume I'. To the great amusement 
of many indigenes, the moustache of Saint Daniel's statue, part of the entrance to the 
St Etienne Cathedral in Metz, which had been sculpted to resemble Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
had been `shaved off with the help of a hammer and chisel. 
Maurice Barres's description of the return of his beloved Metz to France, 
written on Tuesday 19 November, also captures the atmosphere. 
Metz, ce soir et toute la nuit, tandis que j'ecris ces lignes, 
est pleine de clameurs franraises et de "Marseillaises" 
unanimes. Un des grands jours mosellans s'acheve, un 
jour qui nous sature de joie au point que notre coeur se 
decouvre insuffisant ä contenir cette surabondance. 
Nous sommes debordes par l'allegresse et la gratitude. " 
The culmination of these celebrations came with the first official visit by French 
dignitaries on 8 December 1918. This was a carefully orchestrated tour of the newly 
returned provinces by Poincare, Clemenceau, Foch and a multitude of international 
high-ranking officials including the British, Italian, and United States ambassadors. By 
this stage, the street names in Metz had been changed back to their French equivalents 
of pre-1871, and, in the German quarter, the French Republic and its leaders were 
41 Pictures and postcards of these scenes can be found in the private papers of the chanoine Francois 
Cuny, ADM, 18 195. 
42 See Maas, `Zeitenwende in Elsaß-Lothringen' in Speitkamp, Winfried, ed., Denkmalsturz, 
Gottingen, 1997, pp. 79-108. This article looks in great detail at the destruction of German 
monuments in Metz. It links this to the myth of Alsace-Lorraine, examines the motives behind their 
destruction, and analyses the French administration's `policy' towards regional monuments in the 
light of its own propaganda during the years which followed. 
43 Maurice Barres, La Lorraine devastee, Paris, 1919, p. 168-169. 
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honoured as streets and squares were named after them. For example, Kaiser 
Wilhelm-Ring was renamed Avenue Marechal Foch. Documents in the municipal 
archives in St Avold include letters from dignitaries thanking the people of the town 
for honouring them in this way 44 The politicians and their entourage also visited 
Strasbourg and Colmar on 9 and 10 December and an extremely lavish official book 
was published commemorating this three-day visit 45 
Some celebrations were inevitably less visually spectacular than the bunting and 
flags displayed in Metz. Others were clearly more restrained, their rural populations 
less demonstrative perhaps, their municipal funds more limited. Yet for those 
involved, the sentiments expressed were no less heart-felt or genuine. The mayor of 
Bitche, for example, in March 1871, had presented a flag made by the women of the 
town to Lieutenant-Colonel Bousquet of the French army who declared, `Je vous jure 
que nous rapporterons un jour ce drapeau, düt-il ne rester qu'un seul homme pour 
1'accompagner. ' On 5 January 1919, the flag was duly returned to the town hall of 
Bitche accompanied by an impressive array of French army officials 46 
It is undeniable that during those days, the sense of joy and emotion was in no 
way staged or exaggerated purely for the purposes of French propaganda. Pierri 
Zind's criticism of French tactics seems rather too harsh when all is considered. He 
claimed French generals, in an effort to seduce the weary population of Alsace- 
Lorraine, sent troops to the region who were well rested, in smart new uniforms, ready 
for the processions and celebration balls held in honour of the liberation. Although his 
44 Archives municipales de St Avold, IH1. 
45 Rend Weiss, Le Premier Voyage officiel en Alsace-Lorraine Francaise 8,9,10 Decembre 1918, 
Paris, 1919. Copy held in the BN in Paris. 
46 Rohr, La Lorraine Mosellane, p. 3. 
88 
scepticism of French intentions is by no means misplaced, such tactics were only to be 
expected in view of what was at stake. In fact, Alsace-Lorrainers had a great deal to 
celebrate in November 1918, with or without the arrival of plump French soldiers 
seeking to make a good impression. The more appropriate question to ask, therefore, 
is what was being celebrated during those days of tricolours and patriotic parades? 
Any interpretation of the celebrations in the Moselle in November and 
December 1918 depends very much on which version of events prior to and during the 
First World War is accepted. Broadly speaking, there are two versions to be 
considered. The first is regarded by many as the myth of Alsace-Lorraine, created by 
the French government with the assistance of certain Alsatian and Lorrainer emigres 
living in France after the annexation. It depicts a region, annexed against its will in 
1871, whose indigenous population resisted both passively and actively a policy of 
brutal Germanisation. This lasted until the liberation by French troops in 1918, 
returning the relieved and overjoyed populations to la mere patrie. This version was 
based on revanchist theories, and a revanchist movement which was at its peak in the 
1880s and 1890s in France. From this, wartime propaganda was produced by the 
French Government in order to rally the French population behind the war effort. For 
example, Albert Bettannier's drawing entitled, `La conquete de la Lorraine', depicts a 
group of mosellan women and children, some in traditional costume, hard at work with 
their laundry. Through the open window, against a rural setting, three German soldiers 
in Prussian helmets present a posy of flowers to the women. However, the women are 
poised in various positions which imply their desire to fend off German attentions. 
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One holds a broom, another an iron, whilst two women appear ready to tip a basin of 
water over the soldiers' heads. 7 
The French version of how annexation unfolded in the provinces also had 
another aspect to it. On the one hand, the French had succeeded, by 1918, in 
convincing the French population that the regions had been worth fighting for, that the 
inhabitants were `more French than the French', impatiently awaiting a return to full 
French sovereignty. On the other, they succeeded in convincing the indigenous 
population of Alsace and the Moselle that a return to France would be accompanied by 
a sincere respect for the regions' traditions and cultures. After all, the French had, on 
numerous occasions throughout the war, promised just such an outcome. In the 
Moselle, it was General Mangin who promised that `vos families, vos biens seront 
proteges; vos institutions, vos traditions seront respectees' 
48 Elsewhere, General 
Joffre had promised, `La France vous apporte ... le respect de vos libertes ä vous, des 
libertes alsaciennes, de vos traditions, de vos convictions' 49 Similar promises were 
repeated by Poincare in 1915, by General Petain in 1918, by Edouard Herriot that 
same year, and on more than one occasion, by Alexandre Millerand over the years 
which followed desannexion. Undoubtedly, these promises implied to the populations 
of the provinces that France intended leaving their religious statute intact, that no 
effort to remove the use of local dialects would be made, that legislation put in place 
during annexation to which the inhabitants had become accustomed, would remain 
intact. However, the implications of these solemn promises made by the most 
47 See Agulhon, Maurice, Nation, patrie, patriotisme en France du moyen age a nos jours, Paris, 
1993. Such resistance among the women of the Moselle to German charms is not borne out in the 
marriage statistics. See chapter two, p. 45, Table 5. 
48 Furthermore, this very promise was quoted in the book commemorating the return of the provinces 
to France. Weiss, Le Premier Voyage Officiel, p. 37. 
49 Pronounced 24 November 1914 at Thann, Lower Alsace, in the area occupied by French troops after 
the first offensive of the war. In Rohr, La Lorraine mosellane, p. 20. 
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prestigious of French leaders, completely contradicted the impression created by the 
same French leadership among Francois de l'interieur. They had been led to believe 
that the provinces were so anxious to become French once again, that the sacrifices 
necessary to bring them in line with the rest of France would be of little consequence 
to the indigenous populations. Indeed, the population of France was convinced that 
Alsace and the Moselle would imperceptibly fall in line with the rest of the Third 
French Republic, the integration process allowing any unfortunate bad German habits 
to melt away. This was the myth of Alsace-Lorraine. For French observers, therefore, 
the celebrations which accompanied the arrival of the French soldiers, could only be 
interpreted as the salute of a solidly patriotic indigenous population. After 47 years of 
resistance, November 1918 was their much longed for liberation. 
Another way of reading these celebrations, suggested here, is based on the 
more recent acceptance that Germanisation, despite the very real problems it 
encountered over the years, had made numerous improvements and brought positive 
changes to the lives of the inhabitants of the Moselle, even those who were 
Francophone. More importantly, this version takes into account the expectations of 
the indigenous populations by 1914, prior to the outbreak of war. After 43 years of 
German rule, many of the initial difficulties associated with the transfer of sovereignty 
within the region had been resolved. Germanisation during the period had not been 
consistently brutal, as some Francophile versions have claimed. Certainly, there were 
those among the Francophone indigenous population who remained unmoved by the 
linguistic and cultural changes brought about by Germanisation. Many had found the 
German take-over of power in the provinces particularly intrusive. However, two 
generations had been born and educated under German rule, marriages between the 
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immigrant population and the indigenous population were by no means uncommon, 
and significant legislative, administrative, economic, and urban developments had made 
positive and popular changes within the regions. Just as important as the relative 
advances made by Germanisation, is the fact that few events had occurred during the 
period of annexation up to 1914 which had indicated a likelihood that France would 
ever be in a position to ensure the regions' return to French sovereignty. As Stevenson 
points out, between 1887 and 1905, the danger of a Franco-German war receded. 
Although in theory French governments continued to support revanchism, 50 none was 
at all interested in going to war in the name of the lost provinces . 
S1 Adamthwaite 
quotes the German ambassador in Paris as stating in February 1914, `the bellicose 
desire for revenge ... is now outmoded. 
It only exists to a certain extent in theory. 
The wound of 1871 still burns in all French hearts, but nobody is inclined to risk his or 
her son's bones for the question of Alsace-Lorraine'. 52 Up to 1914, therefore, the 
future had remained unarguably German. Only after war between France and Germany 
had been declared, due to reasons unrelated to the Alsace-Lorraine question, did this 
future come into question once again. Clearly, though, it would be wrong to assume 
that those among the indigenous population who lived their lives in the light of this, 
and who might have been considered successfully `Germanized', were now 
Germanophile. Those who sought employment in the German civil service, for 
example, did not necessarily seek to endorse German rule. For purely practical 
reasons, individuals' behaviour was more often dictated by 
50 Even the strength and importance of French revanchism itself is questionable. Bariety and Poidevin 
suggest that with the exception of certain intellectuels and the creation of the revanchist groups such 
as the Ligues des patriotes, revanchism was only really sustained in schools where, they claim, 
patriotism had replaced the role of religion. Poidevin, Raymond, and Baridty, Jacques, Les relations 
franco-allemands 1815-1975, Paris, 1977, p. 111. 
" Stevenson, D., French War Aims Against Germany 1914-1919, Oxford, 1982, p. 2. 
52 Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery, p. 18. 
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circumstances rather than by patriotism or sentiment. Whilst Germanisation had 
certainly enjoyed its successes, clearly the region would require a further passage of 
time, and of generations, before the whole process could mature into widespread, pro- 
German sentiment. 
As for the populations' rejection of German rule in November 1918, implied by 
the celebrations and festivities described above, this must be viewed in the light of 
German behaviour towards the populations during the war. The German military 
managed to undo 43 years of steady assimilation in a matter of months following the 
outbreak of hostilities. Martial law brought censorship of the press and post within the 
regions. `War Committees' were created in order to identify, round up, and imprison 
all persons suspected of even the most minor anti-German offence. It was largely the 
Francophone population which feared these committees. Alsatians and Mosellans 
were treated with distrust by the military, to the extent that soldiers, recruited from the 
indigenous population, were sent to the Russian front as it was felt they could not be 
relied upon to fight against the French on the Western Front. 53 The cruel, 
unpredictable behaviour of some of the German military personnel during the war 
instilled a fear among the indigenous population. This could not be erased by 
Scheidemann's plan to grant autonomy to the regions in October 1918, or by his 
proposal of a neutral state a matter of weeks later. Frederic Eccard shows that, 
amongst the indigenous, French-speaking bourgeoisie, patriotic sentiment had always 
remained alive during annexation. However, it was the brutality of the Prussian 
military personnel which, he claimed, pushed the rest of the population into the arms of 
53 During the Second World War, soldiers from the indigenous population forced to fight in the 
German army were known as the malgre nous. From the Moselle alone, 30,000 such soldiers were 
forcibly recruited in 1942. See Nonnemacher, Georges-Gilbert, La grande honte de 1'incorporation 
de force des Alsaciens-Lorrains, Eupenous-Malmedien et Luxembourgeois dans l'armee allemande 
au cours de la Deuxieme guerre mondiale, Colmar, 1966, p. 5. 
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France. 54 It seems that for these sections of the indigenous population, support for 
France was derived from a dislike of Germany, rather than from a recognisable sense of 
French patriotism. At the time of the armistice, therefore, promises from the French 
military and political hierarchy were a good deal more convincing, and very much more 
appealing, than the proposals of a country which felt it could not trust the region's 
population in peacetime, to say nothing of four years of war. 
Thus, for the long suffering population of the Moselle, convinced by France 
and disgusted by Germany, it was not hard to see where their future lay. Primarily, 
their celebrations during those November days, were in honour of an end to the 
fighting and the killing. The Moselle had suffered its losses, just like other regions of 
France. The war had brought food shortages, hardships, disease, and danger to the 
civilian population. But the tricolours which adorned the villages and towns of the 
Moselle, and the joyful singing of the Marseillaise which echoed day and night through 
the streets and town halls across the region as French troops performed their liberation 
marches, were not indicative of a long standing loyalty or patriotism towards the 
French Republic. They were adopted symbols of an optimism for the region's future, a 
region which could not afford the luxury of neutrality or independence. The fact that 
this was a French future was almost irrelevant. The festivities reflected the belief that 
the Moselle could finally find political and social stability, that the region would no 
longer be treated as the insignificant partner in the context of a Reichsland, but would 
find, once again, its role as a departement of importance, perhaps even as the 
prestigious home to the capital of the region of Lorraine. These were the broad 
54 Eccard, Pour une politique alsacienne et lorraine, p. 7. 
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expectations of the population of the Moselle. The finer details could be worked out in 
the months ahead. Overall, there was plenty to celebrate. 
A New Beginning 
Alsace-Lorraine can, in fact, in some sense be compared 
to a lover, who for nearly 50 years has kept up its zeal by 
sentiment rather than by the reality of facts. The renewal 
of close acquaintance after such a long period has not 
failed to produce deception. " 
In November 1918, it appeared France still had every opportunity to avoid producing 
such disappointment. However, a fresh start which took careful consideration of the 
regions' particular situation, which acknowledged the difficulties of a recent, and not 
so recent, history, which recognized the need for a cautious beginning, was made all 
the more unlikely by the emergence during the latter stages of the war of differences of 
opinion among French politicians and key emigres. Here were two regions which had 
been part of a federal system for 47 years, albeit as an imperial territory rather than a 
fully fledged state, and which were being returned to a centralized republic. Yet, an 
immediate and forced alignment with the French judicial, political, and administrative 
systems was just as hard to imagine in the post-armistice period as the continuation of 
the federal structures inherited from the German Reich. 
The policy for the integration of Alsace and the Moselle into France had been 
examined and discussed at length from 1915 onwards by a variety of committees and 
conferences, some of them officially appointed by the French government, others of a 
55 Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon in a letter written 10 October 1919. GFC. 43 vol. 16, p. 63. 
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more informal nature. The Conference d'Alsace-Lorraine was set up on 10 February 
1915 by Rene Viviani of the French Foreign Office and held its meetings at the Quai 
d'Orsay in Paris. Louis Barthou, as president of the Conference, led a distinguished 
group of high-ranking civil servants, French politicians, and emigres (some of whom 
had only left the regions following the outbreak of war in 1914). Lorraine was largely 
under-represented, although Georges Weill, an Alsatian who had been a socialist 
deputy for Metz in the Reichstag from 1912, was appointed. The Conference had, as 
its mandate, to propose political and administrative solutions to the anticipated 
integration of the regions into France. 
Jules Siegfried founded the Comite d'etudes economiques et administratives 
relatives ä l'Alsace-Lorraine, also in February 1915. This government initiative was 
very badly received by Lorrainers in Paris as, once again, Lorraine was only 
represented by Georges Weill. The groupe lorrain was therefore formed in response 
to the Comite Siegfried with Maurice Bompard (a Messin by birth) as its president. 
Francois de Wendel and the chanoine Collin were nominated vice-presidents. The 
groupe strongly advised against an "assimilation brutale" of the administration and 
legislation within the regions, and carefully underlined the differences between the 
Moselle and Alsace which, they stated, should be borne in mind during the process of 
integration. In the end, Bompard, de Wendel, and Collin took their places at the 
Conference, which allowed Lorraine's `voice' to be heard allowing the groupe to 
restrict its activities, ultimately becoming more of an advisory body to the 
Conference. 56 Finally, in 1917, as preparations for the return of the regions became 
more decisive, a Comite d'etudes was formed by academics and members of the 
56 Roth, La Lorraine annexee, p. 624. 
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Academie Francaise. Ernest Lavisse was president and Vidal de la Blache became 
vice-president. This was an unofficial body whose task it was to gather information 
about the region's history, geography, and economy. 
As Jean-Louis Masson shows, these various groups and committees presented 
three broad solutions to integration of the provinces from which the French 
government could choose. 57 The first solution opted to give Alsace-Lorraine a 
regional structure and a special status within the Republic, continuing the German-style 
administration. This would clearly have suited many Alsatians as Strasbourg would 
have remained as overall capital. It was also favoured by regionalists in France who 
saw Alsace-Lorraine as a testing ground for their ideas. The second approach 
recommended the re-establishment of the system of departments whilst conserving, for 
a lengthy period, a transitional regime but retaining as the ultimate aim the 
implementation of French law in the regions. The idea of a lengthy period of 
adjustment appealed to many Alsatians and Lorrainers, who were well aware of the 
need to avoid abrupt change. It also increased their chances of negotiating in specific 
areas certain concessions. The third solution proposed an almost immediate return to 
French law and administration, reinstating the pre-1871 departmental boundaries. 
Only a very few Lorrainers, staunchly patriotic to France, and fiercely anti-Alsatian, 
favoured this. Almost all other emigres and observers considered this an unwise and 
hasty way to proceed. As a result, the overall thrust of the wartime recommendations 
opted for a transitional period of a significant duration, allowing for a gentle and subtle 
approach to bringing Alsace-Lorraine in line with other French regions. Furthermore, 
the Conference stressed in its final reports that, initially, there should not be a return to 
S' Masson, Histoire administrative de la Lorraine, p. 430. 
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pre-1871 departmental boundaries. It claimed such a move would create among other 
difficulties, financial complications, as departmental budgets for the Moselle would be 
out of step with those of the other three Lorrainer departments-58 The report stated, it 
would be `plus facile d'admettre qu'une petite partie de la France soit soumise 
provisoirement ä une legislation speciale, que d' admettre, pour un meme departement, 
deux legislations differentes. '59 
Despite the overwhelming advice to exercise caution, the prevailing opinion 
within Clemenceau's inner circle was for as swift a reconstitution of the lost provinces 
as possible. This reflects, of course, their self-made dilemma created by the wartime 
propaganda efforts to convince the French people that the populations of Alsace- 
Lorraine were sufficiently French to be worth fighting for, and likewise to convince the 
returned populations that France would accept them as they were. Clemenceau's inner 
circle, though, was convinced that returning the regions to the French system of 
departments was the only way of avoiding a strengthening of the original German 
institutions, although they did concede that a provisional administration of short 
duration was inevitable. 0 What became the most important aim of the French 
government, as the return of Alsace-Lorraine became a reality, was to ensure that until 
the peace conference, the myth, created during the war, remained intact in order that 
the populations' desire to return to France be recognized internationally. According to 
the French government, this could only be achieved by swiftly implementing measures 
58 A return to pre-1871 boundaries would have resulted in the return of the arrondissement of Briey to 
the Moselle and the return of the arrondissements of Chateau-Salins and Sarrebourg to the Meurthe- 
et-Moselle. 
59 Quoted in Masson, Histoire Administrative de la Lorraine, p. 429. Masson also points out that 
although recommendations were made by the Conference, these reflected only the majority opinion. 
Some, for example, even among the Alsatians present, were unhappy about the continuing unity of 
Alsace-Lorraine in the Reichsland form. 
60 Roth, La Lorraine annexee , p. 649. 
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to curb separatist, federalist, or pro-German activity, and by erasing all that 
represented the now defunct German administration. 
61 Hence, the immediate move to 
eliminate the title and concept of `Alsace-Lorraine'. Alsace-Lorraine had never existed 
in French eyes, and therefore the term should no longer be used 62 
So, how did the new French administration function in the regions immediately 
following their return to France? In Paris, prior to the end of the war, Services were 
set up in order to deal with the provinces' affairs: their administration, civilian matters, 
and the Alsace-Lorraine statute. On 15 November 1918, a decree was signed creating 
a commissaire de la Republique for each department, the idea being that this post 
would later be translated into that of prefect, as in all other French departments. Leon 
Mirman63 became commissaire for the Moselle and likewise, Georges Maringer for the 
Bas Rhin. However, the latter also became haut commissaire, a role which allowed 
him to supervise affairs affecting all three of the returned provinces. This position did 
not, strictly speaking, replace the German Statthalter, as an administration was set up 
in Paris which was directly controlled by the Under Secretary of State Jules Jeanneney, 
thereby shifting overall control of the regions from Strasbourg to Paris. Jeanneney and 
Maringer were brothers-in-law and, as Paul Smith points out, they embodied 
Clemenceau's thoughtless and insensitive approach to the question of the returned 
provinces, an approach which was not to become any less insensitive as time passed. 
Assigning two Protestant republicans to the task of dealing with a largely Catholic 
population was a sign of even greater tactlessness to come. 64 Mirman was no better a 
61 Smith, `From the Reich to the Republic', in France: Nation and Regions, Kelly, M., and Blick, R., 
eds., Southampton, 1993, pp. 182-189, p. 183. 
62 ADM, 301 M 52. 
63 Mirman was Prefect for the Meurthe-et-Moselle from 1914 to 1918, and was commissaire de la 
Republique in the Moselle from 1918 to 1919. 
64 Smith, Paul, `From the Reich to the Republic', in France: Nation and Regions, Kelly, M., and 
Bock, R., eds., Southampton, 1993, pp. 182-189, p. 187. 
99 
choice. As Roth states, his jacobin temperament prevented him from understanding 
the delicate issues of religion and regionalism within the Moselle. 5 One of his first 
acts as commissaire was to take over the prefecture buildings in Metz from his German 
predecessor, Baron von Gemmingen-Hornberg. His account of this, sent to Jeanneney, 
gives a useful indication of his style. 
Je mets M. Gemmingen en demeure de partir; il demande 
des delais craignant les diffcultes d'un demenagement 
rapide[... ] Cette vieille bete insista, je lui reponds que 
Pun de nous devait ce soir coucher ä 1'hötel, ou lui qui ne 
representait plus rien, ou moi qui representait le 
gouvernement de la Republique 66 
In fact, the organisation of the administration which resulted from a series of 
decrees in November and December 1918, as well as the attitudes towards integration 
of the regions implied by the appointments of the above individuals, provoked deep 
criticism from the earliest stages. Excessive centralisation and the hurried 
departementalisation of the provinces meant that by March 1919, a complete overhaul 
of the administration was required. Jeanneney's plans to slip the provinces back into 
France without any fuss or bother, retaining for as brief a period as possible local and 
German legislation, were stunningly unsuccessful. In fact, his actions merely led to the 
rapid emergence among the population of a sense of dissatisfaction and disillusionment 
with the new administration, the malaise lorrain. 
65 Francois Roth, Le temps des journaux, p. 28. 
66 Quoted in Roth, Francois, 'Un prdfet de guerre en Lorraine: Leon Mirman', in Revue 
administrative de l'Est de la France, no. 16,1979, pp. 5-19, p. 14. 
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Other more practical problems faced the new regime during those early days. 
Of course, the demobilisation of Mosellan and Alsatian soldiers, who had fought 
during the war in the German army, had to be carried out by the French army. Not 
only were they to be demobilized, they also had to be repatriated. Despite initial 
promises of a swift return of soldiers to their homes, delays soon occurred. Firstly, the 
German military authorities did not always follow Ebert's instructions to release 
Alsatian and Mosellan soldiers. Secondly, transportation presented difficulties. As 
German soldiers retreated and made their way home, Alsatian and Lorrainer soldiers 
attempted to go against this human tide. Many were without correct or adequate 
papers which created further delays. News of soldiers' whereabouts, especially those 
who had been fighting on the Russian front, failed to reach families in the provinces 
and concerns were voiced increasingly in the press. On 18 November the press in 
Metz stated, `Le retour des soldats lorrains qui avaient servi dans 1'armee allemande 
s'effectue avec une lenteur desesperante. Les families sont inquietes. Depuis quinze 
jours, les nouvelles manquent totalement'. 67 Once soldiers actually arrived in the 
region, they were sent to barracks and military centres, where they had to await a 
hearing before tribunals set up to assess their national sentiment. Only those who 
managed to show their loyalty to France were repatriated. The rest were denied entry 
to the regions. Rumours circulated suggesting that if Alsace-Lorraine soldiers 
returning to the regions arrived in civilian dress, their cases would be processed more 
swiftly than those arriving in German military uniform. Sadly, this was not the case, 
and even provisions in the Treaty of Versailles failed to improve matters significantly. 
67 Quoted in Brasme, Pierre, `Le rapatriement des prisonniers et des combattants alsaciens-lorrains 
(1918-1920)', Bulletin de liaison de l'A. N. S. B. V., 1988, pp. 140-147, p. 142. 
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However, the new regime, as well as the French military authorities, was blamed for 
failing to treat the situation with more urgency, and for taking so long to bring about 
demobilisation. 
Further difficulties faced the new regime including the need to repair damage to 
the Moselle caused by the close proximity of the region to front-line fighting 
68 
Although only small areas of the Moselle were affected, some villages and farmland 
were more damaged than others. Property had been damaged, livestock stolen or 
requisitioned, and furniture and personal belongings removed as the German army had 
made its way to and from the front. The French authorities moved swiftly to offer 
assistance to the region, taking advantage of an opportunity to show its commitment to 
the returned population and its welfare. The re-supplying of food to the region also 
took priority in November and December 1918, and very soon the population found, 
having suffered from the allied blockade of Germany during the last months of the war, 
that gradually most basic foodstuffs could be obtained in Metz for the first time in 
many months. However, prices were not controlled, and, very quickly, unfavourable 
comparisons were made with prices in nearby Nancy. 
Clearly, there was more to integration than simply dealing with the immediate 
practical difficulties of the initial few weeks. For the new administration, of much 
greater importance was the formation and consolidation of French sentiment among 
the region's indigenous population. In their desire to perpetuate the idea of France, 
"une et indivisible", any regional dissent, or any divergence from French republican 
patriotism, could not be accepted in the provinces. The period of annexation presented 
a multitude of issues which were at odds with French republicanism. It was certainly 
611 See Clout, Hugh, 'Rural revival: the recovery of the Moselle after World War I', in Modem and 
Contemporary France, 1994, NS2(4), pp. 395-403. 
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easier in some ways for the French government to treat the situation as if German 
annexation had not really happened. However, by working with the myth they had 
created, the French authorities could not accept that Alsace and the Moselle had 
developed along different religious, political, and cultural lines for the duration of 
German rule 69 And the idea that a half-way house between a federal state and a 
centralized state could be found, or made to work, was too risky in the light of the 
approaching peace conference. France had to be seen to be in control of its unruly 
children. For this reason, the French approach to integration was, from the start, based 
on the idea that only French sentiment was `good' sentiment. Anything else was 
German, and `bad', and therefore should be suppressed or removed. During those 
early, frantic days, there was no room for those who found it hard to consider 
themselves anything other than Mosellan, or at best Lorrain, even though indigenes 
who had considered themselves specifically German prior to the signing of the 
armistice, were few and far between. 
Concluding remarks 
A useful analogy for the return of the Moselle and Alsace to France is that of the 
children of divorced parents. After years spent living half the week with one parent, 
and half the week with the other, it soon becomes clear that stability in each child's life 
is not derived from the warring parents but from the siblings. The population of the 
Moselle (one of the children, in this case), had come to accept Germany (the 
Vaterland) but not necessarily German nationality or pro-German sentiment. In 1918, 
not all within the population could remember what it had been like to be part of France 
69 See Maas' useful discussion of this point in, `Zeitenwende in Elsaß-Lothringen', in Speitkamp, 
Winfried, ed., Denkmalsturz, Gottingen, 1997, pp. 79-108. 
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(la mere patrie) prior to 1871 and even then, they were only familiar with life in the 
French Empire, not the Third French Republic. This is not to suggest that there was 
necessarily a sense of unity among the children, or within the Moselle's population. In 
spite of each parent's faults, one child might have more affection for the father, another 
for the mother. In 1918, though, by attempting to separate what was French from 
what was German within the region, France omitted to take into consideration the 
complexities of the situation its lost children had experienced. For a week between the 
signing of the armistice and the entry of French troops, they had found themselves in 
no man's land, a political vacuum, and had automatically fallen back on their own 
resources in order to stabilize the situation. If France was to win their confidence and 
to earn their love and respect, it would need to do a great deal more than make 
superficial promises and put on lavish liberation ceremonies. 
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Summary 
Germany's last-ditch attempt, between September and November 1918, to prevent its 
Reichsland from falling into French hands, an attempt which initially offered the 
regions' populations autonomy within the Reich and then promoted the idea of an 
independent, neutral state, failed to raise even minimal interest. The offer simply came 
too late in the day. The brief impact of the German Revolution on the regions with the 
formation of soldiers and workers' revolutionary councils, led to disarray in the 
German army, caused strikes in key industries, and created pockets of communist 
activity which were to become the source of friction within the regions over the 
months which followed. Despite the formation of a National Assembly, and the 
declaration of a Republic in Alsace-Lorraine during the early days of November, a 
sense of suspended animation fell over the regions between the signing of the armistice 
and the entry of French troops, broken only by the pomp and circumstance of the 
liberation marches and the widespread celebrations which followed. However, it is 
clear that what was being celebrated by the indigenous population in the Moselle was 
not so much a return to being French, as an end to fighting, an end to Germany's 
martial law, an end to food shortages, and an end to being German. Although used as 
evidence of pro-French sentiment by French officials, these celebrations were clearly 
the result of immediate circumstances rather than of long-term ideological convictions 
and national identity. The failure to recognise this, as well as the failure to follow the 
recommendations of wartime committees gradually to integrate the provinces into 
France, exercising tact and sensitivity in the process, sowed the seeds of a malaise 
lorrain, even before the year was out. Winning over public opinion within the French 
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interior, as well as on the international front, were clearly considered more pressing 
than the task of winning over the regions' populations beyond the superficiality of the 
1918 celebrations. 
Chapter IV 
Administration of the Moselle 
and the malaise lorrain 
France in 1918 was, in many respects, radically different from the France the Moselle 
had known before 1870. The principal difference was, of course, that France had 
become a republic, formed after Napoleon III's expansionist foreign policy had 
collapsed in the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War. Alsace and annexed Lorraine, 
though, had continued within the authoritarian structures of an empire, albeit German. 
There had, inevitably, been numerous changes to the structure and administration of 
the French nation under the Third Republic. However, three areas in particular were 
of concern to the populations of Alsace and the Moselle. Firstly, the Ferry Laws of the 
1880s, among other achievements, reduced the role of the Catholic clergy in schools, 
replacing the 1850 Loi Falloux which had previously sought to increase Catholic 
influence. ' Secondly, the Dreyfus Affair had shocked Alsatians in particular, but also 
mosellans, whose Jewish community was centred largely in Metz. This was because 
the affair had demonstrated anti-Semitic sentiment among the French population, 
which had hitherto gone largely undetected, and which was clearly at odds with French 
ideals of liberty, fraternity, and equality. Thirdly, and most importantly, the 1905 laic 
laws radically changed the image of France, an image which had been carefully 
preserved by many within the indigenous populations of the Moselle and Alsace. By 
separating the Church from the State, the laws engendered in these provinces a deep 
sense of disillusionment and estrangement from la mere patrie, at a time when the 
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autonomist movement was appearing to gain some ground in its attempt to win a 
constitution for the Reichsland. By the beginning of the First World War, it was 
becoming clear that France, and its lost provinces, were living increasingly separate 
lives. 
The war, though, changed everything, and it was not long before the return of 
the lost provinces became the primary French war aim. 2 Equally, within the two 
provinces, German actions against the indigenous populations brought the question of 
a return to French sovereignty back into the limelight. Thus, in November 1918, 
Alsace and the Moselle were seized by France after a period of separation which 
amounted to almost half a century3 The initial emotions and declarations have been 
dealt with in the previous chapter. What will be dealt with here are the complex 
questions of administrative and legal integration, the difficulties they posed, and the 
extent to which mistakes in French policy towards the provinces, as well as unrealistic 
local expectations, were responsible for the emergence of a malaise lorrain. However, 
a brief profile of post-war France is necessary before examining the specific experience 
of the Moselle. 
Post-war France 
The post-war celebrations, which swept across the French nation, were influenced by a 
somewhat unrealistic optimism that prosperity and pre-war abundance would swiftly 
return. Few were prepared, or willing, to accept that recovery from a war such as this 
1 Jules Ferry (1832-1893) brought about the introduction of free and compulsory primary education, 
state certification of school teachers, lycdes for girls, and encouraged training in technology and 
languages. He sought to reduce the Catholic clergy's influence in education. 
2 Baechler, Christian, `L'Alsace-Lorraine dann les relations franco-allemandes', in Baridty, J., Guth, 
A., Valentin, J. M., La France et I'Allemagne, Nancy, 1987, pp. 69-109, p. 69. 
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would be preceded by a period of intense hardship. Shortages of food and essential 
goods, a greatly diminished workforce (the war had cost France 1,300,000 lives), 
insufficient raw materials for industry, reduced levels of livestock, agricultural 
machinery, and fertilizer, meant that France was to suffer short-term misery and long- 
term discomfort well into the 1920s. Working class agitation in 1919 and 1920 led to 
strikes, whilst a wave of revolutionary activity across Europe aroused fear and 
paranoia among the political classes and the population as a whole. The loss of life had 
serious consequences for the birth-rate and the number of marriages over the years 
which followed, the only increase in population resulting from the very large numbers 
of immigrant workers arriving in France. Most came from Poland and other Eastern 
European countries, as well as Italy 4 
In politics, the aggressive nationalism of the Bloc national between 1919 and 
1924, followed by the crisis-ridden, anti-clerical Cartel des gauches between 1924 and 
1926, meant that the early 1920s produced a turbulent period in French political 
history. Both of these governments posed problems for Alsace and the Moselle. The 
first, initially under Clemenceau in 1918, led to a series of hasty decisions regarding the 
future of the provinces and their integration, decisions based on the joyous reception in 
the regions of the French liberation, but also on the desire to resolve the question 
quickly. It is not entirely clear why Clemenceau acted so hastily, sweeping aside the 
carefully considered advice of the wartime committees and councils. He was certainly 
not naive enough to believe the integration process could be rushed through simply in 
order to avoid local dissent. In fact, as he recalled on 5 November 1918 after 
I The provinces were 'seized', rather than 'returned', as it was only after the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles that French claims to the regions were internationally recognized, and French sovereignty 
over the provinces was made legal. 
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announcing the terms of the armistice, Clemenceau was the last survivor of those who 
had signed the protest against the Treaty of Frankfurt and the annexation of Alsace- 
Lorraine. 5 Furthermore, he had never sought to hide the fact that he felt personally 
wounded by the events of 1871, nor did he ever seek to hide his dislike for, and 
distrust of, Germany, something which his efforts at the Paris Peace Conference clearly 
illustrate. However, apart from the official visit in December 1918, Clemenceau's 
involvement in dealing with the situation in Alsace and the Moselle should not be 
overestimated. Prior to the opening of the Peace Conference in January 1919, he was 
extremely preoccupied preparing the French case to be presented at Versailles. What 
little time he had was taken up with the numerous official visits around the country, in 
particular to those areas devastated by war and in greatest need of support and 
encouragement from the government. Domestic matters, including the integration of 
Alsace and the Moselle, were therefore handed over to the relevant government 
officials, in this case, the under-Secretary of State, Jules Jeanneney, a republican 
radical who openly despised Germany, and to the Services d'Alsace-Lorraine which 
had been set up prior to the end of the war in Paris. However, the most likely reason 
for the government's haste, and for Clemenceau's apparent lack of interest in a tactful 
approach to the situation, was the need, ahead of the Paris Peace Conference, to 
forestall any argument about the regions' unconditional return to French sovereignty. 
Clemenceau did not wish to face any objections from Britain or the United States on 
what was only one small aspect of the peace treaty. However, failure to deliver 
ratification of the return of annexed Lorraine and Alsace to the French people, would 
almost certainly have resulted in a dramatic loss of public confidence in his 
° See Becker, Jean-Jacques, and Bernstein, Serge, Victoire et Frustrations 1914-29, Paris, 1990, 
p. 162. Chapter 7 deals comprehensively with the effects of war on France. See also chapter seven, 
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government. Although the return of the provinces was an integral part of ensuring 
French security against Germany, self-determination remained a key moral issue at the 
conference. In the end, the successful outcome of the peace talks for Clemenceau on 
the count of the Moselle and Alsace, which backdated their return to 11 November 
1918 and ignored Germany's call for a plebiscite, was counterbalanced by his failure to 
convince the British and the Americans to give France the desired level of security 
against further German aggression. 
Following the peace treaty, the success of the Bloc national up to 1924 was a 
clear reflection of the desire for national unity, and was indicative of the vain hope that 
the government which had won France the war could also win it a prosperous peace. 
However, it was the Bloc national, largely under Poincare as President, which had to 
deal with a series of crises at home and abroad, including the political crisis of 1920 
and 21, the French occupation of the Ruhr, and continuous strikes by workers. Their 
failure to resolve these crises led, in 1924, to the election of the Cartel des gauches 
headed by Edouard Herriot. 6 Although not intended as a radical move, his proposals 
to apply all aspects of republican legislation throughout the country, including bringing 
to an end the special religious regime in Alsace and the Moselle, created a reaction far 
stronger than any he could have anticipated. Reaction was strongest in the returned 
provinces, but soon spread to the rest of France, leading ultimately to the downfall of 
the socialist coalition in 1926. Herriot was unable to make any anticlerical legislation 
stick during his brief period in power, and the continued existence of the Concordat in 
the Moselle and Alsace is testimony to his mishandling of the populations, rather than 
to any sudden upsurge in support for clericalism within the population as a whole. In 
The workforce, pp. 260-270 below. 
5 Watson, D R., Georges Clemenceau. A Political Biography, London, 1979, p 326. 
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any case, by the late 1920s, the perceived threat from the Catholic Church and other 
religious orders (a threat which had fueled anticlerical sentiment from as far back as 
1789), and therefore the need to enforce radical legislation, had slipped from political 
consciousness. Finally, it was Poincare, heading a national union government, who 
was brought back in 1926. He stabilized the franc, thereby calming the nation, and 
restoring confidence. Clearly, these were unsettled times and difficult years for the 
French population as a whole, a factor which must be borne in mind in assessments of 
the very localized problems of the Moselle and Alsace. 
The structure 
At the end of the First World War, and right up to the entry of French troops in 
November 1918, much uncertainty remained as to how the new administration of 
Alsace and the Moselle would be structured. International law prevented anything 
more than the implementation of a provisional administration in the initial stages. The 
decrees of 15 and 26 November sought to suppress the concept of `Alsace-Lorraine', 
creating a new regime based on the original concept of three departments. Annexed 
Lorraine, although it did not correspond geographically to any pre-1871 department, 
was renamed the Moselle. The question of its boundaries was set to one side, whilst 
the initial problems of integration were addressed. Equally, the two districts within 
Alsace regained their pre-1870 departmental names, the Bas-Rhin and the Haut-Rhin. 
The territory of Belfort, which had remained French throughout annexation, attached 
as it was to the Vosges department of Lorraine, remained outside Alsace, again to 
6 See Jeanneney, Jean-Noel, Lecon d'histoire pour une gauche au pouvoir. La faillite du Cartel 1924- 
26, Paris, 1977. 
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avoid complications. ' On 15 September 1918, a Comite consultatif d'Alsace-Lorraine 
was created in Paris, which was to be consulted on all administrative or organizational 
questions within the territories. The committee was reorganized by the decree of 26 
November, and became the Conseil superieur d'Alsace et Lorraine. This decree also 
placed in overall charge of the regions the President du Conseil, the head of the French 
Government under the constitution of the Third French Republic, who, at that stage, 
was Georges Clemenceau. He, in turn, delegated all power to Jules Jeanneney, the 
Under Secretary of State. 
The three commissaires de la Republique were Georges Maringer in the Bas- 
Rhin, Henri Poulet in the Haut-Rhin, and Leon Mirman in the Moselle. The intention 
was that they should function as departmental prefects, as in the rest of France. In the 
meantime, Georges Maringer took on the role of haut-commissaire dealing with 
matters which concerned the three departments collectively. Very quickly it was 
realized, by the commissaires themselves, that the complexities of the situation could 
not be dealt with in the framework provided. The excessive and hurried centralization 
of administrative procedure to Paris provoked deep criticism from within the 
provinces, which was fueled by the commissaires' inability to speak German. 
Overwhelmed by the sheer size of the task facing them, the commissaires soon lost 
heart. Their often inept handling of the situation was hard to hide from the press, and 
the administration rapidly descended into disorder within weeks of the French 
liberation, prompting increasingly unfavourable comparisons with the German 
7 Masson also points out that many Alsatians were keen to retain the post-1870 departmental 
boundaries, as this helped to perpetuate the sense of particularisme within the regions, emphasising 
the fact that both geography and sentiment had changed within the regions during annexation, and 
that such differences should therefore be accommodated by the new French administration by way of a 
more liberal regionalist policy. Masson, Histoire administrative de la Lorraine. Des provinces aux 
departemements et a la region, Paris, 1982, p. 43 1. Masson provides an excellent survey of the 
administrative structures put in place during this period. 
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administration. Maringer was the first to admit that matters were not going according 
to plan, and informed Paris that an overhaul of the administration was urgently 
required. 
On 21 March 1919, a commissariat general de la Republique was created in 
Strasbourg, and a commissaire general replaced Maringer's post of haut commissaire. 
This amounted to a public admission that the early French administration had failed. 
Equally, the position and responsibilities of the new commissaire general were 
remarkably similar to those of the German Statthalter. Alexandre Millerand, a grand 
homme politique, took up the post and was given far-reaching powers. He was 
answerable to the Minister for War, and, ultimately, the President of the Republic. Up 
until the national elections of November 1919, Alsace and the Moselle were ruled in 
this way, with no political representation in the French parliament. Again, this 
prompted comparisons with the outgoing German administration, which had granted 
both a regional parliament (which sent representatives to the Reichstag), and a regional 
government, which had dealt expeditiously with regional affairs, equivalents of which 
did not appear to be on offer from France. 
Millerand's office was in Strasbourg rather than Paris, a move which brought 
an instant improvement in the administration's efficiency, which in turn brought an 
instant improvement in its popularity. What helped most was the fact that decisions 
were taken by orders, or arretes, rather than by complicated decrees which had to pass 
through parliament before they could be enacted. Millerand was undoubtedly the right 
man for the job. His attitude towards the regions' unfortunate situation was more 
understanding and open than that of his predecessor. However, he had two difficult 
tasks. Firstly, he had to resolve the difficulties created by the initial four months of 
French administration, soothing the ruffled populations, and reaffirming original French 
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promises, many of which already appeared to have been broken. Secondly, he had to 
prepare the way for progressive assimilation. The latter had, of course, been the main 
French aim from the start. It was only now accepted that this process could not be 
achieved from one day to the next. Yet, the task facing Millerand and his 
administration was indeed awesome. Eccard lists some of the areas requiring 
Millerand's immediate attention upon his arrival: the restoration of adequate fuel, food, 
and raw material supplies; the repair of war-damaged areas of the regions; the 
maintenance of the transportation system; the reorganization of the administrative 
system; the replacement of those Germans working in the legal profession and the civil 
service with their French equivalents. He also had to address the exchange of 
currencies, questions of nationality, the removal of undesirable elements from the 
population, and the liquidation of German property. He had to reorganize the 
education system, create a new teaching personnel, consider the taxation and social 
insurance systems, resolve the religious and language questions, and prepare the way 
for the assimilation of all areas of legislation. On top of this, he had to consider public 
opinion within the region, weighing this up with the French Government's objectives in 
Paris! 
From 10 May 1919, power was centred even more in Strasbourg, as the 
Conseil superieur was transferred from Paris. Millerand, as commissaire general, 
became president of this council, and it was he who sought (unsuccessfully) to 
translate it into a Conseil regional. The council's aim was to help the commissaire 
general in the process of assimilation and integration, and it was to be made up largely 
of experts and specialists able to represent the diverse interests of the region. In the 
8 Eccard, 'L'Alsace et la Lorraine sous le Commissariat General et apr6s sa suppression', in Revue 
politique et parlementaire, November 1925, pp. 197-237, p. 207. 
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event, a slightly different format was adopted which created three Conseils generaux in 
the three departments. A Conseil regional then met four times a year to deliberate on 
issues arising from the departmental level. On 17 October 1919, a law was introduced 
to clarify the nature of the overall administrative regime, formally accepting that the 
commissariat general in Strasbourg would be maintained, albeit provisionally. It was 
given no `life expectancy' at this stage. Such a time restriction would undoubtedly 
have been badly received by the local population, and, in any case, would have been 
very difficult to calculate, as those already in the regions had gradually recognized. 
Millerand's term as commissaire general marked one of the high points in 
French handling of the provinces' return to France. His main problem was his early 
departure, as he was recalled to Paris in January 1920 to become premier and foreign 
minister under Paul Deschanel 9 His success can be measured in the speed with which 
he reassured the populations, combining his regionalist interests with his awareness of 
how far he could push the returned populations in order to achieve assimilation as 
quickly as possible without encountering resistance. His numerous speeches and 
interviews demonstrate his distinctive bedside manner. 
`L'Alsace et la Lorraine sont passionnement francaises, 
mais elles sont en meme temps passionnement 
alsaciennes et lorraines. Comment pourrions-nous leur 
en vouloir d'un particularisme qui leur a permis de se 
conserver ä nous? ' 10 
9 Millerand then replaced Deschanel as President of the Republic. 
10 Millerand, quoted in Eccard, `L'Alsace et la Lorraine sous le Commissariat G6ndral', in Revue 
politique et parlementaire, November 1925, p. 208. 
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Eccard's glowing appraisal of the `role capital joue par Millerand jusqu'au jour de son 
depart le 20 janvier 1920', reflected approval felt in both the Moselle and Alsace, who 
were otherwise critical of the opening months of French rule in the provinces. 
Cette puissance de travail, cette grande intelligence, cette 
nature de chef qui distinguaient Millerand, lui permirent 
de realiser dans le court espace de dix mois, une oeuvre 
que l'on ne saurait qualifier autrement que de formidable 
et qui posa les principaux jalons de celle continuee par 
ses successeurs. " 
His successor was, in fact, the apolitical diplomat, Gabriel Alapetite, a high- 
ranking civil servant who sadly lacked the panache, presence, and influence of 
Millerand. His appointment, therefore, marked the beginning of another troublesome 
era in the administration of the provinces. Millerand's ability to obtain funds seemingly 
from nowhere, to display such generous empathy with the regions' desire for 
decentralization whilst planning their full assimilation into the Republic, and to 
demonstrate his political weight at every turn, made him a hard act to follow. 
Alapetite appeared almost impotent in contrast. The very fact that he had previously 
been Resident General in Tunis, seemed to imply that, according to the French 
Government, the former Reichsland required a commissaire general with experience in 
the French colonies to handle it. '2 Alapetite soon came under fierce attack, despite 
attempting to continue most of Millerand's policies, and sharing many of Millerand's 
sentiments about the integration process of the provinces. This is illustrated in a 
11 Eccard, Frederic, Le livre de ma vie, Strasbourg, 1951, p. 103. 
12 See Jaeger, Jules-Albert, `Un grand fonctionnaire, Gabriel Alapetite', in L'Alsace Franpaise. 
Revue hebdomadaire d'action nationale, 3 April 1932, year 12, no. 14, written following Alapetite's 
death. Alapetite had been recalled from Madrid where he was ambassador to France in order to take 
up the post as commissaire general in Strasbourg. 
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comment he made at the end of his time in Strasbourg, when he expressed the hope 
that the ongoing integration process would not mean that benefits from the period of 
German annexation would be lost, and that `people who had become accustomed to 
electric light should not have to go back to the use of oil lamps'. '3 His term of office 
in Strasbourg was dogged every step of the way by rumours that his departure was 
imminent. The press reckoned he should never have been appointed to the post, one 
newspaper declaring 
Resident general ä Tunis, il ya laisse le souvenir d'un 
homme sans initiative, sans volonte [... ] Ambassador ä 
Madrid, il representa la France sans aucun eclat ni relief, 
donnant l'impression d'un diplomate denue de toute 
valeur professionnelle. 14 
Almost immediately following Alapetite's appointment, the process of 
rattachements, of handing over control of key areas of the regions' administration, was 
accelerated, thus undermining the authority and reputation of the new commissariat 
general. The result was clearly detrimental to the smooth running of the provinces, as 
ministers in Paris, often demonstrating a complete ignorance of the complexities of the 
regions' legislative and administrative peculiarities, stumbled from one crisis to 
another. Between the end of 1920 and early 1922, control over the railways, civil and 
criminal justice, finance, mining, and the postal and telegraph services, were all handed 
back to Paris. Yet these were clearly `safe areas' - sections of local administration 
which could be transferred with little protest from the local populations, whose 
attention was firmly focused on the key issues of education, religion, and language. 
13 Quoted in report from Lord Crewe in Paris to the British Foreign Office, 19 May 1924. 
PRO, FO 371/10545. 
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In July 1922, Alapetite, a man of honour and integrity, if lacking somewhat in 
rhetoric, was ordered to present himself before a government committee to defend his 
position, as well as that of the Commissariat. The Government, anxious to bring the 
provisional administration to a close, sought an explanation as to why the pace of 
integration could not be quickened. Alapetite stated that it was his duty to introduce 
French legislation to the provinces, "aver 1'assentiment et la collaboration des 
populations interessees. "15 In fact, only a matter of months later, Louis Barthou, the 
minister in charge of affairs concerning the returned provinces, was sent to Strasbourg 
to announce the proposed suppression of the commissariat general. However, upon 
arriving in Alsace, he was quickly converted to the idea that this would, in fact, not 
only be unwise, but illegal. 16 He changed his speech, promising in place of the 
proposed suppression, the offer of the Government's support and cooperation within 
the regions. This is a clear example of how this kind of change of heart only ever 
occurred when the situation was viewed not from the centre, but from the periphery 
itself. 
The stay of execution for the commissariat general was short lived, as Barthou 
was succeeded by Colrat, who was pro-centralization. He was keen for the 
suppression of the commissariat to take place on 1 July 1924, but he found little 
support for this early conclusion of the special administration. Such uncertainty and 
divergence of opinion in Paris could not fail to engender criticism in the local press. 
The French Government's obsession with drawing the commissariat general to an 
early close, undoubtedly played its part in undermining the overall process of 
14 ADBR 121 AL 154, file marked `Coupures de presse 1920-1923, article entitled `M. Alapetite 
quitterait Strasbourg prochainement'. 
15 Eccard, `L'Alsace et la Lorraine sous le Commissariat General' in Revue politique et 
parlementaire, November 1925, pp. 197-237, p 214. 
16 Ibid. 
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integration. Instead of bolstering the image of the special administration in the 
provinces, by allocating adequate political and financial power to give the likes of 
Alapetite the necessary room for manoeuvre, the French government consistently 
weakened the commissariat's public image, casting doubt over its very existence, and 
weakening its authority. Newspaper headlines as early as May 1920, announced `M. 
Alapetite quitterait Strasbourg - La fin du commissariat gen6ral'. 17 As a result of this 
poor public image, right up to 1924, the commissariat was unable to broach the most 
politically sensitive areas of assimilation for fear of opening a Pandora's box. Yet, 
after the national elections of 1924 and the arrival of the Cartel des gauches in power, 
a far more brutal approach was taken. Ignoring the difficulties of the previous 
administration in resolving the contradiction between the special regime in Alsace and 
the Moselle and French republican legislation elsewhere, Edouard Herriot announced, 
his intention to enforce all anticlerical republican legislation throughout France, 
including the Moselle and Alsace. Herriot's announcement had disastrous 
consequences, mobilizing a Catholic reaction in France which emanated from the 
returned provinces and resulted, first, in Herriot's capitulation on all aspects of 
anticlerical legislation, and second, in his resignation of 10 April 1925. 
The long-anticipated suppression of the commissariat general finally took 
place on 24 July 1925. Those areas of administration which had not been previously 
transferred to respective ministries in Paris, fell under the authority of the President 
himself. However, few were satisfied, either with the way in which matters had been 
handled, or with the end product. On 1 June 1924, a limit of ten years was set for the 
completion of the legislative assimilation of the regions into France. A law of 23 
17 Le Messin, 25 May 1925, ADBR 121 AL 154, file marked `Coupures de presse 1920-1923. 
Numerous articles demonstrate the perceived weakness of the commissariat. 
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December 1934 prolonged this to 1945. Further laws have since extended this 
arrangement, without ever addressing or questioning the transitionary nature of the 
regime. French legislation was never systematically introduced to the regions, and the 
main, politically sensitive areas, in particular religion, education, judicial matters, and 
social insurance, have remained largely untouched since 1918. These inter-related 
areas will now be addressed in more detail, in order to assess why they played such a 
key role in creating stumbling blocks for the smooth integration of the Moselle into 
France. 
Education 
As Jean Kieffer has shown in his recent study of primary education in the Moselle, at 
any one time during the inter-war period, at least half of the region's population was 
affected by issues concerning primary education once parents, teachers, and pupils had 
been taken into account. 18 It was the extent of such public interest which inflated the 
importance of problems created by the sudden changes effected in the classroom by the 
new French authorities. These difficulties concerned principally primary education and 
centred on two overlapping areas, those of language and religion. French policy 
regarding education stated that the methode directe should be employed in all primary 
schools in the region. This system involved the use of French in all aspects of teaching, 
prohibiting translation into either the local dialect (Muttersprache), or German. The 
objective was that children should be surrounded by the French language whilst at 
school, and therefore distanced from the German language and culture. This policy 
was clearly the result of the desire of the French authorities to remove swiftly all traces 
of Germanisation, and, as they saw it, to return the provinces to their pre-annexation 
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state. However, their actions were also interpreted as an attempt to suppress not only 
German, but also the local dialect, and with it local culture and traditions. In 1920, the 
weekly government publication, La Correspondance de Strasbourg (Strassburger 
Correspondenz), itself published in French and German, set out the principles for 
teaching language in the schools around the region. It stated that `dire que le francais 
doit etre la langue essentielle, c'est dire que nos eleves doivent recevoir une culture 
francaise. "9 The text goes on to state that language and the development of the mind 
are intrinsically linked, and, for this reason, the use of German and similar, Germanic 
dialects should be avoided in all schools. The objective was for children to leave 
school able to `comprendre autrement qu'en gros les journaux francais, lire aver plaisir 
et profit les livres francais, suivre les manifestations de la pensee francaise, et par lä 
participer ä la vie intellectuelle et morale du peuple francais. i20 The Correspondance 
went on to state that language imposed a way of thinking in a child. `Si on leur donne 
la forme allemande, on compromet l'avenir et Ion condamne peut-etre la pensee de 
1'enfant ä se developper selon les formes de la langue et de la pensee allemandes. ' A 
subsequent issue of La Correspondance de Strasbourg addressed the question of the 
methode directe, stating that pupils should not just speak French, but think in French 
too. 
Admettre que la langue francaise doit etre la langue 
preponderante en Alsace et Lorraine [... ], c'est admettre 
que nos eleves doivent penser directement en 
francais. [... ] Or, admettre cela c'est aussi [... ] par une 
18 Kieffer, L'Enseignement primaire mosellan, p. 68. 
19 La Correspondance de Strasbourg. Strassburger Correspondenz, 1920, No. 6,5 February, pp. 39- 
40. ADM, 22 Z 1. 
20 Ibid. 
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consequence necessaire, admettre le principe de la 
methode directe. 21 
However, not everyone accepted that the predominant language should be 
French, if this meant losing or marginalizing the Muttersprache. Several hours a week 
of German were taught, for, it was claimed, `economic' reasons, as it was recognized 
that German would be required by some school-leavers seeking employment. 
However, this did little to help pupils who came from homes where only the local 
dialect was spoken. For them, Hochdeutsch was just as foreign as French. Ultimately 
this policy had unfortunate long-term consequences for the Moselle's schoolchildren, 
many of whom emerged from their early years having mastered neither French nor 
German. To their ears, both remained foreign languages. Documents, gathered for an 
exhibition commemorating the 1918 armistice in St Avoid, include an account written 
by Emile Jochum, born in 1906 during annexation. At the end of his account, he 
apologized for his poor French. `Excusez mes fautes et les maladresses de ma 
redaction. Je n'ai beneiicie que de 18 mois d'ecole francaise. Et cela est dejä un 
exploit. '22 For most of Emile's life, he lived in a country whose official language 
sounded foreign and unfamiliar. Ultimately, it was the stubbornness of the partisans of 
bilingualism in resisting attempts to bring the Moselle's education system in line with 
the rest of France, as well as French insistance on immediately employing the 
unpopular and rigid methode directe, which resulted, at least for the younger 
generations, in an unsatisfactory state of affairs from which it took the Moselle many 
years to recover. 
21 La Correspondance de Strasbourg, 1920, No. 9,17 February, p. 63. ADM, 22 Z 1. 
22 Archives municipales de St Avold, account entitled, `Emile Jochum alias Youbil6 dcrit a 
Brassorama'. 
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The only area where the methode directe was not applied was in religious 
education, which was allocated four hours per week in the school curriculum. Here, 
the teacher was allowed to decide for herself or himself in which language the subject 
should be taught, up to the stage at which pupils' knowledge of French was sufficient 
for them to properly appreciate the content of the lessons. This was interpreted by 
some as a concession to partisans of bilingualism. However, in reality, the reason such 
partisans preferred that the use of German or the Muttersprache be made compulsory, 
was in order to inhibit many teachers from the French interior from `poaching' teaching 
posts from local mosellan teachers. 23 In the long term, this state of affairs did not 
promise well for those seeking to increase the numbers of Mosellans in posts of 
responsibility within the administration of their region in the future. In the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War, enthusiasm was high among adults in the 
Germanophone indigenous population to learn French. Classes were set up around the 
region. Teachers were drafted in and class numbers were high. The municipal archives 
in Thionville contain a `Liste d'inscriptions pour les cours de francais de la ville de 
Thionville' which were held at the Pensionnat de la Providence. 24 Of the 30 names 
listed, 22 were Mosellan, four were Alsatian, and three were Luxembourger. Only one 
was German. Their professions varied widely, and included a railway worker, a 
policeman, several butchers, a postman, and a hairdresser. However, by 1921, 
numbers had dropped throughout the region and enthusiasm had died away. Funds to 
pay teachers were limited, class times were not always convenient for those attending, 
and it was soon realized that French was, in fact, a very different language from that of 
the more familiar German. Gradually, classes were canceled due to lack of interest, 
23 Kieffer, L'Enseignement primaire mosellan, p. 56. 
24 Archives municipales de Thionville, 19/292. 
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but not before the likes of Millerand and Alapetite had recognized and acknowledged 
the effort made by individuals to learn this new and difficult language. They also 
admitted that the task of learning a new language was especially difficult for the older 
generations, whose minds, they claimed, were perhaps not as supple as those of their 
grandchildren. 
As well as the difficulties posed by bilingualism in education, the question of 
confessional schools also created problems. The Loi Falloux of 15 March 1850, 
defining for the whole of France the confessional nature of schools, was still in place in 
the Moselle in 1918. This meant that religious education, as well as the influence of 
the specific religious denomination in the everyday running of a school, was still an 
integral part of state-run educational institutions around the provinces. German 
legislation on educational matters during annexation had sustained this system, whilst 
in France, the whole face of education had been altered by the Lois Ferry of the 1880s. 
These laws had severely curtailed the role of religious denominations in schools. The 
assimilation of the Moselle region into France in 1918 inevitably included the 
introduction of anticlerical legislation into state education. However, as was explained 
in a study carried out by Jacques Leblanc and published in 1922, very few within the 
population of Alsace and the Moselle wished for the immediate introduction of the 
French educational system which relied heavily upon the existence of private 
confessional schools for those who wished their children to receive an education 
according to their religious denomination. 25 In the Moselle and Alsace, there were 
only 69 such schools, compared to 2,841 state-run schools. Clearly, the pre-existing 
system of private education could not cope with the demand, which would result from 
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the application of the Ferry laws in the region, a region for whose population religion 
played such a vital role. 
Early on in the French administration in the regions, it soon became apparent 
that both religion and bilingualism in schools were issues which should be treated with 
the utmost tact and sensitivity, affecting, as they did, so many within the population. 
On 17 October 1919, the law confirming the provisional nature of the overall regime 
also confirmed that legislation affecting education, which had been in place during 
annexation, would be maintained. Herriot's rashness in 1924, therefore, came as 
something of a shock to the populations, and prompted a predictable outcry. 
Language 
The question of linguistic integration rapidly became an issue, because of its role in 
administration, judicial matters, politics, and legislation, as well as education. 
However, it seems it was never an issue in its own right, that is, a problem which 
demanded from the administration, or the Paris government, separate attention. In 
fact, in 1923, the Marquess of Crewe noted that, in his judgment, the question of 
language itself was unlikely to produce any serious difficulty in the assimilation 
process. Indeed, he claimed that some within Government circles regretted that, due 
to the war, the German language was now so marginalized in schools and universities 
nationwide that very few students took classes in it. 26 
Yet, throughout the more recent history of the provinces, there had always 
been a linguistic policy. Under French sovereignty up to 1871, the policy had been one 
25 Leblanc, J., La Liberte de l'enseignement en Alsace et Lorraine, Paris, 1922, cited in Lord 
Hardinge's report sent from Paris to the Foreign Office in London, 14 October 1922. PRO, FO 
371/8259, p. 116. 
26 The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 13 October 1923. PRO FO 
371/9391, p. 155. 
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of francisation, and during German annexation, one of Germanisation. Both nations 
adhered to the idea that sentiment followed language. However, in September 1919, 
the sous-prefet of Boulay sent a report to the commissaire in Metz expressing his 
satisfaction at finding generally among the populations, `un ardent patriotisme, un reel 
attachement ä la France et a la Republique'. 27 Unfortunately, though, he went on, `la 
langue francaise est presque totalement ignoree'. The sous-prefet recommended, 
therefore, that the development of the French language in such Germanophone, rural 
districts, be an exercise `de patience; de methode, et de tact'. Likewise, the Journal de 
Forbach published an article 22 May 1919 on the subject. 28 It stated that it was 
essential for French to be taught in the Germanophone sector of the Moselle region, in 
order that inhabitants could `participer ä la vie entiere: spirituelle, politique et 
materielle de la France'. However, in these regions, the German language `fait partie 
du coeur et de l'esprit de l'homme; et c'est un avantage aussi de posseder les deux 
langues'. Despite this, there has never been a linguistic statute in the provinces 
designed to protect linguistic traditions, or local dialects. Yet, neither has there been 
any series of laws designed to regulate the use of an official language in all areas of 
everyday life. This was all the more surprising due to the importance laid by both 
nation states upon the use of a national language as a means of defining and reaffirming 
national identity and sentiment. Indeed, both German and French administrations 
banned the use of the `other' language in certain areas, but this never took the form of 
a blanket policy or law. There were numerous loopholes in linguistic legislation, 
inadequacies as well as oversights, which meant that exceptions were made, officially 
as well as unofficially. Under the French administration following integration in 1918, 
27 Report sent to the commissaire de la Republique in Metz from Boulay, 11 September 1919. ADBR 
121 AL 91. 
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for example, all publicity concerning elections could be presented in both French and 
German, and the official bulletin for the region's administration was also published in 
both languages. Bilingualism was sometimes accepted in advertisements and 
announcements, but only if French came first. 
Overall, the French, after 1918, appear to have acted more hastily than the 
Germans did after the Treaty of Frankfurt. Although the two nation states had similar 
objectives and therefore similar policies, Germany allowed for longer periods of 
adjustment, gradually phasing out the use of French in administrative, legal, and 
political matters. 29 The French, even before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, 
introduced the use of the French language into judicial matters with immediate effect. 
And as detailed above, the use of the methode directe in primary education was also 
introduced immediately by the French, but not the Germans. Again, it can be argued 
that the circumstances of annexion in 1871, and desannexion 47 years later, were 
simply so dissimilar that drawing comparisons is both unhelpful and unwise. The 
French authorities needed speedy results in the integration process, in order that the 
myth of Alsace-Lorraine should not appear to have been contradicted. Public opinion 
within the French interior certainly had high expectations. And likewise, certain 
seemingly ill-informed politicians under-estimated the extent of the task before them. 
In any case, statistics show that in the Moselle, despite its large Francophone areas, 
73.5 per cent of the population indicated German as their mother tongue by 1910, 
28 Article entitled, 'La question des langues dans les @coles primaires des regions de ('Alsace et de 
Lorraine oºl on parle allemand', Journal de Forbach, 22 May 1919. 
29 In 1892, Germany had limited the number of communes where French was the accepted official 
language to 3 in Upper-Alsace, 22 in Lower-Alsace, and 286 in annexed Lorraine, 311 in total. 
However, by 1911, the total number for the whole of Alsace-Lorraine had only been reduced to 291. 
Office de Statistique d'Alsace et de Lorraine, 3ii me annee, 1921, Strasbourg, p. 21. 
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whereas only 22.3 per cent indicated French. 30 The figures reflect the fact that in 
1910, the indigenous population of the Moselle represented only 67.4 per cent of the 
total population, compared to 85.8 per cent in the Haut-Rhin and 88.7 per cent in the 
Bas-Rhin. " Clearly, Germany had left France with a sizeable community of German 
nationals among the regions' populations, as well as the prospect of a long and difficult 
period of linguistic francisation. Many had considered the task to be limited to the 
two departments of Alsace. However, as these figures show, the Moselle had 
complications of its own, including the arrival of large numbers of foreign workers 
speaking neither French nor German. 
Obviously, the complexities of the situation inhibited the implementation of 
blanket policies regarding the official language of the Moselle region following the 
events of 1918, especially when it came to legislation. However, there were certain 
consequences. For example, all national laws introduced to the regions were always 
written in the sovereign's national language. Texts of local laws, on the other hand, 
were always introduced in both French and German. By not fully replacing with their 
French equivalents all the German and local laws, which had been put in place in 
Alsace and the Moselle prior to 1918, the legislation began to look somewhat like a 
patchwork quilt. To this day, the original texts of certain German laws which were not 
replaced, remain in German. Any translations of these texts into French do not 
constitute the original law itself, and therefore cannot replace that law. So, when the 
30 Office de Statistique d'Alsace et de Lorraine, 3i8me annee, 1921, Strasbourg, p. 22. However, it 
should be noted that in Chateau-Salins, for example, the figure for those speaking French as their 
mother tongue was 68.4%. The regional disparity was therefore yet another problem. In Upper 
Alsace, French was considered the mother tongue of 6.1 % of the population and in Lower Alsace, a 
mere 3.8% of the population. 
31 Ibid., p. 6. Equally, as a percentage of the total population of the Moselle in 1910, only 73.2% had 
been born in Alsace-Lorraine compared to 87.4% of Lower Alsace and 90.3% of Upper Alsace. 
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law has to be verified, for whatever judicial reason, it is the German original which has 
to be consulted, not a French translation. 
In this sea of legal intricacies between the French and German languages, it is 
easy to see how there was, in fact, no real place for the multiple regional dialects which 
had thrived over the centuries, despite the dominance of German to the east, and 
French to the west. Language for the nation states, was a symbol of national 
allegiance, an instrument with which one could manipulate national sentiment. 
However, it was a blunt instrument which took little care of centuries of tradition and a 
carefully nurtured culture. Equally, bilingualism was distrusted and disregarded by 
France and Germany, both of whom viewed it as a means of watering down, if not of 
compromising, their respective national cultures, as well as weakening their overall 
control of the populations concerned. Neither viewed it simply as an inevitable feature 
of borderlands whose heritage simply ran deeper than that of the modern nation state. 
Few, in Paris at least during the initial integration process, were willing to ignore 
language as the principal indicator of sentiment, despite most observers' impression. 
There was little evidence to suggest that the majority of Alsatians and Mosellans 
accepted French rule, even if this was only due to the absence of a better alternative. 
German speakers were persistently branded as Boche by those arriving from the French 
interior, with high-ranking officials openly using the term in letters and documents. Le 
Messin newspaper demanded that les fonctionnaires venus de tous les coins de la 
France pour conquerir la France ... cessent de nous traiter comme pays conquis et de 
noun appeler Boches ainsi que cela se passe journellement. '32 The disappointment and 
32 Quoted in a report by Mirman, 13 September 1919. ADBR 121 AL 91. Mirman was, in fact, as 
guilty as any of the haut fonctionnaires of freely using the term Boche when referring to indigenes 
who were unable to speak French. 
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disillusionment for so many caught within this linguistic paradox was to manifest itself 
in the malaise lorrain. 
The religious question 
The `religious question' in Alsace and the Moselle was arguably the most potentially 
explosive issue in the overall process of integration. Evidence for this statement can 
clearly be seen in the reaction, in 1924, to Herriot's attempt to abolish the regions' 
special religious status. Andree Viollis, writing in 1928, even went so far as to claim 
that the religious question was the principal cause of the malaise lorrain. 33 The 
difficulty which religion posed for integration of the provinces into France centred on 
the question of the removal of the 1801 Concordat, and the implementation of the Laic 
Laws in its place, laws which had been introduced into France in 1905. Why, then, did 
the idea of bringing in line the returned provinces with the rest of France arouse such 
widespread resistance? 
Some accounts of the period point to the very high percentage of Catholics in 
the Moselle as an explanation for this reaction. By 1926 Catholics made up 92.4 per 
cent of the Moselle's population. 34 This implies that it was Catholics, more than 
Protestants and Jews, who sought to defend most vigorously the special religious 
status within the regions. 35 However, 28.4 per cent of the population of the Bas-Rhin 
was Protestant, where equally strong resistance to the removal of the religious statute 
was voiced. Perhaps, then, the problem lay not in the breakdown of the population 
into sects, but in the extent to which the population practised religion combined with 
the importance of the role religion played in individuals' lives. In both the Moselle and 
33 Viollis, Alsace et Lorraine au-dessus des passions. 
34 See table 3, p. 42. 
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Alsace, prior to annexation, the proportion of the population practising religion had 
remained high in both rural and urban areas. There had been little evidence of a 
drifting away within any sect, something which was only reinforced by the dramatic 
political events of the 1870s. During annexation, many considered the clergy, in 
particular the Catholic clergy, to have provided the leadership and stability which many 
among the Francophile populations felt they had lost with the departure of their classes 
dirigeantes. In fact, it was, to a certain extent, thanks to the clergy that the memory of 
France was kept alive during the regions' separation from la mere patrie. Following 
1918, with the shift of much of the German population back to Germany, the regions' 
classes dirigeantes once again departed leaving, for a second time, the Catholic clergy 
to provide any sense of continuity, community, and stability for the populations. 
Whilst these aspects of religious practice and the role of the clergy are relevant, 
it appears the key to the problem lay, once again, in the question of expectations as 
much as in religion itself. In 1914, whilst the future appeared unarguably German, the 
populations had no reason to adapt themselves to the idea of the removal of the 
Concordat. Even in 1918, they still did not anticipate any major changes to their 
religious statute. They had, after all, been promised, by the French, protection and 
respect for their traditions, institutions, and beliefs. From these promises, therefore, 
they understood that the role of religion in their everyday lives would remain 
unaffected. The French population, on the other hand, had been given longer to adapt 
to the idea of separating the Church from the State. They had had time to understand 
that such a separation was intended not to defeat the role of the Church, but, in some 
35 Lord Crewe's assessment of the Protestant and Jewish press led him to draw this conclusion in his 
despatch from Paris to the Foreign Office in London, PRO, FO 371/10545, p. 237. 
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ways, to reinforce and redefine the Church's role in society. 36 For the returned 
provinces in 1918, French intentions for their swift assimilation with France left little or 
no time for adaptation. Lord Hardinge remarked in his monthly report of December 
1922, that Alsace and the Moselle were not as dissimilar to France on the religious 
front as some might suggest. He claimed that although France employed an anticlerical 
policy, expressing an attitude which was at times "violently sceptical", this did not 
implicitly deny that France had also a "deeply mystical Christian" side. The two 
survived side by side within the one nation and, `with tact and patience all the apparent 
difficulties connected with confessional schools and the Concordat may be gradually 
overcome'. 37 
But was Lord Hardinge rather too optimistic in his belief that matters could be 
resolved in such a way? There appeared to be very little time available for tact or 
patience in the early days of the new French administration which had chosen a method 
of integration envisaging sweeping measures, rather than a softly softly approach. Too 
rapid a centralization and departmentalization of the provinces, as well as the general 
desire to assimilate swiftly the regions' legislation and administration with the rest of 
France, were the initial mistakes made by the French administration. Yet, in the early 
stages, there was no direct mention made by the new authorities of any specific 
changes to the religious statute itself. The initial mistakes brought with them the threat 
of the removal of the Concordat and the Loi Falloux, and it was this perceived threat 
in the early stages of integration which appears to have caused many of the difficulties. 
36 In fact, during the war, attitudes in France had improved towards the clergy due to the impressive 
contribution made by young clergymen involved in frontline fighting. After the end of the war, public 
opinion recognized the small, but significant, role they had played in the French war effort. Equally, 
during the war, the Laic Laws had been, to a certain extent, relaxed in order to accommodate the 
spiritual needs of the people in such diffficult and distressing circumstances. It was not until 1924 
that Herriot ventured to 'tighten up' their application throughout France. Inevitably, this met with 
opposition from the Catholic Church. 
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The `assimilation brutale' of Jeanneney and Maringer, which gave the earliest hint that 
the concordat was in danger, was followed by Millerand's `appeasement', something 
which Alapetite inherited and pursued over the following four years. During this 
period, the Bloc national avoided studiously the religious question, preferring to deal 
with the many less sensitive issues of integration, and postponing indefinitely the 
removal of the Concordat and confessional schools. It was only in 1924, therefore, 
that the first, direct attack on the religious status of the regions was made. At the time, 
not everyone was convinced that Herriot really intended an immediate implementation 
of the Republic's specifically anticlerical legislation. But his ministerial declaration of 
17 June 1924 was worded in such a way that it was seen as the beginning of a socialist 
Kulturkampf. The section of the statement which referred to Alsace and the Moselle 
read, 
Le gouvernement [... ] realisera la suppression du 
commissariat general et preparera les mesures qui 
permettront, en respectant les situations acquises, en 
menageant les interets mat6riels et moraux de la 
population, d'introduire en Alsace et en Lorraine 
l'ensemble de la legislation republicaine. 38 
Herriot himself appears to have been completely taken aback by the violent 
opposition to his proposals, both in the recovered regions and in France as a whole. 39 
In fact, it was not at all surprising that such measures should be rejected in the Moselle 
and Alsace. Out of 24 deputies representing the regions in the French parliament, only 
37 PRO, FO 371/8259, pp. 152-153. 
38 Published in Le Temps, 22nd June 1924, in an article entitled `Le gouvernement, I'Alsace et la 
Lorraine'. 
134 
one communist deputy was a member of the Cartel des gauches government. A total 
of 21 of the remaining 23 deputies belonged to the Bloc national, now in opposition, 
undoubtedly an indication that the regions' populations favoured a continuation of the 
policy of postponement. In reality, Herriot was simply pressing on with the policies 
which the Bloc national government had been pursuing, albeit tentatively, during the 
early 1920s. The British Consul-General in Strasbourg even suggested in his letter of 
24 June 1924 that, `this trouble need never have become so acute if it [the religious 
question] had been resolutely faced at an earlier date: postponement has only made it 
worse and ... strengthened the extremist 
feeling on both sides' 40 He went on to state 
that, `it is conceivable that if Monsieur Poincare had done exactly what Monsieur 
Herriot proposes to do he could have done it without meeting so much opposition'. 41 
This, of course, does not excuse Herriot's ignorance on the subject of the Moselle and 
Alsace. Had he been better informed, and perhaps more willing to acknowledge the 
impressive progress already made within the regions since integration, his plans might 
have taken into consideration the all important question of transition. However, 
Herriot, like Clemenceau in 1918, had to think of his coalition government, as well as 
public opinion in the French interior, and not just that of the local populations. So, 
once again, the needs of the periphery were neglected in favour of the greater need 
presented by `core' considerations and politics. 
In January 1925, Herriot was forced to back down on the question of the 
religious statute, and he announced that the Concordat should remain in place in the 
returned provinces. The remaining areas of law and administration still had to be 
39 Becker and Berstein, Victoire et frustrations, p. 263. In fact, Herriot appears to have been pushed 
into making these anti-clerical statements by those around him. See Jeanneney, Lefon d'histoire 
d'une gauche au pouvoir, p. 64. 
40 PRO, FO 371/10545, p. 216. Letter from the Consul-General in Strasbourg to the British 
Ambassador in Paris. 
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transferred to Paris, and, equally, the suppression of the commissariat general had to 
be arranged. A meeting between Herriot and the prefects, senators and deputies of the 
three departments was held on 7 November 1924, and an agreement was reached on 
the less sensitive issues concerning assimilation, but no fixed date was agreed for 
completion of these matters. However, as a result of the crusade-like defense of the 
religious statute in the provinces, the Concordat remains in place to this day, 
something which continues to surprise Frangais de l'interieur arriving in the region, 
who believe France discarded Napoleon's religious arrangement long ago. Ultimately, 
the greatest significance of the furore which followed Herriot's proposals in 1924, was 
the strengthening of support for the autonomist and particulariste movements in both 
the Moselle and Alsace. Certainly, the manner of opposition to the crisis varied 
between the two provinces, some considering the response from the Moselle as having 
been more muted than that of Alsace. Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Mosellans were any less concerned about the preservation of the Concordat or 
confessional schools than Alsatians. As was argued above, both education and 
linguistic difficulties, as well as the religious question, were major contributors to the 
widely felt malaise lorrain in the region. Indeed, it was the great Europeanist, and one 
of the Moselle's leading political representatives, Robert Schuman, who was 
responsible for many of the most hard-hitting attacks on Herriot's ministerial 
declaration, attacks made in the press as well as in the French parliament. In June 
1924, for example, he stated, 
Les gouvernements qui se sont succdde depuis 1918 ont 
tous confirme et solennellement reitere les promesses 
faites pendant la guerre au nom de la nation francaise. 
41 PRO, FO 371/10545, p. 217. 
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Nous ne pouvons nous attendre 4 voir le gouvernement 
exposer un programme d'avenir, qui est en contradiction 
formelle avec les programmes sur lesquels ont ete elus les 
sept huitiemes des representants des departements 
interesses42 
In the end, the religious problem in the Moselle and Alsace clearly illustrates 
the extent to which the process of integration had been under-estimated by successive 
governments following the end of the war. Herriot's proposals triggered an 
outpouring of regionalist emotion, which drew attention to all areas of dissatisfaction 
felt among the populations, including linguistic policy and educational policy, as well 
as changes to legislation affecting the regions. 
Legislative assimilation 
Legislative assimilation in the returned provinces was not a direct cause of the malaise 
lorrain, with the obvious exceptions of legislation concerning education, language, and 
religion, as well as legislative changes proposed for social security arrangements in the 
provinces. However, this process was not without its difficulties. Assimilation was a 
highly technical exercise which required the skills and patience of experts in all fields of 
law, from commercial and civil law to the penal code. The complexities of linguistic 
legislation have already been illustrated above and it has also been shown that by 1925, 
legislative assimilation was by no means complete. What will be discussed here, 
though, are the broad problems which the commissariat general faced in assimilating 
the legislation of the provinces with that of the rest of France, and how these problems 
were resolved. 
42 `Le gouvernement, I'Alsace et la Lorraine', in Le Temps, 22 June 1924. 
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The legislation of Alsace and the Moselle can be divided into four different 
categories. The first concerns national laws put in place by the French administration 
prior to 1870; the second concerns local laws put in place in the regions also prior to 
1870; the third concerns national laws brought in by the German administration during 
annexation; and the fourth concerns local laws which were implemented during 
annexation, and which applied only to the Reichsland. This meant that contrary to 
what some within the new French administration thought, the legislation of Alsace- 
Lorraine in 1918 was not completely German. In fact, purely German legislation was 
only to be found in a limited number of specific areas, such as social security. 
Otherwise, many local and French laws remained untouched throughout annexation, of 
which Napoleon's 1801 Concordat was the most notable. 
There were numerous reasons why France was unable immediately to draw the 
provinces' legislation in line with French legislation, the most important of which was 
the sheer size of the task. Clearly there were other, more pressing, aspects of 
integration requiring urgent attention, and, in any case, chaos would have resulted 
from the over-hasty introduction of a complex set of new laws. Beyond these practical 
considerations, it was quickly pointed out that certain laws within France had already 
been ear-marked for change, laws which were outdated and therefore in need of 
modernization, but which had not yet been amended. There was no sense in applying 
such laws in the returned provinces, only to replace them in the provinces shortly 
afterwards. Furthermore, the cost of the whole, laborious exercise had to be taken into 
consideration, so that the process could be planned accordingly. However, there are 
two crucial reasons why the French administration hesitated in this process of 
assimilation. Certain German laws simply had no equivalent in French legislation, and 
so there was little point in removing them. More importantly, however, many German 
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laws were more modern than, and indeed superior to, those employed within France. 
If this was not immediately obvious in 1918 to the likes of Jeanneney in Paris or 
Maringer in Strasbourg, it certainly was to the populations of Alsace and the Moselle, 
and, in fact, had been one of the observations of the Conference d'Alsace-Lorraine in 
the final stages of the war. The areas of legislation which were either superior to 
French law, or had no equivalent with which to replace them, were those concerning 
securite sociale (social security), regime des societes (company law), livrefoncier 
(property rights), and liberte communale (municipal by-laws). As Woehrling states, 
application of the French equivalents of these laws would, for Alsace and the Moselle, 
have been `une veritable regression'. 43 
In order that certain local and German laws be removed and French laws put in 
their place, the process had to be brought before the French parliament. This was 
time-consuming, and so it was agreed that in urgent cases the change-over could be 
done by decree. As it turned out, most cases were deemed urgent, and, with the 
exception of the most important laws, most were introduced by decree between 1919 
and 1924. Commissions were set up in order to examine the four grands codes 
requiring attention: penal law, civil law, commercial law, and civil procedure. 
Specialists in these specific areas were then recruited to sit on the commissions. 
Although these commissions were obliged to follow closely the guidelines for allowing 
certain laws to remain, namely those with no equivalent in French law, or which were 
technically superior to French law, or those likely to become part of French law, there 
were still instances where the commissions had to resort to creating a troisieme 
43 Woehrling, Jean-Marie, Perspectives sur le droit local, Alsace-Moselle, Strasbourg, 1987, p. 8. 
This is one of the most critical and comprehensive treatments of local law, and its formation from 
annexation through to present day. 
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legislation. 44 This `third legislation' consisted of a series of new laws which were 
unique to the returned provinces, and which took the best from both French and 
German law. Examples of this can be seen in civil and commercial law. 
As far as the Moselle was concerned, a swift solution to the assimilation of 
commercial law was urgently required. It was quickly realized within the region that 
commerce and industry were at a disadvantage in attempting to function within French 
markets, whilst being governed by a different set of laws and regulations. This, along 
with resistance to the concept of a `third legislation', was symptomatic of the general 
feeling within the Moselle that Alsatian particularistes were only interested in 
emphasising and protecting the regions' differences with France, rather than seeking a 
sensible compromise between brutal assimilation and protection of local interests. In 
fact, the Metz bar declared at their assembly on 30 September 1922 that the idea of a 
`third legislation' was unacceptable, stating they wished to see `ou bien la procedure 
locale, ou bien la procedure francaise, mais l'une ou l'autre' 45 They voted a motion 
requesting the immediate introduction of French civil and commercial law, but the 
maintenance of local laws of procedure. 
Just as the Concordat remains in place today, so the complexities of the legal 
status of Alsace and the Moselle remain. The Institut du droit local alsacien-mosellan 
was created to deal with the exceptional nature of the local statute and with the 
ongoing process of assimilation, a process which shows few signs of reaching a 
conclusion. Philip Simpson has likened the droit local of Alsace and the Moselle to 
Scottish law, stating that 
44 Ibid. p-9- 
45 Crehange, Michel, Maitre, 'Les barreaux d'Alsace-Moselle au temps des annees vingt', presented at 
the Colloque de droit local, 1 June 1994. 
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Even if Scottish law, like that of Alsace-Lorraine, has, on 
occasion, been neglected, it has, nonetheless, always 
been recognized as constituting a distinctive system of 
law, a system which has brought rise to a distinctive set 
of problems 46 
Just as the laws remain today, so do the problems. 
Francais de 1'interieur 
It was inevitable in 1918 and 1919 that the integration of Alsace and the Moselle 
would be a labour-intensive exercise, involving the need for large numbers of French 
nationals brought in from the French interior. The first to arrive were, of course, the 
military: officers as well as ordinary soldiers. They carried out the task of occupying 
the provinces, ensured the departure of all German soldiers, restored calm, law and 
order to the regions, and then set about the francisation of the populations. The 
military had certainly been warned about what to expect upon their arrival in Alsace 
and the Moselle. In 1914, in the course of the hostilities, a small corner of south 
western Alsace, including the towns of Thann, Masevaux, and Dannemarie, was 
occupied by French troops. Certain specific problems of integration had been 
experienced by those involved in the process. For example, few within the population 
were able to speak French, and, likewise, few among the French soldiers or officers 
were able to speak German. 47 Difficulties and disillusionment, therefore, rapidly set in 
a6 Simpson, P. J. D., 'Le droit ecossais au royaume-uni', in Etat regions et droits locaux, Strasbourg, 
1997. 
47 It is important to note, however, that France was forced to respect international conventions in this 
region because of the risk of German reprisals elsewhere in occupied France. Furthermore, the reality 
of administering a region where most of the population spoke only German, or a German dialect, and 
where German rather than French law was in use, meant the French authorities were obliged to 
assemble one of the most highly qualified groups of administrators of all time in order to handle the 
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on both sides. Yet, despite the acknowledgment of these difficulties by the Conference 
d'Alsace-Lorraine, it appears few lessons were learnt, or rather acted upon, following 
the signing of the armistice in 1918. Although the Moselle's population included a 
sizeable Francophone population, events in 1918 were not dissimilar to events 
elsewhere in Alsace. With the exception of those areas where the French language had 
remained predominant throughout annexation, much of the region sounded and 
appeared considerably more German than the incoming military personnel had 
expected. Once the official and unofficial celebrations had taken place, the nature of 
`normal' life was quite unexpected for soldiers and officers alike. It was very hard for 
many of them to accept that these apparently Germanized populations had, in fact, 
been worth fighting for, remembering, of course, that the return of Alsace and Lorraine 
to France had been presented as the primary French war aim. French propaganda 
produced during the war had not only succeeded in perpetuating the myth about 
Alsace-Lorraine, but it had also created a deep hatred of Germany, playing on 
exaggerated images of stereotypical Germans, known as Boches, who spoke an 
unfamiliar and unintelligible language. It was extremely difficult, therefore, for French 
soldiers to separate the ordinary citizens of the regions from the propaganda images. 
The initial experience of the military was similar to that of the incoming civilian 
population, most of whom were civil servants. Key administrators and their staff were 
the first to arrive and very soon afterwards, a recruitment programme was initiated in 
the interior to find replacements for the departing Germans, many of whom had held 
senior positions in the civil service. In the early stages, very few among the new 
administration were recruited from the Moselle's population. A notable exception to 
complexities of the situation. See Smith, Paul, `The Kiss of France: the Republic and the Alsatians 
during the First World War', Panayi, P., Minorities in Wartime, Oxford, 1993, pp. 27-49. 
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this can be seen in the replacement of the German police force, where great care was 
taken to recruit from the indigenous populations. 49 There were only two possible 
sources for supplying indigenous manpower to a new gendarmerie of the Moselle and 
Alsace. The first included those Mosellans and Alsatians who had been recruited to 
the French army during the war. This had only been possible for those who had 
escaped German occupied territory at some point during the war. 
49 The French 
military, in turn, had decided against allowing them to fight in Europe, and so they had 
joined the French army in Africa. The second source of recruits included Mosellans 
and Alsatians who had been mobilized into the German army, and who had been sent 
to camps throughout France for the duration of the war. Yet, their desire to embark 
upon the profession of gendarme was by no means assured. In 1917, an officer 
employed by the Service des Alsaciens-Lorrains noted: 
Je ne sais trop s'il y aura grande affluence pour cette 
carriere car le paysan aime rentrer pour cultiver sa terre; 
I'ouvrier rejoindra sa fabrique oü les salaires sont tres 
eleves. Les commercants eux aussi trouveront des 
emplois plus remunerateurs. On n'est pas sans ignorer 
[sic. ] que les gendarmes etaient bien mieux pays que les 
gendarmes francais 50 
Furthermore, this new French police force was to be responsible for creating and 
consolidating French sentiment in the returned provinces. But, how many of the 
region's indigenous population were in a position to provide this aspect of the 
48 See Philippot, Georges, Gdneral (C. R. ), 'Gendarmerie et identite nationale en Alsace et Lorraine 
apres 1918', in Revue historique des armies, No. 4,1998, pp. 61-78. 
49 Those from the area around Thann, Masevaux, and Dannemarie, the area which was occupied by 
the French army in 1914, fell into this category. 
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integration process? The solution to this problem did not, however, lie in recruiting 
Franpais de I'interieur, as it was essential that gendarmes spoke the required 
languages and dialects. Likewise, a police force recruited from the interior would have 
been very poorly received by indigenes. In the end, a centre for training gendarmes 
was set up in Strasbourg, following preparations made towards the end of the war, and 
was run by Lieutenant-colonel Albert Michel, an `Alsacien, Frangais et Gendarme'. 
His task was to train recruits to become gendarmes, as well as to teach them the 
French language and instruct them in French culture and patriotism. 
In other areas of administration, by early 1919, significant numbers of Francais 
de I'interieur had arrived and were trying to make some sense of the situation. They 
felt greatly inconvenienced by the practical differences and difficulties they encountered 
in the regions. For example, despite the departure of thousands of Germans from the 
city of Metz, the incoming French found it hard to obtain furnished accommodation. 
In a letter to Mirman, Captain Langrogne of the French army suggested that furnished 
properties belonging to expelled Germans should be made available to those seeking 
accommodation in Metz, as a short-term solution to this frustrating problem. 
5t 
Equally, the complicated differences between legal systems, pay levels, and the 
continuation of the use of local statutes in all areas of life, took the incoming French 
some time to understand and accept, even though in many cases, Franpais de 
I'interieur were often paid higher salaries than indigenes. 
Initially, each side viewed the other with suspicion. In 1921, the British 
Consul-General in Strasbourg noted that the arriving French had swiftly come to the 
conclusion they were in `an unfriendly region'. He also stated that, `intemperate 
50 Philippot, 'Gendarmerie et identite nationale', in in Revue historique des armees, No. 4,1998, 
pp. 61-78, p. 64. 
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behaviour on the part of a few newly arrived Frenchmen is having a bad effect'. 52 
Clearly, combined with the `intemperate behaviour' of the likes of Maringer in 
Strasbourg and Mirman in Metz, whose tact did not always flow as freely as their anti- 
German sentiment, the undoubted arrogance of some of the incoming French created a 
very poor impression indeed. Equally, the returned populations were highly sensitive 
during those early days. They had suffered greatly under German rule and were 
anxious to see early signs of a favourable contrast between the French and German 
administrations and administrators. A number of newspapers and journals quickly 
picked up on the early instances of tactless behaviour on the part of the incoming 
French. This publicity only served as further damning evidence against the new 
administration, adding to the mounting criticism of the swift centralization of the 
regions' administration to Paris, as well as the French government's desire to 
implement immediately French legislation. Things were not going according to 
expectations for either side. It is therefore not at all surprising that any instances of 
apparent insensitivity towards the indigenous population, should be interpreted in the 
blackest of terms. 
Equally, any French arriving in the regions were immediately confronted with 
an indigenous population which, on the face of it, appeared to demand the perpetuation 
of a German-style state with German administrative methods, German legislation, and 
the German language. There were also cases of outright hostility from certain sections 
of the indigenous population, one of which was reported in the French-language 
newspaper the Thionvillois. The article, which appeared on 8 July 1920, is entitled, 
`Les effets de la campagne anti-Nouveaux Venus', and in smaller print, `Apres la 
51 ADM, 304 M 214. 
52 Report from Strasbourg to the British Foreign Office, PRO, FO 371/6990, p. 200. 
145 
bombe de Hagondange c'est maintenant le gateau empoisonne ä Metz'. The article 
describes how the Thionvillois had reported on previous occasions, but did not 
condone, recent attacks in Metz on Francois de 1'interieur. These attacks, it claims, 
were the result of campaigns in the German-language press designed to spread hatred 
among the indigenous populations towards French civil servants with slogans such as, 
`Gens venus de Paris, comme jadis on se defendait contre ceux venus de Berlin! '. A 
bomb had apparently exploded at the house of a French factory owner in Hagondange 
and two French teachers at a lycee for girls had received hate-mail telling them to leave 
the region. A cake was later delivered to them, laced with poison. 
These initial `public relations' difficulties were, in some respects, inevitable. It 
should still be asked, however, whose responsibility was it to ensure harmony during 
the initial period of contact between the two populations? Main, during the war, 
warned he did not wish to hear of any insulting behaviour on the part of his soldiers 
towards the indigenous populations. But who was to instruct the civil servants and 
civilian populations arriving from the interior, populations which had trusted their 
government's propaganda and which had been told the provinces were `more French 
than the French'? It was not until the arrival of Millerand, with his soothing speeches 
and appeasing tactics, that order and a reflective calm could be returned to the realm of 
public opinion. It was he who broke the vicious circle of spite and misunderstandings 
between populations, whose expectations had been raised by events well outwith their 
control. The excitement for the indigenous population of being returned to France, 
and the excitement for the incoming French of reintegrating the lost provinces into la 
mere patrie, was swiftly dampened by reality. The desire among most Mosellans to 
become part of France was genuine enough. However, the ironing-out process was to 
be far more complicated and time-consuming than any of them expected. Language 
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continued to play its part in dictating prejudice between the Francais de 1'interieur and 
the indigenes, creating a barrier which took years to lower, despite the sincere, though 
somewhat short-lived, efforts of the region's Germanophone populations to learn the 
French language, and, in some small way, discover how, in fact, one could become 
French. 
The malaise lorrain 
In March 1922, the newspaper, the Courrier de Metz, published an article on its front 
page which addressed the subject of the `malaise lorrain vis-ä-vis de la mere-patrie'. 
53 
Its author concluded that after three years of assimilation, 
Par la plume et par la parole, ils [the French authorities] 
n'ont fait que vexer une population qui n'ajamais cesse 
d'etre francaise. Ce n'est pas [... ] en s'attaquant ä tout 
ce qui constitue la vie morale des Lorrains desannexes 
que l'on realisera une assimilation intelligente. 
The author concluded, `Assimilateurs de toutes marques, sachez oü vous arreter dans 
votre travail. Ne vous attaquez pas aux forces morales qui ont fait ]a grandeur de la 
France et la force de la Lorraine longtemps annexee. ' The greatest problem for the 
French authorities was that the malaise lorrain, the sense of dissatisfaction and unease 
with the new regime, affected those within the returned provinces who should have 
been the easiest to assimilate into post-war France. Generally speaking, Francophone 
indigenes in the Moselle tended to be more predisposed to becoming French than 
s3 Le Courrier de Metz, 3 March 1922. 
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Germanophone Mosellans. S4 Yet, the manner in which the region was treated during 
the assimilation process, indicated that their loyalty to France had either not been 
recognized, or was being ignored. Instead of saluting their loyalty and patriotism 
towards la mere patrie, French assimilationists grouped all Alsace-Lorrainers under 
the one umbrella, and failed to recognize the various needs of the Moselle's 
heterogeneous population. The tone of the above article reflected the general 
frustation and unhappiness of three years of an integration process, which had involved 
instances of tactlessness, ineptitude, and clumsiness on the part of the new authorities, 
as well as the realisation that French promises were not going to be kept. The 
`mutuelle confiance' engendered during a visit to Metz by Millerand with Messins and 
Mosellans alike in May 1919 provided a rare moment of optimism which evaporated as 
soon as Millerand left office SS Victor Demange even created a newspaper as a result 
of the malaise lorrain which had been discussed as early as January 1919. Finding that 
the French language newspapers, revived after the French occupation of the region in 
December 1918, were providing only, as he saw it, the French patriotic line, Demange 
launched his own, German language newspaper, the Metzer Freies Journal. The first 
issue appeared on 19 June 1919. Demange sought to provide, for those less enchanted 
with the new regime, a newspaper for Germanophone Mosellans which dealt with their 
specific problems in the light of integration and assimilation: problems created by 
rushed linguistic assimilation, by the arrival of Francais de l'interieur. Although this 
newspaper did not attract many readers among Francophone, Francophile indigenes, 
enjoying instead its success among the Germanophone industrial workforce to the 
north of Metz, it was a newspaper which expressed the sentiments of many who had 
54 There are no rules about this, though, and, as has been stated in previous chapters, language and 
sentiment did not always converge. 
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been quite glad to see the departure of German rule, but who found themselves 
alienated by the new regime. Despite the French authorities' belief that Demange was 
unpatriotic, probably a communist, and that he posed a serious threat to the stability of 
the region, a belief which resulted in his arrest and brief imprisonment only weeks after 
the newspaper had been launched, there is little evidence that the paper's content did 
any more than express the concerns of many among the Germanophone population, 
concerns which had more to do with the practical issues of day to day life than with 
questions of patriotism or national sentiment. Indeed, in 1919, Demange and his 
journalists expressed the same misgivings and concerns which were later to appear in 
the French language press, as can be seen in the above extract from the Courrier de 
Metz. 56 
Needless to say, attacks in the press on the French administration's progress in 
assimilating the populations did not go unheeded. Mirman's defence of French actions 
in his pamphlet Aux populations lorraines, written less than a year after the entry of 
French troops into the region, contains his somewhat feigned surprise that the 
populations should find so much fault in his, and the administration's, performance. 57 
His pamphlet deals systematically with rumours, some clearly outrageous and 
exaggerated, spread within the regions since November 1918. He claimed he was 
responding to `une veritable campagne de denigrement systematique contre tout ce qui 
touche ä l'administration francaise et parfois ä la France elle-meme. ' The contents of 
ss Le Lorrain, 28 May 1919. 
56 The Courrier de Metz was published only until 1922. 
57 Mirman, L., Aux populations lorraines, Metz, 1919. The original letter was written 1 October 
1919, six weeks before Mirman's term as commissaire ended with his resignation. According to 
Roth, 'il quitte Metz discretement sans laisser beaucoup de regrets, semble-t-il'. Roth, 'Un prdfet de 
guerre en Lorraine, Leon Mirman', Revue administrative de l'Est de la France, No. 16,1979, pp. 5-19, 
p. 17. Mirman was succeeded by Francois Manceron as prefect of the Moselle. The title of 
commissaire de la Republique was replaced as of 22 October 1919, even though the commissariat 
general was not suppressed until 1925. 
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the pamphlet were originally written as a letter sent to the members of a commission 
departementale, which Mirman had decided to offer to a larger audience. Some of the 
more `abominable' rumours he cited included the removal of crucifixes from all 
schools, the beating of the inhabitants of the village of Fleury by French soldiers, and 
the deportation of children who, it transpired, were not actually being forcibly 
deported, but given a free trip to Nancy and Paris, courtesy of the French State. 
However, whilst Mirman found it astonishing that anyone could find fault in his 
administration's efforts, his often indignant explanations fell upon deaf ears. This is 
not because the populations were stubbornly inclined to believe the somewhat fantastic 
rumours, but because there was clearly a basis for their dissatisfaction which Mirman 
could not deny: the region had been promised a life better than that which they had 
experienced under German rule; they had been promised protection of their beliefs, 
traditions, and institutions; they had been promised a reward for their loyalty to France 
throughout annexation. None of these promises appeared to indigenes to have been 
forthcoming. So when Herriot announced, shortly after the election of the Cartel des 
gauches to power in 1924, that yet another promise was to be broken, the Moselle's 
populations felt acutely betrayed. Herriot's announcement marked the lowest point in 
relations between the returned provinces and the French administration. This was 
manifested in the Moselle by a brief burst of support for autonomism, which, hitherto, 
had remained centred in Alsace. But, more importantly, the events of 1924 marked the 
consolidation of an identite mosellane, created by the pressures brought to bear on the 
heterogeneous populations by the French Republic, rather than the consolidation of a 
patriotisme francaise, which was, after all, the intended outcome of the assimilation 
process. 
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Concluding remarks 
The malaise lorrain, was based on a deepening sense of distrust among the 
populations. It began within days of the arrival of French administrators from the 
interior, and reached a climax in the aftermath of Herriot's Kulturkampf. France, like 
Germany, had found it almost impossible to grant the Moselle, let alone Alsace, the 
freedom it desired to glide gradually into the French nation, and to accommodate the 
necessary compromises along the way. The distrust, therefore, stemmed from French 
attempts to remove the aspects of Germanisation, which Mosellans had considered 
successful, such as a modern social security system and a more liberal approach to 
linguistic, educational, and religious assimilation. It also stemmed from disillusionment 
which had set in as the various French promises were broken one by one. These 
promises had raised the expectations of the region's population since desannexion, 
expectations which included the maintenance of certain local and German laws, the 
rejection of the Republic's religious laws, and the protection of local traditions and 
cultures. However, in the Moselle the populations did not reject out of hand every 
aspect of assimilation. Most recognized the need to alter, modify, or accept 
compromise in certain areas of legislative integration and so the majority of the many 
changes which were made in the early 1920s passed off without comment or 
resistance. Again, the desire of so many among the indigenous population to work 
positively towards assimilation is more evident in the Moselle than it was in Alsace. 
However, `ce pauvre malaise' as the Courrier de Metz called it, existed in the shadow 
of an Alsatian malaise, and, as a result, was misrepresented and misunderstood. Had 
the French authorities recognized the need to differentiate between these two 
provinces, perhaps the difficulties of assimilation and integration could have been 
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largely avoided, in the Moselle at least. Yet, the administrative aspects of integration 
were not alone in causing distress and unhappiness among the populations, and in 
contributing to the malaise lorrain. As the next chapter will show, the manner in 
which the authorities chose to remove those within the populations deemed unreliable 
or indesirable also came in for major criticism. 
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Summary 
The initial period of integration into France for the Moselle was marked, on an 
administrative level, by friction, misunderstandings, and uncertainty. Among the 
Francophone sections of the population, eagerness to re-establish direct links with 
Paris was widespread. However, the initial experience between November 1918 and 
March 1919 was so unsatisfactory that a return to the Statthalter style of 
administration directed from Strasbourg was seen as the only way to proceed. 
Millerand's term as commissaire general was sadly all too brief (had he remained, how 
differently would the 1920s have unfolded? ) and his successor, although an able 
administrator, lacked the flair and public appeal necessary to lead the regions through 
the inevitably difficult years of integration. Whilst the malaise alsacien drew 
international attention, the lesser known malaise lorrain developed along similar lines. 
Issues related to religion, education, language, and the local statute all presented 
stumbling blocks for the new French regime, which, try as it might, failed to convince 
the returned populations that a swift and full assimilation with la mere patrie on all 
levels was either necessary or prudent. Compromises were required from both sides, 
but they were not forthcoming. The Francais de 1 `interieur arrived in their droves, but 
their disillusionment with the reality of everyday life in the returned provinces brought 
about disharmony and a sense of mutual distrust between the two populations. In 
particular, the Francophone sections of the region's population struggled to reconcile 
their cherished image of the motherland with the actions of the incoming French. 
Furthermore, impatience and mismanagement in 1924 on the part of politicians, 
notably Herriot with his attempt to implement republican laic laws in the provinces, 
meant the process of integration was once again threatened by French tactlessness. An 
overzealous desire to suppress regionalism and replace it with centralisation, 
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Chapter V 
Epuration: expulsion 
and voluntary repatriation 
Votre frere ne se trouvait toujours pas avec les expulses 
de St-Avoid que je rencontrais et avec lesquels j'eus 7 
heures d'arret ä Sarrebourg. La joie de ces pauvres gens 
de trouver quelqu'un qui s'interessait a eux! Qui fera 
partie du prochain convoi? Je me le suis demande bien 
souvent depuis lors, et quand viendra mon tour? ' 
The author of this letter, sent from Phalsbourg near the border with Alsace and 
intercepted in January 1919 by the contrdle postal in Metz, expresses the acute anxiety 
and uncertainty felt by many of those civilians of German origin living in the Moselle 
following the signing of the armistice. The author goes on, 
Ici on a commence aussi les expulsions; samedi prochain 
les 12 premieres victimes s'en vont. Vous pensez dans 
quel etat d'äme on reste a son poste. Alors qu'il est 
impossible d'avoir un laisser-passer, on est prisonnier au 
vrai sens du mot. 
The report which records the above, cites three other letters which all describe a 
similar sense of despondency among German immigrants. Another correspondent in 
the same report states, `Papa a ete releve de ses fonctions aujourd'hui; comment cela 
' Chateau de Vincennes, 16 N 1464, report of the commission de Contrele Postal Civil de Metz, of 
post read between 13 January and 26 January, 1919, extract 7. It is unclear whether this extract was 
originally written in French or German, but the latter is more likely. The Contr6le employed 
numerous translators to assist with the task of reading civilian post. 
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ira-t-il encore? L'expulsion suivra-t-elle? '2 With the uncertainty came fear: `On n'ose 
plus se montrer dans la rue'. 3 
Alfred Wahl, one of very few historians to address French policy towards 
Germans living in the returned provinces in November 1918, analyses the change in 
sovereignty, the question of nationality, and the expulsion of Germans, such as those 
quoted above. 4 Wahl claims that the Treaty of Versailles allowed France to adopt an 
attitude towards the German immigrant population of the provinces, which was `bien 
plus liberale' than that adopted by Germany at the Treaty of Frankfurt. At that time, 
Wahl claims, Germany had operated sweeping measures which automatically changed 
the nationality of the indigenous population from French to German. Only those who 
chose to leave the region were able to retain French nationality. The French, on the 
other hand, allowed Germans to remain in the regions without forcing a change of 
nationality upon them. They even accepted that those Germans who wished, could 
apply for French nationality through the naturalisation process. In the meantime, 
however, France 
proceda ä des expulsions individuelles d'elements qui se 
livraient ä une propagande anti-francaise. Ces mesures, 
accompagnees d'abus inevitables, donnerent l'impression 
d'une regression du liberalisme alors qu'il n'en etait 
rien. s 
Yet, Wahl's idea of a `liberal' approach appears to be at odds with those Germans who 
feared expulsion from the regions, and dared not show themselves in the street. If only 
2 Ibid. Extract 8. 
3 Ibid. Report for letters sent to destinations abroad between 6 and 15 January 1919, extract 27. 
4 Wahl, A., `Changement et Souverainete et Option et Nationalite', in Cahier du Cercle Jean Mace, 
No. 27, Metz, 3rd trimester, 1988, pp. 1-10. 
5 Ibid, p. 10. 
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those indulging in anti-French propaganda were to be expelled, why were these 
German immigrants so unsure who would be next? This chapter examines French 
policy on the question of nationality and German immigrants living in the region, and 
asks if Wahl's assessment is justified or reasonable. 
Epuration 
In the weeks, months, and years which followed the end of German rule in the Moselle 
and Alsace, thousands of inhabitants of the Moselle left the region. Their departure, 
often voluntary, formed part of a period of epuration operated both by the French 
military and civilian authorities, as well as by many among the indigenous population. 
The term epuration is used in this context to mean the purging, cleansing, or 
purification of the region and its population of all German or enemy elements. This 
was at best an unofficial policy, a series of uncoordinated and fluctuating responses to 
a set of practical problems, themselves in course of evolution and definition. It had no 
clear starting point, and no single architect. No document officially announced its 
application amongst the multitude of arretes and instructions, which showered down 
upon the provinces from December 1918 onwards. Instead, epuration was a term 
which crept into use, a term which increasingly appeared in official papers and titles of 
newspaper articles, a term which fell, with increasing ease, from the lips of disgruntled 
indigenes, keen to see Germanisation erased and to witness the departure of those who 
had dominated the regions and their populations for so long. In January 1919, a notice 
in the Courrier de Metz stated the following; 
L'epuration. Une societe s'est constituee ä Hayange en 
vue d'epurer le pays de tous ceux qui durant la guerre se 
157 
sont fait remarquer par leurs insultes et grossieretes ä 
1'egard des indigenes. 6 
For the following months, the topic of epuration continued to dominate headlines. Le 
Messin ran an article 3 March 1919 entitled, `L'epuration de l'Alsace-Lorraine' in its 
column on `Questions du jour'. ' Likewise, in March 1919, the Thionvillois, in its 
review of the press on 21 March 1919, contained a section on `L'Epuration'. 8 
The term epuration has also been translated to mean ethnic cleansing and, in 
this case, such a translation is arguably valid. However, its use must be qualified. This 
was nothing remotely like ethnic cleansing of the kind which resorts to mass murder to 
eliminate, and rape to pollute, entire races. What occurred in Alsace and the Moselle 
following the armistice of 1918 was largely non-violent, but its objective was to erase 
(rather than to ignore) all effects of Germanisation, in order to wipe clean the slate, 
and to carry on as if the half century of German rule had never actually taken place. 
The problems with such a simplistic objective, as shown in the previous chapter 
regarding language, religion, education, and legislation, are multiple. German rule had 
not been superficial, and it could not be lifted, like a heavy cloak, from the minds and 
lives of the regions' populations. Yet, the new French regime carried on regardless, 
and the changing of street names and shop signs to French equivalents was one of the 
6 Le Courrier de Metz, 13 January 1919. 
Le Messin, 8 March 1919. 
8 Le Thionvillois, 21 March 1919. Discussion of Epuration in the French-language press was 
common as a means of reinforcing a newspaper's Francophile credentials. Until the Metzer Freies 
Journal appeared in June 1919, little critical comment was made about the expulsion of indesirables 
in any newspaper. No editor wished to appear unpatriotic, or arouse the wrath of the new French 
authorities. Likewise, no editor wished to risk alienating large numbers of his readers. See Limits to 
epuration below, p. 195. The term epuration is also used in the Repertoire numerique detaille du 
Fonds du commissariat general de la Republique 1918-1925, of the Archives departementales du 
Bas-Rhin, published in 1980, p. 117, section E, `Service General de police d'Alsace-Lorraine - police 
et surete general, dpuration - commissions de triage'. 
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first, very visual achievements of the broader epuration process. 
9 As the extracts cited 
from the contröle postal indicate, not all German immigrants wished to leave, and 
often, though not always, it was the arrival of expulsion orders which forced 
individuals to make the journey across the new Franco-German frontier, with little 
more than a suitcase and some small change. Others, for differing reasons, opted for 
voluntary repatriation, either pre-empting the expulsion orders or accepting that there 
was no future for them in the region. 
Classification of the Population 
It was the abbe Wetterle, who first suggested during the Conference d'Alsace- 
Lorraine that the initial step in dealing with the returned populations would be to 
classify each and every individual according to their `blood origins', rather than by 
their place of birth. The exact mechanism of this operation does not appear to have 
been set out by the Conference, and neither was it indicated that the expulsion of 
Germans would be the principal aim of classification. The naturalisation of Germans 
living in the region was of more concern than expulsions at that stage, and was a 
recurring theme in the discussions of other war-time groups, for example, the Groupe 
Lorrain. In fact, the Section d'etudes de legislation also discussed the issue in 
November 1918, with particular reference to the problem of what to do with German 
immigrants if they could not be expelled en masse. 1° It was recognized that expulsions 
on that scale were unfeasible, not least because of the effect on the labour supply. 
However, Wetterle's proposal was accepted by the Conference, and, in April 1915, it 
9 Modifications to signs relating to the change in the frontier, as well as alterations in the names of 
towns and villages, were sometimes achieved by simply painting over the German signs. However, 
the paint did not always adhere properly, to the embarrassment of the French authorities. ADM, 304 
M 296. 
10 Proces verbaux of 20 and 21 sessions in AJ 30/95. 
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was agreed that upon victory, French troops arriving in Alsace-Lorraine, with the 
assistance of mayors' offices around the regions, would distribute identity cards to 
every man, woman, and child. It was recognized that in the event of a plebiscite within 
the regions, it would be essential to limit the electorate to those originating from 
Alsace and the Moselle. Classification of the population would, therefore, allow the 
French government a chance to separate out those whose sentiment was anti-French or 
unreliable. By November 1918, events had already begun to force the pace, and, after 
having visited the regions, Conference delegates, reported that indigenes were already 
demanding the expulsion of German civil servants. The classification of the 
population, in the light of this, was to play a crucial role in the expulsion process. 
By the end of the war, classification of indigenous Mosellans and Alsatians was 
already a well established practice, in the sense that Alsace-Lorrainer refugees who had 
made their way to France during the war, had been classified by special commissions 
which accorded the `tricolour card' to those of sound pro-French sentiments. Equally, 
in 1914, inhabitants of `Alsace reconquise', which was an army operational zone, had 
also been subjected to a system of military controls involving the use of cards. For the 
military at least, with its tendency towards order and organisation, such a system was 
comforting and reassuring. 
Four different categories of card were created, and these were set out in an 
arrete issued by the General Gouverneur de Metz, General de Maud'huy. 11 The first, 
card A, was given to those who had held French citizenship, or whose parents had held 
French citizenship prior to 1870, and who had lost this by virtue of the Treaty of 
" `Instruction sur l'application de l'arretd du 14 decembre de General Gouverneur de Metz', ADM, 
304 M 325. See also an illustration of the appearance of each card in Rosse, Das Elsaß, p. 528. 
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Frankfurt. ' This class of person was automatically reintegrated into the French 
Republic, `de plein droit'. In appearance, card A had two parallel stripes running 
diagonally across the white card, one blue and the other red, signifying the colours of 
the French flag, as can be seen in figure 4 below. 
Autorisations aceard8es as titulaire 
de cette carte: 
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Figure 4: Identity card A awarded to indigenes in the Moselle and Alsace. 2 
Card B was issued to those born in Alsace-Lorraine, but who had only one 
parent of French origin (and therefore entitled to join category A). This card had two 
red stripes, which formed a cross. Foreign subjects of non-enemy states were issued 
See Figure 4. 
From Philippot, Georges, Gendarmerie et identite nationale en Alsace et Lorraine de 1918 ä 1926, 
memoire de DEA, Metz, 1997. 
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with card C, which had two blue diagonal stripes which crossed in the middle. And 
card D, which was entirely white, was issued to those for whom both parents 
originated from enemy countries (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria) 
as well as their children, even if those children had been born in Alsace-Lorraine. 
There were 1,082,000 card A holders, 183,000 card B holders, 53,000 card C holders, 
and 513,000 card D holders in the Moselle and Alsace combined according to the 
Journal d'Alsace et de Lorraine, of 15 December 1919.14 
This system had practical advantages for the French authorities. It did indeed 
simplify the initial task of governing the regions by providing the authorities with a 
profile of the population, indicating how many Germans there were, as well as making 
them easily identifiable, and by separating foreigners who originated from allied 
countries from those from enemy countries. It must be remembered that Alsace and 
the Moselle were under military occupation following the armistice, and had to be 
governed as such, ensuring the security of the population as a whole, as well as the 
military. Likewise, many among the indigenous population were anxious to distinguish 
themselves from `Boches', and, as this was not always possible from a linguistic point 
of view, the carte d'identite marked with the French national colours was often carried 
with pride. The cards also doubled as travel documents. On the back of each card it 
stated, `Autorisations accordees au titulaire de cette carte'. There was space for 
permission to travel, and even to go hunting. Anyone wishing to travel within the 
regions had to carry their card, after having obtained the appropriate permission (in the 
form of a laissez-passer). A network of control posts around the regions were 
"4 Kirk, Grayson, French Administrative Policy in Alsace-Lorraine, 1918-1929, unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1930, p. 137. Kirk actually gives the date as 15 December 1918, 
rather than 1919. It is most probably a typographical error, as mayors around the regions were given 
until 24 December 1918 to draw up the necessary lists of residents in their communes. It is 
inconceivable that these figures were prepared and collated a full week ahead of this date. 
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operated by the military, at which all individuals were obliged to produce a carte 
d'identite and the correct permission to travel. These restrictions meant the new 
regime was able to hold a tight grip on the population. Those unable to prove their 
origins, were automatically allocated card A. 15 However, despite the obvious 
advantages for a government dealing with a seemingly unstable, multi-racial 
population, the system created a catalogue of difficulties and problems which produced 
anger, disillusionment, and frustration among those sections of society which did not 
fall neatly into category A. 
In fact, General de Maud'huy himself unwittingly set out in his instruction the 
first problem encountered by families. The document gives several examples of how 
classification would work in practice, the first of which showed how husbands and 
wives could find themselves in different categories. Madame Y, born of French origin 
(with two French parents), married to Monsieur Z who was German, would receive 
card A and her husband, card D. When it came to children, however, the system began 
to show signs of discrimination based on gender. Children would receive, 
la carte B 
si un des deux ascendants seul est franrais 
si Pun et 1'autre ont la carte B 
si le pere a la carte B et la mere la carte C 
la carte C 
si le pere a la carte C et la mere une carte autre 
que la carte A. 
15 Rosse, Das Elsaß, p. 529. This was for orphans, or displaced persons, who were unlikely to pose 
any kind of political threat. 
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A heavy emphasis was laid upon the origins of the father, rather than the mother, when 
deciding which category of card a child should receive. 16 This was because French 
men were full citizens in 1918 whereas women were not, as illustrated by in the fact 
that they did not have the vote. This system is rather at odds with the reality that many 
indigenous men in the Moselle and Alsace fought in the German army, and were 
treated with great suspicion by the French authorities upon their return to the regions. 
However, the most distressing aspect of the system was that it was clearly possible in 
some cases for a family to have three different categories of card. '? 
Pierri Zind is particularly scathing about the system of classification. `Cette 
segregation raciste etait foncierement ignoble'. '8 He argues that the system 
superimposed the artificial unity of France upon the regions, ignoring the ethnic roots 
of their populations which reached into the surrounding regions: from the Saarland, the 
Palatinate and Luxembourg for Lorrainers; to Switzerland, the Rhineland and Baden 
for Alsatians. According to Zind, the Parisians appeared more foreign to the 
populations of the Moselle and Alsace than the Germanic races to the north and east. 
Zind's examination of the ethnic origins of the provinces theoretically provides a sound 
case against the system of classification. Most Mosellans and Alsaciens de vieille 
souche would not have had to look very far back in their family trees to find their roots 
which penetrated deep into the surrounding continent. However, in 1918, how many 
within the indigenous population cared to consider this point of view? How many 
were there whose ethnic origins were actually reflected in a sense of mixed identity, or 
sentiment, or of divided loyalties? Especially among the Mosellans, many were 
16 The prejudice written into the classification of children appeared when the father had a card B and 
the mother a card C, the child would follow the father's classification and also receive a card B. 
However, if the father had a card C and the mother a card B, then the child would still follow the 
father's classification and receive a card C. 
11 Rosse, Das Elsaß, p. 529. 
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overjoyed to receive their red, white, and blue identity cards. For the vast majority of 
the indigenous population, especially in rural areas where there had been very little 
German immigration, classification was clear-cut and there was no difficulty in joining 
category A. 
Yet, not everyone appreciated having to prove that their origins were purely 
French. Marguerite Puhl-Demange believes many actually found this process deeply 
offensive. 19 In the urban context, mixed marriages were considerably more common. 
A report from the contröle postal de Metz quoted one exasperated correspondent, who 
claimed, `II faut actuellement apporter un arbre genealogique pour obtenir seulement 
une carte d'identite'? ° It was, in fact, those who did not fall neatly into category A, 
but who joined the somewhat grey area of categories B and C, who regarded the 
system as unjust and fundamentally flawed. It was these people who would have been 
most likely to agree with Zind's racial criticism of classification. How many of their 
neighbours, friends, and even relations, easily qualified for category A cards but had 
great grandparents who came from the Saarland, Bavaria, or even Prussia? What lay 
at the source of these people's sense of injustice was that whilst de Maud'huy's 
instruction states that the carte d'identite `ne confere pas un titre de nationalit6', 
categories were still decided according to the national origins of each individual, not 
by the individual's national sentiment. And yet, the question of sentiment was clearly 
in the minds of the system's architects when guidelines were drawn up for calculating a 
child's category in the case of a mixed marriage. The result was that, ultimately, a 
rogue parent of foreign origin could deny a staunch French patriot, perhaps even a 
18 Zind, P., Elsaß Lothringen, Alsace-Lorraine, p. 111. 
19 Suffert, G., Pelt, J-M., Marguerite Puhl-Demange. La Lorraine au quotidien, Metz, 1986, p. 32. 
Puhl-Demange was the daughter of Victor Demange, who founded the Metzer Freies Journal in 1919. 
20 Chateau de Vincennes, 16 N 1464. Report of 25 January 1919. 
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member of the Souvenir Francais or one time protestataire, 2' full integration into 
their beloved France, whilst, across the street, a neighbour who, during German 
annexation, had denounced indigenes to the German administration, was reintegre de 
plein droit with no questions asked. 22 
A weekly report from the administrateur in Sarreguemines, dated 11 March 
1919, noted that the indigenous population in his arrondissement was unhappy with 
the conditions for obtaining card A, laid out in the arrete of 14 December 1918. 
Beaucoup disent que cet arrete accorde trop de faveurs ä 
des personnes qui ä leur avis ne sont plus dignes d'etre 
considerees comme Alsaciens-Lorrains telles les femmes 
qui ont mane des allemands (sic. )23 
The indigenes would prefer, the report goes on, that category A cards only be issued 
to `Alsaciens-Lorrains proprement dits'. 
There is little likelihood that any system of classification could have taken into 
account any means of measuring sentiment under the circumstances presented in 1918, 
and during the months and years which followed. Indeed, the French authorities set up 
various separate bodies which sought to establish the national sentiment of individuals. 
Nonetheless, the cards, intentionally or otherwise, crudely denoted sentiment, racially 
segregated the population, and interfered with the everyday lives of those who carried 
them. As Marguerite Puhl-Demange states, for those whose children received a carte 
C, this amounted to a type of `marque d'infamie', the worst form of stigma. 24 This 
was because, again contrary to de Maud'huy's statement that the identity cards only 
21 This was someone who had supported the Protestataire political movement following annexation, 
which protested against the Treaty of Frankfurt during the 1870s and 1880s. 
22 Kirk, French Administrative Policy, p. 137-139. 
23 ADM, 301 M 53. 
24 ADM, 301 M 53. 
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constituted `un classement en ce qui concerne la circulation dont eile facilite le 
contröle', the cards had a further impact upon their holders. Holders of card A and D 
received radically different rates for their German marks when they attempted to 
exchange them for francs. Card A holders received 1.25 francs for their marks, 
whereas card D holders received only 0.74 francs. 25 Furthermore, the administrateur 
in Metz-Campagne, in his weekly report of 7 March 1919, described how a young 
man, in receipt of a carte B due to having a French father and a foreign mother 
(though not necessarily German), was having some difficulty finding work in the 
railways. They, and other administrations would only employ card A holders. 
11 ya des personnes tout ä fait recommandables, tres 
francaises, qui voient le gagne-pain ainsi enleve ä leurs 
enfants, qui cependant si on prend alors la loi de la 
nationalite sont francais du pere. Un grand malaise regne 
de cet etat de chose... 
The administrateur added that it was necessary to remind administrations that la carte 
d'identite ne cree pas un titre de nationalite, que c'est une simple question de 
circulation et que par consequent les titulaires de la carte (B) ne sont pas ä exclure par 
principe des emplois administratifs. '26 
Mayors' offices around the region regularly received inquiries from individuals 
seeking to obtain cartes A in place of cartes B, as many feared that only those in 
category A would be allowed to remain in the regions. 27 All offices were instructed to 
25 Rosse, Das Elsaß, p. 518. 
26 Kirk, p. 137. Kirk cites another case in which an Alsatian civil servant `who had been retarded in 
his professional advancement because of his Francophile sentiments, and who, forty years before, had 
married an Austrian woman, now saw his children given a class B card and thereby impeded in their 
search for work'. 
27 ADM, 301 M 53. Weekly report from the administrateur in Sarreguemines, of 21 April 1919, and 
sent to the commissaire de la Republique. 
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turn away such inquiries. Inevitably, it was not long before counterfeit identity cards 
were being sold on the black market to Germans. One such case was reported in 
Algrange, near Thionville, where the secretary of the mayor was accused of giving 
cartes d'identites A to a German and his father for 20 francs. The administrateur of 
Thionville-Ouest, in his letter of 11 March 1919 to the commissaire de la Republique 
in Metz, called for `une sanction severe' against those responsible, and stated that, 
`toute faute de ce genre donne toute latitude ä ces allemands [sic. ] de denigrer les 
procedes de l'administration francaise' 28 A similar affair was reported in the 
newspaper, the Lorrain. 
On a saisi, ä differentes reprises, des cartes d'identite A 
sur des Allemands authentiques. L'origine de ces cartes 
est maintenant etablie: il existe, ä Offenbourg, une 
officine qui, sous la direction d'un Allemand nomme 
K[... ], fabrique des cartes d'identite 29 
Cards were then sold in the Moselle for between 50 and 200 francs. 
Clearly, the system was not altogether foolproof. But the emergence of a black 
market for identity cards was entirely predictable, in view of the benefits of card A and 
the punitive nature of card D, since possession of a carte D did not only mean financial 
disadvantages and employment difficulties. From the very earliest stages of the 
system's implementation, it became obvious that the main reason for classifying the 
population was to quickly and efficiently sift out those elements within the population 
who were deemed `Boche', `suspect', or `undesirable'. Ultimately, those in possession 
of a carte D were not expected by the French authorities to remain within the returned 
28 ADM, 802 P (provisional code). This was known as the Affaire Kieffer. 
29 6T3, Le Lorrain, 1 August 1919. 
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provinces. 0 Classification of the population was the first step in the epuration 
process. The aim was to identify the enemy, stand them apart, then drive them out, 
either by persuasion or by force. 
Expulsion or voluntary repatriation? 
C'est comme un enchantement, nous ecrit-on de la vallee 
de la Fentsch. L'epuration se fait avec une suite 
extraordinaire. En moyenne 150 personnes quittent 
notre arrondissement par semaine pour retourner en 
Bochie. 11 n'y a pas un qui echappe ä la justice des 
choses. 3 1 
Within the returned provinces, Germans, or card D holders, fell into three categories: 
those allowed to remain for a fixed term; those authorized to leave voluntarily; and 
those obliged to leave, and issued accordingly with expulsion papers. Much has been 
made of the role of the commissions de triage in determining who was to leave 
following desannexion. 32 However, they played only one part in the process of 
expelling large numbers of Germans, as well as Mosellans and Alsatians, from the 
regions. In fact, expulsions ordered by the commissions de triage account for only a 
fraction of the overall departures. More importantly, Mirman did not regard the 
commissions de triage as the sole means of expelling individuals from the region. 33 
The first expulsions date from 23 December 1918, long before the Treaty of 
Versailles and the legal transfer of the territory to French sovereignty permitted such 
3o Rohr, La Lorraine mosellane, p. 11. 
31 Article entitled 'l'Epuration' in Le Thionvillois, 9 April, 1919. 
32 These commissions are discussed below, p. 182. 
33 ADM, 26 Z 26. Letter to the administrateur de Sarreguemines of 25 February 1919, part II. 
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actions. The last took place in July 1921. All expulsions were justified by the French 
authorities by reference to article 7 of the law of November and December 1849, and it 
was upon this law that the commissaire de la Republique en Lorraine based the 
following announcement; 
Le Ministre de 1'Interieur pourra, par mesure de police 
enjoindre ä tout etranger voyageant ou residant en 
France de sortir immediatement du territoire francais et 
le faire reconduire ä la frontiere. 
The same rights also applied to prefects in frontier regions with regard to non-resident 
foreigners, who could be referred to the Minister for the Interior for expulsion. 34 The 
above announcement also stated that those who attempted to return to the provinces 
following expulsion, could be imprisoned for up to six months (although it appears 
sentences were often no more than six days). 
35 The Circulaire ministerielle of 23 
January 1919, set out the conditions under which a person's presence in the provinces 
could no longer be tolerated. These conditions were as vague as possible. All persons 
who were deemed to have compromised `f'ordre et la tranquillite publics' could be 
expelled. Anything from drunkenness, rowdiness or immoral behaviour, to singing 
loudly in German, could result in the issuing of expulsion orders. In other words, this 
circulaire provided a `licence to expel'. However, as far as the question of epuration 
was concerned, this method was rather haphazard, and could only affect those who 
actually stepped out of line. Thus, the French authorities set about establishing which 
34 ADM, 304 M 212. This document is undated. However, it was written between January and 
March 1919 as it refers to a ministerial note of 23 January, whilst in March, affairs regarding the 
regions were no longer handled directly by the Ministry for the Interior, but by the commissariat 
general in Strasbourg. The 1849 law, though, was cited from the earliest stages of the French 
occupation of the provinces, in order to justify the expulsion of Germans and indesirables. 
35 Brasme, `Expulsions et Rapatriements', in Bulletin de Liaison de l'ANSBV, No. 18,1991, pp. 53- 
59. Copy held in ADM, pp. 1-23. 
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groups in society should formally be invited to leave. Initially, it was written into the 
terms of the November armistice that all military personnel were obliged to leave the 
regions within two weeks. It was also anticipated by the French authorities that all 
German civil servants would leave as soon as their positions had been filled by 
indigenes, or by the incoming French. This involved all levels, including high-ranking 
administrators, teachers, clerical staff, postal staff, as well as railway workers. Civil 
servants were regarded as the `agents' of the state, and in the case of the Moselle, the 
vast majority of middle to high-ranking civil service posts had been held during 
annexation by Germans, many of whom had filled the posts vacated in the 1870s by the 
outgoing Mosellans optants. 
As well as civil servants, other specific categories of person were expected to 
leave. In his letter to the administrateur in Sarreguemines of 25 February 1919, 
Mirman announced Jeanneney's desire to see the expulsion and repatriation of 
`boches' accelerated in Lorraine. 36 Exactly why Jeanneney desired this is unclear. 
Local discontent at the sluggishness of epuration may have been one reason. Equally, 
the French feared that, rather than there being a shortage of labour, an unemployment 
crisis was looming as the war economy and the need for munitions evaporated. The 
popularity of the French regime relied heavily upon its ability to ensure employment for 
the indigenous population. Whatever the reason, Mirman expressed the need to expel, 
not only those who had committed `des actes specialement reprehensibles', but also 
those who were `susceptibles d'exercer une influence allemande du fait de leur 
situation sociale; les intellectuels, les rentiers, les proprietaires fonciers, les 
commercants etc. '. The higher up the social ladder these people were, the more 
desirable was their departure. The administrateur for Metz-Campagne also supported 
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the need quickly to expel factory owners and directors who were, he claimed, `en 
general tres allemands, anti-francais'. 
37 For those Mirman refers to as `boches 
complets', there was, he added, no real need to consult the commissions de triage, 
except where there was some doubt about their origins. However, Mirman reckoned, 
that there was less urgency about the `little people' - workers, employees, and artisans 
- so long as their attitude was irreproachable. This 
letter, with its aggressive tone, 
constant use of the term `boche', and its desire for indiscriminate expulsions, paints a 
particularly disturbing picture of Mirman and the administration he led in the Moselle. 
It is also damning evidence of how Mirman, backed up by Jeanneney, milked the 1849 
law in order to cleanse the region of as many Germans and indesirables as possible. 
The two men appear to have surpassed the mandate of the law, employing, instead, 
what they regarded as `preventive measures' with regard to those they reckoned were 
most likely to pose a nationalist, political threat. 
In May 1919, further groups were identified by the new regime for expulsion, 
and this time they included the unemployed and the poor. Again, these were groups 
which, it was claimed, posed both a political and social threat to the stability of the 
region. As Brasme states, this was yet another preventive measure which accepted the 
public's belief that Bolshevism and poverty went hand in hand. However, these two 
groups also placed the greatest financial burden on the regions, a burden their 
expulsion would helpfully remove. In August of that year, Millerand asked his 
commissaire in Metz to `provoquer le depart des Allemands necessiteux, actuellement 
ä la charge des budgets locaux'. 3B The following month, it was decided that all 
36 ADM, 26 Z 26. Section VI of letter. 
37 ADM, 301 M 53. Weekly report from the administrateur in Metz-Campagne, of 7 March 1919. 
38 Brasme, `Expulsions et Rapatriements', in Bulletin de Liaison de I'ANSBV, No. 18,1991, pp. 53- 
59. Copy held in ADM, pp. 1-23, p. 13. 
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unemployed Germans who had not yet requested their repatriation should be expelled. 
Unfortunately, no figures exist for exactly how many were `disposed of' n this way. 
The indignity and misery of expulsion from the Moselle region could, 
supposedly, be lessened by opting for voluntary repatriation. This meant that, instead 
of awaiting expulsion orders by following the correct procedure, permission would be 
granted to allow individuals and their families to leave the region and travel to 
Germany. In fact, even before the armistice had been signed, many families had chosen 
not to remain. At that stage, they had attempted to sell as much of their property as 
possible, and had taken with them whatever money and belongings they could 
transport. Once the French authorities arrived, such were the restrictions on 
movement within the provinces, that the only way to depart legally was to opt for 
voluntary repatriation. 
The Messin newspaper carried an announcement by de Maud'huy giving 
permission to depart to les citoyens allemands qui lui en feront la demande et qui ne 
sont pas sous le coup de poursuites judiciaires'. 3' Regular notices appeared in the 
Moselle's press informing Germans wishing to leave of the repatriation procedure. 
After submitting a demande de rapatriement, the individual was obliged to produce 
identification papers, a certificate of nationality, a receipt stating that payments of all 
taxes were up to date, and a favourable report from the relevant mayor. 40 All of the 
above documents were then examined by the Bureau Special des Rapatries pour 
I'Allemagne (second floor of the Corps du Garde, Place d'Armes, Metz). This office 
was run by the military. Once permission had been granted, a form was issued in both 
French and German stating where and when the applicant should present himself or 
39 Le Messin, 2 January 1919. Article entitled 'Rapatriement des Allemands'. 
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herself . 
41 In the case of Madame S..., aged 47 and living in Terville (adjacent to 
Thionville), she and her six children were to present themselves on 22 April 1919 at 
8am at the station buffet in the station at Thionville, where every rapatrie was to be 
examined and their baggage searched. The form went on to state, 
Chaque voyageur pourra emporter: 
1. Un maximum de 30kg. de bagages. 
2. Deuxjours de vivres. 
3. Un maximum de 2000 marks par personne majeure et 
de 500 marks par enfant, en Billets de banque 
allemands. 
Toute somme superieure sera confisquee. 42 
Each rapatrie was also obliged to buy a rail ticket for the journey which was 
obtained the night before travelling. Gold, coins of any kind, and French or allied 
money were forbidden. All property and belongings left behind by both the expulses 
and the rapatries were liable for sequestration, and then liquidation by the French 
authorities 43 This, coupled with the rapidly decreasing value of the mark, left families 
with barely enough money to feed themselves, let alone find accommodation once they 
reached Germany. Yet, not everyone was granted permission to go to Germany. 
Brasme cites the example of Judge Ernst Kirnstein who, in March 1919, due to the 
somewhat precarious state of his financial affairs, was refused permission to be 
ao Brasme, 'Expulsions et Rapatriements', in Bulletin de Liaison de I'ANSBV, No. 18,1991, pp. 53- 
59 Copy held in ADM, pp. 1-23, p. 5. 
41 See figure 5 which shows an example of a voluntary repatriation form. ADM, 27 Z 6. In many 
cases, only the French section was filled in as it was the French military who completed the forms and 
very few of them understood German. Equally, the form was to be presented at the point of departure 
to the military authority who, again, were only interested in the details written in French. 
42 ADM, 27 Z 6. 
43 Exceptions were eventually made for civil servants who were granted permission to retrieve their 
furniture from the provinces. 
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repatriated. He was prevented from departing because he would have left behind 
debts, despite the fact that he had once been a reserve officer in the German army, and 
was of Prussian origin. 4 Although the French regime invited the German population 
to apply for voluntary repatriation, there were limitations. Furthermore, the forms 
issued for those choosing to depart contained exactly the same terms and restrictions 
as the expulsion orders, as can be seen in figures 5 and 6 on the following pages. " 
Calculations made from documents in the Archives departementales de la 
Moselle, suggest that between 1918 and 1921,4,389 expulsions were made by the 
French authorities from the whole of the Moselle department 46 This figure represents 
the number of names to be found in a hand-written book, which appears to provide the 
most complete list for the period. The figure may be slightly distorted as in some cases 
only the head of the family was listed, even though other family members were 
included in the deportation order. Equally, a further hand-written list contains the 
names of 5,740 individuals considered to be indesirables. However, as a covering 
letter with this list suggests, many of those identified as indesirable would have already 
opted for voluntary repatriation ahead of police enquiries and investigations, and so 
expulsion measures would not have been necessary. A type-written list entitled 
`Indesirables et expulses de Metz' gives more information about the 2,678 individuals 
44 Brasme, 'Expulsions et Rapatriements', in Bulletin de Liaison de I'ANSBV, No. 18,1991, pp. 53- 
59. Copy held in ADM, pp. 1-23, p. 5. Germans of Prussian origin were the most despised of all by 
the French, due to wartime propaganda and memories of the Franco-Prussian War. 
45 See Figure 5. 
46 ADM, 304 M 220. This file is to be found in the Repertoire numerique under the section 
'Relations franco-allemandes'. Unfortunately, it is not possible to tell exactly how many among these 
expulses were indigenes, and how many were Germans. 
175 
Profession 
Domidlibe It... it k9'LeLf. ...... _.. ..... ......... 
rat avC quo w Jemands de r paLrioment eat acceptte. 
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Figure 5: Voluntary repatriation form, issued 19 April 1919. 
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Figure 6: Expulsion form, issued 19 April 1919. 
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expelled from the city 47 For example, the names of 21 `Religieuses Boches qui se sont 
tres mal comportees pendant la guerre' are to be found. As well as nuns, individuals of 
all professions are listed including lawyers, doctors, shopkeepers, domestic servants, 
and hairdressers, to name but a few. 
Table 6: Changes in population according to nationality 48 
Nationality 1910 1921 Percentage 
change 
German 164,502 44,899 -72.7 
Austrian 3,806 616 -83.8 
Hungarian 222 104 -53.2 
Overall, though, the total number of expulsions indicated by these lists does not 
account for the dramatic reduction in the size of the German community illustrated by 
the change in census figures between 1910 and 1921. As detailed in table 6 above, 
there were 164,502 Germans living in the Moselle in 1910. This figure had dropped to 
44,899 by 1921, a drop of 119,603 (72.7 per cent). 49 This reduction can largely be 
accounted for by the system of expulsion and voluntary repatriation operated by the 
French as soon as they arrived in the region. The total number of those who opted for 
voluntary repatriation can only be estimated, as lists are not as complete or as reliable 
as those for expulsions. Several factors should be taken into account. Allowance must 
be made for the departure of the German military at the end of the war. In 1910 there 
had been 22,228 military personnel permanently stationed in the Moselle. The death 
47 ADM, 304 M 213. 
°B Annuaire Statistique, Office Regional de Statistique d'Alsace et de Lorraine, Premier Volume - 
1919 ä 1931. 
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toll at the end of the war, which again is hard to estimate due to the massive shifts in 
population during and immediately after the conflict, must also be considered. 
Likewise, an indeterminate number of Germans had already left the region before 
French troops arrived, and expulsions began. However, it is unlikely that many 
actually succeeded in reaching Germany, as roads were choked with retreating soldiers 
and their equipment. In total, therefore, taking into consideration the above 
movements of population, it is estimated that roughly 90,000 German immigrants 
between 1918 and 1921 opted for voluntary repatriation to Germany from the Moselle 
department. 
An undignified departure 
The trains carrying the rapatries and expulses from the Moselle region passed into 
Germany either through Alsace and across the bridge at Kehl, or over the border to the 
north of the region at Forbach and on to Saarbrücken. Most departed from Metz, 
Thionville, or Sarreguemines. At the stations there was a heavy military presence and 
Gendarmes were also on hand to control any crowds. The commissaire special 
Wagner was in charge of the station in Metz and his reports give vivid accounts of the 
departures. One such document, of 2 April 1919, describes the scene. On platform 6, 
the train destined to take the `indesirables expulses' to Saarbrücken waited. A military 
and police contingent ensured that only those permitted to depart boarded the train, 
whilst an officer formed an orderly crowd, grouping men and women separately. 
5° An 
incident occurred where a uniformed customs officer assisted a woman expulsee with 
49 The numbers of Austrians and Hungarians dropped by a similar margin during the same period, as 
they were also among those considered to be from enemy states. 
so ADM, 304 M 212. Sent to the commissaire de la Republique in Metz. It is unclear why it was 
necessary to separate men and women in this way. 
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her baggage. `Le Commissaire special lui ayant fait remarquer son attitude hideuse en 
cette circonstance et son manque de dignite sous l'uniforme en presence de 400 
Allemands expulses, l'a renvoye des quais'. Some American soldiers also gained 
access to platform 6, and were seen to make their farewells and to shake hands with 
some of the expulses, notably women. They were also dismissed from the platform by 
the commissaire special. As the train departed, infantrymen took up their positions 
standing on the footplates of the carriages. A crowd of onlookers had also gathered at 
the station. Some may have turned up out of curiosity, wishing to witness the 
remarkable sight. Others may have come to bid farewell to family members or friends. 
Une foule qu'on peut estimer ä un millier de personnes se 
tenait sur les deux routes bordant la voie, derriere les 
grillages et palissades, et saluait les partants en agitant 
leurs mouchoirs. Il n'y a pas eu de cris, ni de chants, ni 
aucune manifestation bruyante. 
After the train had departed, the crowd dispersed. 
Another report, also written by Wagner, of 7 May 1919, illustrates the routine 
nature of the exercise, `Le beau temps avait attire plus de monde que de coutume pour 
assister au passage du train'. 5t He also notes that the expulses were finding ways of 
taking more than the permitted 30 kilogrammes of luggage. They did this by arriving 
at the station the night before they were due to depart, and checking in their luggage. 
That luggage was placed in the three luggage vans attached to the train. The following 
morning, however, the expulses arrived, each carrying a further 30 kilogrammes of 
luggage. Conditions during the journey were reportedly poor, and a complaint was 
51 Ibid. 
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sent to the commissaire de la Republique in Metz by the conseiller d'Etat Kneip. 52 
Some trains carried up to 1,400 expulses and rapatries, a fifth of whom were children, 
and, in some cases, took 36 hours to arrive at Kehl. Children were reported to have 
suffered from diarrhoea and other illnesses related to the lack of properly heated food. 
Some expulses and rapatries, especially those departing from Sarreguemines, 
travelled into Germany via the bridge at Kehl, a town situated on the east bank of the 
Rhine river across from Strasbourg. The administrateur of the arrondissement of 
Sarreguemines, received a letter from the German Foreign Minister recounting how a 
major in the German army had been horrified to discover that his wife had been frisked 
at the checkpoint in Kehl, before her expulsion to the Rhineland. The administrateur 
pointed out that soldiers and Gendarmes were merely following orders by carrying out 
the task, but that perhaps women could be recruited in their place. A daily pay of five 
francs was suggested. Frisking was necessary, as well as luggage searches, in order to 
prevent individuals from carrying extra currency, gold, or silver, but may have been 
used to further intimidate expulses and rapatries. 
In fact, humiliation appears to have been the order of the day, and newspapers 
such as the Thionvillois joined in the chorus. On 9 April 1919 the newspaper reported, 
with undisguised glee, the expulsion of the director general of the Usines de la paix at 
Knutange, who was arrested and taken to Metz, `chained to a vagrant'. The 
newspaper lists the names of other expulses and adds, `Ils passent, comme les ämes en 
peine, pour la derniere fois sur le parvis qui vit leur grandeur et leur chute. Its se 
consolent cependant, car ils ne sont jamais seules. ' 
A more distressing aspect of the departures via Kehl was the presence of 
jeering crowds. A letter sent to Beaune describes the scenes at the Pont de Kehl. 
52 Reitet, Montigny -les-Metz, p. 341. 
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Depuis longtemps, nous ne nous etonnons plus des 
humiliations, infamies, etc. ... Des scenes dechirantes se 
sont passees lä (surtout quand la populace, qui semble 
payee pour cela, bombarde avec des pierres. ) ... E. a 
aussi dejä ete attaque et gravement maltraite; il s'en est 
tire vivant comme par un miracle. 53 
Indeed, the humiliation and hopelessness of the situation at times had extreme 
consequences both for those actually expelled, as well as those awaiting expulsion. A 
letter, from the commissaire special in Metz to the Directeur des Services Generaux 
de Police in Strasbourg, describes how a German police superintendent, imprisoned 
pending expulsion under General de Maud'huy's orders at the end of January 1919, 
committed suicide only days after his imprisonment. 54 He left a wife and four children. 
In the same prison, and in similar circumstances another police superintendent also 
attempted suicide. Following his recovery, the authorities proceeded with his 
expulsion, along with that of his wife and three children. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the population threatened with departure 
from the Moselle region faced the prospect with dread and fear. It was not long, 
though, before the indigenous population began to sense the shame in the epuration 
process, fearing, above all else, the consequences of the humiliation inflicted upon the 
expulses and rapatries, not all of whom were necessarily German. One letter sent to 
the commissaire general in Metz, called for an end to such treatment, predicting with 
alarming accuracy that `II se passera quelque chose de terrible qui aura la guerre pour 
53 Chateau de Vincennes, 1611 1464. Report from the Contröle postal in Metz, extract 28. 
54 ADM, 304 M 2. Letter of 22 April 1921. 
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resultat, car cette honte que vous infligez ä ces gens se transformera en une colere 
secrete et implacable comme la foudre et se vengera d'une facon indescriptible. '55 
The sifting process 
Of all the aspects of the epuration process to come under heavy criticism, both 
internally and externally, the commissions de triage appear to have been the most 
disturbing and disliked. They have been variously described as `ludicrous and tragic'56, 
as `une Sorte de Haute Cour de justice en patriotisme'57, and as `depourvu de toutes 
les garanties des procedures et jugements ordinaires'"58 According to Georg Wolf, 
they represented a `Schandfleck der Ubergangszeit', a shameful stain on the history of 
France. 59 So, what were these commissions or tribunals, why were they set up, and 
what were they meant to achieve? 
Again, this was one of the abbe Wetterle's inventions, suggested during the 
Conference d'Alsace-Lorraine, and implemented by Clemenceau even before the 
armistice had been signed. Wetterle insisted upon the expulsion of all Germans who 
had emigrated to the regions during annexation, as well as their descendants. Initially, 
the idea of the tribunals was to enable the authorities to `weed out' politically 
unreliable Germans who would pose a threat to the stability of the region. However, 
the tri was soon extended beyond Wetterle's original definition, forcing the Mosellan 
and Alsatian populations to prove their reliability to the incoming French authorities. 
Germans or Austro-Hungarians were only to go before the commissions in exceptional 
ss ADM, 304 M 212. Anonymous letter. 
56 Kirk, French Administrative Policy, p. 46. 
S' Robert Redslob, quoted in Zind, Elsaß-Lothringen, Alsace-Lorraine, p. 117. Zind describes Redslob 
as `un patriote anti-autonomiste'. 
58 Lucien Minck, in the radical newspaper, the Depeche de Strasbourg,, 12 January 1930, cited in 
Rohr, La Lorraine mosellane, p. 16. 
s9 Quoted in Rosse, Das Elsaß, p. 531. 
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cases. Later, in his book Tetes de boches, published in 1917, Wetterle indicated that 
those Alsace-Lorrainers who had `leche les pieds des maitres prussiens', should join 
the defeated Germans on the other side of the Rhine 60 That such unreliable indigenes 
existed at all, is completely at odds with the French argument that Germanisation had 
failed to impress or influence any of the original French population. Nonetheless, 
those immediately under suspicion were all Mosellans and Alsatians, who had worked 
as civil servants, or who had held political appointments under German rule. Rosse 
claims even some emigres who had spent part, if not all, of the war in the French 
interior, were also forced to prove the reliability of their sentiment. 
6' 
Each case brought before the tribunals passed through various preliminary 
stages. In every district, a commission du premier degre was set up, charged with 
producing initial reports 62 The system was under the overall control of the French 
military. Each commission was composed of three members: an officer chosen from 
the counter-espionage bureau of the French army who acted as president, and two 
civilians. For example, the report of 17 December 1918, sent to General de Maud'huy, 
states that the Metz tribunal consisted of General Violand as president, Monsieur 
Pidancet of an inter-ministerial commission, and Monsieur Collin, a retired teacher 
from Metz. No information is given as to these individuals' qualifications for taking up 
their seats on this tribunal. For example, none of them appears to have any obvious 
legal training. 63 This panel could call upon the services of the Gendarmerie whose role 
it was to carry out `de petites enquetes', to respond to accusations against individuals, 
60 Rossi, Das Elsaß, p. 530. 
61 Ibid. 
62 ADM. 304 M 329, account regarding the setting up of the Metz commission de triage, written by 
General Violand, commandant of the Metz tribunal. 
63 ADM, 304 M 329. 
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to interview them, as well as any witnesses, and to report back to the tribunal. 4 If the 
case was to be taken any further, the commission du l er degre would hold a hearing 
and send its recommendation to the commission du deuxieme degre in Metz. Only this 
final commission was empowered to actually recommend expulsion. Remarkably, little 
is known either about the composition or the actions of this tribunal. An order of 23 
January 1919 handed over ultimate authority from the military authorities to the 
commissaire de la Republique, so that the final decision regarding an individual's fate 
lay in his hands alone. 
A note for the commissions de triage, from the Etat-Major of the second 
bureau, gave the tribunals a choice of three possible verdicts for each case 65 Firstly, a 
person could be declared `non suspecte', and, in this case, no further action was 
required. The second outcome declared the person `suspecte mais non imm6diatement 
dangereuse'. He or she was allowed to remain in the region, but at a fixed address. 
This category later involved varying levels of surveillance of individuals. The third 
option declared the accused dangerous, and recommended imprisonment pending 
removal from the regions. Germans categorized as `dangerous' by the tribunals were 
liable to be expelled and sent to Germany on the next convoy. Mosellans and 
Alsatians, on the other hand, were expelled from the regions, but sent to camps in 
central France. According to Rosse, however, it was possible that those who were 
ignorant of their legal rights could be sent to Germany along with those of German 
origin. 66 Heavily targeted by the tribunals were indigenes who had held posts during 
64 ADM, 304 M 214. This file contains hand-written reports by Gendarmes on information gathered 
about individuals. 
65 ADM, 304 M 329. Note of 9 December 1918. 
'6 Rosse, Das Elsaß, p. 532. 
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annexation in the German civil service. 7 As a result of such investigations, even those 
found `innocent' were obliged to accept demotion, premature retirement, or transfers 
from their home towns. 
Adjustments to the system of tribunals were made over the months which 
followed their creation. These attempted, it would seem, to address some of the acute 
problems which had emerged. In February 1919, for example, new regulations stated 
that the officers in charge of each tribunal should have an adequate command of both 
German and the local dialects 68 On 7 May, it was announced that civil servants would 
no longer be tried before the tribunals, but at conseils de discipline. However, these 
councils still had the authority to recommend expulsions where necessary. Only a few 
days later, an arrete was issued by Millerand announcing the creation of commissions 
d'examen des etrangers. They were set up in order to deal with Germans and Austro- 
Hungarians `dont le sejour en Alsace-Lorraine pourrait etre contraire ä l'ordre 
public'. 69 These new tribunals were presided over by a magistrate, and prepared the 
way for naturalisation applications from Germans following the signing of the peace 
treaty. From then on, therefore, the commissions de triage (which were still not 
presided over by magistrates) dealt solely with the indigenous population. On 16 June 
1919, Millerand suspended the notorious commissions de triage, but it was not until 
27 October 1919 that they were, officially abolished. Kirk states rightly in his 1932 
thesis, `Probably the actual number deported was not great, but one is astonished to 
67 Soldiers who had served in the German army were also heavily scrutinized at special military 
tribunals, which considerably delayed their return home at the end of the war. See Brasme, 'Le 
rapatriement des prisonniers et des combattants alsaciens-lorrains', p. 142. 
68 It appears there were not even translators present in the early stages of the tribunals. 
69 ADM, 304 M 154, written by Millerand, the commissaire general de la Republique. 
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find, after ten years, how bitter are the memories of the people concerning these 
commissions and their work'. 0 
Even by June of that year, these tribunals had caused untold damage, not only 
to the lives of those sentenced by them, but to the reputation and perceived integrity of 
the new French regime. Initially, many had welcomed a system which would 
supposedly sift out undesirable elements, removing those who had publicly or secretly 
worked against the indigenous population during annexation and during the war. In 
view of the regions' brush with revolution during the final days before the entry of 
French troops, it was easy for the somewhat jittery middle classes to convince 
themselves that all German neighbours posed a Bolshevik threat. It is possible the 
French administration played on these fears in order to oil the wheels of the epuration 
process. However, as time passed, the injustice of the system gradually seeped into the 
public consciousness, not so much through revelations in the press, but through 
personal experience. Increasing numbers of indigenes, rather than German 
immigrants, found themselves before the tribunals, leading some newspapers to attack 
the system. `La composition et le fonctionnement des nouvelles Commissions 
d'examen donnent aux Allemands toutes les garanties desirables d'equite. 11 ne faut 
pas que les indigenes soient moins bien traites. '7' Some ten years later, Robert 
Redslob added his voice to the protests against the tribunals, claiming it was incredible 
that Mosellans and Alsatians were forced to defend both their actions during 
annexation and `l'attitude qu'ils avaient eue pour le regime constitutionnellement etabli 
et base sur un traite en regle'. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, the indigenous 72 
70 Kirk, p. 46. Kirk, in the course of his research, did not have access to the lists of expulses contained 
in the papers of the commissariat general. 
71 ADER 121 AL 162. Revue de la Presse Alsacienne, report on the commissions de triage. 
72 Robert Redslob, published in Le Temps in April 1929 and quoted in Rohr, La Lorraine mosellane, 
p. 16-17. 
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population had acted in a manner which had appeared, in the circumstances, to be legal 
and proper. Anticipating, as they had, a continuation of German rule, should 
Mosellans and Alsatians really have turned down opportunities to work in the civil 
service which governed their own regions? Penalising them, after their return to 
French sovereignty, for holding posts in the German civil service was tantamount to 
punishing them for preventing Germans from gaining total control of their regions. 
Redslob goes on to add, je dois avouer en toute humilite que je n'ai rien compris ä 
cette procedure'. 
One autonomist propaganda tract set out its grievances against the 
commissions de triage in a brochure entitled The Protest of Young Alsace. 73 It 
claimed the tribunals were made up of Alsatians who were `unfamiliar with Alsace, or 
who were persecuted under the German regime and ... therefore greatly prejudiced'. It 
went on to claim that judges and witnesses were not sworn, and were therefore not 
accountable. Furthermore, `the accused does not know his accuser', `the accused may 
not be defended by a lawyer', and `there is no possibility of an appeal'. This 
autonomist publication was not the only one to hurl such accusations of illegality and 
injustice. Lucien Minck published in the Depeche de Strasbourg in January 1930 a 
similar attack, adding, `Il convient d'ajouter que les tribunaux ont use et abuse de cette 
situation illegale, au point de baser parfois leurs jugements sur des dossiers sciemment 
fausses et sur des documents inexistants. '74 Due to the secrecy surrounding the 
tribunals, it is hard to know the extent to which all of these criticisms were justified, 
but there appears an equal lack of evidence in their defence. Indeed, Mirman's 
73 PRO, FO 371/3750. Signed by The Executive Committee of the Free State Elsaß-Lothringen, this 
rather poor translation was published in Geneva. 
" Quoted in Rohr, La Lorraine mosellane, p. 16. The Depeche de Strasbourg was a radical 
newspaper favoured by autonomists. 
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comments in general do little to reveal any great sense of `fair play'. He even stated, 
`L'avis des Commissions de triage n'est pas reglementairement necessaire, ces 
commissions ont ete faites pour proteger les Alsaciens ou Lorrains non les boches. ' 
Yet, by June 1919, Millerand was compelled to suspend their activities, after only one 
month in office during which only Mosellans and Alsatians were tried. During the 
years which followed their abolition, repeated attempts were made to force the French 
government to revise the tribunals' decisions, and to win compensation for the victims. 
Such attempts were supported by almost all deputies from Alsace and the Moselle, 
most notably, Robert Schuman. On 18 February 1931, he proposed a law in favour of 
compensation for civil servants who had been victims of the tribunals during the 
months leading up to 7 May 1919. However, government support for Schuman's 
efforts was not forthcoming, despite the strength of feeling and weight of support. 75 
The tribunals, in concept as well as function, were indeed unreliable and unjust 
in the returned provinces. The mosellan author, Mungenast, highlights their 
fundamental flaw, stating, `au lieu de regarder vers 1'avenir [elles ne] consideraient que 
le passe'. 76 The fact that they survived a mere six months after integration is testimony 
to their singular lack of appropriateness. Exactly who was responsible for the injustice 
served upon both the immigrant and indigenous populations is difficult to say. Their 
evolution from Wetterle's simple model enforcing the departure of Germans, to a form 
of `civilian court-martial' is easy to trace. However, the damage caused by these 
tribunals would have been minimal had it not been for the willing, and often 
enthusiastic, participation of a society riddled with willing denonciateurs, whose letters 
of accusation against neighbours, colleagues, and competitors, flooded Mirman's 
75 Rosse, Das Elsaß, p. 535 and Rohr, La Lorraine mosellane, p. 18. 
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office in the months following integration. Was the disgrace of the commissions de 
triage not theirs, just as much as the new administration's? 
A witch-hunt 
Due to his previous connections with the German Catholic Centre Party, and despite 
being entitled to hold a category A identity card, the abbe Louis Pinck fell into the 
category of Mosellans 'ä surveiller discretement' following the French seizure of 
power in the provinces. " An inhabitant of Pinck's home town of Hambach (near 
Sarreguemines), whom Pinck had taken to court in 1913, decided to denounce the 
abbe, accusing him of preaching from his pulpit that Alsace-Lorrainers who had 
deserted the German army had failed to keep their oath of allegiance to the Kaiser. 
Despite the fact that almost all the inhabitants of Hambach, including the mayor 
himself, considered this to be untrue, Pinck was nonetheless summoned to appear 
before the commission de triage at Sarreguemines in January 1919. During the 
following four months, Pinck was ordered to report twice weekly to the local military 
control, and he was forbidden to travel outwith his parish. When, in December 1919, 
the sous-prefet of Sarreguemines finally lifted the travel restrictions, Pinck requested 
that he be allowed to retain his carte de circulation as a memento of his persecution. 78 
Not all denunciations were of such high-profile individuals as Louis Pinck. 
Neither were they always aimed at those as capable of defending themselves as he. In 
fact, Mirman's office, as well as mayor's offices around the region, were inundated 
76 Quoted in Commaille, Laurent, 'Ernst-Moritz Mungenast et la Lorraine', in Les Cahiers Lorrain, 
Nos. 3-4, October 1992, pp. 545-555. 
" Hiegel, Henri and Charles, `L'oeuvre du folkloriste lorrain, Louis Pinck (1873-1940)', in Les 
Cahiers Lorrains, 1981 third trimester, pp. 199-218. 
78 Pinck was one of a number of high profile Mosellans who supported the autonomist movement in 
the inter-war period. No doubt this, as well as his experience at the commissions de triage, are not 
unconnected. 
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with letters of denunciation of ordinary citizens. One letter alone, addressed to 
Mirman and written by an inhabitant of the Ile St. Symphorien quarter of Metz, 
included the denunciation of at least 27 neighbours. The author insisted, `il serait grand 
temps de faire une raffe complete de tous ces monstres qui ne cessent d'injurier la 
france [sic. ] et qui font la propagande pour exciter la revolution'. 79 The author 
described his various neighbours as `pire que boches', as well as `bocke de la haute 
classe'. He included the names of spouses, as well as children, and the accusations 
appear to be based largely on overheard conversations. There is no way of telling how 
seriously this letter was taken. Certainly, in the early stages, though, many were taken 
at face value, as can be seen in the case of Louis Pinck. 
The mayor of Sarreguemines, Monsieur Sigwald, was one of the first to invite 
denunciations from the local population by placing, on 6 December 1918, the 
following announcement in the Saargemünder Zeitung. 
Des personnes qui auraient des communications ä faire a 
la Commission de triage pour I'evacuation des 
indesirables sont priees de les faire par ecrit et signees ä 
l'adresse suivante: Monsieur le President de la 
Commission de triage, Mairie de Sarreguemines. 80 
This was complemented by regular announcements in the press instructing Germans 
about the procedure for voluntary repatriation: addresses for applications, how to 
apply, as well as quantities of luggage and money allowed. For example, the 
newspaper Le Messin carried one such announcement on 2 January 1919 under the 
heading `Rapatriement des Allemands', which read `On nous communique que 
79 ADM, 304 M 212. The date on this letter is illegible. 
S0 Quoted in Rohr, La Lorraine mosellane, p. 15. 
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Monsieur le General Gouverneur de Metz est dispose ä autoriser ä rentrer en 
Allemagne les citoyens allemands qui lui en feront la demande et qui ne sont pas sous 
le coup de poursuites judiciaires'. 
The mayor's invitation, as well as these announcements, appeared in the press 
at a time when the atmosphere within the Moselle region was already highly charged. 
A report for the Contrble postal de Metz in March 1919 describes the general feeling 
among the indigenous populations. `La haine des Lorrains vis-ä-vis des allemands [sic. ] 
persiste... Les Lorrains comptent que le Gouvernement francais saura faire justice de 
toutes [les] atrocites commises au mepris des lois de guerre'. 81 The pitiful sight of 
wagon-loads of Germans, leaving the regions to travel to Germany brought a sense of 
satisfaction to many who felt that justice was being served. As each convoy made its 
way into `Bochie', so the denunciations multiplied until there was a permanent threat 
of denunciation, not just for Germans remaining in the province, but also for 
Mosellans. On 2 May 1919, the newspaper Le Messin reported, `Les denonciations 
pleuvent chez le Commissaire de la R6publique et chez le Gouverneur contre les 
Allemands de la region. ' Gradually, opportunism crept into the equation and business 
competitors, feuding neighbours, and disgruntled tenants were to be found among the 
denouncers. One letter of denunciation contains the accusations of a shopkeeper 
writing from Sarrebourg following her expulsion from Metz. 82 What is surprising 
about this letter is that the author appears to be of German origin, and yet she 
denounces German shopkeepers. The author mentions a tobacconist and a wine 
merchant, and states they had spoken ill of the French in the period before her own 
91 Chateau de Vincennes, 16 N 1464. Report of 16 March 1919, section entitled 'Operations de 
contröle et impressions gendrales'. 
82 ADM, 304 M 216. Letter of 15 March 1920. Obviously, this expulsee had been allowed to return 
to the region. 
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expulsion and were therefore `boche'. Yet, she claims, these were people who, in the 
presence of French, were `les plus bochophobes'. Her reason for making the 
denunciation was, she alleged, so that they too would experience the misery she had 
endured as a result of her expulsion. The letter accompanying the complaint of 15 
March 1920, and sent by the military authorities in Sarrebourg to the sous-prefet in 
Metz, suggests the denunciations may be of some use `quoique inspire par la jalousie 
et la rancune'. Even the normally Germanophobic newspaper, Le Messin, recognized 
the spurious nature of many of the denunciations. 
Quelques-unes emanent de concurrents commerciaux, 
d'autres de personnes qui convoitent I'achat d'une 
maison que 1'Allemand menace d'expulsion devra vendre 
ä prix reduit. Certaines sont inspirees de basses 
vengeances. Les services competents devinent aisement 
les vilenies qui inspirent quelques denonciateurs. 83 
Some mayors felt that by `advertising' voluntary repatriation, they could stem 
the flow of false denunciations. Brasme gives the example of Sainte-Marie-aux- 
Chenes, north west of Metz, whose mayor recognized that many denunciations were 
`souvent dictees par la vengeance personelle'. By encouraging Germans themselves 
to come forward, thereby pre-empting denouncers, `1'epuration se fait en toute 
douceur, et ]a vie communale n'y perd rien en dignite et en cohesion'. 84 Instead of 
preventing false denunciations by punishing those who invented them, the authorities 
93 Le Messin, 2 May 1919, quoted in Brasme, 'Expulsions et Rapatriements', in Bulletin de Liaison de 
1'ANSBV, No. 18,1991, pp. 53-59. Copy held in ADM, pp. 1-23, p. 8. 
84 Brasme, 'Expulsions et Rapatriements', in Bulletin de Liaison de I'ANSBV, No. 18,1991, pp. 53- 
59. Copy held in ADM, pp. 1-23, p. 10. 
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chose simply to speed up the departures, so that there would be fewer Germans to 
denounce. 
The Archives Departementales de la Moselle contain numerous letters of 
protest against accusations and expulsion orders. In one such letter, the author 
claimed that, as an Alsatian, he should be allowed to remain in the region until 
ratification of the peace treaty, at which point he would become `properly' French 
anyway. He went on to claim that he was wrongly accused of having willingly served 
in the German army. He lists as referees, among others, Francois de Wendel along 
with nine others, including three mayors. However, the accompanying report shows 
that investigations for the commission de triage uncovered proof that the author had 
been closely involved with the German administration before the war and that, among 
other things, during annexation, he had been a close friend of General Lochow, 
`Gouverneur deteste de Thionville'. 85 The investigations into the author's past, carried 
out for the commission, appear to have been extremely thorough, although his claim to 
French nationality was nonetheless justified. Despite this, the conclusion of the 
investigations was to proceed with his expulsion, as well as that of his mother. 
A very different letter, from an innkeeper in Metz, also asks for his case to be 
reconsidered. 86 He was summoned to appear before the commission d'examen des 
etrangers in Metz on 25 October 1919. However, not knowing prior to his hearing 
either the accusations against him or his accuser, he was unable to defend himself 
properly. At the hearing he learned the identity of his accuser, and discovered that it 
was, in fact, the father of a business competitor with whom he was on particularly poor 
terms. Attached to the letter is a petition with the signatures and addresses of eight 
85 ADM, 5R 549. 
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commercants, all vouching for the innkeeper. Unfortunately, the outcome of this case 
is not indicated. 
Obviously, not all denunciations were invented by opportunists or business 
competitors. It was certainly necessary to expose those Germans who posed a very 
real threat to the political stability and security of the region, a procedure the new 
authorities, who had not witnessed the period of German rule, were unable to carry out 
without some assistance from the populations. However, in the miserable atmosphere 
created in the post-war period by the expulsions, why was such a great effort required 
in order to persuade the German immigrants to make their way `back to Germany'? 
Germany, in the post-war years, presented a most unappealing destination for many 
Germans who considered Elsaß-Lothringen to be their home. Many had lived there all 
their lives and did not consider themselves to be `immigrants'. Large numbers of them 
had broken ties with their native German regions, and without the existence of modern 
communications, had lost touch with those they had left behind. 87 As well as this, 
Germany was politically unstable. The creation of a republic, led by the socialist SPD 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), was a singularly unappealing combination 
for the professional middle classes. Indeed, it would be inaccurate to say that they 
were all `returning' to Germany. Many of them had been born in the regions, 
considered themselves Elsaß-Lothringer, and found it almost impossible to consider a 
future anywhere else. It was inevitable that, amongst those resisting departure, were 
some truly `undesirable' elements who would do everything within their powers to 
remain and oppose the new regime. But this only partially excuses the enthusiasm to 
86 ADM, 304 M 154. Letter of 3 November 1919 and addressed to the president of the commission 
d'examen des etrangers, Metz. 
87 Schillinger, 'Metz de I'Allemagne ä la France', in Annuaire de la Societe d'Histoire et 
d'Archeologie de la Lorraine, Metz, 1974, pp. 123-131, p. 125. 
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denounce. The viciousness of so many of the denunciations and the sheer number of 
false accusations, have cast a very dark shadow over the inter-war history of the 
region. It is perhaps this, more than anything, which has produced such a stubborn 
reluctance to record the history of this period. Few have been willing to ask questions 
of those who lived through this, either as denouncers, or as denounced. 
Limits to epuration 
L'heure est venue de faire tri ve ä ces fächeuses meprises 
et que sans renoncer pour autant aux expulsions düment 
reconnues necessaires il soit mis un terme aux autres, aux 
rigueurs injustifiees. 88 
The desire to `tone down' the epuration process was increasingly voiced from 1919 
onwards. However, the true extent of the damage caused by the commissions de 
triage and the denunciations was not recognized until the mid to late 1920s. Initially, 
public opinion supported the departure of Germans in their droves, and responses from 
public figures seem to attempt to reflect such support. According to a deputy from the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle, `On est d'une extreme faiblesse vis-ä-vis des boches et on les 
tolere beaucoup trop. On pourrait certainement en faire expulser encore beaucoup 
pour le bien du pays ., 
89 The newspaper, Le Thionvillois, urged that epuration should 
be accomplished `sans faiblesse mais avec esprit de m6thode et de justice'. 
90 Yet, it is 
hard to know how enthusiastic most indigenes actually were in private. An extract 
quoted in a report from the Contröle postal in Metz for November 1918, states that 
gs CARAN AJ/30/296. Letter from General J. Stuhl, senator for the Moselle region, sent to the 
Pr6sident du conseil, 2 March 1925. 
89 CARAN AJ/30/23 1. Letter from a deputy in the Meurthe-et-Moselle, undated. 
90 Le Thionvillois, 21 March 1919. 
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the expulsion of the mayor of St Avold, who had, in fact, done a great deal during the 
war to protect the citizens of the town from martial law, was a grave error. `Je croyais 
1'esprit francais plus large que cela et on verra trop tard que l'on a fait une faute. '91 
The report of 5 January 1919 concluded that, whilst the indigenes increasingly desired 
the expulsion of German immigrants from the region, they feared that, `les mesures 
prises ä leur egard ne soient empreintes d'une trop grande indulgence et executees 
avec trop de bienveillances. '92 As with so many similar situations, it is likely that 
epuration of the population was supported in theory, whilst in practice it was 
distressing to witness, especially when the expulses were neighbours or acquaintances. 
Needless to say, voicing such regret was not without its unpleasant 
consequences. There were, for example, very few forums for the expression of private 
fears during a period of censorship and postal controls. Equally, sentiment was 
persistently viewed in black and white terms, and setting out misgivings about the 
expulsion of the enemy would undoubtedly have been swiftly interpreted as 
Germanophilia or even Pangermanism. The imprisonment of Victor Demange, 
founding editor of the Metzer Freies Journal, was due, in part, to his enunciation of 
the problems afflicting the region including the arbitrary nature of the epuration 
process. 93 However, the expression of such views was not always motivated by a 
sense of dismay at the handling of the situation. More importantly, the departure of 
thousands of German immigrants had significant economic consequences for the 
region, more so even than for Alsace, and it was for this reason that a revision of the 
91 Chateau de Vincennes, 16 N 1464. Report for the week 25-30 November 1918, extract 15. 
92 Ibid. 
93 See Roth, Le temps des journaux, pp. 211-224. 
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policy was more openly demanded by various individuals. `Ne va-t-on pas ruiner notre 
province en la privant de ses commercants, de ses industriels, de ses ouvriers? '94 
The Revue de la presse alsacienne dated 29 August 1919, reported that the 
Journal d'Alsace et de Lorraine had demanded the mass expulsion of German workers 
`sans tenir compte du point de vue economique' 95 However, the Lothringer 
Volkszeitung claimed that public opinion in the Moselle rejected a policy based solely 
upon sentiment. The lack of a skilled workforce in the Moselle could not be quickly 
remedied by employing foreign workers, as they were seldom adequately qualified for 
the task. Although German workers were often seen as the instigators of strikes, some 
form of judicial statute could be created which would prevent this by threatening 
troublemakers with expulsion. In fact, in a report from Mirman to the administrateur 
in Sarreguemines, dated 25 February 1919, section VIII states, `il ne faut pas expulser 
un allemand meme du groupe 4 [D] qu'apres s'etre preoccupe de son "utilite" 
economique' 96 Mirman was concerned, though, that every effort be made to replace 
Germans as quickly as possible. He also states that, for example, no German farmers 
would be expelled from the region until a mosellan farmer was ready to step in and 
continue farming the land. Neither would an industrialist, employing a large 
workforce, be expelled until his immediate replacement was guaranteed, thereby 
safeguarding the future of production as well as of employees. 
The Messin newspaper addressed other side-effects of the mass departure of 
Germans. In an article entitled `L'expulsion des Indesirables et le repeuplement de la 
Lorraine par des Francais', which appeared on 30 April 1919, the writer explains that, 
94 Le Messin, 2 May 1919, quoted in Brasme, 'Expulsions et Rapatriements', in Bulletin de Liaison de 
I'ANSBV, No. 18,1991, pp. 53-59. Copy held in ADM, pp. 1-23, p. 17. 
93 ADBR, 121 AL 162. This review of the press, carried out by the new French administration, 
regularly featured articles from the mosellane press. 
96 ADM, 26 Z 26. It is assumed here that all Germans were in 'group 4' or category D. 
198 
whilst the indigenous population viewed the departure of `des etres grossiers et 
malfaisants' with relief, there were also damaging side-effects of the loss of such large 
numbers of the population, especially for landlords and commercants. Indeed, despite 
having been among the first to refuse to do business with Germans and to demand their 
expulsion, shopkeepers and small businessmen were also among the first to suffer from 
a loss of customers and a dramatic drop in income. 97 Needless to say, the solution 
proposed in the Messin was not to slow down the departures of Germans, but to speed 
up the arrival of suitable replacements from the French interior. 
Arrangements were indeed made to allow certain German workers to remain in 
the region. For example, a letter from the De Wendel company in Hayange, dated 26 
April 1921, includes a list of German miners whose conduct had apparently never been 
the subject of complaints, and to whom, according to the company, it would be 
acceptable to award work permits. Another letter, sent from the Sous-Prefet in 
Sarreguemines dated 1 July 1925, states that within the arrondissement of 
Sarreguemines, a total of 264 Germans were employed in agriculture and industry. 
The Sous-Prefet goes on to recommend that in order to resolve the serious shortage of 
labour in the region, `l'emploi d'ouvriers agricoles allemands, semble, etant donne la 
situation geographique du departement de la Moselle, pouvoir remedier ä la crise. i98 
Other, perhaps more minor, inconveniences were experienced by the often sudden 
departure of individuals. For example, on 9 January 1919, the commissaire de la 
Republique in Metz wrote to the mayor of the city, pointing out that the expulsion of 
97 Brasme, `Expulsions et Rapatriements', in Bulletin de Liaison de I'ANSBV, No. 18,1991, pp. 53- 
59. Copy held in ADM, pp. 1-23, p. 17. 
98 ADM, 310 M 50. 
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the German police doctor meant that medical supervision of prostitutes in the city was 
being neglected. 99 
The sense of regret at the manner in which epuration took place, the delays in 
finding French replacements, and the fear that the process would, in fact, have serious 
economic consequences for the region, all appear to have influenced the new regime's 
approach to the policy of expulsion, as well as persuading Germans to leave the region. 
However, it was ultimately the Treaty of Versailles itself which had the greatest impact 
on the treatment and destiny of the region's indesirables. The most important reason 
for avoiding the mass expulsion of the many thousands of Germans residing in the 
region at the end of the war, was never addressed by the new administration. Just as 
they failed to understand the subtleties of language, religion, and education within the 
region, so they failed to recognize the overriding economic and social need for an 
avoidance of a dramatic and devastating demographic rupture, along the lines of that 
which had occurred in the 1870s. Instead of preaching caution, and assisting in 
creating a calm and reflective atmosphere, the new administration gave its blessing to 
the witch-hunt, encouraging vengeance. The example set during the political void 
period between the armistice and the arrival of French troops, where the region's 
Nationalrat set about maintaining stability and security within the regions, was to have 
no impact on the incoming administration. Again, the long-term effects were only 
guessed at by a few, more perceptive, observers within the population. 
99 ADM, 304 M 2. 
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Naturalisations 
Article 79 of the Treaty of Versailles allowed Germans to apply for French citizenship 
through a process of naturalisation. 1°° This contrasted with the Treaty of Frankfurt of 
1871, which, although it granted German citizenship to all Mosellans and Alsatians 
living in the regions, compelled those who wished to remain French to leave the region 
and become domiciled in France. The terms of the Treaty of Versailles were not 
received without protest in the regions and in the French interior. Many were 
outraged at the prospect of any German being able to acquire French nationality 
through the naturalisation process. However, it meant that the indigenous population, 
at least, acquired French citizenship without any great formality. In any case, the 1849 
law, which allowed the French authorities to expel those who posed a political threat, 
continued to apply. Equally, the naturalisation process was most rigorous, and several 
conditions had to be met before citizenship was awarded. For example, the applicant 
had to have been domiciled in the Moselle or Alsace for three consecutive years prior 
to 3 August 1914. 
In an interview published in Le Petit Parisien in May 1919, Millerand addressed 
the question of naturalisations in suitably mild terms. `Le traitd lu mercredi ä 
Versailles prevoit un droit d'option pour les Allemands residant en Alsace-Lorraine et 
qui pourront, sauf refus du gouvernement franrais, opter pour la nationalite 
francaise. ' 101 Millerand was as aware as any that the news of naturalisations would be 
met with resistance in certain sections of society. For example, the Union nationale 
des combattants de Moyeuvre-Grande expressed their sense of outrage at the prospect 
not only of Germans living on French soil, but of Germans acquiring French 
10° See Appendix II. 
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nationality, and with it, the right to vote. 102 Referring to the forthcoming elections in 
his interview, Millerand went on to state, `Il resters ä inscrire les Francais et les 
Alsaciens-Lorrains reintegres dans la nationalite francaise, et ceux qui auront opte. ' 
Between 1920 and 1921, an overwhelming number of 95,893 applications for 
naturalisation were received by the French authorities. 103 The desire to remain in the 
regions was not lessened by the anti-German policy of epuration, or by the time 
involved in the processing of applications. Many of those applying were married to 
Mosellans and Alsatians. 
By 27 July 1922, a total of 35,001 foreigners had been granted French 
citizenship in the Moselle through the process of naturalisation, but not all of these 
foreigners were German. Of this figure, 12,000 were eligible to vote. In the Bas Rhin, 
the total was 27,470, of whom 8,600 could vote, and in the Haut Rhin, 14,593 were 
naturalized, of whom 4,600 could vote. 104 Unfortunately, it is not clear how many of 
these were of German origin, or how many were married to Mosellans and Alsatians. 
For example, between 1921 and 1930,60% of workers in the iron and steel industry 
were foreigners, but only 40% of them were of German origin. 
On 18 March 1922, abbe Louis Hackspill, editor of the Lothringer 
Volkszeitung, addressed the question of naturalisations and set out a number of the 
points which had arisen as a result of Germans acquiring French nationality. His article 
dealt head on with the question of sentiment with regard to nationality, and 
acknowledged that not all applications for naturalisation were motivated by a deep 
sympathy for, or love of, France. On the contrary, many were simply motivated by 
101 Article sent to the British Foreign Office, 11 May 1919. PRO, FO 371 3748, subject 'Problems of 
new administration'. 
102 CARAN, AJ/30/296. 
103 PRO, FO 371/6990, report from Sir M Cheetham in Paris to the Foreign Office in London entitled 
'Political situation in Alsace Lorraine September, 1921', section 19. 
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financial or family considerations. Clearly, the state was perfectly within its rights to 
refuse French citizenship to those it believed undesirable or those who would clearly 
abuse the privilege and pose a threat to French rule in the provinces. Nonetheless, it 
was unreasonable to expect those of German origin to manifest strongly patriotic 
sentiment towards France overnight. Many of them were already partially assimilated 
having married Mosellans and Alsatians during German rule, as well as having lived 
alongside them as neighbours and colleagues for almost half a century. But, the abbe 
reasoned, it was not this generation of Germans who should be expected to manifest 
pro-French patriotism. It was their children, who, given the right atmosphere for 
assimilation, might become true French men and women. The authorities, therefore, 
should not become so hypnotized by the threat of German propagandists supporting 
the autonomist movement, but should allow the population to recover from the loss of 
life incurred by the war, and the lamentably low birth-rate by granting French 
citizenship more freely to German applicants. 
10S This was a situation which politicians 
and political commentators would worry away at during the remainder of the 1920s 
and the 1930s, as individual cases highlighted the complexity of the arrangement, until 
the outbreak of the Second World War annulled all their efforts. 
Epuration: the results 
By 1921, the epuration process had largely achieved its principal objective: the 
departure of the majority of German immigrants, including Austro-Hungarians, from 
the region. Approximately 100,000 German immigrants and undesirable indigenes 
from the Moselle had crossed the new national frontiers into Germany to start new 
104 CARAN AJ/30/296. Those eligible to vote were males over the age of 18. 
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lives. The Moselle had been almost completely ethnically cleansed. Only those 
required for `economic reasons' or who were married to indigenes had slipped through 
the net. A fraction of the total departures involved expulsions. The vast majority were 
made by those who had opted for `voluntary' repatriation. Yet, the evidence presented 
here suggests that the voluntary nature of these departures is questionable. What then 
was the reality of the voluntary departures? And how does the nature of these 
departures fit in with Wahl's idea of a liberal policy towards questions of nationality? 
On the face of it, there were very few differences between voluntary 
repatriation and expulsion. In the early stages, when most departures occurred, both 
methods placed exactly the same tight restrictions on the amount of luggage and 
money individuals were permitted to carry. Each dictated the time and place of 
departure. Each involved the segregation of men and women for the duration of the 
journey into Germany, an uncomfortable journey which could take several days. And 
upon arrival in Germany, both expulses and rapatries faced the same problems, that is, 
refugee status, a lack of money, no accommodation, and arriving in a country in 
disarray, and on the brink of economic collapse. Why then opt for voluntary 
repatriation? Why not wait and see if expulsion papers would arrive at all as the 
process amounted to the same in the end? 
In its favour, opting for voluntary repatriation avoided a process which could 
involve denunciation, arrest, police enquiries, and possible imprisonment. Likewise, 
the expulsion process was unpredictable. As the letters quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter show, no-one knew who would be next to be summoned before the 
commission de triage or the commission d'examen des etrangers. Voluntary 
pos The intensity of similar problems which continue to preoccupy the French authorities today with 
regard to the immigrant population, suggest Hackspill was fighting a losing battle against prejudice. 
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repatriation allowed families to avoid such uncertainty. Yet the reason voluntary 
repatriation became such a popular option had little to do with the desire to avoid 
expulsion. Those who temporarily prolonged their residency in the Moselle, found that 
everyday life contained numerous pitfalls and dangers. After 10 pm the use of German 
in public places was forbidden and many shops put up signs stating that they no longer 
served `Boches'. The exchange rates for card D holders were considerably lower than 
for card A holders. Equally, jobs for Germans were increasingly rare which led to 
unemployment. This, in turn, resulted in an increased risk of expulsion, as the 
unemployed were placed high on the list of those to be expelled. However, the 
greatest problem for those Germans seeking to remain in the region was not actually 
the inconveniences and obstacles placed in their way by the new authorities. The 
greatest fear stemmed from the threat of physical violence and intimidation. The 
newspapers do not report such behaviour. However, as will be seen in the next 
chapter, Germans were attacked. Indeed, such attacks were witnessed in the streets of 
Metz during the liberation celebrations. 106 A small number of indigenes who now felt 
they had the upper hand in the region, were willing to indulge their desire for 
vengeance. It seems, therefore, that in every way possible, life was made as awkward 
and as unpleasant as possible for German immigrants who attempted to remain. 
Voluntary repatriation, therefore, despite its drawbacks, indignity, and sacrifice, 
became the best option. 
This was the reality of voluntary repatriation and of the process of epuration. 
This was the `liberal' approach for which Wahl congratulates the new French regime. 
Where Wahl refers to `abus inevitables', is he really referring to the whole policy of 
voluntary repatriation, or is he singling out a few cases of denunciation, and a few 
106 In her diary, K mentions these attacks. Entry of 8 December 1918. See also chapter VI, p. 221. 
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hasty expulsions? On paper, perhaps the French authorities were more liberal than 
their German counterparts when it came to the terms of the 1871 and 1918 peace 
treaties, if such comparisons are valid. However, a policy of epuration was in 
operation long before the Paris Peace Conference even convened. 
Concluding remarks 
Epuration was a response to public calls within France to remove all enemy subjects 
from French soil following the war, and following German atrocities elsewhere in 
occupied France. It was also a response to public opinion within the provinces from 
those seeking vengeance for their treatment at the hands of the German regime during 
the war. And finally, epuration was a response from the French government and 
French military authorities, who felt the only way to secure the regions and to 
implement a policy of francisation was to bring about the departure of all Germans, 
and to racially cleanse the Moselle and Alsace. They did this by expelling those they 
considered indesirables, but more importantly, by coercing thousands of individuals 
and families into opting for voluntary repatriation. However, apart from free-lance 
denunciators and vigilante groups turning up at people's homes and places of work to 
`persuade' them to leave the regions, epuration required initiative, authorisation, and 
instructions from above. How things were determined in Paris still requires more 
focused research. On the ground in the Moselle, though, without any reference to the 
Treaty of Versailles, administrators and military personnel combined orders from Paris 
with their hatred of Germans to make epuration of the population very effective 
indeed. 
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Summary 
Between December 1918 and the end of 1921, the French authorities attempted to 
cleanse the Moselle region of its German immigrant population as part of an overall 
programme of francisation in the returned provinces. Their methods involved the use 
of a system of classifying the population according to individuals' ethnic origins. This 
allowed all enemy subjects to be grouped together. The next step involved the 
expulsion of all `undesirable elements', which included indigenes guilty of 
collaborating with the German authorities during the war. In order to assist the 
authorities in identifying such indesirables, commissions de triage were set up. 
However, these tribunals had no legal basis, and their methods created a direct 
infringement on the human rights of the accused. They were used largely to deal with 
indigenes, whilst German immigrants were brought before commissions d'examen des 
etrangers. Those issued with expulsion papers then faced an undignified journey to 
Germany on special trains. Limitations to the weight of luggage and amount of money 
carried were enforced. Men and women were obliged to travel separately, and the 
journey often took several days. Those who managed to avoid being expelled, though, 
were not much better off. They often found themselves the subject of denunciations 
sent to the French authorities. Equally, efforts to make life as difficult as possible for 
them forced many to opt for voluntary repatriation to Germany. Yet rapatries 
departed in the same way as expulses, which also meant the sequestration and 
liquidation of their property. In all, the policy of epuration, whether through expulsion 
or voluntary repatriation procedures, succeeded in removing nearly 100,000 German 
immigrants from the Moselle. Only a very few were able to return following the 
Treaty of Versailles which allowed for a limited number of naturalisations. 
Chapter VI 
From War to Peace: 
Change and Adaptation 
The experience of those expelled from the Moselle or repatriated to Germany was one 
of hardship, uncertainty, and, in so many cases, utter misery. But, what of the 
indigenes who remained in the region, who lived through the months of dramatic 
change, of bewildering or joyous integration, of adaptation as radical and as 
disorientating as the experience of almost half a century before? What was their 
experience? What were their concerns, fears, hopes, and ambitions? To what extent 
did the return of French sovereignty to the region alter their lives and to what extent 
did they simply continue as before, unruffled by the politicking of Paris, Berlin, 
London and Washington and more concerned with the everyday routine of births, 
deaths, and marriages, of harvests and food prices, train delays and unseasonable 
weather? 
This chapter uses as its principal source the diary of a young woman, referred 
to here as W. The complete diary spans most of K's adolescent and adult life. The 
years 1916 to 1925 have been examined here. Correspondence with K's sister, G, has 
revealed that the diary was not written for posterity, but simply as a record of events to 
be remembered by the immediate family. Nevertheless, at times it seems to provide a 
cathartic effect'. Unlike, for example, the diary of a politician or public figure, this 
document does not seek to justify, excuse, or explain grand events or actions. Instead, 
' The diaries were lent to the author on the condition that the family be allowed to remain anonymous. 
2 The family tradition of keeping a diary had already been established by the sisters' grandfather, 
whose entries during the Franco-Prussian war are as enlightening and moving as K's for the First 
World War and its aftermath. 
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it presents a very personal, intimate and simple account of a young woman's life, 
which contains some reference to current affairs and international events. 
Rich though this source is, it still presents the same difficulties and restrictions 
so familiar with all historical documents. Firstly, the author represents only one 
inhabitant of the Moselle. However, the lives of her family and friends, as well as the 
inhabitants of the village of Peltre3 are gradually revealed in the entries. Likewise, G is 
aware of the existence of other viewpoints and other mentalities: `Naturellement la vie 
des uns n'est pas tout ä fait conforme ä celle des autres, il ya des variantes d'une 
famille ä l'autre. Ce n'est pas dröle d'habiter les pays frontieres oti l'on passe d'une 
nationalite ä une autre. '4 Secondly, the diary tells us little of the experiences of 
German immigrants, for example, who continued to live in the region after the war, or 
of the whole expulsion and repatriation process described in the previous chapter. 
However, this is neither surprising, nor particularly significant. The village of Peltre 
had very few German inhabitants once the troops, housed in nearby barracks, and the 
wounded, nursed in the village convent, had been evacuated at the end of the war. 
Indeed, such omissions tell us more, rather than less, about how individuals and their 
families coped with these events during such disruptive times. A source such as this 
often requires as much interpretation of what it does not say (the role of the historian 
as detective becomes necessary here) as of what it does say. As a contribution to 
historical memory, this diary provides the most intimate of eye-witness accounts and it 
will be used in this chapter alongside archival documents which help to broaden the 
picture of everyday life as it was in the aftermath of the First World War in the Moselle 
region. 
3 Peltre is a small village situated approximately 5 kilometres south east of Metz. In 1910, its 
population numbered 816. 
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Family and village life 
K was the daughter of a primary school teacher and was born in 1893,22 years after 
the formal annexation by Germany of the Moselle region. Living as they did in Peltre, 
the family was Francophone and staunchly Francophile, but had opted to remain in the 
Moselle despite their obligation to take German nationality. As a school teacher, K's 
father spoke and taught in both French and German throughout annexation, despite 
being reproached by the German authorities, as well as by fellow teachers, for using 
French too readily to explain lessons to pupils .5 He argued, however, that, as most of 
the children came from Francophone families, their progress would only be hindered if 
they were denied explanations in their mother tongue. 
As well as carrying out his functions in the village school, the job also brought 
with it the responsibility of acting as the mayor's secretary. Duties ranged from 
recording statistics at harvest time, to organising requisitions made during the war, as 
well as ensuring the distribution of food tokens for rationing afterwards. Numerous 
extra duties were incurred as the Maison mere des soeurs de la Providence de St 
Andre was to be found in Peltre. 6 Nuns arrived from all over France, Germany, 
Belgium, and Luxembourg to join the convent. The issue of identity papers and other 
administrative procedures relating to the nuns fell to the mayor's secretary. 
Furthermore, during the war, German officers were regularly billeted on the family's 
house. With the signing of the armistice in November 1918, the billeting continued, 
only this time with French officers. 
° In a letter to the author from G, 14 June 1998. 
S The German authorities initially allowed the use of French in classes within the francophone sector 
of the Moselle, and then attempted to phase it out gradually during annexation. 
6 See Andre, Marie, 11 cherchait des pierres. Vie de Monsieur 1'abbe A. Gapp, fondateur de la 
congregation des soeurs de la Providence de Saint-Andre, Paris, 1957. 
210 
The family was devoutly Catholic, which was typical in the Moselle, 
particularly in the Francophone sector. K and her sister and mother attended church 
services or offices almost every day of the week, in order to take communion or attend 
vespers, to attend special masses for the war dead, to commemorate the anniversary of 
the death of a family member, or, as on one rather unusual occasion, to offer up 
prayers for rain during a particularly severe drought. ' There was a great deal of 
contact with the nuns in the convent through the father's work in the school, and also 
as K and G were often called upon to assist in services in the convent's chapel. Both 
sisters went to school there. Also, K owned a camera and frequently took portraits of 
the nuns or of distinguished visitors. 
K and G had a brother who was born in 1887. At the outbreak of war in 1914, 
as he was nearing the completion of his medical studies, he was called up to the 
German army and sent to the Vosges region for front-line duty. In September 1914, 
he was killed. As the only son, and as a popular and much loved member of his family 
and the community, his death caused enormous sadness and suffering, not least 
because he died fighting'on the side of the German Reich and against his family's 
beloved France. His parents made several visits to the Vosges in an effort to find his 
remains. However, despite having dental records, they were never successful. On one 
occasion, a body from an unmarked grave was exhumed, but the dentition did not 
match that of their son. 8 Unfortunately, in the early stages of the war, soldiers did not 
wear identity bracelets. Each year, a mass was held to mark the anniversary of his 
death. 
Entries in July 1921. 
Entry of 9 October 1922. 
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There was further tragedy in 1925, as, after the late diagnosis of cancer, the 
sisters' mother died. Whether because of the death of her mother and the subsequent 
need to take care of both her father and younger sister (G was only 13 when her 
mother died), or simply because of the disruptive circumstances which afflicted her life 
during and after the war K and G were never married. As G recently wrote, 
Notre vie n'a pas ete trios gaie et K, decedee ä 104 ans 
[in 1997], a vu disparaitre presque tous les membres de 
la famille. Il reste des descendants eparpilles un peu 
partout sur 1'hexagone et que nous ne connaissons meme 
plus .9 
As a result of their family upbringing and the strict adherence to Catholic 
tradition, neither sister ever embarked upon a career, or took up paid employment of 
any kind, except during the Second World War when they were forced to work under 
the Nazi administration. Between 1920 and 1921, upon the retirement of their father 
from his duties both as a teacher and as the mayor's secretary, the family moved house 
within the village of Peltre. The two sisters remained in that house until they were 
unable to tend the grounds or afford its upkeep, having been entirely dependent upon 
their father for any income. It was sold in 1965 and they moved to a flat in Metz. The 
death of their father in 1941 had brought the loss of his pension and a large portion of 
the sisters' income. The greatest, if not the saddest, irony of his death was that, after 
the anguish of annexation in 1871 and the joy of the reunion 47 years later, he did not 
live long enough to witness his region's return to France in 1945 after the second, Nazi 
annexation. He and many other staunch French patriots from his generation who died 
9 In a letter to the author from G, 22 November 1998. 
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during the Second World War were said to have died of disillusionment, of a broken 
heart. 
The impact of war 
Although the front-line was some distance to the south of Peltre with Allied 
and German troops locked into muddy battle in the Meurthe-et-Moselle region, there 
was considerable military activity in the surrounding area, especially at the beginning 
and end of the war. In particular, aerial bombardments caused damage around Marly, 
Sablon, as well as Metz itself. 1° These bombings were not particularly accurate in 
those early days, and often the risk was greater from plane crashes rather than from the 
bombs themselves. On one occasion, a French plane manned by two Englishmen, who 
were slightly injured, was brought down between Peltre and Pouilly. Many rushed to 
see the wreck despite the continuing danger caused by the aircraft which were still 
overhead. '1 
During much of 1918, however, K notes that the family, as well as their various 
officiers, spent many nights in an inadequate shelter in the garden. They could hear 
the sound of bombing over nearby munitions stores and factories and, on occasion, 
fires would light up the sky as misdirected bombs and explosions ignited hay or straw 
in farm buildings. On 12 September, K noted, `Le canon a marche toute la nuit d'une 
facon effrayante. On aurait cru que c'etait tout pres'. That afternoon, two bombs had 
landed on bridges in Metz, whilst, a few miles away, the family continued with the task 
1° See Clout, Hugh, 'Rural revival: the recovery of the Moselle after World War I', Modern and 
Contemporary France, 1994 NS2(4) pp. 395-403. Clout points out that compared to other areas 
affected by front-line fighting, the Moselle was not classified as `devastated' and repair of damage 
was classified as reconstitution. Most of the damage was caused by the transportation of military 
supplies and troops to and from the front, as well as by the plundering of farmland and farm buildings 
for food by the retreating German army. 
1 Entry of 14 September 1918. 
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of jam-making. But the length and nature of the war created a tremendous weariness. 
The sound of the bombing, which caused the window panes to rattle incessantly, 
seldom allowed the family to sleep before 2am. And yet they continued, as normal, 
with their everyday chores during the day, most of which related to the preparation of 
food supplies which would see the family through the winter. 
Reliable news of the progress of the war was scarce. Rumours, therefore, 
played a large part in the outlook of the family as well as the local community. In early 
September, it was claimed the Americans were making such good progress that they 
would soon arrive. A month later, it was again thought the Americans were almost on 
the Moselle's doorstep and on 10 October, it was declared that an armistice had been 
signed, `ce qui n'est pas vrai, car les aeros viennent encore... '. This was followed on 
28 October by a rumour, spread by the German district administration (der 
Kreisdirektion) in Ancerville, 12 that if Alsace-Lorraine was to become French again, 
the Germans would operate a `scorched earth policy'. Although the region was only a 
matter of weeks from the end of the war, the German authorities still played on the 
anxiety and uncertainty of the populations. 
In mid-September villagers evacuated from areas closer to the front passed 
through Peltre, whose main street was constantly filled with carts and wagons carrying 
the young and old, and who had been forced to leave their homes and their possessions 
behind. The inhabitants of Peltre were instructed not to take in any of the evacuees 
because of the military presence in the village. At this time, K's father was told to 
prepare for the arrival of more troops who were to be accommodated in the school 
itself. Twice, soldiers had even camped in the garden of K's aunt. On 26 September, 
the order arrived for the nuns to evacuate the convent so that it could be made into a 
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hospital. In the midst of the chaos, K admits after a night of bombardments, on est 
tout ä fait desoriente'. Yet the next day she and her father went to Pouilly in the 
afternoon, and she declared, `c'est un plaisir de ramasser des champignons, car il y en a 
beaucoup depuis les pluies qu'on a eues. '13 
Clearly, by October 1918, the communities in Peltre and the surrounding area 
sensed that the end of the war was close, but not quite upon them. `La guerre n'est 
pas encore fini, car le canon gronde encore bien fort'. 
14 The movement of troops, the 
delays to trains, the quick succession of rumours, were all reminiscent of the very early 
days of the war. The number of wounded in the convent increased daily, and by 4 
November there were at least 200. The aeroplanes still passed until late at night, 
German officers still arrived to be lodged by the family, and yet on 5 November, K 
noted that, `on s'occupe de tous les cotes ä preparer des drapeaux comme on peut, car 
il n'y a plus moyen de trouver du bleu ä Metz'. Two days later, news of `de gros 
troubles' in Berlin and Kiel reached them. From this point, the usually short, 
unemotional entries in K's diary are replaced with detail and excitement. On 8 
November, their officer returned to the house to say that a great battle was taking 
place, and that the Germans were waiting for the Americans to reach them. `On ne 
peut pas dormir, le canon fait trembler nos fenetres continuellement. La Baviere est 
republique, le roi est jete bas; ils ont sürement peur que les allies n'entrent par 
1'Autriche...... 5 
The constant flow of soldiers, evacuees, and horses, combined with almost 
constant rain, turned the street outside the family's house into deep mud making it 
12 K's family owned property which they let in this village, south east of Peltre. 
13 Entry of 27 September 1918. 
14 Entry of 29 October 1918. 
15 Ibid. 
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almost impossible to go out. On 9 November, K noted that everyone was returning 
terrified from Metz. 
Les rouges saisissent tous les fusils des autres soldats. 
Its arrachent les epaulettes de tous les officiers qu'ils 
rencontrent et les desarment completement. Its ont la 
baonette [sic. ] en main pour les recalcitrants. 
By the afternoon, order had been restored. `Les revolutionnaires ont plein pouvoir ä la 
mairie de Metz et partout le drapeau rouge flotte de tous les cotes. ' Almost all the 
German soldiers were wearing red rosettes. The family's officer had said his farewells 
that morning and his luggage had already been collected, but he was scared to go to 
Metz, and so remained for some time at the house. He eventually departed only to 
return at 2am, to K's irritation. 16 Germany, she stated, had accepted the conditions of 
peace, even though they were harsh. `Ils sentent qu'ils sont ä bout. 11 est temps'. 
Despite this, the aeroplanes returned, hitting a tram in Metz and killing several people. 
Even on the eve of peace, she declared, the guns still sounded. They continued to 
sound until 6pm on 11 November, at which time the armistice, signed that day at 
midday, came into effect. `Les troupes se sauvent dejä.... Its en passent jour et nuit, 
car ils s'en vont presque tous ä pied... Bon voyage... Les blesses qui sont obliges de 
suivrent font pitie. ' Pages from K's diary for 11 November are reproduced below in 
figure 7. 
16 Entry of 10 November 1918. 
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Figure 7: Extract from K's diary, 11 November 1918 
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The armistice 
During the days which followed the signing of the armistice, looting began. Military 
supply depots were the first to be attacked by local people, who were searching for 
food and fuel, but also taking tools and other useful materials they could find. In Metz 
they attacked shops owned or run by Germans. This went on day and night, some 
taking carts with them in order to carry more. Coffee, flour, semolina, tinned food, 
butter and lard were all taken. According to K, Vest un vol manifeste... '. '' The 
weather had turned bitterly cold and they expected snow. But German troops 
continued to file through Peltre which, she notes, she photographed. Finally, the 
family's officer left, to K's relief. When she awoke on 16 November, the last of the 
German army had left. 
Figure 8: K's photograph of the departing German soldiers, taken on 15 
November 1918. 
17 Entry of 15 November 1918. 
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Figure 9: K's photograph of the first French troops arriving in Peltre, 17 
November 1918. 
K took photographs during the days when German troops retreated from the 
region, passing through Peltre, and French troops arrived, only days later. There is a 
clear contrast between the neat lines of French soldiers in Figure 9 and the depiction of 
demoralized German troops, disshevelled and with their heads bowed, in Figure 8.18 
With the arrival of the French army in the village, a French officer was billeted in the 
family house. To their delight, he was a Parisian teacher who had begun his first 
teaching post a year before the war began. The family stayed up until after midnight 
chatting to him. `I] fait si bon, causer ä ces francais (sic). ' K still set herself apart from 
`these French', perhaps out of habit, or perhaps because, unlike her parents, she could 
not consider herself to be `one of them' yet. After all, she still possessed German 
18 K mentions discreetly taking photographs of the retreating German soldiers in her diary entry of 15 November. 
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nationality. On 18 November, the first French newspaper was printed in Metz entitled 
Le Lorrain, le Messin, le Courrier. 19 
During this period of `suspended animation', when the German army was in the 
process of departing and the French troops were arriving hot on their heels, one of the 
greatest inconveniences for K and her family was the disruption of the trains to Metz. 
There were no trains at all for several days after 18 November, and K's father was 
obliged to go on foot to Metz, in order to see the `triumphant entry of French troops'. 
K and her mother and sister were invited to travel with their officer in his carriage, and 
arrived in style, taking up their places at the front of the crowd in time for the 
procession which began at 1.30pm French time. With the armistice and the occupation 
by French troops of Alsace-Lorraine, the region had lost an hour to bring it in line with 
the rest of France. 
The celebrations were enthusiastically received by the crowds. French 
aeroplanes flew overhead doing acrobatics and dropping flags, postcards and rosettes. 
Unfortunately, one came down too low and got caught in the telegraph wires. 
According to K, there were some fatalities. The aircraft was completely destroyed, but 
the pilot survived . 
20 Also, General Petain, who was supposed to ride in at the head of 
the procession, was delayed by several days due to a riding accident. Nevertheless, K 
noted that the cavalry and infantry were `en tres bonne tenue'. Overall, she states, 
with the exception of some Germans who were to be found in the crowd, everyone 
was very pleased to see the French army. 
19 The first edition of a French-language newspaper printed in the Moselle after the end of the war 
was a combined publication of these three newspapers, all of which had been banned by the German 
authorities at the beginning of the war. See also Figure 3, p. 85, which shows the first delivery of 
French-language newspapers to the region at the end of the war. 
20 See Berrar, Jean-Claude, Memoire en Images. Metz, Joue-L. s-Tours, 1996, p. 109, which shows a 
photograph of the stricken plane in Place Royale, Metz. 
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Gradually, the benefits of the Allied success filtered through to the inhabitants 
of Peltre. On 24 November, they were able to have the first holy bread at communion 
since the outbreak of war. Food rationing was in operation and food tokens were in 
short supply, but meat could be found quite easily. It was with great surprise that K 
noted how white French bread was. The train service gradually improved, and soon 
the village was preoccupied with the issuing of travel and identity documents, which 
had to be signed by the army captain who was staying at the chateau in Peltre. 
Everyone had to declare themselves to the French military authorities. Meetings of the 
local council brought about the nomination of a new mayor, and lists were drawn up of 
candidates suitable for election under the new French administration. After months 
and years of martial law, food shortages, and general hardship, K was invited to a 
dance held by the officers billeted in Peltre. 21 About 14 or 15 officers entertained the 
local girls with singing and dancing. K and her friends returned home at 10.30pm, 
despite the officers' kind attempts to keep them longer. This was exactly the kind of 
event criticized by Pierri Zind as a blatant attempt by the French to `seduce' the local 
inhabitants. 22 In fact, there was no need to `seduce' K or her family. Their loyalties 
were already clear in their minds. However, as G has since pointed out, not all families 
or communities shared the same opinions as K and her family. 
The series of events and festivities to mark the return of French sovereignty 
continued well into December. On 6 December, a large meeting was arranged at the 
convent in Peltre, in order to discuss the organisation of classes for teachers in the 
region who did not have adequate French. The commissaire general, Mirman, was 
21 Entry of 1 December 1918. 
22 `Les generaux faisaient venir des troupes reposdes, semillantes, habillees de neuf, pretes pour les 
bals et les defiles, en vue de s6duire les Alsaciens-Lorrains vaincus et affames'. Zind, Elsass 
Lothringen. Alsace Lorraine, p. 97. 
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expected to attend, and a great deal of trouble was taken to mark the occasion. Young 
girls in local costume were present and bouquets of flowers had been provided. 
However, not only did Mirman not appear, but, to the consternation of the organizers, 
no replacement was sent. Even the smallest villages in the region were anxious to be 
recognized by the incoming French, as well as to be given the opportunity to welcome 
the new French hierarchy. 
The next big event was the first official visit to the returned provinces by 
President Poincare and his Prime Minister, Clemenceau. K joined the immense crowd 
which turned out to greet the dignitaries, and to see the American and French troops 
on parade. `La joie tient du delire, on est si heureux d'etre delivrei23 Local girls in 
traditional costume lined the route, and flowers were thrown into the open carriages. 
That evening, however, K and her companions witnessed frightening scenes of 
brawling and street disturbances. Several shops belonging to Germans had their 
windows smashed and were looted. Familiar shops in the centre of Metz had been 
completely emptied of stock. General de Maud'huy had apparently sent troops to 
prevent further trouble. During the day K had already noticed `l'animation des civils 
contre les allemands (sic. )'. Any Germans who took to the streets that evening were 
chased with cries of `A bas les Boches (sic. )! '. The next day, K returned once again to 
Metz and this time saw crowds of French, American, Italian, and British soldiers 
milling around the town. `C'est autrement bien qu'il ya un mois quand on ne voyait 
que des boches (sic. ). i24 
The signing of the armistice and the occupation of the region by French troops, 
therefore, had brought for K's family the opportunity to enjoy the lavish celebrations 
13 Entry of 8 December 1918. 
24 K began to use the term bocke despite her usually tolerant attitude towards Germans. 
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laid on by the incoming French military. They relished the chance to walk the streets 
of Metz, and converse freely and openly in French. However, it was not until the 
conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, when it was confirmed that Germany had 
accepted the punitive conditions imposed upon her by the Allies, that many were 
willing to believe that both the war and the German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine 
were over. On 23 June 1919, K wrote with heavy scepticism, shared by so many in the 
regions, `On est ä la joie partout, fait-on bien?... C'est ce qu'on saura plus tard. ' 
A new routine 
In August 1918, K appears to have found no irony in the pleasant image of her parents 
gathering mirabelles to make jam during the day, whilst at night they huddled, terrified, 
in their cramped bomb shelter in the garden, with bombs landing on nearby towns and 
villages where family and friends lived. Likewise, K is equally matter-of-fact about a 
visit from the German tax inspector on 9 September 1918, only weeks before the end 
of the war and the transfer of sovereignty over the regions. Food shortages, by then 
affecting the German army and not just civilians, meant that the family's grape harvest 
was poor, as so much had been stolen by hungry soldiers. The potato crop had to be 
brought in early in order to avoid a similar fate, and there was a rush to harvest the 
cabbage to prevent the underfed livestock from eating it first. 
As the end of the war approached, the village of Peltre suffered, like so much 
of Europe, from a major epidemic of Spanish influenza which resulted in many civilian 
deaths. The severity of the epidemic meant the end of the war itself was almost 
eclipsed. The young and the old were particularly badly affected, and, from mid 
October, the school was closed in an effort to check the epidemic. 
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In fact, had it not been for the epidemic, it is likely the school would have 
remained open throughout the final stages of the war, and up to the armistice itself. 
Instead, it reopened at the end of November. 25 Also, part of the school was used 
initially to store French weapons and ammunition when the first troops arrived. 
However, very quickly, the children were able to return to their classes. With the same 
teachers (who were largely nuns from the local convent), classes resumed, but in a 
different language. There is no better illustration of how smoothly this transition 
operated than in G's Deutsche Schrift jotter, as figure 10 shows on the next page. 
26 
Her last exercise in German handwriting is dated 9 October 1918. This was followed, 
on the very next page, by her first exercise in French handwriting, entitled `La Gaule et 
les Gaulois'. The text reads, `La France se nommait autrefois la Gaule. Elle dtait 
couverte de forets et de marais. Les Gaulois etaient des hommes grands et robustes'. 
G appears to have found writing in French easier than in German, which, at that stage, 
was still taught using the gothic style. Undoubtedly, this is because of her family's use 
of written and spoken French at home. 
Not everyone among the Moselle's indigenous population was so fortunate. 
Emile Jochum, born in 1906 in St Avold on the German side of the linguistic frontier, 
did not know any French in 1918. He attended school for a further 18 months after 
which his formal education in French ended. 27 Such was the experience of a great 
number of children and youths living in these regions, who found their education so 
25 Deaths as a result of the epidemic continued well into January and February 1919. 
26 Likewise, the Bekanntmachungen (public notices register) for St Avold, 1 April 1916 to 5 
December 1918 also illustrates the change in administration and the subsequent change in language. 
Prior to November 1918, most entries were in German. Only information which specifically had to 
reach the Francophone population was in French. After November 1918, though, all entries appeared 
in French but were followed by a German translation. Archives municipales de St Avold, I AL3. 
27 Emile Jochum was invited to write down his experiences from the armistice period for an exhibition 
organized by the municipal archives in St Avold. A copy of his short account is held in the archives. 
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Figure 10: Extract from G's Deutsche Schrift jotter showing the transition from 
German to French rule. 
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dramatically altered, and were left with a fluency in German which gave them few 
career prospects, and a smattering of French which was inadequate. Often, pupils who 
had been regarded as extremely promising under German annexation, found their 
hopes of further education dashed by their linguistic shortcomings. However, 
occasionally there were lighter moments. Emile Jochum recalled returning to school 
after the French had arrived in St. Avoid on Thursday 21 November 1918. 
Et voila qu'on nous gratifie d'un Soldat haut comme trois 
pommes ne sachant pas 1'allemand... et nous pas le 
francais. 11 a demande nos noms. Voila que Klein dit 
Fensterbrett [window ledge], Vigneron dit Goldspatz 
[golden sparrow], etc... Quand Monsieur Haas est venu 
voir si nous avions fait du progres, le soldat appela 
Fensterbrett... et notre directeur est parti en riant. Le 
lendemain tout avait change. 
For children in the very early stages of their education, the new 
administration's francisation plans were more easily implemented, and propaganda 
was openly used as if it were a blunt instrument. In April 1919, K noted that large 
quantities of material had arrived at school for the children: postcards, jotters with 
patriotic covers, books, and pictures. The jotters, in contrast to their rather sober 
German equivalents, were brightly coloured with pictures of famous Alsatian or 
Lorrainer military heroes on the front, and texts entitled `Les gloires militaires et civiles 
de 1'Alsace et de la Lorraine' on the back. The campaign was indeed lavish and no 
doubt delighted the youngsters and amused any Francophone, Francophile parents. 
Likewise, numerous patriotic songs and poems were recited in schools and at 
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ceremonies, celebrating the defeat of Germany and the victory of France in the 
returned provinces. G kept copies of some of these and their words are reproduced in 
Appendix III. 
A return to something resembling `normality' for K was not possible until early 
1919. The lengthy entries in her diary describing the final stages of the war, the 
armistice, the political void which followed, and then the celebrations and festivities 
marking the arrival of French troops, did not abate until well into 1919. In December 
1918 she explained that life was too hectic to allow her to write every day so she 
would content herself with a brief resume. It was not until February and March 1919 
that life eventually returned to a calmer weekly routine. Wash days, digging and 
planting in the garden, visits to relatives in Metz and neighbouring villages, housework 
and cooking, duties associated with the church, all gradually resumed their normal 
significance. In these areas, little in K's daily routine had changed since before or 
during the war. However, subtle, as well as more obvious, changes to her life can be 
detected following the change in administration. 
The most prominent of these changes is K's involvement with the women's 
branch of the Ligue Patriotique des Francaises (the LPF). 28 It appears her first 
contact with the league came in July 1919, when she attended a meeting organized at a 
friend's house. Here she heard a talk on the league, although there is no indication of 
what the talk was specifically about. Two weeks later, K, along with the ladies from 
the chateau in Peltre, collected subscriptions for the League. K comments that this 
went well and everyone was willing to join. The League was a right-wing Catholic 
28 McMillan, James, `Women, religion, and politics: the case of the Ligue Patriotique des Francaises', 
in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Societyfor French History, Vol. 15,1988, 
pp. 355-364. 
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organisation, which had emerged as a result of the conflict between the church and 
state in the late nineteenth century, following the Dreyfus Affair. K's reasons for 
joining are likely to have been dictated by her family's Catholicism, rather than by the 
political agenda of the LPF, which included calls for women's suffrage. One of K's 
first responsibilities as a member was to make a collection for the pays devastes. Such 
collections were made all over the regions immediately after the war, and the sums 
collected by villages and communities were often used as evidence of loyalty to France. 
K was pleased with their collection (350 francs), as the League was collecting only 
from women, and not from the military or from working men. 
At regular intervals K, and other members, distributed the League's 
newspapers around the village. However, it was not until December 1920 that the 
League's activities began to take up more of K's time. A meeting of all the younger 
members was held on 12 December at the chateau in Peltre. They requested that a 
conference (presumably a large meeting of all members from the area) be held by the 
League, which would be followed by the performance of a play. The idea was 
unanimously accepted, and the meeting was concluded once cakes and chocolates had 
been served (which many of the younger girls could not enjoy as they were so 
intimidated by their grand surroundings). Plays were decided upon, and rehearsals for 
`Les sabots du diable' and `Veuve la verdure' began a few days later. K hosted the 
rehearsals in the family's kitchen, as the school had no heating in the evenings. After 
two weeks of rehearsals, the plays were successfully performed in front of an all- 
female audience. 
K's enjoyment of theatrical performances is obvious from her diary as was her 
increasing involvement with the League, which, she notes in January 1921, seemed to 
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be linked to the preparation and performance of plays (although K never took a leading 
part in any of them). In fact, K continued to distribute newspapers, and to attend 
meetings of the League over the following years, despite the diminishing interest and 
attendance by fellow members. In October 1923, she commented in her diary on the 
very poor attendance at a League meeting. At a further meeting in April 1924, she 
was the only one to attend. K had been an enthusiastic and loyal member of the 
League, which must have provided one of the few forums for more serious discussion 
outwith her family circle, as well as the opportunity to hear invited speakers. 
A second, equally important change to K's everyday life involves the obvious 
question of language. Before the outbreak of war in 1914, the policy of Germanisation 
had succeeded in reducing the overall number of French speakers in the Moselle, but 
had not succeeded in preventing Francophone parents teaching French to their 
children. K's family is a perfect example of this. At home, they spoke only French. 
However, they were bilingual and able to conduct all other affairs in German. 
Occasionally, in her diary, K uses German terms where she does not know the French 
equivalent, such as Unterstand (bomb shelter) and Kreisdirektion (regional 
administration). During the war, use of the French language, both spoken and written, 
was strictly prohibited. In the case of K's family, there was the added pressure of 
accommodating German officers billeted on their house, which meant they could not 
even be overheard using French. Nonetheless, K continued to write her diary in 
French, which, if it had been found, could have created serious repercussions for the 
family. Yet, K expressed only mild irritation with these officers in the very last days of 
the war. Her demeanour was otherwise correct and polite. Likewise, it was only once 
the war had ended that she first used the term boche to refer to Germans. Only two 
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and a half weeks before, she had attended the funeral of a German soldier who had 
died of his wounds in the convent. 29 As the German soldiers withdrew from the 
region, K had expressed pity for the wounded who struggled behind. And during the 
celebrations to mark the entry of French troops to the region, she was clearly taken 
aback by the violence she witnessed in Metz against Germans. Her use of the term 
boche is perhaps indicative of the more general need among the indigenous population, 
and mimicked by K, to distinguish themselves from the Germans, as well as to express 
their pro-French sentiment. Her use of the term does not necessarily, therefore, reflect 
her own antipathy for the German people. 
On 31 January 1920, an Alsatian festival was held in Rombas which K 
attended. She thoroughly enjoyed the musical entertainment, as well as a play which 
was performed entirely in Alsatian. Despite a good knowledge of both German and 
French, there were still a few words she did not entirely understand. Two years later, 
whilst visiting a cousin in Alsace, she commented, `C'est assez difficile de comprendre 
le patois allemand des indigenes' . 
30 Again, this emphasizes the linguistic gulf that 
existed between Mosellans and Alsatians at that time. As she had set herself apart 
from the incoming French officers, billeted on the family's house, she also set herself 
apart from the Alsatian indigenes. However, an equally vast gulf existed between 
those who lived to the south of the linguistic frontier in the Moselle itself, and those 
who lived to the north. Once, during a visit to Boulay, K attempted firstly to 
communicate with the local people in German, then in French. However, it seems they 
were unwilling to trust her in either language. 31 
29 Entry of 13 October 1918. 
30 Entry of 19 May 1922. 
31 This was recounted to the author by G at a meeting on 22 April 1998. 
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Current affairs 
Throughout her diary, K commented regularly upon local, regional, and international 
issues, occasionally allowing her opinions to spill onto the page. Her sceptical 
treatment of rumours during the final stages of the war meant that she was seldom 
misled. She also showed a great enthusiasm to learn about events elsewhere. Young, 
male friends and relatives who had been enlisted to the German army and sent to 
Russia to fight, were a source of information and stories. In early December 1918, the 
family had a visit from `un vrai francais en uniforme boche'. Such visitors were clearly 
relished by K and her family, as were the French officers they accommodated. 
K paid particular attention to local events, such as the almost immediate 
changes made to the local council in Peltre, and the drawing up of lists of suitable 
candidates to replace those thrown out. She even became quite excited about the first 
elections to the national assembly in November 1919. And why not? These were 
exciting times. Yet she, like all women in France in 1919, could not vote. Had the 
region still been part of Germany, the reverse would have been the case. Still, K did 
not brood on this point. Perhaps knowledge of her father's work, and his 
opportunities to participate in local, regional, and national politics, were sufficient for 
the time being. 
The railway line which serves Peltre, runs through the centre of the village and 
the station is only a short walk from the family's house. Almost every day, one or 
more members of the family made a journey by rail, usually to Metz. K recorded in her 
diary delays to trains, people she had met on the train that day, and a multitude of petty 
details concerning rail travel. As a result, K followed with a keen interest strikes 
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affecting trains. In fact, the reliability of the train services provide an excellent social 
and political gauge for integration of the regions. In September 1920, she 
acknowledged Millerand's rise to President of the Republic. In March 1921, she noted 
that her father was extremely busy with the grand recensement, the first since the 
region had been returned to France. In January and February 1923, she mentioned 
strikes followed by the occupation by French troops of the Ruhr. In March 1925, she 
recorded the death of President Ebert in Germany. And later that year, she gave a 
lengthy description of how a strike by `Bolsheviks' in Rombas, in protest against the 
war in Morocco, had failed. Yet, what is interesting about K's awareness of these 
issues is that they concern both France and Germany. Happy though she and her 
family were to disassociate themselves from German rule, they were still aware of their 
vulnerability on the new and very weak north-eastern frontier bordering Germany. 
Clearly, much of K's knowledge of current affairs was derived from her father. 
His work and his contact with the local council and with teachers' organisations, meant 
that he was well informed about a wide range of issues. More than likely, the family 
read newspapers on a regular basis. But there were also the numerous visits to 
relatives and friends in Metz, as well as around the region. Family and church matters 
were important, but K's awareness of what was going on in the world around her is 
not consistent with someone who indulged purely in idle gossip. There is evidence of 
an earnest desire to keep abreast with issues which influenced her life and that of her 
family, as well as the future of her region and country. 
Despite this, any mention of the denunciation and expulsion of Germans from 
the Moselle region following the arrival of the French occupying forces, of the mass 
repatriation of German civil servants, of the difficulties experienced by members of the 
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clergy caught on the wrong side of French patriotism, is most obviously absent from 
the pages of K's diary. She made no mention of the trainloads of expulses, of the sale 
of sequestered furniture, property, and even clothes advertised in the local newspapers 
on a daily basis, or of the efforts of the authorities to limit the number of letters of 
denunciation arriving at the office of the commissaire general in Metz. All of the 
above was common knowledge in the regions at the time. It would have been obvious 
simply from the newspapers, but even more evident for someone who visited the 
station in Metz in a regular basis. In order to witness every trainload of expulses and 
rapatries, large crowds gathered to bid them farewell. The platform was carefully 
cordoned off, the military and police presence was greater than usual. Clearly, it would 
have been almost impossible for K to have remained unaware of what was happening, 
especially in view of her awareness of current affairs in other areas. Why, then, did K 
never mention such matters? Were she and her family simply burying their heads in the 
sand? Or is the answer more sinister than that? Did they actually play their own part 
in chasing the German immigrants from the Moselle region? From what can be seen of 
K's family through the pages of her diary, none of these scenarios is at all likely. 
Firstly, the family's direct contact with Germans was relatively rare, confined to 
officers billeted on the house. Otherwise, few Germans had moved to the village of 
Peltre during annexation. After the war, therefore, the family is unlikely to have had 
any first hand experience of the expulsion of German families. Secondly, what exactly 
could K have said in response to the expulsions, in view of the fact that the diary was 
written primarily to remember family events? Thirdly, the post-war period and the 
behaviour of the indigenous population must be seen in the context of the horrors of 
war, and of the brutality of Germany's martial law. Denunciations, tribunals, and the 
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mass departures of German immigrants did not suddenly appear out of nowhere. 
Bitterness and vengeance were not new, or unexpected, emotions in the aftermath of 
war. Likewise, it was easy to justify the new order, with indigenes for once seemingly 
at the top, and Germans below. Perhaps there was even a feeling of inevitability about 
the expulsions. Germans had to be dealt with one way or another. Finally, what could 
K's family have said or done to counter the mistreatment of Germans? Whilst they 
might not have agreed with the extreme behaviour of some of their fellow indigenes, 
neither were they in a position to pass judgement or to criticize them. To do so would 
so easily have been interpreted as unpatriotic, pro-Boche behaviour and would have 
brought with it the threat of commissions de triage. And, like so many who had 
suffered their own personal tragedies during the war, the need to `get on with their 
lives' was an over-riding priority. Showing concern or moral outrage at the fate of 
Germans living in the region would simply have involved them in a prolonged and 
emotional battle, which they could well do without. 
The healing process 
The months and years which followed the armistice were punctuated with 
celebrations, memorial services, and official visits by French dignitaries. The public 
relations machinery of the new administration, initially in the form of the service de la 
propagande, regularly rolled into action giving the reintegrated population the 
opportunity both to celebrate its return to la mere patrie and to learn about its new 
sovereign power. 32 Propaganda techniques employed include the use of the cinema. 
32 In the Moselle, a service de propagande was created in 1919 and was directed by the head of the 
cabinet of the commissaire de la Republique en Moselle, Jacques Feschotte. In April 1919, this 
service was attached directly to the cabinet of the commissariat general in Strasbourg. Its initial aims 
were to survey the press and co-ordinate anti-German propaganda, but it soon took on a more positive 
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On 25 February 1921, K notes that teachers from neighbouring villages came to watch 
a film on the war, and on areas devastated by the fighting. There was a good turn-out 
for this event, typical of those organized by the Service de la propagande. Many other 
events and excursions were organized, including visits to battlefields (notably Verdun), 
to the pays devastes, and even to holiday camps in the rest of France. K's family 
visited the areas around Nomeny, Rocourt and Lemenil in the Meurthe-et-Moselle 
department on 1 August 1920. `C'est vraiment pitie de voir tout ce pays lä, ... il ne 
reste rien d'avant guerre, tous les logements sont refaits provisoirement en planches: 
1'eglise, palais de justice, caisse d'epargne, tout', 33 
From the earliest stage of its return to France, the region embarked upon a 
series of celebrations as well as commemorations. On 22 December 1918, K attended 
a Te Deum, held to commemorate the end of hostilities and, above all, to thank God 
for the region's return to French nationality. K notes that this was a most beautiful 
occasion (except that, to her disgust, the collection was made by `la plus enrage 
coureuse de boches pendant toute la guerre... '). On 22 May 1919, the schools were 
given a day's holiday in honour of a visit by the commissaire general, Alexandre 
Millerand. 34 And on 28 June 1919, with the signing of the Peace Treaty in Paris, the 
streets were decorated with tricolores. `La gare est toute gamie de verdure et de 
approach to influencing and educating the local populations in the French way of life. See ADM, 3 
Tp 174-182. 
33 Even around Peltre as late as June 1921, debris from the war had not been properly cleared. 
Around lunch time on 29 June, the family heard explosions from the nearby woods. Fire, caused by 
the drought conditions, had spread to a munitions dump and had set bombs off. It took many years 
before the countryside was made safe. Four years later, K remarked that in the woods near Peltre, 
what was called locally la route de guerre, was marked by bomb craters and burnt out cars. Some of 
these craters can still be found today. 
34 Raymond Poincard and his wife paid the region a visit on 23 August 1919, which coincided with a 
boat festival on the Moselle river, and in November of that year, K visited a display of gifts in Metz 
offered to Foch, Mangin, and Petain by the citizens of the Moselle. 
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drapeaux et habitee (manned) des boches... '. Whilst the Peace Treaty marked 
definitively the end of German rule in the regions, those of German origin were still 
heavily represented in certain sectors of the civil service, notably the railways. 
In July 1919, for the first time ever, the inhabitants of Alsace and the Moselle 
celebrated the national holiday marking the storming of the Bastille during the French 
Revolution. As a national holiday, Bastille Day on 14 July had only been celebrated in 
France since 1880, and so no one among the indigenous population was familiar with 
its traditions, and in some cases, with its significance. In fact, a `guide' was published 
for teachers, mayors, organizers of festivities explaining how to celebrate `La Fete du 
14 Juillet'. See figure 11 below 3s 
Vient de paratlre : 
«LA FETE DU 14 JUILLET» 
« La Fete du 14 Juillet u, pa. Paul Cl., 
pentier, Instiluterr 4 Meta, LElkyuJ de la SociElt nationale 
des Conferences populatrea, est un petit livre mis i la portfe 
de tons : it est id' guide precieux pour Conftrenciers, Instituteurs. 
Maires, appeles i prendre la parole le jour de notre grande 
1.2te Nationale ou charges de I'llsboration de son programme. 
14 Juwllet 1789 - 14 Juillet 1790 - 14 Juillet 
1919 - Le Drapeau tricolore -. La MaraeMaise .- 
teR! (a sont lei diverses reties de cet ouvrage fort interessant, 
qui contient en outre un choix des plus judideux de lecture, 
et de Poesies empruntees a nos grinds histotiens ou a nos 
meilleurs pobtes at toute une shte de chants patriatiques des 
mieux sesectionnes 
A la fin de ce recued qm renferme tonte une veritable 
documentation pour conferences at discours, I'on trouve encore 
Ies chapitres suivanta : Sujets ä trailer - La Fole Nationale 
a la Ville et au Village - enfin un Programme de File 
scolaire. 
La tneilleur accueil sera sOrement rlnervi a ce Iivre done 
It besoin se misfit sentir et que chacun voudra posseder dang 
as biblioth6que 
Priere d'inserer en Bibliographie. 
Figure 11: Publicity for a new publication on how to celebrate 14 July. 
35 ADM, 3 Tp 181. 
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On 13 July, K and her family attended a series of short plays performed in honour of 
the celebrations and later, with G, participated in a torchlit procession through Peltre 
organized by the military (Alsace and the Moselle were still technically under military 
occupation) and civilian authorities. The next day, a children's festival was held in the 
school, and in the evening they went to Metz to watch a magnificent fireworks display, 
marred only by the rain. Newspapers issued special editions to mark the occasion, 
commemorative posters were put up around the towns and villages and souvenirs went 
on sale. K clearly enjoyed these festivities. She enjoyed seeing Metz adorned in 
tricolore flags and decorations, and the festive occasions which brought a break from 
the daily routine of household chores and manual work in the garden or in the family's 
fields. Clearly, she liked learning about France, and experiencing for herself all the 
things her family had told her about la mere patrie during the first 25 years of her life. 
The new French administration lost no time in laying on patriotic events and 
official visits for the indigenous populations. Many involved elaborate ceremonies, 
heavily steeped in symbolism of the reattachment of Alsace and the Moselle to France. 
They also involved the more serious task of commemorating the war-dead of 1870 
whom, it was felt, France had not yet been able to honour. On 24 June 1920, K 
attended an open-air mass near Nancy celebrated by Monsignor Pelt, the Bishop of 
Metz, followed by a procession led by Maurice Banes who later gave a speech. The 
flags of Metz and Strasbourg were carried by Lorrainer and Alsatian girls in traditional 
costume and the ceremony ended with the replacement of the cross of Lorraine which 
had been removed in 1870. On a more local level, a Grande Fete du Souvenir 
Francois was held in Peltre to commemorate the soldiers who had fought in the 
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Franco-Prussian war of 1870. A service was held in the village cemetery and a speech 
was made by Jean-Pierre Jean36. Difficulties arose with the commemoration of the 
region's war dead as so many indigenous soldiers during the First World War had 
fought in the German army. 37 Both iconography and the dedication had to be suitably 
adjusted, in order not to cause unnecessary offence to families such as K's, who 
mourned the death of a son and brother killed in the fighting against their beloved 
France through no fault of their own. The problem was resolved in Peltre, as it was in 
so many communes, by erecting a monument engraved with the words `A nos Morts' 
instead of the more common `aux enfants de ... morts pour la France' to be 
found in 
the `interior'. In the graveyard in Peltre, the Souvenir Francais erected a monument in 
1922, engraved unambiguously with the words, `Aux soldats Frangais tomb6s a Peltre 
en 1870'. 
It was not until November 1922 that K mentioned any specific celebrations to 
mark the anniversary of the signing of the armistice. That year, there were great 
festivities in Metz and all over the region. Workers were given a holiday and there was 
a ball held in Metz which K attended and which went on all night. What can be 
interpreted from K's diary, is that even amidst the routine of everyday life in the 
aftermath of war and prolonged rationing, as well as economic uncertainty created by 
integration, such festivities and `high days' brought a rare chance for enjoyment and 
relaxation. The demographic rupture suffered by Metz and other towns around the 
Moselle region, had left the morale of the city deeply affected. Recovery from the 
inevitable social, economic, and political problems would take time. If K's experience 
36 J. -P. Jean was the administrateur and Delegue general of the Souvenir Francais, and author of Le 
Livre D'Or du Souvenir Franfais, published in Metz in 1929. 
37 Kidd, `War, Memory and Commemoration', in Evans, Martin, and Lunn, Ken, eds., War and 
Memory in Twentieth-Century Europe, Oxford, 1997. 
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is at all representative, the celebrations, ceremonies, and commemorations were a 
necessary part of the healing and recovery process. K and her family had, after all, 
suffered the terrible loss of a brother and son as a result of the was. He had been killed 
fighting against the French whose victory his family now celebrated. So, these 
celebrations were not always imposed upon the population by the service de la 
propagande, intent on feeding the population neat packages of easily digested French 
patriotism. They brought a welcome and necessary break from the hardships of the 
integration process, and provided a chance to begin unravelling the inevitable 
confusion created by wartime and pre-war traumas. 
A lesson in history 
Esperons qu' apres deux grandes guerres nous allons 
continuer ä pouvoir vivre en paix. L'histoire est une 
succession de jours bons et mauvais pour tous les pays 
jusqu'ä ce que les nations aient compris que la guerre 
n'arrange rien et est la ruine de tous. 38 
G's sadness and regret at the extent and impact of war reflects her own suffering as 
much as that of others whose regions have become battlegrounds for international 
struggles. The sisters' lives were deeply affected by the Franco-Prussian war, as well 
as the First and Second World Wars. Despite the absence of conflict between France 
and Germany for the last 40 years, the Moselle region and its population remain 
scarred by these wars. Questions of loyalty which arose with each annexation, each 
war, and each subsequent reintegration, have forced individuals to question their trust 
in their friends, neighbours, and even family, to keep innermost feelings and their true 
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sentiment to themselves. G describes the Moselle's population as mefcante, distrustful 
and suspicious of each other. 39 Even events surrounding the reattachment of the 
region to France in 1918 remain as sensitive now as they were then. Perhaps this is 
why K does not detail the experience of Germans living in the region. Perhaps the 
need for mefiance was already established even as she wrote the entries in her diary 80 
years ago. Despite what is clearly missing from K's diary, it remains one of the very 
few written documents from the period to trace the daily existence of members of its 
population. But K only paints part of the picture. What of those who, unlike K and 
her family, were unable to rejoice at the turn of events in October and November 
1918? What was it like to live in a region and no longer find security in the 
administration, political institutions, or police force? 
It was the wish of many in the French administration, as well as extreme 
Francophiles within the population, that those who had collaborated with the Germans 
during annexation and war, should be made to suffer the consequences of their actions 
following integration. As detailed in the previous chapter, the broad impact of this was 
a witch hunt, which resulted in the expulsion and repatriation of thousands of Germans 
and `unreliables'. Those who managed to remain, were reduced to the status of 
second class citizens, something the indigenous population had complained about 
throughout annexation and the war. For example, an advert placed in the Courrier de 
Metz newspaper in July 1919, by a men's clothing supplier, stated, `Alsaciens et 
Lorrains de Coeur. Pour vous prouver notre fratemite et notre solidarite nous voulons 
vous eviter l'ennui de vous fournir encore dans les maisons d'ennemis. ' An avis dated 
10 December 1918 stated, `Il est interdit de parler Allemand (sic. ) en public apris 22 
38 From a letter to the author of 14 June 1998 from G. 
39 From a meeting with G on 22 April 1998. 
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heures. Les Allemands ne sont pas obliges par nous de saluer les officiers, mais ils 
doivent saluer nos drapeaux. '4° The curfew was lifted by General de Maud'huy on 7 
August 1919, as it was recognized that the German population had been greatly 
reduced, but, more importantly, because of `la difficulte eprouvee par un grand nombre 
d'Alsaciens et de Lorrains de langue allemande ä s'exprimer en Francais'. 41 The 
problems which the curfew had caused the police were highlighted in a report, dated 
29 July 1919, written by the commissaire special in Metz. Three individuals had been 
arrested for speaking in German after 10 pm, when it was discovered that all three 
were indigenes. A fight had broken out after one of the three had been `traite de 
Boches' by a gendarme. 
Language repeatedly created difficulties between the indigenous population and 
the new authorities to the north of the linguistic frontier in the region. In August 1920, 
the mayor of Sarreguemines wrote that despite several attempts, he had been 
unsuccessful in persuading shopkeepers in the town to put all signs in French rather 
than German. However, he went on, in view of the fact that Sarreguemines was a ville 
frontiere, it was necessary to use both languages. In some cases, he concluded, the 
use of German was no longer merely informative for the public, but a declaration in 
itself. In Metz and Strasbourg, on the other hand, many chemists tried to resolve the 
problem by erecting signs in multiple languages, including English and Italian. Many 
complaints were made by Germanophone indigenes to the authorities about their 
mistreatment. An anonymous letter to the commissaire in Metz of 23 July 1923 
described how a Lorrainer soldier from Sarreguemines had been punished following an 
40 ADM, 301 M 69. 
41 Ibid. 
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altercation in which another had called him a `bocke' 42 The soldier listed other 
grievances including the fact that `French' troops (meaning presumably Francophone 
troops) were granted leave, whereas the Germanophone Alsatians and Lorrainers were 
not. 
As for German immigrants who remained in the region, they were continuously 
regarded with suspicion. In a report by the Administrateur in Chateau-Salins, the 
author conceded that `les Allemands sont corrects mais rien de plus'. He went on to 
state that the population suspected the German employees of sabotaging the postal and 
telegraph services, which had been poor since the end of the war. Such suspicions 
were widespread, and, in one case, resulted in an incident at the station in 
Hagondange 43 A train carrying a group of local delegates was so badly delayed that 
they were forced to wait until the next day for their connecting train. So incensed was 
one of the delegates, that he grabbed the German-style hat of one of the station 
employees and threw it to the ground, stating that, if the train had been coming from 
Berlin rather than Metz, no such problem would have occurred. As far as the 
employee's hat was concerned, the delegate declared, he should not be wearing one in 
the German style. The employee, despite the intensity of insults heaped upon him, 
made no complaint. Clearly, such happenstance was commonplace. 
An extract from a letter, written by a Madame Pelt of Forbach, illustrates the 
prejudice which formed amongst some members of the indigenous population about 
the continuing presence of Germans in the region. 44 She complained the railways were 
run entirely by Germans whose mission it was to impede the smooth running of the 
42 ADM, 26 Z 46. 
43 ADM, 301 M 69. Report of 21 January 1920. 
44 ADM, 301 M 69. Extract of 7 February 1919. 
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trains. She stated, `ces Allemands qui ont garde leurs places, sont brutaux avec les 
Lorrains qu'ils ont sur leurs ordres. ' Furthermore, Germans, she claimed, were 
inciting Lorrainer employees to strike. She asked, `Pourquoi sommes-nous Francais 
puisque des Allemands nous commandent? '. Germans were suspected of spreading 
anti-French propaganda, of importing cocaine to the region through Forbach, and even 
of supplying cheap German pornographic literature to booksellers in the region. 45 
In some areas, almost a year after the region's return to France, Germans still 
outnumbered the indigenous population. In the arrondissement of Thionville Ouest, 
the administrateur complained that he did not have the necessary staff to control the 
region. 46 He had no chief of police in a region where there were numerous 
revolutionary elements. Out of a population of nearly 80,000, only 20,000 were 
lorrain. The rest were Germans or other foreigners. 7 Yet, reports with evidence of 
Germans actually causing disturbances, or of committing the crimes so many accused 
them of, are rare. On the contrary, several reports indicate that many employers 
considered the German worker as `discipline, parfois specialise, qui leur donne 
satisfaction'. 48 That particular statement was made by the chief of police in Metz. The 
sous-prefet of Metz-Campagne also commented that Germans working in industry in 
the area were largely specialists, who would be difficult to replace. Equally, German 
agricultural workers had generally been with their employers for some time, `auxquels 
ils donnent toute satisfaction'. 49 
45 PRO, FO 371/8259. Report of 22 March 1922 from Lord Hardinge in Paris, p. 36. 
46 ADM, 301 M 74. Letter of 15 October 1919. 
47 In 1923, the total number of Germans resident in the Moselle departement was 33,449. There were 
24,092 Italians, 12,311 Poles, and 11,418 Luxembourgers. 
as ADM, 310 M 50. Report to thecommissaire central in Metz of 14 June 1925. 
49 ADM, 310 M 50. Report to the Prefect of the Moselle of 4 July 1925. 
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The general picture which emerges from the documentation shows that, in 
many cases, it was not the remaining German population which was the main source of 
trouble in the Moselle, but Alsatians working in the region. A report concerning 
incidents in Hagondange, in October 1919, concluded that there was, `un mouvement 
nettement anti-francais qui se manifeste parmi les ouvriers d'usine d'origine alsacienne 
[sic. ]'. 50 A group of Alsatian workers had apparently attacked two French soldiers, 
who had entered a cafe in Hagondange, and asked for a drink in French. The Alsatians 
responded, `Ici on ne cause pas Francais (sic. ). Voila les soldats francais. 11 faut tous 
les tuer. ' Another report painted a similar picture stating, 
La plupart des allemands [sic. ] se montreraient en 
general calmes et corrects, ne demandant qu'ä gagner 
tranquillement leur vie, les alsaciens [sic. ] toujours en 
groupes, provoquent des rixes et font du tapage au cafe, 
oü its chantent des chansons patriotiques allemandes, ce 
qui semblerait plutöt etre par esprit de contradiction que 
par patriotisme allemand. 5' 
Alsatians working in Hayange were also the subject of reports as a result of their 
rowdy behaviour, and the pleasure they took in singing loudly in German, as well as 
their local dialect, all of which clearly irritated the authorities and the Moselle's 
indigenous population. Even those who spoke German were often treated as `Boche' 
by the Francais de I'interieur. 
The French authorities were left with an awkward situation which was not 
what they had anticipated in the regions. Their initial policy of banning the use of 
50 ADM, 301 M 69. Report of 7 October 1919. 
51 ADM, 301 M 69. Report by the commissaire special for Thionville of 30 August 1919. 
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German in public had back-fired, as it penalized many among the indigenous 
population who were not Francophone or bilingual. Where they had anticipated 
trouble and unrest from Germans, there had been little. Instead, it was Alsatian 
particularistes who spent their time attempting, and usually succeeding, in upsetting 
the French soldiers and authorities. Even some members of the Francophone 
population expressed disquiet at the treatment of indigenes by the incoming French. 
One letter, although not representative of all opinion in the region, stated that despite 
the author's acceptance that everyone had been delighted when the Germans departed, 
`ä la police on est encore traite pire qu'en temps des boches'. S2 The letter was signed 
`un vieux soldat de 1870'. 
Concluding remarks 
During a trip to Lourdes with her mother in 1922, K commented in a letter to friends 
on how they were received at the Hotel de la Ville de Metz et de Strasbourg. 
Expecting to be properly welcomed at a hotel with such a name, K and her mother. 
were deeply disappointed when they were given poor service and an unsuitable room. 
`Nous n'avons vraiment pas ete revues comme des Lorrains'. 53 This was K's first visit 
into France, beyond Lorraine. How difficult it must have been for the experience to 
live up to her expectations. K, just like the anonymous and aged war veteran above, 
who politely apologized in his letter to the new administration for complaining, had 
expectations of what integration should mean and the manner in which it should take 
place. However, the process of integration was to be longer and more complicated 
than they, or the French authorities, could have anticipated. The transfer of 
52 ADM, 304 M 1. Letter of 28 May 1919. 
53 This letter of 9 September 1922, written by K, was returned to her by the addressee. 
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sovereignty gave a new set of people the upper hand. The Germans were forced to 
accept humbly second class status, and to endure the same treatment many of their 
fellow countrymen had dealt to the region's indigenes during the war. In turn, the 
indigenes had to accept that recognition of their full French status was reliant on their 
ability to speak French, as much as on the granting of French citizenship by the Treaty 
of Versailles. 
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Summary 
The early period of transition from war to peace in the Moselle was, in the case of K's 
Francophone, Francophile family, a time for celebration, enjoyment, and relaxation. 
K's diary records the numerous official visits, `liberation' parades, and torchlit 
processions, as well as more sombre commemoration ceremonies performed by the 
Souvenir Francois, which marked the early weeks and months of French rule in the 
regions. Through the involvement of K's father in municipal affairs, the family were 
kept up to date on various aspects of the integration process. However, attention was 
soon turned to the more mundane aspects of everyday life: visits from friends and 
relatives, trips to Metz for shopping and appointments, and chores in the house and 
garden. There is little mention in K's diary of the fate of the thousands of Germans, 
expulses and rapatries, and their treatment by the authorities and by certain sections of 
the indigenous population. On the one hand, this absence of comment is surprising in 
view of the number of departures made from Metz station, and in view of the process 
of denunciations and sequestration of property. On the other hand, the diary was not 
written in order to record such events, or to pass judgement on a process which may 
have seemed inevitable in the circumstances. In any case, K's experiences in the 
aftermath of war were unlike those of indigenes to the north of the linguistic frontier. 
There, problems which arose because of language again feature prominently in police 
reports from around the region. Yet, more often than not it was Alsatians, rather than 
Mosellans or Germans, who were guilty of causing unrest and disturbing the peace. 
Once again, the problems can often be traced back to the conflicting expectations of 
indigenes and Francais de 1'interieur. 
Chapter VII 
From Miracle to Malaise: 
the Economy 
En 1914, le gigantisme regne en Lorraine. Des usines 
immenses couvrent les vallees. On parle de millions de 
tonnes de minerai extrait du sous-sol, de reserves pour 
cent ans. [... ] De 1'acier Thomas jaillissant du 
convertisseur en milliers d'etincelles illuminant le ciel 
lorrain. Spectacle grandiose, cascades de lumiere, Hots 
d'or et de oriel... ' 
These spectacular images, conjured up by Francois Baudin, of Lorraine's magnificent 
factories, vast mine fields, and seemingly endless mineral resources in no way 
exaggerate the region's industrial potential on the eve of the Great War. The 
remarkable essor (development) of Europe's richest industrial zone which stretched 
from the Ruhr, through the Saarland, to Luxembourg, Lorraine and Belgium, had 
taken place, according to Baudin, thanks to exceptional economic conditions. Such 
prosperity led to the take-off of modem agricultural practices, the release of manpower 
from rural employment, and the mobilisation of an international workforce from the 
German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Baudin, Histoire economique et sociale. Vol. H Lessor, p. 277. Baudin's three volume study of 
Lorraine's economic and social history deals with the whole of Lorraine. However, the rapid 
expansion of mining and industrial activity affected largely the Meurthe-et-Moselle (the 
arrondissements of Briey and Longwy) and the Moselle departments. 
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Italy, and beyond. However, war, and its outcome, were to put the brakes on 
Europe's success story, in particular where the Moselle was concerned. 
During the war, French territory occupied by German forces included the 
arrondissement of Briey, encompassing numerous iron ore mines and iron and steel 
factories which were sequestered and exploited by the German occupiers during most 
of the conflict. However, in the final stages of the war, as a German defeat looked 
certain, they removed all the tools, machines, and supplies they could before 
systematically destroying what remained, sabotaging the region's industrial and mining 
production as best they could. 
3 In the Moselle, all mines and industry belonging to 
French owners were also sequestered by the German government, and run by German 
The armistice reversed this, returning sequestered property to its rightful companies 4 
owners. Factories, mines and businesses which had been owned by German companies 
or individuals prior to the war, were run by the French state through the Service des 
liquidations et sequestrations d'Alsace et de Lorraine until they were sold off to new, 
non-German owners. Unlike the Meurthe-et-Moselle, the Moselle escaped any major 
physical damage to its industrial assets. It was only in the final stages of the war that 
allied aeroplanes were sent to bomb the region. For the rest of the war, however, the 
French had left industry and mining largely intact, as it had been their intention from 
the earliest stages of the war to regain sovereignty of the regions. 
In the days which followed the armistice, the scene which greeted the incoming 
French army as it arrived in what had been occupied territory in the Meurthe-et- 
Moselle, was one of devastation. `Quant aux urines, ä ces grandes acieries qui etaient 
2 Ibid. 
3 Galloro, Piero-Dominique, La main-d'oeuvre des usines sidirurgiques de Lorraine, 1880-1939, 
unpublished PhD thesis, Metz, 1996, p. 294. 
° Although indigenes were legally German, during the war they were set apart from German 
immigrants. 
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l'honneur et la gloire de la France de l'Est, on peut dire qu'elles n'existent plus. '5 The 
Moselle's mines and industry, on the other hand, remained intact. Nevertheless, 
production was halted at the end of the war, due to the activities of the revolutionary 
soldiers' and workers' councils, and the confusion which accompanied the armistice in 
the provinces. Initially, therefore, the task of rebuilding the Meurthe-et-Moselle's 
factories and restoring access to its mines, was far greater than the task of restoring the 
Moselle's industrial productivity. Before long, grumblings from the local populations 
in Briey and Longwy could be heard about the length of time it was taking to restore 
communications in the region, whilst comparisons with Alsace and the Moselle, whose 
communication systems gave the appearance of running relatively smoothly during the 
days following the entry of French'troops, only increased the sense of dissatisfaction 6 
However, such mutterings of discontent, criticising a perceived favouritism shown to 
the newly returned provinces, merely foreshadowed far more vociferous complaints 
from Nancy, regarding the re-entry of Strasbourg and Metz to the competition for the 
title capitale de lest which had economic, as well as social, consequences for the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
In any case, such complaints were premature. Although industry and mining in 
the Meurthe-et-Moselle required, in most cases, re-building from scratch, this provided 
the perfect window of opportunity for the modernisation of machinery and methods. 
Once construction was complete, the region's progress was steady and sustained, as 
pre-war supply routes resumed and former markets reopened. Yet, the Moselle's 
failure to follow the Meurthe-et-Moselle's lead was not simply due to different 
circumstances, or to teething troubles with new suppliers and markets. Prolonged 
5 Albert Lebrun, Minister for the Liberated Regions, quoted from an interview in Le Temps, cited in 
Bonnet, L'Homme dufer, p. 193. 
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stagnation, from which the Moselle's economy suffered throughout most of the 1920s, 
was due to a complex web of factors, circumstances, and missed opportunities on 
regional, national, and international levels. This was in stark contrast to a decade of 
comparative success and expansion, not just in the Meurthe-et-Moselle, but in the rest 
of France, which followed the example of the United States by increasing industrial 
output and improving general prosperity. With the exception of the crisis period of 
1920 to 1921, and the instability of the franc between autumn 1926 and spring 1927, 
France was able to raise its industrial output from an index of 100 in 1913 to 140 by 
1929.7 Yet this success story was not geographically uniform, and the Moselle, 
despite its obvious potential at the end of the war, was not in a position to contribute 
to French prosperity. This chapter will examine the reasons behind this economic 
paradox, which took the region's economy from pre-war miracle to post-war malaise, 
and which led Claude Precheur to conclude that upon the region's return to la mere 
patrie, `la Moselle fut sacrifiee' 
g 
Liquidation of industry 
In 1925, a lengthy publication appeared under the title Sequestres et liquidations des 
biens allemands en Alsace et Lorraine. Its author, Anatole Perier, was the Directeur 
du service des liquidations d'Alsace et de Lorraine and he endeavoured, in his 
publication, to set out the methods and reasons behind the sequestration and 
liquidation of German property in the returned regions. 9 Liquidation affected primarily 
mines, industry, and businesses owned by German or enemy subjects prior to and 
6 Galloro, La main-d'oeuvre des usines siderurgiques, p. 295. 
7 Becker and Berstein, Victoire et Frustrations, p. 314. 
8 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 241. 
9 Perier, Sequestres et liquidations des biens allemands en Alsace et Lorraine, Paris, 1925, pp. 1-5. 
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during the war. Private property and personal belongings were also sequestered and 
sold off during the years which followed, and bank accounts were frozen and later 
liquidated. Perier argued that justification for this whole process would be based 
entirely upon German behaviour during the 1914-18 war. At the Hague conference in 
1907, attempts had been made to protect ordinary citizens during times of war. These 
included preventing occupying powers from laying claim to private capital or industry, 
from destroying or seizing privately owned property, unless this was necessitated by. 
war, a move which sought to control looting and plundering. Wars, therefore, were to 
be between armies, not peoples. During the first World War, though, Germany's 
seizure of industrial and mining interests in the occupied territory, notably in the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle department, its subsequent removal of all machines, tools, and 
supplies, and finally its destruction of what remained, was in direct contradiction of the 
Hague agreement. For this reason, at the end of the war, the French Government 
proceeded with two arretes implementing the sequestration and liquidation of all 
German property in Alsace and the Moselle. 
The arrete of 30 November 1918 stated, firstly, that all commercial relations 
within Alsace and the Moselle would operate freely with the exception of transactions 
involving enemy subjects. The new administration reserved the right to take any 
necessary measures against such enemy subjects and their property in the interests of 
public order. This arrete also stated that all commercial activity across the regions' 
borders to enemy or neutral territory was prohibited. It was in this arrete that the 
sequestration of German property within the regions was envisaged. The second 
arrete of 17 April 1919, ordered the liquidation of all sequestered property belonging 
to Germans. The German government later objected that France had been too hasty in 
proceeding with the sale of German property in the regions, claiming that this should 
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not have been carried out until the final ratification of the peace treaty. Perier's 
account defends French actions, stating, firstly, that sequestrations had occurred in 
response to German war-time sequestrations, and secondly that, in any case, the 
armistice had already pronounced the desannexion of the provinces, which gave 
France the right to act as they pleased as the new sovereign. However, the use of the 
phrase `in the interests of public order' in the first of the arretes is a clear sign that the 
French needed to cover their backs. Desannexion was by no means written in stone by 
the armistice. This, coupled with what could be interpreted as a tit for tat response to 
Germany's war-time sequestrations, could have left the French occupiers of the 
provinces in a most precarious position, had anyone chosen to examine the legality of 
their actions. They therefore ensured that they could at least claim to be acting in the 
interests of `public order', which was the only real power granted to any occupying 
force pending peace negotiations. In the end, though, German complaints fell upon 
deaf ears, as the Treaty of Versailles granted France the desired desannexion of the 
provinces, back-dating it to the armistice itself, and the topic of sequestrations and 
liquidations merged neatly with the entire process of 'reintegration'. 10 
The effective trade embargo between the provinces and Germany, created by 
the first of the arretes, was to have an immediate and damaging effect on the economy 
of the region. Indeed, a process of assimilating the Moselle's economy with that of its 
new sovereign had been anticipated and planned for during the war. However, this 
would take time. For 47 years, the Moselle's economy had, almost exclusively, been 
supplied by, and had sold to, German markets. Although the armistice agreement, as 
well as the two arretes, had included clauses which allowed Germany to continue 
1° Perier, Sequestres et liquidations, pp. 10-13. 
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supplying coke to the Moselle's iron and steel factories, " other areas of the economy 
were left high and dry by the restrictions. The Treaty of Versailles eventually imposed 
a transitional regime, which, from 10 January 1920, awarded producers from the 
returned provinces a form of franchise allowing them to retain some of their customers 
in Germany. However, German clients were, not surprisingly, unwilling to co-operate 
and, in any case, had already sent their orders elsewhere. 13 Equally, the German 
economy and that of the Moselle quickly fell out of step. Germany survived the `world 
economic crisis' of 1920 and 1921, enjoying almost full employment, whilst elsewhere 
governments struggled with mass unemployment and social unrest. But, the 
inflationary period, which had begun during the war and culminated with hyperinflation 
shortly before the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1922, meant Germany could no 
longer afford to import iron and steel as the mark's buying power plummeted. Yet for 
the Moselle, its severance from what had been - up to 1918 - well-established markets, 
meant it had to await the emergence of new customers for its raw materials and 
products before its economy could begin to recover. These were hard to come by in 
the post-war climate. Although reconstruction in devastated areas required raw 
materials such as iron and steel, the erection of temporary buildings using timber was a 
quick and popular option in many areas. Likewise, a dramatic drop in demand for iron 
and steel in ship-building and munitions production had occurred world-wide. Orders 
from other industries, such as the up and coming car industry, picked up some of the 
slack. However, competition for contracts was stiff, and, crucially, the Moselle was 
slower than other regions to respond. 
See chapter 3, pp. 94-96 which discusses the role of the various war-time committees and 
conferences dealing with such issues. 
12 The supply of coke was indeed problematic with regard to the region's economic recovery, and will 
be dealt with in a separate section later in this chapter. 
13 Roth, Encyclopedie illustree. Le vingtiPme siecle, p. 41. 
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Short term solutions to issues raised by the French sequestration policy were 
few and far between. Initially, communications between France and its returned 
provinces were, in practical terms, extremely difficult, despite the Meurthe-et- 
Moselle's protestations. The front line, although no longer a battlefield, had left a scar 
across the countryside which was, as yet, difficult to traverse. Even without the war 
and its effects, rail links, telegraph lines, and even roads across the 1871/1918 national 
frontiers, were not well developed. In fact, it was not until 1931 that the direct railway 
line between Metz and Paris was completed. Likewise, there was no canal system 
linking this new north eastern corner of France to the French `interior', Luxembourg, 
or Belgium. " Transporting supplies to the regions was therefore extremely difficult, 
as was sending goods and products in the opposite direction. Internally, despite the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle's assertions, transport systems were equally problematic. They 
were crucial in the reconstruction process, especially in the early days of 
ravitaillement, and the restoration of industrial activity. This was partly why the 
railways became such a sensitive area. The French authorities were caught between 
their desire to expel civil servants working in the railway and postal systems, and their 
need to keep the trains running, which involved retaining German personnel who made 
up the vast majority of managerial and supervisory posts. These were jobs which 
required skills and training which the indigenous population did not have. Hence the 
unpopular importation of Francais de l'interieur. 
Further difficulties were caused by the sequestration of mines and industry 
ordered by the French authorities in November 1918. Sequestration, combined with 
the policy of expulsion, which removed all German directors and managers from their 
14 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 241. 
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posts, 15 meant that, with the exception of those interests owned by members of the 
indigenous population, all factories and mines had to be run by the French government 
through specially appointed sequestrators. The larger factories were run by the service 
industriel de Lorraine, and smaller factories and mines by the service des mines. 
According to Roth, this caused businesses to become rapidly disorganized with the 
arrival of replacement directors who spoke no German, and who apparently bullied the 
Germanophone workforce. 16 Private industrialists and entrepreneurs, who eventually 
benefited from the liquidations, later claimed that the problems they faced in the mid 
1920s had been caused by poor management on the part of government 
sequestrators. '7 Whilst such accusations are perhaps not surprising (an industrialist 
who blames himself for his industry's shortcomings is rare), the first of the liquidations 
did not actually begin until August 1919, and, although the majority of factories and 
mines had been liquidated by the end of 1920, `8 the passage of time between the end of 
the war and their attachment to new companies did little to encourage a speedy return 
to production, or to attract new investment. Once contracts had been settled 
elsewhere, it was very difficult to win them back. In fact, a report published by the 
Association miniere d'Alsace et de Lorraine in 1920, suggests that demands made 
during the September 1919 miners' strike reflected the union's desire to, 
'S Delahache, writing in 1921, stated that the Francophone population demanded the expulsion of all 
German directors 'ä peu pr8s tous pangermanistes aver@s', but that their replacements were often 
made rather too hastily using unsuitable Francais de I'interieur. The army was obliged to provide 
many of the engineers required in the sequestration process, so that an officier technicien could be put 
in charge of every mine. Delahache, Les debuts de l'administration, p. 44. 
16 Roth, Encyclopedic illustree. Le vingtieme siecle, p. 40. 
" The publication L'Echo des Mines et de la Metallurgie claimed this in its edition of 10 December 
1922 (no. 2762). Copy held in the EAU. 
18 By 1921,24 mining concessions remained under sequestration, only one of which was being 
exploited. And by 1931, the French government remained in control of an insignificant number of 
mines. Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 68. 
256 
... consolider sa situation en obtenant 
des sequestres des 
avantages que n'accorderaient peut-etre pas, apres les 
liquidations, des industriels plus independants et par 
consequent moins dociles aux suggestions de 
1' administration. 19 
Even before mining and industrial interests had actually been sold off, the sequestration 
process had played its part in creating uncertainty, as well as a difficult working 
atmosphere for the workforce, thereby delaying a return to normal production. 
The liquidation process, once it got under way, radically changed the structure 
of ownership of both mining and heavy industry within the Moselle region. 20 French, 
Belgian, and Luxembourger companies profited most from the liquidation of heavy 
industry. Before and after liquidations took place, with the exception of the de Wendel 
companies, remarkably few mining concessions or factories were owned by Lorrainers. 
The French authorities sought to ensure that mines were sold off in groups, rather than 
under multiple ownership, as they had been under German rule. The post-war period 
was one of unprecedented concentration of ownership in French industry as a whole, 
and the Moselle entered the French economy just as this transformation was taking 
place. 
The de Wendel family, whose mining and industrial interests surprisingly lay in 
both the Moselle and the Meurthe-et-Moselle (in other words, in Germany and 
France), had been sequestered during the war by Germany, returned to the Moselle 
immediately following the armistice. They not only retrieved their property, but 
increased their control of mining interests to nearly a fifth of all deposits in the 
19 Quoted in Bonnet, L'homme du fer, p. 213. 
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Moselle, thanks to the liquidation process. 2' At a time when post-war cash flow 
problems would have otherwise prevented them from making any new financial 
commitments, the de Wendels and other existing French, Belgian and Luxembourg 
groups and companies, joined forces with various banks from the three countries in 
order to bid for the Moselle's sequestered mines and factories. The Banque de 1'Union 
Parisienne (which became Credit Lyonnais), the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the 
Banque de Bruxelles et Societe Generale de Belgique, and the Banque Internationale 
du Luxembourg all participated in buying up the industrial valleys of Lorraine. 
22 For 
example, factories previously owned by the Stumm brothers at Uckange, fell under the 
ownership of the Societe Nord de Lorraine: the Roechling factories at Thionville 
joined the Societe Metallurgique de Lorraine; and the Thyssen factories at 
Hagondange joined the Union des Consommateurs de produits metallurgiques et 
industriels. This latter, a consortium of 400 or so companies, produced materials and 
parts relating to the successful French car industry, including Renault, Panhard, 
Peugeot, and Fives-Lille. The French government gave excellent terms of repayment 
to the various groups and consortia, allowing them until 1940 to repay loans in annual 
instalments at an interest rate of only three percent. The size of the loans was further 
reduced by inflation during that period. However, it was not just these excellent terms 
which caused the French socialists to denounce the entire liquidation process as, `la 
20 See CARAN, AJ/30/213, for detailed information concerning the sequestration and liquidation of 
mines in the Moselle. 
21 In fact, the de Wendel family had been accused of making deals with both the French and German 
armies during the war, in order, it was said, to arrange protection for their factories and mines in both 
the Moselle and the Meurthe-et-Moselle. However, the accusations were found to be false. It is 
astonishing, though, that the de Wendels had succeeded in overriding the barrier of the Franco- 
German frontier in this way. It is a clear indication of the political and industrial power the family 
wielded before, during, and after the war. 
22 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 207. 
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plus grande operation de piraterie de tous les tempsi23 According to Precheur's 
figures, the three main industrial and mining zones of Hagondange, Rombas, and 
Knutange were sold for a total of 385 million francs. The estimated peacetime value of 
interests grouped in the three areas was 8 billion francs. 24 
Needless to say, nothing short of the complete nationalisation of mining and 
iron and steel production in the returned province would have contented the socialists. 
However, this `royal cadeau', granted to companies and firms in the private sector (not 
all of whom were French), was, in fact, a simple solution to the problem of 
compensation for damage caused to their mines and factories in France during the war, 
for which Germany was ultimately liable through reparations payments to be agreed at 
the Paris Peace Conference. In other words, by selling off German sequestrations at 
`knock down' prices, the French government was merely delivering compensation 
directly to industrialists. Indeed, the private sector had feared that the return of the 
Moselle to France might present a perfect opportunity for the French government to 
nationalize mining and industry. However, this fear was unfounded, and, according to 
Gerard, the government `servit docilement leurs interets', preferring, it seems, to 
resolve the question of compensation rather than to make a large profit for the French 
treasury. 25 
Overall, the specific problems suffered by the Moselle's economy in relation to 
the sequestration and liquidation process, lay in the passage of time between the initial 
seizure of German interests by the French authorities, and their final attachment to new 
companies. This passage of time, although inevitable, was sufficient to allow a 
significant break in the continuity of management within each factory or mine, a 
23 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 208. 
24 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 207. 
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problem which was compounded by new managers' lack of knowledge of the German 
language. However, these problems were not the only reason why the Moselle's 
economy fell behind that of its neighbour, the Meurthe-et-Moselle, as well as Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Saarland. After all, it took Lorraine's two industrial regions 
roughly the same length of time to reach a point where production could be resumed in 
earnest, one experiencing liquidation, the other, complete reconstruction of mining and 
industrial interests. It is necessary, therefore, to look elsewhere for the reasons behind 
the Moselle's relative economic stagnation. 
The Workforce 26 
Table 7: `Foreigners' living in the Moselle, 1910-1926, by nationality (percentage 
of the total population in brackets) 
Nationality 1910 1921 1926 
Germans 164,502 (25.1) 44,899 (7.6) 32,520 (5.1) 
Italians 26,133 (4.0) 15,354 (2.6) 31,945 (5.0) 
Lux'bourgers 10,784 (1.6) 12,772 (2.2) 11,538 (1.8) 
Belgians 1,347 (0.2) 2,579 (0.4) 2,023 (0.3) 
Russians 377 (0.05) 759 (0.1) 2,233 (0.4) 
Czechs no figures27 825 (0.1) 1,900 (0.3) 
Poles no figures 5,644 (1.0) 20,755 (3.3) 
25 Gerard, p. 107. 
26 Unless otherwise stated, figures relating to the population as a whole and to foreigners in this 
section have been taken from the Annuaire Statistique (Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Moselle), Premier 
volume - 1919 ä 1931, p. 36. ADM, BA 863. 27 Czechs and Poles were included in the figure for Germans in 1910. 
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Whilst changes in ownership of the Moselle's industry and mining brought disruption 
to production and therefore the region's economy, the post-war period also saw 
dramatic and damaging fluctuations in population, which had major consequences for 
the stability of the workforce. Since the 1890s, and the marked increase in industrial 
and mining activity in the Moselle, the existing indigenous workforce had been 
supplemented principally by workers from other German states (notably the Saarland, 
the Rhineland, and Bavaria). Increasingly, however, workers were recruited from 
further afield. As detailed above in table 7, in 1910, there were 26,133 Italians and 
10,784 Luxembourgers living in the Moselle 28 Apart from the 164,502 German 
immigrants living there in 1910, these two nationalities made up almost three quarters 
of the `foreign' population. This non-indigenous population was distributed around 
certain key areas in the region. The German military and civil servants were found 
almost exclusively in urban areas, most notably Metz. Rural areas were hardly 
penetrated at all by the immigrant population. The German, Italian, Luxembourger, 
and remaining foreign workers were to be found in the industrial areas between Metz 
and Thionville, and around Forbach and Sarreguemines. The war itself drew many 
workers away from industrial and mining employment. In mining alone, the workforce 
dropped from 17,430 in 1913, to 7,064 in 1914. Production, however, continued in 
the region as the meagre workforce was supplemented by prisoners of war. For 
example, in 1916,6,804 Russians were sent to be used in iron ore mining, whilst 
Belgians were sent to coal mining. 29 
28 Germany had set up recruitment offices in Italy from 1905 onwards, to obtain labour for its 
industrial areas including the Moselle. France had done so from 1911 onwards, supplying the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle with labour in the same way. In the post-war period, when Italian recruitment 
recommenced, the pre-war connections were re-established, and used by French employers in both 
the Meurthe-et-Moselle and the Moselle. See Galloro, Ouvrier defer, princes du vent, Part II. 
29 Notice sur l'industrie miniere en Alsace-Lorraine pendant la guerre (1914-18), Strasbourg, 1920, 
produced by the Association pour les interets miniers d'Alsace et de Lorraine. EAU 10/96. 
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The post-war period, though, saw a radical metamorphosis of the nationality of 
the Moselle's population and, more specifically, its workforce. 30 In the population as a 
whole, the immigrant German community was dramatically reduced, with the almost 
comprehensive removal of military personnel and civil servants (with the exception of 
key areas, notably the railway and postal systems), coupled with the departure of the 
professional middle classes from urban areas. Germans had made up 25.1 per cent of 
the total population in 1910, a figure which was reduced to 7.6 per cent in 1921, and 
to 5.1 per cent in 1926. The number of Germans employed in factories around the 
region was reduced by a further 38 per cent, and in mining by 30 per cent between 
1918 and 1919.31 However, the pace of departures from mining and industry slowed 
over the following years, as employers requested that certain categories of skilled 
German workers be retained, since replacements were difficult to find. Even in 1925, 
industrialists still felt that it was `indispensable aux usines de s'adresser en Allemagne ä 
certaines categories de specialistes ou de techniciens' 
32 Equally, it was felt that many 
of the so-called `troublemakers' had been removed in the first wave of expulsions. The 
remaining Germans were tentatively regarded as more reliable. 
33 By 1926, in mining at 
least, the number of German miners remained significantly higher than any other 
foreign nationals. 34 The demands of industrialists and patrons during the post-war 
period, therefore, defined the limits of epuration in the Moselle industrial and mining 
zones. 
30 It should be noted that the Moselle's immigrant population (excluding German immigrants), came 
to the region almost exclusively as a response to the demands of industry and mining. In fact, non- 
German immigrants seldom worked or lived outside the industrial and mining regions. In 1926, for 
example, foreigners working in the region totalled 55,906, of which public services employed only 
936, whereas industry employed 24,362, and mining and quarrying 21,585. 
31 Galloro, Ouvrier defer, princes du vent, Part II. 
32 ADM, 310 M 50. Report of 15 July 1925. 
33 See chapter 6, pp. 238-244, for a comparison with Alsatian workers who were often the instigators 
of social unrest during the years which followed integration. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, the end of the war did not herald the immediate return of 
the many thousands of Italians who had departed in the early stages of the war, despite 
the gaps left in the Moselle's workforce by departing Germans. Their return was only 
sporadic in 1919 and 1920, especially in heavy industry. The first reason for this was a 
law which was passed by the French government immediately following the end of 
hostilities, which prevented `la delivrance aux frontieres de nouvelles cartes d'identite 
et de circulation pour les travailleurs etrangers du commerce et de l'industrie'. 35 It 
was not long, however, before the authorities were forced to allow the entry of certain 
categories of workers, such as miners, skilled construction workers, and chemical 
workers. The restrictions on the entry of foreign workers reflected the desire among 
the French authorities to ensure that newly demobilized French workers would not find 
their jobs already taken by foreigners. 36 Secondly, Italians were slow to return to 
factories and mines, as many of them found temporary work in the reconstruction of 
areas devastated by war, both in the north of Italy, and in other areas of France. 
However, figures from reports produced by the Association des Maltres de Forges de 
Lorraine, show that - between 1921 and 1926 - Italians were arriving in the Moselle in 
far greater numbers. By the latter date, there were almost as many Italians in the 
region as there were Germans. 37 
34 In 1926, there were 7,188 Germans employed in mining (including 96 women). 
35 Instruction from the Minister of the Interior of 6 January 1919, ADMM, 10 M 34, quoted in 
Galloro, Ouvriers defer, princes du vent, Part II. 
36 Such anxieties were shared by many governments faced with the problems of finding employment 
for demobilized soldiers, in order to stave off any potential revolutionary activity. In Germany, for 
example, women who had replaced male workers in factories and other professions during the war, 
were unceremoniously dismissed to make way for servicemen immediately following the war. 
Bridenthal, R, 'Beyond Kinder, Kuche, Kirche: Weimar Women at Work', in CEH, 6, No. 2, p. 149. 
37 See EAU, 10/96, L'Industrie Siderurgique en Lorraine depuis 1'armistice. Compte rendu (annees 
1919 et 1920) published by the Association des Maitres de Forges de Lorraine. See also same 
publication for the years 1921 and 1922. 
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Italians were not the only foreigners to arrive in the region in the years 
following the end of the war. The number of Poles in the region rose from 5,644 in 
1921, to 20,755 in 1926. Agreements between the French and Polish governments 
allowed Poles to enter France in order to find employment, but a rigid system of 
controls was established, ensuring that all prospective workers passed through a camp 
to the south of Nancy, a form of Ellis Island, where they were given medical 
examinations and identity papers. Those who were deemed unfit for work in factories 
or mines were returned to Poland. Likewise, the number of Czechs residing in the 
Moselle rose from 825 in 1921, to 1,900 in 1926: and, similarly, the number of 
Russians rose from 929 to 1,255 in the same period. Many of them had been high 
ranking officials in the Russian white army, or aristocrats fleeing the 1917 Revolution. 
Records from factories in the Moselle region in some cases list previous employment 
as `Colonel in the Tsar's army', or simply as 'Prince' . 
38 Between 1924 and 1925 at the 
Societe Metallurgique de Knutange, more than a quarter of the workforce was 
Russian, due to links established by a former director of the factory in Russia before 
1914.39 The number of Belgians and Luxembourgers also rose steadily, the latter 
reaching 11,538 by 1926.40 And, gradually, the mid 1920s saw the arrival in the region 
of small numbers of North Africans originating from French colonies. 
1 
Most foreigners living in the region in the 1920s were recent arrivals in search 
of semi-skilled or unskilled work, and two thirds of them were male. In Thionville, for 
example, where half of all foreigners in the region lived, there were twice as many men 
38 In factory records held by P-D Galloro. 
39 Galloro, Ouvriers defer, princes du vent, Part II. 
40 As was the case with workers from the Saarland, many Luxembourgers worked in the Moselle, but 
continued to live in their native country. 
41 Eventually, North Africans were to make up a significant community of workers in Lorraine. See 
Noiriel, Girard, Un siPcle d'integration des immigres dans le pays Haut Lorrain. Approches socio- 
historique, Paris, 1992, available through MIRE, Ministere des affaires sociales, Paris. 
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as women. Furthermore, the figures for certain nationalities show a more uneven 
balance between the sexes than for others. For example, there were equal numbers of 
men and women among Germans, Belgians, and Luxembourgers living in the region in 
1926, whereas there were at least twice as many men as women among Poles, Italians, 
and Czechs, and five times as many men as women among Russians. Precheur also 
shows that Belgians, Luxembourgers, and Germans were far more likely to marry 
members of the indigenous population than other nationalities 42 In part, language and 
culture certainly account for this statistic. But the fact that these nationalities were the 
most numerous, making up almost half of the total foreign presence in the region, must 
be also taken into account. Single women arriving in the region tended to seek work 
in commerce and manufacturing, although a large number of the German women who 
were already working in the region were employed in domestic work, education, and 
commerce. Overall, though, the imbalance between the sexes, only added to the 
instability of the workforce, as young, single men tended to be more footloose than 
those arriving with wives and families. 
In the workplace, the problem of communication between so many nationalities 
was, in part, overcome by the use of words or jargon taken from all relevant 
languages, rather than by selecting one dominant language such as German. Even 
Lorrainers originating from neighbouring departments could not always find a common 
language. The same was true for Alsatian, Luxembourger, and Belgian workers, who 
all spoke different dialects. The introduction of languages as diverse as Russian, 
Italian, and Arabic only compounded the problem. Often symbols, rather than words, 
were used in notices, in order for employers to communicate with their workforce. In 
fact, guidelines were laid down and special regulations created for employers to help 
42 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 564. 
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them deal with the influx of foreign labour. 43 However, some employers regarded the 
cosmopolitan nature of their workforce as advantageous, 
car il trouve en eile un element stabilisateur au point de 
vue du mouvement ouvrier: ces individus de nationalites 
differentes ne causant pas la meme langue ne peuvent pas 
se grouper pour imposer des revendications 44 
In 1926, and despite the dramatic changes in the post-war period to the nationalities 
found among the region's foreign population, the largest foreign community in the 
Moselle was German, whilst still more Saarlanders, especially miners, escaped the 
statistics as they were travailleursfrontaliers, workers who lived in the Saarland but 
who crossed the border each day to work in the Moselle. 
45 
Of course, Germans already living in the region, and foreign nationals, only 
made up part of the total workforce in the post-war period, the bulk of which 
contained a combination of Mosellans, Lorrainers from the region's three other 
departments, Alsatians, and Frangais de 1'interieur. Restrictions on the number of 
foreign workers entering the region, put in place immediately following the armistice 
by the French government, were aimed at placing the local population (now French), 
and demobilized soldiers from elsewhere in France, at the head of the queue in the 
recruitment process in the regions. However, war had only aggravated an existing 
demographic trend in France, which meant that other French departments were unable 
to supply large enough numbers of workers, either skilled or unskilled, to compensate 
43 PRO, FO 371/8259. Report from Lord Hardinge in Paris to the British Foreign Office, 10 April 
1922, p. 59. 
44 Galloro, Ouvriers defer, princes du vent, Part II. 
45 Schill, Pierre, Les greves de I'immediat apres-guerre dons les mines de charbon de Moselle, DEA, 
Bourgogne, 1997, p. 103. 
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for the departure of Germans 46 German machinery was unfamiliar to many potential 
recruits, and, in any case, most Franpais de l'interieur - who had not previously 
worked in heavy industry - were not interested in that kind of work. Many came from 
rural backgrounds, and so were ill-prepared for mining or factory work. Most of those 
who did come to work in the Moselle at the beginning of the post-war period, were 
either from the Meurthe-et-Moselle, the Meuse, or the Vosges regions. Less than 5 
per cent of the total workforce in the Moselle was made up of French workers from 
departments outside the region of Lorraine. 47 
This, however, was not how the region's press perceived the recruitment 
process. According to Serge Bonnet, in the spring of 1920, political and social unrest 
were caused by the belief among workers, prompted by the press, that Alsatians and 
Mosellans had been made redundant in order to make way for Franpais de l'interieur, 
as the French authorities' policy of francisation was implemented. This claim drove 
the Chambre syndicale de l'Industrie du Bas Rhin to publish figures showing that in 
key factories in the region, such as at Hagondange, Uckange, and Rombas, as well as 
the Sarre-et-Moselle mines, departing Germans had, in fact, been replaced by 'Alsace- 
Lorrainers'. Indeed, according to these figures, the Frangais de I'interieur 
represented 0.5 per cent of the workforce in March 1919, and only 2 per cent by April 
1920, whereas the percentage of Mosellans and Alsatians rose during the same period 
from 47 per cent to 75 per cent 48 This situation was repeated throughout industry, 
and throughout the early 1920s. However, the readiness of workers to believe that 
there was a conspiracy to replace indigenes with Francais de l'interieur, is the telling 
factor. This corroborates the thesis that the public relations exercise of the new 
46 Galloro, Ouvriers defer, princes du vent, Part H. 
47 Ibid. 
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administration was listing badly. It was all too easy for the indigenes to interpret 
French actions negatively, and to believe the incoming French would seek to dominate 
them in exactly the same way as the outgoing Germans. 
Overall, however, the figures presented by the various censuses of the early 
1920s, and those provided by individual industries and employers, give only a snapshot 
of the workforce and its distribution. What they do not accurately portray is the 
constant movement of workers, indigenes, Francois de 1'interieur, and foreigners 
alike, not only around the region, but into neighbouring regions and countries. As 
wages varied in mining around the region by up to 7.7 per cent, 
49 so they varied 
between factories, and between the Moselle, the Meurthe-et-Moselle, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, and the Saarland. According to Galloro, the workforce itself had few 
national allegiances when it came to their search for work. Workers moved swiftly 
from one factory to another, and from one country to another, in search of higher 
wages. From this, Galloro concludes, that - as far as the workforce was concerned - 
the industrial region, of which the Moselle was only one part, was carved up by what 
workers saw as artificial frontiers. 
S° Furthermore, Galloro shows that the movement 
of certain workers around the region was just as remarkable as the movement of other 
workers between factories within individual towns, allowing workers to enjoy stability 
in their home life, whilst enjoying the benefits of a form of `work circuit', pursued in 
the interests of higher wages. 51 
48 Bonnet, L'homme du fer, pp. 203-207. See also Schill, Les greves, pp. 235-236. 
49 Schill, Les greves, p. 94. 
50 See Galloro, La main d'oeuvre des usines. 
" Further research in this area will hopefully shed light on the nature of the foreign sections of the 
workforce, and the possibility that a high turnover of foreign workers was a positive means of 
integration, due to their constant adaptation to new circumstances and situations. 
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This ever increasing mobility of the workforce, which made the supply of 
labour unstable, ran parallel to dramatic fluctuations in the demand for labour. 32 In 
other words, employers suffered as much from workers' infidelity, as workers suffered 
from the stop-start effect of production. Economic crises affecting most regions and 
countries in the post-war era, notably in 1920 and 1921, were partly responsible. 
However, the major cause of instability in the demand for labour was undoubtedly the 
wholly unreliable supply of coke from Germany's Ruhr valley, which was essential for 
the processing of iron ore in the Moselle. When coke supplies were low, employers in 
the iron and steel industry were faced with the dilemma of what to do with their 
workers. Whilst they could not afford to keep them on during periods of inactivity, 
once coke did begin to arrive, they were anxious to have a workforce near at hand to 
recommence production as quickly as possible. The socialist German-language 
newspaper, the Volkstribune, complained of this problem in June 1919, stating that 
even though the supply of coke had resumed, there was still a lack of skilled labour. 
53 
Likewise, the inactivity of iron and steel factories had a knock-on effect on demand for 
iron ore mined in the region, and therefore on the demand for miners. In 1923, the fact 
that iron ore production remained at 50 per cent of the 1913 levels, was blamed on the 
knock-on effect of the Ruhr crisis. And when, during the following year, the crisis 
ended and iron ore mining resumed, it only increased to 60 per cent of 1913 levels, due 
to a lack of miners. 54 
52 It is hard to establish which came first in the Moselle - instability in the supply of labour, or 
instability in the demand for labour - as the region was affected by factors not shared by the whole of 
the Saar-Lor-Lux region. 
13 Quotation given in French in Bonnet, L'homme defer, p. 209. 
s4 EAU 70/4 1, MDF doc. 40, Les Mines de Fer d'Alsace et de Lorraine en 1922, Bulletin no. 3911, 
p. 2. 
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During the early 1920s, employers' preoccupation with questions concerning 
their workforce led them to take unusual measures 55 Redundancies were limited as 
much as possible. However, after the 1920 strike in the region, when the economic 
crisis was at its worst, employers were forced to make reductions. However, these 
were usually limited to foreign workers and Alsatians, rather than Mosellan workers. 
Once the crisis had passed, and production was no longer hindered simply by 
stagnating markets, employers attempted to find alternatives to sackings and 
redundancies as a means of preserving manpower. During periods of acute crisis, new 
recruitment was kept to a minimum, and alternative work was sought for industrial 
workers. The idea of `farming out' workers to other areas of work, such as mining or 
agriculture, until production could resume was heralded a great success in the Moselle. 
For example, at Audun-le-Tiche, 'les ouvriers en surnombre ä l'usine sont occupes ä la 
coupe de bois' 56 Even the perceived threat of communist activity among German 
workers in the factories was overlooked by the French authorities in the interests of 
retaining the workforce, ready for the industrial recovery. Where redundancies were 
made, for example, in factories at Uckange, they were regretted only a few months 
later when production resumed. Above all else, employers feared losing their skilled 
workers to other factories or regions. 
Another solution to the problem was partial unemployment, where individual 
workers lost one or two days work per week. Employers were particularly sensitive to 
workers' family situations in reducing working hours. The Association miniere 
d'Alsace et de Lorraine stated that redundancies should only affect casual and 
unmarried workers. As a result, at Ottange, unmarried workers were the first to lose 
ss See Galloro, Ouvriers defer, Princes du vent. 
56 ADM, 320 M 30. Report by the Sous-prefet de Thionville, 17 February 1923. 
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two days work per week. Other examples show that foreigners were also more likely 
to be sacrificed than indigenous workers. Some workers even took the opportunity to 
carry out their military service on the basis which guaranteed work when they 
returned. In fact, according to Galloro, leave of absence, rather than redundancies, 
accounted for up to 28 per cent of all departures from factories in 1921, and up to 25 
per cent in 1923. This greatly reduced the numbers of enforced departures. 57 
Nonetheless, the social perspective taken by employers in an attempt to 
stabilize the workforce does not appear to have worked convincingly. Despite 
concerns for married versus unmarried workers, and indigenes versus foreigners, 
employers were playing a game of `catch-up'. The pattern of workers without loyalty 
to employer, company, or region, emerged as a result of changes brought by war, by 
French policy in the regions, in particular the epuration policy, by unpredictable levels 
of production affected by economic crises, and by the coke supply to the region. In 
other words, employers had as much or as little control over labour as they had over 
other factors of production in the 1920s. Thus, when the French Government sought 
the co-operation of industrialists, asking them to join the Caisse departementale de 
secours contre le chömage, many refused to join because, they said, of the severity of 
the economic crises. 58 But if the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of the workforce, 
and its recently acquired tendency to flit from one factory or region to another, were 
not enough to torment employers and destabilize output, there was another problem 
which played its part in hindering the Moselle's return to normal, competitive 
production. This was the problem of strike action. 
57 Galloro, Ouvriers defer, princes du vent, Part II. 
58 The French administration decided to retain the German system of unemployment benefit in the 
regions, rather than changing it to the French equivalent, in order to avoid delays, confusion, and 
unnecessary dissatisfaction within the population. 
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Strikes and social unrest 
The strikes in the Moselle, in the aftermath of the First World War, must be read in the 
context of fears in France, and elsewhere, that a revolutionary moment was imminent. 
These fears were most clearly illustrated by the extensive preparations made by the 
authorities in the Moselle and Alsace, and in the rest of France, to repress the major 
working-class movement widely expected for May Day, 1920. In the years of the 
Spartacist rising and the Munich soviet, the communist republic in Hungary, the 
occupation of factories in northern Italy, mutinies in the French fleet in the Black Sea, 
the widespread strikes in France in 1919 and 1920, and the foundation of the French 
communist party, it was natural that the authorities should respond nervously to any 
form of social unrest and strike action in the Moselle. It was only to be expected in 
such a climate that the working out of post-war industrial relations would be tense. 
Between 1919 and 1925, a total of 71 strikes took place in the Moselle in 
mining and industry, as well as in the postal and railway systems. There were two 
main periods of disruption: the first between 1919 and 1920, in the lead up to the 
world economic crisis; and the second in 1923, just as the Ruhr crisis was about to 
reach its climax. During the first period, 64,089 strikers were involved, and during the 
second, 25,192 were involved. However, in 1923,1,114,056 days were lost to strike 
action, whereas in 1919 and 1920 only 659,232 days were lost. Between these two 
phases of disruption, strike action was more muted. However, the days of employer 
dominance over the workforce were long gone, and demands regarding pay and 
conditions, which the likes of the de Wendels would never have tolerated pre-1914, 
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were commonplace 59 `La lutte contre le patronat' had begun. 60 But how problematic 
were strikes? What caused them in the first place? And how successful were they in 
the light of the post-war economic crises, changes in ownership, and fluctuations in the 
nature and nationality of the workforce? 
If the French press was to be believed, at the heart of every strike was a 
German instigator. On 26 April 1920, the Francophile newspaper, Le Messin, carried 
an article entitled, `La Verite sur les Greves de Lorraine et d'Alsace. Les Boches sont 
les initiateurs du mouvement qui est dinge contre la France'. The national press also 
took a keen interest in the departure of Germans, and the newspaper, Le Matin, 
published an article at the end of January 1919 entitled, `A la porte les Boches'. 61 
Strikes, especially in the autumn of 1919, were quickly attributed to German 
propaganda which was seeping in, it was said, from Germany through the French- 
occupied Saarland. 62 It was not just the press who believed Germans were the 
troublemakers. The Directeur General du Commerce, de I'Industrie et des Mines 
wrote to the commissaire general in Metz complaining that one of the causes of 
strikes was to be found, `dans le maintien d'un personnel allemand "trop 
considerable"' 63 Many more accusations against Germans of a similarly vague nature 
are to be found in both the press and the administrative papers of the period, to the 
extent that responsibility for the failure of industry and mining to improve output was 
laid squarely at the door of the German workers and miners. 
19 Jeanneney, Jean- Noel, Francois de Wendel en Republique: ! 'argent et le pouvoir, 1914-1940, Paris, 
1976, p. 117. 
60 ADM, 301 M 54. Report from the Commissaire special in Thionville addressed to the prefer de la 
Moselle in Metz, 30th July 1921. 
61 Quoted in Schill, Les greves, p. 101. 
62 Roth, Encyclopedie Illustree. Le vingtieme siecle, p. 40. 
63 Cited in Schill, Les greves, p. 102. 
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Indeed, in November 1918, revolutionary workers' and soldiers' councils had 
brought production to a complete standstill, and factories were `ä la merci de meneurs 
allemands' 64 These ringleaders apparently received their orders from unions whose 
headquarters were in Germany. According to Schill, in 1918, the first post-war strike 
in mines at the Vuilleron pits at Petite-Rosselle involved only German miners. Not one 
indigenous miner took part. However, as Schill points out, in the immediate aftermath 
of the region's return to French sovereignty, strike action among Mosellans would 
have been viewed as ingratitude of the highest order. 65 Again, in January 1919, further 
strike action took place in Gargan, where 80 per cent of miners went on strike in a pit 
at which 72 per cent of workers were German. Moreover, in pits with such high 
proportions of Germans, the miners' representatives were more likely to be German. 
Once the proportion of Germans was reduced, indigenous miners were able to take 
more control. This can be seen in April 1919, when strike participation by German 
miners was minimal, compared to participation by indigenous miners, and those from 
neighbouring French departments. 
Overall, though, there appears to be little hard evidence to support the theory 
that Germans were consistently the trouble makers. French troops were soon drafted 
in to dissolve the revolutionary councils and to restore order, and, overall, the 
`anarchic period' was short-lived. Admittedly, there were not always enough troops to 
maintain the level of control desired by some more fearful of the communist threat. 
Likewise, the formation of a suitable police force took some time to establish. This 
resulted in regular complaints from administrateurs sent to the numerous industrial 
64 L'industrie siderurgique en Lorraine depuis 1'armistice. Compte rendu (annees 1919 et 1920 - 
premiers mois de 1921), published by the Association des mattres de forges de Lorraine, p. 6 EAU 
10/96. 
65 Schill, Les greves, p. 104. 
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and mining trouble spots around the region, who requested extra support. However, 
not all communists were German, and conversely, not all Germans were communist. 
After the first wave of expulsions and repatriations, many of the real German trouble- 
makers had undoubtedly been weeded out, whilst those who remained were more 
interested in staying in employment, rather than causing political instability, social 
unrest, and revolution throughout France. 
So what were the real causes of the numerous strikes which afflicted the 
Moselle during the early 1920s, and which pointed to such a high degree of social 
dissatisfaction? Transitional problems certainly account for some of the initial strikes, 
and a number of specific difficulties can be identified. The question of valorisation or 
the rate of exchange for the mark, was dealt with almost immediately by the new 
administration. As a general policy, a ministerial decree of 26 November 1918 ordered 
that marks in the returned provinces would be exchanged at a rate of 1.25 francs 66 In 
fact, on the day of the armistice, the franc was worth only 0.7 of a mark. The collapse 
of the mark over the months and years which followed resulted in a catastrophic drop 
in its value against the franc, reaching 0.0000015 by 1923. As far as employees were 
concerned, the change in payment of their wages from marks to francs was, in itself, 
not the source of major difficulties. In some cases, such as in iron ore mines, it was 
decided that one mark would, in fact, equal one franc with a supplement paid at 25 per 
cent of the worker's wage, as compensation for high prices. However, a massive 
discrepancy emerged between labour costs and the price paid for products, especially 
in mining. This resulted in the gradual reduction in March 1919 of the hourly rate paid 
66 As was shown in chapter 5, p. 166, the exchange rate varied between holders of category A identity 
card holders and category D. The rates quoted here are those applied to wages where a clean break 
with the use of the mark was possible. 
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in certain mines. 7 At a time when prices were rising so quickly, these wage reductions 
were extremely unwelcome. 
In fact, la vie chere was the most commonly voiced complaint in the post-war 
period, and was repeatedly identified as the main factor behind wage claims and 
subsequent strike action. In the immediate aftermath of war, the delivery of goods and 
supplies to the returned regions, bringing to an end shortages caused by the Allied 
blockade, disrupted prices of basic goods, and brought unfavourable comparisons with 
neighbouring regions. In fact, inflation continued throughout the period at an alarming 
rate, so that between 1913 and 1925, prices had increased in the Moselle region 
fivefold. 68 The increase was most dramatic between 1913 and 1921, after which prices 
dropped in response to the easing of the economic crisis, only to rise again in 1924 and 
1925, as the Ruhr crisis reached its peak and then passed. Accordingly, pay demands 
in the regions followed similar patterns. Whilst workers and miners in the Moselle 
reacted to the diminishing worth of their wages in the face of the rise in the cost of 
living, the same trends were being experienced elsewhere in France. However, it was 
often specific events within the region which sparked unrest or strikes. For example, 
police reports describe how in October 1919, miners in Forbach were involved in a 
protest march against la vie chere. In particular, they demonstrated against 
shopkeepers who had fixed prices at unreasonably high levels. According to the police 
report, the miners were successful in their efforts, which made them particularly 
popular with the general public, as a reduction in prices was successfully achieved. 
Other efforts were made to find a way around inflation, the first of which were 
economats patronaux, stores run by the owners of mines and factories who were able 
67 Bonnet, L'homme dufer, p. 213. 
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to protect miners from the fluctuations in market prices, and also from the effects of 
contraband which found its way onto the market. Cooperatives also appeared, for 
example in Oeting, where they were run by workers rather than employers, who were 
accused of profiting from their captive consumers through the economats. According 
to Schill, such innovations by workers seeking to counteract rising prices, stem from 
pre-war habits when strike action was not an option. 
69 In the post-war period, 
preservation of the levels of their pay were among strikers' demands, such as in the 
case of iron ore miners cited above, who were faced with a reduction of 25 per cent in 
their pay. In fact, in February 1919, workers in heavy industry demanded the 
introduction of a minimum wage as a result of the decreases in pay levels. In May 
1920, as part of an agreement to end strikes which had begun the preceding month, 
minimum rates of pay were agreed for both skilled and unskilled workers. 7° On other 
occasions, strikes resulted from the desire to obtain increases in wages to keep up with 
the rise in the cost of living, for example in December 1919 in heavy industry in 
Rombas. However, this strike was brought to an end, not because of a pay agreement, 
but because employers threatened to close the factory down altogether. 
Problems with pay, though, were not the only causes of strikes. The more 
general question of improvements in working conditions covered issues such as the 
reduction of the working day from ten hours to eight hours. This was one of the 
demands made by workers in heavy industry in February 1919. Paid holidays, the 
maintenance of the family allowance which had been introduced under German rule, 
and double pay on Sundays were also demanded with limited success (workers in 
68 Industrie siderurgique en Lorraine, 1923,1924,1925. Compte rendu, published by the Association 
des maItres de forges de Lorraine, p. 7. EAU 10/96. 
69 Schilt, Les greves, p. 101. 
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heavy industry were offered an increase in pay of 15 per cent for working on Sundays). 
Political demands only crept into the equation once the various fragmented groups 
representing workers in the regions linked up with French trade unions, such as the 
CGT (the Confederation general du travail) in the spring of 1919. Demands included 
recognition of unions and the nationalisation of mines, a demand which had more 
relevance during the liquidation process than at any other time. But, with membership 
of national trade unions came increasing organisation and co-ordination, which, in 
turn, increased the success of strikes themselves. Strikes thereafter were more likely 
to coincide with those occurring in France as a whole, such as the strike in heavy 
industry in June 1919. But employers still believed that unrest was sparked largely by 
German separatist propaganda, which worked parallel to the CGT. The success of this 
is questionable in the Moselle if not in Alsace. " 
Other, more localized, incidents continued to highlight problems which 
specifically affected the Moselle. One example of this can be seen in the strike which 
broke out in April 1920. As was shown above, it was believed that Lorrainers 
(Mosellans) were being made redundant by new French companies, anxious to make 
way for Francais de 1'interieur. A general strike was called on the basis of the latter 
complaint, which extended throughout the returned regions affecting industrial and 
railway workers. Following this, employers went to great lengths to show that their 
recruitment policies were not biased in this way. Another example of regional factors 
affecting strike action can be seen in the connection made between strikes in the 
Saarland and then in the Moselle. Miners at the Petite-Rosselle pits followed the 
70 L'industrie siderurgique en Lorraine depuis 1'armistice. Compte rendu (annees 1919 et 1920 - 
premiers mois de 1921), published by the Association des maItres de forges de Lorraine, p. 8, EAU 
10/96. 
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Saarland's example of May 1919, where miners had already been on strike for a 
month. The reason for this apparent solidarity was clearly the fact that so many miners 
working in the Moselle's mines along the border were from the Saarland. In fact, 
miners in the Saarland returned to work a week after the Moselle's miners joined them. 
According to Schill, solidarity between miners in Germany and the Moselle became 
less common over the months and years which followed the armistice. However, there 
is repeated evidence that employers feared the reverse was the case, something which 
was to have an important impact on the voting habits of the middle classes, who feared 
the threat of a German-led revolution in the region's factories and mines. 
In general, strike action in the Moselle reflected patterns which resulted from 
the problems of integration, both immediate and long-term, as well as economic 
fluctuations which put pressure on the levels, and the buying power, of wages. There 
is little evidence that workers in the regions consistently placed political motives above 
social or economic demands. Any inclination towards political or revolutionary action 
either resulted from the hangover created by the anarchic period at the time of the 
armistice or from the newly established links with French trade unions, especially the 
socialist CGT. Overall, the impact of strikes on productivity was not as severe as 
some believed, as very few strikes involved the entire workforce within specific 
factories or mines, let alone the region as a whole. However, coupled with the 
difficulties facing industry, mining, and the economy of the Moselle during the years 
following integration, strikes merely served to compound a situation which saw major 
fluctuations in output, demand, and supply. Timing of strikes, their extent and 
duration, were all unpredictable for employers who were struggling to control factors 
71 L'industrie siderurgique en Lorraine depuis ! 'armistice. Compte rendu (annees 1919 et 1920 - 
premiers mois de 1921), published by the Association des maitres de forges de Lorraine, p. 7, EAU 
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of production. However, what strikes reflect is the acute hardship and sense of 
unhappiness which affected the workforce during the first few years of the region's 
reattachment to the French economy. More often than not, strikes followed action 
taken by employers in an attempt to counter inconsistencies and uncertainty in other 
areas of production, the most important of which was the supply of coke. 
The supply of `combustibles' 
In January 1923, political, as well as economic factors, drove President Poincare to 
initiate the occupation of the Ruhr district in Germany, an area which contained some 
of the richest coal mines in Europe. A group of engineers were sent to the region 
accompanied by various French and Belgian army divisions, whose task it was to 
ensure control of coal and coke production and their delivery to France. According to 
Kolb, the political reason for this action was the French desire to push Germany's 
frontier back to the Rhine, a process which should, in Poincare's view, have been 
carried out at the Paris Peace Conference. 
2 The economic reason was Germany's 
failure to meet its reparations obligations, something which was crippling industry in 
the Moselle. The passive resistance carried out in the Ruhr district by its population, 
which brought coal production and transportation to a standstill over the months which 
followed, meant the situation escalated into a major crisis between Germany and 
France. The two countries were thrown into a state of conflict which saw coal and 
coke deliveries to France almost disappear altogether. The value of the German mark 
10/96. 
72 Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic, English translation, London, 1992, p. 46. 
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plunged as a result of the heavy cost of inactivity in the Ruhr, and a lack of revenue 
from taxation and sales of coal, brought the German people to their knees, and forced 
their government to capitulate in September 1923. 
For the Moselle, the occupation of the Ruhr marked the peak in the crisis in 
industry. It followed months and years of unpredictable deliveries of coke to the 
region's metallurgy industry, as Germany had failed to meet agreed levels set out in the 
Treaty of Versailles. French industrialists claimed the Germans were falsifying 
production figures for coke to make production look weaker than it actually was. The 
action had caused productivity in the Moselle's iron and steel industry to only stutter 
into life at the end of the war, which in turn had created such uncertainty in production 
and employment. Various reasons account for why the Moselle was so badly affected 
by this intermittent supply of coke. Firstly, the development of heavy industry in the 
region had been carried out in the context of German industry. Iron ore mined in the 
regions required a specific quality of coke, in order that it be successfully processed. 
That quality of coke was produced in the Ruhr district, and so the two mining regions 
were inextricably linked almost from the beginning of large scale production of iron 
and steel in the region. Other types of coke produced elsewhere were not as efficient 
or suitable as that produced in the Ruhr. For example, coke produced around 
Forbach, in the Moselle itself, was of an unsuitably crumbly quality. And Francois de 
Wendel, in his frustration at the lack of alternative sources, complained of British coke, 
`prix eleves pour des cokes de qualite deplorable [mais quit nous ont preserve d'un 
arret total'. 73 
According to Precheur, liquidation of the Moselle's industry, thereby severing 
it definitively from German ownership and German suppliers, caused the greatest 
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damage to the region's economy and industry over the subsequent years. But how 
could the French have done otherwise? In the aftermath of the First World War, the 
integration of the provinces could not easily have taken place without placing the 
Moselle's extremely profitable mining and industrial activity under French, or at least 
non-German, ownership. To continue allowing German companies and businessmen 
to profit from the region's resources would have been unthinkable. Rather, liquidation 
could only have worked if it had been accompanied by other arrangements, in order to 
ensure that the region could obtain a reliable supply of suitable coke from elsewhere. 
However, as can be seen above, such a supply was not readily available, and, in any 
case, transportation of coke from abroad to the region posed another difficulty, which 
could not be resolved quickly. The extension of the canal system in the north of 
France and Belgium to the Moselle and Alsace would take many years to complete. 
Solutions to the coke problem in the Moselle's heavy industry, therefore, were 
not readily apparent in the years which followed desannexion. The occupation of the 
Ruhr, in the circumstances, seemed to be a last resort for an exasperated French 
government who wished to see Germany held to its obligations set out in the peace 
treaty. However, Francois de Wendel had been an early proponent of the occupation 
of the Ruhr. So much so that, when France finally sent troops into the region in 1923, 
many believed de Wendel himself had pushed Poincare into the decision in order to 
ensure the provision of coke for his factories, which were starved of German 
combustibles. Behind this theory is the idea that Poincare merely occupied the Ruhr in 
order to re-establish the supply route of coal and coke for Lorraine, not for any other, 
political, motives. In other words, not only did French industrialists benefit greatly 
from the liquidation process, but they were also able to influence the government in 
73 Galloro, Ouvriers defer, princes du vent, Part H. 
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assuring a reliable supply of coke. The historian, J-N Jeanneney, goes to great lengths 
to dispute this interpretation. He argues that the de Wendels, despite their political 
power and industrial dynasty (earning them the nickname les nouveaux ducs de 
Lorraine)74, were unpopular with the likes of Poincare, who was overheard stating 
that, `Ne croyez pas que, pour vous procurer du charbon, je vais risquer la vie d'un 
seul soldat francais' ýS Despite the strength of his opinion, and despite having been a 
proponent during the war of pushing French occupation of the Saarland further north 
to include the Ruhr, de Wendel's influence had its limitations. After all, why had it 
taken so long for the government to pay any attention to him? In any case, along with 
the Comite des Forges at the end of the First World War, the de Wendels were 
regarded by the Parisian politicians with distaste, if not distrust, due to the controversy 
surrounding the bombing of factories and mines in what had been French and German 
Lorraine. No one in Paris was ever quite sure how the de Wendels had handled 
relations with Germany during the war. 
Overall, despite French action in the Ruhr which was motivated, at least in 
part, by concerns to re-supply the Moselle with coke, this supposed solution to the 
crisis in production came after four long years of struggle for the region's industry. It 
is little wonder that de Wendel felt the need to embark upon a `petite croisadei16 in 
order to rescue his own interests in the Moselle, as well as those of other industrialists. 
He was not alone in feeling that the Moselle had, in fact, been sacrificed. Archival 
documents and industrial reports are littered with references to, and evidence of, the 
74 L'Humanite, 2 March 1923, cited in Bonnet, L'homme du fer, p. 225. The article also gave the 
following description of the de Wendel brothers: `Ils sont Ies maitres de tour: Ies autres industriels 
sont leurs vassaux, les ouvriers sont leurs serfs, et le petit commergant lui-meme, &touffd par leurs 
dconomats, est sur le point de disparaitre ou de perdre son independance. ' 
75 Supposedly said to a Lorrainer industrialist, possibly Francois de Wendel, by Count Sforza. Quoted 
in Jeanneney, p. 120. 
76 Jeanneney, Francois de Wendel, p. 123. 
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problems created by the lack of coke in the region. In March 1919, the Chef du 
service industriel de Lorraine, Captain Witzig, wrote in his weekly report to Mirman 
in Metz, 
La situation reste stationnaire dans les hauts fourneaux et 
acieries de Lorraine. Les Allemands n'envoient de 
Westphalie que 4,000 tonnes de coke par jour pour la 
Lorraine, au lieu de 12,000 tonnes dont nous aurions 
besoin. [... ] Sur 68 fourneaux en Lorraine, nous n'en 
avons actuellement que 26 en action. 77 
The situation fluctuated during the following years78, but even in the summer of 1922, 
only half the furnaces in the Moselle were in operation. Due to the urgency of the 
situation at the end of the war, an agreement was signed ahead of the Paris Peace 
Conference in Luxembourg envisaging the delivery of 411,000 tonnes of coal per 
month from Germany, to be divided between Luxembourg, the Saarland, and the 
returned provinces. The first convoys left the Ruhr on 27 November 1918, but ceased 
abruptly on 17 December, and did not recommence until January 1919. The sporadic 
nature of these deliveries was to be a feature of the supply of coal and coke from 
Germany until the mid 1920s. 
It was hoped the Treaty of Versailles would have the last word in the matter, 
but it did not. Initially, this was due to transportation difficulties within Germany, as 
the rail system was in disarray due to strikes. However, it soon appeared to the 
Moselle's industrialists that the German coal industry was simply being provocative. 
The Mattres de forges in the region became involved in sending representatives to the 
77 ADBR, 121 AL 91. Report of 23 - 29 March 1919. 
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Ruhr in an attempt to requisition supplies. In fact, once the occupation of the Ruhr 
began, some of the Moselle's workers offered voluntarily to go to the Ruhr district to 
work in place of German workers, who were on strike as part of passive resistance. 
On 18 March 1923, L'Eclair de l'Est reported this `heroism', stating, `Nous tenons ä 
feliciter chaudement des braves ouvriers lorrains qui ne demandent qu'ä travailler en 
territoire ennemi pour la France. '79 It is perhaps more likely that this offer was made 
out of desperation, as well as frustration, rather than out of patriotism for France, as 
the Ruhr crisis brought on a new wave of redundancies and wage reductions among 
workers. Heavy financial losses were reported by companies. For example, in July 
1922, the Societe Lorraine des Acieries de Rombas declared losses of 27,455,684 
francs, a sixth of the company's value. Simultaneously, the Societe de Knutange 
announced even more depressing losses of 30,317,757 francs, which represented half 
of the company's value. 80 
The disastrous consequences of Germany's reluctant delivery of combustibles 
to the Moselle's metallurgy industry raises the question, why did industrialists in the 
region not seek a long term solution to the crisis, which, after all, had shown no 
significant sign of easing since French soldiers had arrived there at the end of 
November 1918? It was not until 1928 that any plans were made to develop a 
metallurgy plant capable of using the quality of coke produced in the Moselle. At that 
time, the region continued to rely on foreign supplies for 70 per cent of the coke used 
in the region. This meant that the Moselle was completely at the mercy of foreign 
78 See reports sent by Lord Crewe and Lord Hardinge in Paris to the Foreign Office in London 
between 1922 and 1923. PRO, FO 371/9391 and FO 371/8259. 
79 Bonnet, L'homme dufer, p. 225. 
80 PRO, FO 371/8259. Report from Lord Hardinge in Paris to Foreign Office in London, 10 July 
1922. 
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factors, such as fluctuations in price and supplies. 
" What added insult to injury for the 
Moselle, was the fact that, whilst it remained at the mercy of the ebb and flow of 
international relations between France and Germany for its supply of suitable coke, 
Germany merely turned to Sweden to replace the supply of iron ore which had 
originally come from the Moselle. In this way, Germany was able to recover both its 
coal mining output, as well as its metallurgy production, whilst the Moselle could only 
fall further and further behind. 
Agriculture and commerce 
Heavy industry and mining account for the bulk of economic activity in the Moselle 
region, and it was largely as a result of difficulties in this sector that integration of the 
region was so problematic. 
82 However, other areas of the economy suffered their own 
crises of production and confidence, and this chapter would not be complete without 
discussing them. Rural districts in the region were the least affected by changes in 
sovereignty, and by the war. Some farmland was damaged by traffic travelling to and 
from the front, and other areas were plundered at the end of the war by the retreating 
German soldiers. However, the rebuilding of farms and the return to a normal farming 
routine in the region had its benefits, and the more innovative landowners and farmers 
brought in mechanisation and improved techniques. Dairy farming was favoured as a 
replacement for cereal farming, as it was more profitable in the light of improved 
methods of storage and the ever increasing urban markets. 
81 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 348. 
82 As well as coal and iron ore mines in the Moselle, there were also salt mines. There were also large 
numbers of glassworks, including the manufacturing of crystal and engraved or decorated glass. 
Ceramic factories, cement works, and potteries also contributed to the region's productivity. 
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Wine growing in the region experienced successive disasters, such as a fungal 
infection which killed off many vines, the disruptive effects of the war itself, and the 
introduction of stiff competition from the rest of France. 
83 This last problem was 
highlighted by a wine law which was signed at Rambouillet in August 1921, and which 
was applied nationally, replacing the local law of 1909 in the returned provinces. The 
new law prevented Alsatian and Mosellan wine growers from adding `sugar water' to 
the wine which, they claimed, was necessary in order to counter the harsh flavour of 
their grapes. Without this `sweetener' the wine became considerably less appealing 
than wines in the rest of France, and therefore less competitive. 
84 The severance from 
German markets for white wine provided the final blow for many wine producers in 
the Moselle region. The cultivation of mirabelles (a small, hard, yellow fruit 
resembling the plum) and strawberries, especially around Woippy to the north of Metz, 
replaced many of the vineyards. A whole way of life had come to an end. Beer 
production in the regions had increased dramatically during annexation, thanks, largely, 
to demand created by the immigrant German population, but also due to the changes in 
taste among an increasingly urban and industrial population. Reattachment to France, 
therefore, created difficulties for breweries whose best customers were departing in 
their thousands. 
Major changes in commercial activity in the regions created both winners and 
losers. " According to Roth, the liquidation of German property was to allow 
numerous property agents and dubiously qualified intermediaries to line their pockets 
with hefty profits, not to mention those who obtained businesses and property at prices 
pitched well below market value. Likewise, banks also benefited as assets, including 
83 Roth, Encyclopedie Illustree. Le vingtieme siecle, p. 44. 
84 Report from Lord Hardinge in Paris to the Foreign Office, 5 September 1921. PRO, FO 371/6990. 
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savings belonging to German subjects, were frozen and remained so until liquidation 
took place. Roth, like so many others who have made passing comments about the 
subject of liquidations, gives no specific evidence of the profits made through 
liquidations. Apart from the liquidation of mining and industry, for which figures are 
more readily available (although not always completely reliable), there is virtually no 
official record of how much small businesses and domestic properties were sold for, or 
86 to whom. Whatever the finer details of this process, the benefits to those who gained 
from the liquidation process were very great indeed, and have contributed to the 
general sense of shame which the indigenous population still appears to feel for this 
period, especially in view of the fact that, in 1871, the incoming German authorities 
left all property and businesses belonging to indigenes intact. 
The losers, on the other hand, included those who, during German annexation, 
had bought German securities (such as government bonds, war bonds, and municipal 
loans, and so on). The bankrupt German economy was not in a position to repay 
them. Other problems emerged. For example, many indigenes who lived around 
Forbach had opened bank accounts in the Saarland during annexation. Despite French 
occupation of the region, these banks fell outwith the regulations created specifically 
for the returned provinces and therefore valorisation could not apply. `Il s' agit en 
general de petites gens, pour qui la perte sur le change signifie un dommage des plus 
sensibles. "' Taxation within the returned provinces proved a difficult issue, bringing 
complaints in the press and from politicians regarding the perceived imbalances 
85 See also Chapter 4 Legislative assimilation, p. 136-140. 
86 It has been suggested that the most reliable way of obtaining answers to these questions would be to 
examine any remaining legal records held by solicitors for the period, most of which are governed by 
the 50 year and 100 year rules. Certainly, understanding of this period would be greatly enhanced by 
further research into the entire sequestration and liquidation process in the inter-war period. 
87 This point was raised in the Bulletin de Presse Alsacienne of 9 May 1919, ADBR, 121AL162. A 
similar problem existed for Alsatians living on the border with Baden. 
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between Alsace, the Moselle, and the rest of France. Guy de Wendel (Francois de 
Wendel's brother), a Lorrainer deputy in the French Parliament, wrote to Alapetite 
claiming taxation was higher in the provinces than elsewhere in France. Alapetite 
replied at length, pointing out that `state taxation' had been brought in line with that in 
other departments, but because of the survival of the German taxation system at local 
level, taxes could be higher as a result. 88 Similar fears were expressed with regard to 
possible changes to the system of industrial insurance brought in by the Germans. 
These, however, are examples of how complications could arise during the period of 
transition and from one system to another, where financial imbalances were feared, 
especially at times of economic uncertainty. Overall, matters appear to have balanced 
themselves out, as can be seen in the case of the social security system, which was put 
in place during annexation and, due to its popularity with the local populations, 
continues to this day. 
The `Malaise economique' 
The feeling is very obviously gaining ground that all is 
not well with Alsace and Lorraine. We have now to deal 
with a "Malaise administratif ', a "malaise economique", 
and a "malaise psychologique" ... Business was never 
worse and yet there are no signs of determination on the 
part of employer and employee to solve their problems, 
and the spirit of inertia seems to have taken hold. 89 
88 Report from Lord Hardinge, Paris, to the Foreign Office in London, of 5 May 1922, PRO, FO 
371/8259. 
ß9 Report to the Foreign Office by Lord Hardinge in London, 5 September 1921, PRO, FO 371/6990, 
p. 234-235. 
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According to figures produced by the Comite des forges de France, in 1919, the 
Moselle produced 31.1 per cent of the total iron and steel production in France. In the 
following year this increased to 35.4 per cent, despite the fact that only a third of the 
region's furnaces were functioning 90 The Moselle's failure to regain pre-war 
production levels, therefore, had a very large impact on the French national output, to 
the extent that improvements made in other iron and steel areas in France were offset 
by the Moselle's meagre contribution. In 1922, for example, France was able to 
produce only 57.6 per cent of its 1913 output of cast iron. In 1923, this rose to 60 per 
cent. The following year, 1924, with the ending of the Ruhr crisis and the arrival of 
more reliable supplies of coke in the Moselle, output rose to 84.8 per cent. Yet, it was 
still well behind Belgium, which had achieved 113 per cent of 1913 levels. 91 By 1929, 
Precheur shows that whilst the Moselle had achieved 98 per cent of 1913 iron ore 
production levels, Luxembourg had reached 114 per cent, the Meurthe-et-Moselle, 
122 per cent. the Saarland, 153 per cent, and Belgium, 163 per cent. 92 Although 
France compensated in other areas for the Moselle's shortcomings, how much better 
could French productivity have been had the Moselle's output not stagnated in the 
1920s? 
90 Statistique des caisses d'epargne publiques. Annees 1919, i 1920, published by the Commissariat 
general de la Republique, p. 93, ADM, BA 260. 
91 Bulletin no. 3849, Production defonte pendant l'annee 1924, published by the Comite des forges 
de France, 6 March 1925, p. 2. EAU. 
92 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 241. 
290 
Concluding remarks 
The pattern which emerges in the integration of the Moselle's mining and industry into 
the French economy is one of major blows and knock-on effects. Sequestration of 
German-owned factories and mines made the initial period of recovery uncertain and 
sluggish. Liquidation severed links between the Moselle and its long-standing supplier 
of coke, hindering new factory and mining owners in their endeavours to make new 
acquisitions pay. Fluctuations in deliveries of coke, thereafter, disrupted both the 
production of metallurgy goods, as well as the demand for iron ore in the region's 
mines. This, in turn, created multiple problems for both employers and employees as 
the workforce proved unreliable, and often workers were unavailable when production 
could recommence. At the same time, wages decreased and redundancies increased, 
driving workers and unions to repeat strike action. A malaise economique fell over the 
region as it stumbled from one crisis to another, a malaise which did not only affect 
the entrepreneurs and the patrons, but also the workers, labourers, and employees 
throughout the region. Periods of recovery and optimism, whilst evident elsewhere in 
other industrial regions, are harder to identify in the case of the Moselle. It is almost 
impossible to tell exactly why investment failed to flow into the Moselle following 
integration. But ultimately, this web of difficulties, coupled with hostile Franco- 
German relations which weakened the Moselle's geographic situation, and the general 
lack of capital in the post-war era, all conspired successfully to deter investors. The 
Moselle was, indeed, `sacrificed' in the 1920s. But this was not deliberate or planned. 
Rather, it occurred through neglect and through an impromptu conspiracy of elements 
affecting all factors of production. It is therefore with a correctly pitched note of 
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gloom and despondency that Precheur summarizes the state of the Moselle's economy 
in the 1920s. `La rupture du combinat Ruhr-Lorraine n'avait pas amene la creation 
d'un autre combinat Lorraine-Moselle. La crise fut sans doute pour quelque chose, 
1'inertie du capitalisme fit le reste. '93 
93 Precheur, La Lorraine siderurgique, p. 350. 
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Summary 
In 1914, the Moselle region, as part of the German economy, enjoyed expansion and 
success with a neatly structured economy featuring plentiful raw materials, reliable 
suppliers, numerous customers, and a skilled and ever increasing workforce. The war, 
and its consequences, changed everything, and prompted a series of disasters. 
Compared to the surrounding regions, the Moselle's recovery from this was sluggish 
and unimpressive. Sequestration and liquidation of German industrial and mining 
interests brought about a severance of the region's mines and factories from the supply 
of German raw materials, such as essential coke from the Ruhr valley, and from 
German demand for the final products. The departure of many, though not all, 
German workers from heavy industry brought about a period of instability in the 
supply of labour. Many gradually returned from Italy, whilst others arrived from 
Eastern Europe for the first time. Yet, as the supply of raw materials required for the 
production of iron and steel fluctuated, so did the demand for labour, and employers 
were tom between keeping an available workforce to hand, and laying off workers 
when there was no money to pay them. Such was the uncertainty, combined with 
rising prices and social unrest, that strike action was frequent, though not always co- 
ordinated. Attempts to resolve the supply of coke included the French occupation of 
the Ruhr, although this was not Poincare's primary reason for the action. Yet even 
this came very late in the day, by which stage stagnation in production had irreparably 
damaged industry and the economy of the Moselle. The malaise economique in the 
region, caused primarily by heavy industry and mining, but extending into agriculture 
and commerce, arose due to this vicious circle of factors which did little for market 
confidence, and discouraged new investment. 
Chapter VIII 
Politics and Opinion 
Whilst previous chapters have charted the development of the various strains of what 
was known as the malaise lorrain, this chapter will examine how this sense of unease 
and dissatisfaction dictated the pace of post-war political development in the region. 
Equally, a more general assessment of opinion' within the heterogeneous, mosellane 
population will be made. Such an assessment is fraught with difficulties and 
complicating factors: the absence of both women and German immigrants from the 
electoral register in 1919, thereby limiting any conclusions which could be drawn from 
election results; the subsequent inclusion of naturalised male Germans among the 
electorate following the application of the Treaty of Versailles; the instability of the 
population, with the simultaneous departure of German immigrants and the arrival of 
Francais de l'interieur and immigrant workers; an unstable class structure; and 
divisions between urban, suburban, industrial, and rural areas. However, by examining 
post-war political parties and political movements, election results, and the role of 
religion as well as the extent of religious belief in the region, a picture, albeit 
fragmented, of opinion and factors influencing opinion within the region can be 
compiled. 
The use of the term `public opinion' is avoided here as it tends to imply a prevalence or unity of 
opinion, which was clearly not possible within the region's very mixed population. Much of the 
existing historiography on this period for the Moselle refers to the opinion, beliefs, or actions of 'une 
population' which is misleading (see for example Bonnefont, Histoire de la Lorraine, p. 127). 
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The Electorate 
Before assessing the outcome and implications of the 1919 and 1924 general 
elections', it is essential to examine in detail the nature of the electorate. 3 Those not 
included on the electoral role, as in the rest of France, included women. 4 However, in 
Germany, universal suffrage had been extended to include women, thanks to the 
constitution of the Weimar Republic. Nonetheless, there appears to have been little 
comment on this issue in the press in 1919 giving any indication of women's reaction 
in the Moselle to this development. 5 It is clear that the region's press had always been 
a distinctly male domain with only occasional contributions on political issues by 
women. In 1919 at least, attention was turned in the direction of questions raised by 
integration, including the religious question which was, for many women, of central 
importance in their lives. By contrast, a commissaire special in Thionville reported 
that, for the first time, the presence of women at communist meetings in Hayange had 
been noted. 6 However, according to his reading of the situation, women were being 
recruited to the movement as a means of encouraging children to join the communist 
youth movement. Nevertheless, the absence of women from the electoral role of the 
Z `General elections' refers to elections ä la chambre des deputes, or legislative elections to the 
French Parliament. 
3 See the Annuaire Statistique (Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Moselle), Premier Volume - 1919 a 1931, ADM, 
BA 863 and the Office de Statistique d'Alsace et de Lorraine, comptes-rendus, ADM, BA 260, for all 
election statistics and information concerning the electorate contained in this chapter. A particularly 
useful reference volume for elections in the Moselle, including election programmes presented by the 
various parties, was compiled under the supervision of Georges Livet and Guy Cabourdin under the 
title Les elections dans le departement de la Moselle, Fascicule IV - 1919-1939, published by Faculte 
des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Strasbourg, College Littdraire Universitaire de Metz, ADM 
63 J 6/2. 
° It is assumed that the authors cited in this chapter were aware of the fact that women were not 
included in the electorate during this period, despite their failure to mention the gap which this leaves 
in the political profile of the region. 
5 Perhaps further research into women's clubs and associations may shed some light on this area. 
6 Report sent to the prefet de la Moselle, 30 July 1921. ADM 301 M 54. 
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region severely limits the historian's ability to assess their opinions and attitudes to key 
issues. 
A further hindrance is the absence of the sizeable German community from the 
electorate, a community which had, of course, been eligible to vote in pre-war 
elections in the region. Under the new French administration, only those in possession 
of identity cards A and B were allowed to vote, which meant that those Germans who 
might have been resident in the region all their lives were prevented from voting. 
7 The 
Treaty of Versailles allowed many of them to gain French nationality through the 
naturalisation process, which, in turn, allowed them to vote. However, this process 
had not begun by the time the first general elections were held in the region in 
November 1919. Likewise, as was the case elsewhere in France, none of the other 
immigrant populations (from countries other than Germany) was able to vote. In view 
of the increasingly high numbers of immigrants who arrived during the years which 
followed the end of the war, their absence from the electorate once again limits any 
conclusions which can be drawn from election results. 
As can be seen in table 8 on the next page, those eligible to vote in November 
1919 came to 116,409 out of a total adult population of 467,810, the equivalent of 
24.9 per cent. The number of votes actually cast came to 96,971, or 20.7 per cent of 
the total adult population. Once again, this puts election results in perspective since 
only a fraction of the total adult population residing in the region expressed any kind of 
political opinion. In fact, the turnout in the elections of November 1919 was 
remarkably good (83.3 per cent of the electorate), and this was repeated in 1924, when 
there was a turnout of 83.4 per cent. 
7 Again, French desannexion contrasts sharply with German annexation 47 years before when the 
region's indigenous male population was automatically included in the electorate. 
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Table 8: Breakdown of the 1919 electorate. 
Total population 589,120 
Adult population 8 467,810 
Eligible to vote 116,409 
Turnout 96,971 
These remarkably high percentages reflect the extent to which eligible voters had been 
motivated by events surrounding the integration of the province into France .9 It has 
been claimed that such a turnout reflected the desire among the populations to create, 
through general elections, a form of plebiscite in favour of France. Baudon, for 
example, in his study of elections in the Moselle, stated it was generally agreed that 
these first elections, `devaient ... demontrer 
ä l'Allemagne et 4 1'Univers que les 
Lorrains etaient decides ... que 
les premieres elections devaient avoir ... un caractere 
nettement unanime de foi patriotique'. 
10 However, Baudon's assumptions of a 
unanimity of intent among the population, and of a `communaute de sentiments', are 
unproven. A more general conclusion would be that, in the first elections held since 
the Moselle's return to France, the indigenous population was free to vote for parties 
formed for and by indigenes, in circumstances which were clearly very different from 
8 This figure is for 1921. This is the closest reliable figure for the adult population and has been 
obtained from census results. Whilst changes will have occurred in the total adult population between 
1919 and 1921 due to the departure of German immigrants, this will have been largely compensated 
for by the arrival of foreign workers and Francais de l'interieur. Office de Statistique d'Alsace et de 
Lorraine. Compte rendus. ADM, BA 260. 
9 Cantonal elections, though, did not demonstrate the same enthusiasm. According to a report sent to 
the British Foreign Office on 12 June 1922 by Lord Hardinge from Paris, only half the electorate cast 
their votes in these elections on 14 May. In the municipal elections in Metz on 28 May 1922,60 
percent of voters cast their votes. Such indifference on the part of the electorate, it was claimed, was 
responsible for letting in left-wing extremists. PRO, FO 371/8259. 
10 Baudon, E. L., Les elections en Moselle, 1919-1956, Metz, 1956, p. 9. See also Printz, La vallee 
usiniere, p. 167. 
297 
those they had experienced under German rule. Voting was strongest in industrial 
areas and the largest turnout was in the arrondissement of Thionville-Ouest, where 
88.1 per cent of the electorate voted. In contrast, Metz-Ville had the lowest turnout of 
77.9 per cent. " 
The overall size of the electorate rose significantly from 116,409 in 1919, to 
137,697 in 1924. This was due to the inclusion of a small number of naturalised 
Germans, as well as a small number of other nationalities, but mainly because of the 
arrival of Francais de 1'interieur. From the very first elections, the German immigrant 
community was completely disenfranchised. Yet, despite the lack of firm evidence 
from election results, which might have given some indication of the political views of 
those Germans still remaining in the region, civil servants and politicians alike still 
made claims about political extremism brewing among Germans. In fact, the political 
opinions of those Germans living in the region at the end of the war are difficult to 
assess by reference to the distant elections of 1911.12 
Another aspect of the electorate which is problematic is its religious profile, as 
the available statistics only indicate the religion of the population as a whole. In 1910, 
85.7 per cent of the population was Catholic, 13 per cent was Protestant, and 1.1 per 
cent was Jewish. These percentages had changed dramatically by 1921, as the 
Catholic population had increased to 92.4 per cent, Protestants accounted for only 4.8 
per cent, whilst there had been no change in the percentage of Jews. Compared to the 
It is not clear why there should be such a difference in turnout between these two constituencies. In 
particular, a higher turnout might have been expected in Metz. Due to the large number of optants 
who had left following annexation and the subsequent arrival of German immigrants, the city's 
indigenes had gradually been outnumbered by Germans, allowing the election of a German mayor. In 
1918, the reversal of Germany's fortunes brought about a backlash in the form of denunciations 
against Germans living there, as well as violence against German shops and property. 
12 Furthermore, the majority of Germans who did depart during this period were civil servants and 
members of the liberal professions, in other words, sections of society least likely to indulge in 
'Bolshevik' politics, leaving behind the more militant industrial and railway workers. 
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Bas-Rhin and the Haut-Rhin, the Moselle shows the most marked change during the 
period 1910 to 1921 in the proportion of Catholics to Protestants. The fact that, in 
1871, Protestants accounted for only 3 per cent of the population, indicates that the 
majority of Protestants living in the Moselle during the latter years of annexation were 
German immigrants. The impact of desannexion and the expulsion process on the 
Protestant community was therefore devastating. 13 Among those departing were, of 
course, numerous ministers and members of the Lutheran and Reformed Church 
hierarchies. The process of recruiting ministers to replace these departs, in order to 
continue serving the depleted Protestant community, was carried out by the Reformed 
Church in areas such as Germanophone Switzerland. Swiss ministers were appointed 
to parishes in Aigrange, Hagondange, Fontoy, and Boulay. Some were even brought 
in from France, but with limited success. The recovery period was therefore marked 
by linguistic difficulties and many communities felt isolated, their clubs and 
associations destroyed by lack of numbers and support, and their churches too large 
for their diminished numbers. The arrival of Protestant Czechs and Hungarians, as 
well as a constant flow of Protestant Alsatians, modified the situation, as did the return 
of some emigre Protestant families to Metz. However, as far as political 
representation was concerned, this small, fragmented community was to find the 
political arena dominated by Catholic political parties. Whilst during annexation 
Protestants had been traditionally liberal, many had moved towards the SPD at the end 
of the nineteenth century, precisely because it was not linked to Catholicism. 
However, by the mid-1920s, the absence of a socialist party in the Moselle had 
encouraged many of them to turn to the communists. 
13 Alfred Wahl, `Les protestants mosellans durant 1'entre-deux-guerres (1918-1939)', in Le Moigne 
and Michaux, Protestants, Messins, et Moselfans XV! e-XXe siecles, Metz, 1988, pp. 265-273. 
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Further difficulties with the statistics regarding religion in the Moselle, lie in the 
problem of establishing the numbers actively practising their religion, the impact 
religion had on their everyday lives, and, for members of the electorate, on the way 
they voted. K's diary 14 indicates a very high degree of involvement by the Catholic 
Church in the daily life of her family, but also of the entire local, Francophone 
community. Yet, Schill notes that cures posted to the mining areas to the north of the 
region (Germanophone Moselle) complained to their superiors that among the mining 
communities, they found themselves in `de veritables terres de mission'. 'S Schill's 
example, however, does not seem to reflect the general trend in the region, as Kieffer's 
evidence shows. According to him, Catholic values had a profound impact on the 
daily lives of the majority of the Moselle's population, visible in the seasonal pattern of 
marriages, unchanged in the Moselle since the eighteenth century - although this could, 
in some cases, be explained by habit, rather than by strict observance. '6 As the church 
forbade marriage during Advent (the month of December) and Lent (the month of 
March), every year, there was a sudden rush of marriages in November and February. 
Furthermore, the Catholic hierarchy had consistently held a very significant grip on the 
political life of the regions, with numerous members of the clergy standing for election 
at local, regional, and national level. Members of the clergy were also deeply involved 
in the press, but not just religious or literary publications. They were to be found at 
the head of daily newspapers, such as Le Lorrain, the leading Francophone, 
Francophile, Catholic newspaper, run by the abbe Collin, whilst clashes between 
clerical editors and journalists, due to linguistic or even national differences of opinion, 
14 See chapter six passim. 
1s Schill, Les greves, p. 239. 
16 Kieffer, L'enseignement Primaire mosellan, p. 72. 
300 
were commonplace. Even bishops involved themselves in such matters, 
enthusiastically encouraging good Catholics not to buy laic or neutral newspapers, 
which they referred to as the `mauvaise presse'. " Overall, though, as will be shown in 
later sections, voting patterns in the Moselle only reflect in a very general way the 
religious profile and behaviour of the population. It is clear that religion was neither 
the only factor, nor the most important factor, in dictating voting patterns in the 
Moselle during this period. 
Despite the major qualifications noted above, which show the electorate to be 
anything but representative of political opinions held by the entire mosellan population 
for either the 1919 or 1924 general elections, this is not to suggest that election results 
should be disregarded altogether. Although the 1919 electorate was made up largely 
of male indigenes or Mosellans de vieille souche, the emerging political parties were 
to find that there was no simple formula for winning their support, either in the form of 
simple patriotism, or by prioritising along regional lines. 
The Political Parties 
In March 1919, Mirman sent a report to the sous-secretaire d'etat a la presidence du 
conseil commenting on the transformation of the German Catholic Centre Party (the 
Zentrum), into the Union Republicaine Lorraine (URL). '8 In fact, the URL emerged 
on the right of mosellan politics, as centre and right parties in German politics melted 
away, and the Parti lorrain independant (previously the Groupe lorrain) found itself 
17 Roth, Le temps des journaux, p. 44. 
18 Report of 21 March 1919, ADBR, 121 AL 863. For the most thorough and reliable study of the 
Catholic Centre Party in Alsace and, to a lesser extent, Lorraine, see Baechler, Christian, Le Parti 
Catholique Alsacien 1890-1939. Du Reichsland a la Republique Jacobine, Paris, 1982. The Alsatian 
equivalent of the URL was the Union Populaire Republicaine d'Alsace, the UPRA. 
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suddenly free from German politics. 19 In its programme, the URL set out its desire to 
see 
Adaptation, dans un delai aussi rapproche et dans une 
mesure aussi large que possible, de nos lois ä la 
legislation franraise, en apportant ä cette fusion le 
concours d'un esprit democratique et regionaliste 
profondement devoue ä la Republique et ä ses 
institutions. 
Clearly, this final declaration of commitment to la Republique was a declaration of 
patriotism and loyalty to France, rather than to the laic republic itself. A commitment 
to complete integration into France was qualified by reference to `un esprit 
regionaliste', which was entirely at odds with the centralised Third Republic, but 
equally by several other points of the programme including the fourth which stated, 
`Maintien de nos institutions religieuses actuelles', as well as by the sixth point which 
called for, `Maintien ä 1'ecole de son caractere educateur actuel sur le terrain national, 
social et confessionnel, conformement ä nos traditions. ' 
Mirman's overall assessment of the party's programme was that it did not rule 
out the principle of separating the Church from the State in the long term, as was 
intended by republican laic laws. In fact, he was later to be proved wrong in his 
interpretation, since the party, and in particular Robert Schuman, one of its leading 
members, were to be at the centre of the struggle in 1924 against the Cartel des 
gauches' attempt to introduce the laws in the region. However, it is not in the least 
surprising that the main party in the Moselle to be formed in the aftermath of 
19 See Roth, La Lorraine annexee, p. 537, for details of the creation of the Parti lorrain independant in 
1907. See also Roth, Francois, La vie politique en Lorraine au XXe siecle, Nancy, 1985, p. 42. 
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integration should opt for a regionalist approach. After all, the population had become 
accustomed to Germany's federalist style of administration and politics. This was not, 
though, regionalism of the autonomist kind. The URL had clearly no intention of 
supporting the idea of a separate Moselle region, or of joining forces with Alsace. 
Equally, it was not surprising that this party should place the defence of religion, 
notably Catholicism, at the heart of its programme, as this group, who made up 93 per 
cent of the region's population, had everything to fear from a laic, Jacobin republic, 
and were to look to a regional party to defend them in Paris. 
The URL's election list in 1919 contained a distinctly middle class, professional 
group of Francophile, Francophone (with the exception of Schuman who spoke 
French, German, and Luxembourgish) candidates. They included the medical 
practitioner, Dr. Charles Francois who was also mayor of Delme, a small town in the 
Francophone sector of the region: Robert Schuman, a young lawyer practising in 
Metz; General de Maud'Huy, the first military governor of Metz; Louis Meyer, a 
merchant and mayor of Walscheid; the industrialist, Guy de Wendel; and Robert Serot, 
an agricultural engineer, and the son of a Metz businessman who had emigrated to 
Paris in the 1870s. The list also included the abbe Louis Hackspill, and the president 
of the Souvenir Francais, Jean-Pierre Jean. 
20 Such an array of notables instilled a 
sense of confidence in a large section of the electorate, especially in the Francophone 
sector. 
Through this newly emerged ruling class, the party's colours were plain to see: 
a loyalty to France, to the Catholic religion, and, most significantly, to the Moselle 
region. This last, regional commitment, was known as particularisme, a sense of the 
20 Jean was, by profession, a typographer. 
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region's particular identity, and was to play a central role in the URL's success in 
almost all elections in the 1920s following the party's creation. 2' However, such a 
seemingly contradictory combination of loyalties had no obvious equivalent in the 
post-war political parties of the Third Republic, and direct affiliations with parties from 
the `interior', and likewise from Alsace, were firmly rejected. It was therefore 
necessary for URL delegates elected to the Paris Chamber to ally themselves with 
existing national parties on an individual basis. Those elected to the Chamber adhered 
to the Entente Republicaine Democratique, even though, occasionally, the subject of 
forming an independent Alsace-Lorraine group was broached. As a result, the URL 
deputies were able to sit in the Bloc national government between 1919 and 1924. 
However, throughout the 1920s, this question of affiliation in Paris continued to 
exercise the minds of the elected URL candidates, as few of the national parties 
responded satisfactorily to their needs. 
Despite the unity of the central themes of the party's programme, this was a 
heterogeneous party, a `syndicat d'elus aux contours flous', as Delbreil describes it, 
marked by a large diversity of tendencies among its leading members, extending from 
the traditional right to a form of regionalist, Christian, democracy. The traditionalist 
approach was to be found in the chanoine Collin, the abbe Ritz, and Guy de Wendel. 
Serot demonstrated a more `liberal' approach. And a continuing influence from the 
German Zentrum could be detected in the abbe Hackspill, the chanoine Louis, and 
Louis Meyer. The decision to split from Alsatian 'Christian democrats' was helped 
along by the chanoine Collin, who heightened awareness of the `contrastes des 
21 Jean, Hackspill and de Maud'Huy were replaced in the 1924 URL general election lists by Edouard 
Moncelle, an engineer, the abbe Gaston Louis, and Theodore Paqu6, the mayor of St Avold. 
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caracteres et des interets alsaciens et lorrains', whilst Schuman talked of the `tutelle de 
Strasbourg'. 22 
Needless to say, there were limitations to the URL's success, possibly the 
greatest of which was language. 23 With the exception of Schuman, few among the 
party's leadership or its members were fluent in German, and therefore they were 
unable to extend the URL's success deep into the Germanophone sector of the region. 
Secondly, a series of factors during annexation had greatly reduced the indigenous 
population's ability to replenish its stock of politicians and prospective leaders. Under 
German rule, many mosellan families had sent their sons to France to join the French 
army, very few of whom returned after 1918. Although Roth shows that, by 1910, a 
new generation was finally coming of age and remaining in the region, a limited 
number of whom had benefited from the high quality university education offered in 
cities such as Strasbourg, Berlin, Bonn, and Munich, few had considered entering 
politics in order to confront German dominance in the region, preferring to work with, 
rather than against, the very powerful German regime. In fact, even by 1919, Schuman 
had not considered a career in politics, and it was only as a result of pressure from 
friends and acquaintances that he entered politics at the age of 3324 In any case, there 
were few alternatives, since German politicians had been systematically removed, many 
mosellan politicians from the German era had been discredited, and suitable indigenes 
were thin on the ground. Schuman, therefore, was a rare exception among a 
population that included various notables who had blotted their copy books before or 
22 Delbriel, Jean-Claude, `Les democrates-cretiens en Lorraine dans 1'entre-deux-guerres', in Cahiers 
Lorrain, 1987, No. 4, pp. 419-447. 
23 See Roth, Les Lorrains entre la France et l'Allemagne for an examination of continuity and 
discontinuity in the Moselle's classe des notables. 
24 Duvigneau, Marion, L'Hote, Marie-Claude, Michaux, Laurette, Robert Schuman, un Mosellan en 
politique, Metz, 1994, p. 9. 
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during the war, and were still considered at best, unreliable, and at worst, 
'collaborators' . 
25 Finally, of all the URL's representatives, many were descendants of 
Mosellan emigres, including Serot, Bompard, Stuhl, Hirschauer, and de Berthier. 
Although most of these men had spent most, or all, of their lives outwith the Moselle, 
they still claimed to be Mosellans de souche, and were generally accepted as such. 26 
But it was not until after the Second World War that the Moselle was able to supply 
truly home-grown politicians, who provided representation for the region in Paris. It 
was weaknesses such as these, which, to a certain extent, account for the party's drop 
in support in favour of the parties of opposition, notably those on the left. 
In the 1919 elections, the socialist party was the URL's main rival, although it 
had been slower to regroup in the face of the mass departure of Germans, who had 
made up much of the socialist following and leadership in the region. A branch of the 
German socialist party, the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) had first 
been set up in the Moselle in the 1890s, but had been rewarded with little support 
compared to Alsace. One reason for this had been the weakness of the trade union 
movement in the region. The socialist trade unions, in particular, had failed to recruit 
significant numbers, especially among the indigenous workforce. This was largely for 
25 An interesting example is Alexis Weber. Before the war, he had worked as a banker in his home 
town of Boulay and had been its mayor from 1896 until 1908. He was arrested in August 1914 by the 
German authorities, accused of being a revanchist friend of Jean-Pierre Jean, the founder of the 
Souvenir Franfais (papers relating to the Souvenir Francais were found in Weber's house following 
his arrest), and was imprisoned in the fort at Ehrenbreistein near Koblenz along with various other 
political suspects from the Moselle. However, by November 1914 he had managed to convince the 
Germans to allow him to return to his home town of Boulay in the Moselle region. Exactly how he 
managed this remarkable feat remains unclear. However, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France four 
years later caught Weber completely on the wrong foot, having reckoned on a German, not French, 
victory. Using possibly the same personal skills which had earned him his freedom from the Germans 
during the war, he set about re-establishing his status and credibility under the French administration, 
quickly finding a place for himself in the ranks of the URL, going on to sit on the Conseil general de 
la Moselle from 1919 until 1940. See Roth, Les Lorrains entre la France et l'Allemagne, chapter 5, 
pp. 157-207. 
26 Emigres and their descendants returning to the Moselle after 1918 in other professions and walks of 
life were, in fact, few and far between. 
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cultural reasons. The unions had been formed elsewhere in Germany, and their 
German or Alsatian leaders were unpopular among the Mosellans. Nonetheless, the 
election of Georges Weill as a socialist deputy for Metz, in the Reichstag in 1912, 
brought cries of `Metz la rouge', even though success reflected more the quality of the 
candidate, rather than the extent of support for the SPD. 
27 
Curiously, however, the French socialist movement encountered similar 
difficulties in recruiting support among the Moselle's electorate. Its socialist militants 
were all Francais de l'interieur, for whom the indigenes had as much patience as they 
had previously shown for Germans and Alsatians. So, whilst integration of the socialist 
movement into French politics should otherwise have been a relatively smooth process 
in view of the republican political system, its leadership was simply unpalatable to the 
electorate. Equally, the absence of a well structured trade union system in situ further 
hindered progress in spreading the word of French-style socialism. In the 1919 
elections, the Parti socialiste unifie blamed war and poverty on capitalists, militarists, 
and clericals, and pleaded with the public not to listen to `les sottes l6gendes de 
Revolution et de Bolchevisme. Nous ne sommes pas des bolchevistes... '. 28 
Communist influences, derived from the German Revolution of November 
1918, and to a certain extent the Russian Revolution which had been witnessed by 
significant numbers of indigenous soldiers, also left their mark on the political scene in 
the Moselle. 29 The Communist Party in the region was organised under the title of 
Alsace-Lorraine until 1935, but its mosellan section was strong, led by local, working 
class leaders such as Emile Beron, a metal worker who had been fired by the de 
27 Roth, La vie politique, p. 28. 
28 See Livet and Cabourdin, Les elections dans le department de la Moselle. 
29 See Brasme, `Le rapatriement des prisonniers', in Bulletin de liaison de l'A. N. S. V. B., 1988, pp. 140- 
147. 
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Wendels for his political activities, and Emile Frisch, a railway worker. The party was 
almost exclusively Germanophone, and maintained strong links with Germany until 
communism was destroyed under Hitler in the mid-1930s. Support was strongest 
around the industrial towns of Amneville and Hagondange, and the centres for railway 
workers at Basse-Yutz and Montigny-les-Metz. During the inter-war period in the 
Moselle's politics, the left wing, whilst somewhat heterogeneous, remained dominated 
by German culture and German influences. 
In the 1919 elections, a third group of politicians formed the Ligue 
Republicaine Francaise Lorraine. The Ligue brought together an odd mixture of 
liberal democrats, radical socialists, and supporters of republicanism with left-wing 
tendencies. Their programme began, `Electeurs lorrains! Vous n'etes plus sujets de 
1'Allemagne: vous etes des citoyens francais... '. 30 Their overall policy was to see the 
immediate integration and assimilation of the Moselle region into France. As Printz 
shows, the party was born out of laic ambitions originating from outwith the region 
rather than from within, ambitions held by those disappointed by the URL list of 
candidates. The majority of the Ligue's leadership were Nanceiens, known as `les 
gens du duc', who believed that after 47 years of German occupation, the Moselle 
should be taken in hand by a greater, French Lorraine. Not surprisingly, such a 
programme produced little electoral success in the atmosphere of integration, and the 
party did not put forward a list in the following general elections of 1924. 
In fact, the elections of 1924 saw three different groups present lists to oppose 
the URL, none of which had fought in the 1919 elections, and all of which were 
grouped under the heading Cartel des gauches. They included the Entente des 
30See Livet and Cabourdin, Les elections dans le department de la Moselle. 
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gauches, the communists, and the Union Nationale Republicaine Democratique. The 
latter's list included the editor of the newspaper the Metzer Freies Journal, Victor 
Demange31 as well as Jean-Pierre Jean who had left the URL. The main points of its 
programme indicated a desire to see decentralisation, and a simplification of the 
administrative structure in the region including `Suppression d'un regime special aux 3 
departements recouvres: les habitants de la Moselle egaux dans leurs droits et leurs 
obligations aux autres Franrais'. 
32 The changes in the nature of the opposition to the 
URL point to the major differences between the elections of 1919, and the subsequent 
elections in 1924. 
Voting patterns 
In the 1919 elections, the URL secured a place in the French Chamber for every 
candidate on its list, all with clear majorities. As table 9 shows on the next page, the 
party gained 64.2 per cent of the votes against 27.8 per cent by the socialists and a 
meagre 8 per cent by the Ligue. The result was immediately declared a victory for 
French patriotism, putting paid, once and for all, to calls for a plebiscite. The term 
`euphoria' was used to describe the atmosphere in which `the population' (or a fifth of 
it) had voted. However, the elections had gone in favour of a party whose programme 
31 According to a brief biography of Demange, held in the Archives nationales in Paris written 19 
April 1924, 'il engagea une violente campagne et une charge ä fond contre tout ce qui etait frangais et 
venant de France. Il a lutte longtemps pour le maintien de la langue allemande, campagne connue 
sous le titre de 'defense de la Muttersprache'; les Francais de I'interieur, surtout les fonctionnaires... 
le regime franrais etc. (sic. )' Demange supposedly encouraged strikes in September 1919, 'dmettant 
des idees et sentiments rdvolutionnaires, tant dans son journal que daps les reunions. ' Thereafter, 
according to the document, he ceased his attacks and lived in some degree of comfort. 'On est 
seulement dtonne de lui voir mener actuellement un train de vie somptueuse qui denote une situation 
d'aisance et de fortune qu'on ne lui connaissait pas avant. ' The French regime never liked Demange. 
Indeed, his newspaper, the Metzer Freies Journal, did not display the degree of patriotism towards 
France required by the French authorities following desannexion. The fact that the paper was in 
German condemned it from the start. In any case, it promoted an extreme form of particularisme, 
rather than a revolutionary, communist, or pro-German doctrine. CARAN, AJ/30/232. 
3' Livet and Cabourdin, Les elections dans le department de la Moselle. 
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illustrated certain key reservations about full integration into France, notably on 
questions of religion, language, and education, unlike the Ligue with its preference for 
immediate integration and assimilation. Surely a truly patriotic vote would have gone 
in favour of the Ligue? Likewise, had the euphoria not evaporated well before the 
elections, to be replaced within weeks of the signing of the armistice by a malaise 
lorrain, felt among large sections of the population? 
Table 9: Results of general elections, 16 November 1919, in the Moselle. 
Political Party Percentage of total vote 
Union Republicaine Lorraine 64.2 
Parti Socialiste Unifle 27.8 
Ligue Republicaine Lorraine Francaise 8 
In fact, the success of the URL can lead to two possible conclusions. Firstly, it 
could be said that the majority of voters accepted integration into France as either 
necessary or desirable, but only on certain levels. Acceptance of a France governed by 
a centralised, laic republic, for example, is less evident. Secondly, if the euphoria of a 
return to France had evaporated within weeks of November 1918, the sense of relief at 
being released from Germany's wartime domination was sustained during the following 
months, and carried with it certain hopes and expectations. These were to be found in 
the URL's election manifesto, which offered a future in which the region's indigenes 
would no longer play second fiddle to `outsiders', such as Germans, Alsatians, and 
Francais de l'interieur; protection for the region provided by her new sovereign 
against future threats of invasion by Germany; and respect for the promises made 
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during and immediately following the war by army generals and politicians, notably 
those concerning the safeguarding of local traditions, beliefs, and language. 
The weakness of the Ligue's vote in the 1919 elections can clearly be put down 
to its failure to take a particulariste stance, as well as its intention to push for swift, if 
not brutal, assimilation with France. Those who voted for the Ligue undoubtedly 
included any newly arrived Francais de l'interieur, in particular Lorrainers arriving 
from the other three departments of the Lorraine region. What is far more significant, 
though, is the socialist vote, which was strongest in the arrondissements of Thionville- 
ouest (37.9 per cent), Sarreguemines (35.8 per cent), and Forbach (32.8 per cent). In 
the town of Thionville itself, the socialists gained 43.5 per cent of the vote, which 
produced the only instance where the URL was pushed into second place, with only 
35.7 per cent of the vote. Clearly, the socialists were strongest in areas to the north of 
the linguistic frontier, whilst the populations of Thionville and Forbach all contained 
large numbers of industrial or mining workers. The socialist vote was weakest in 
Chateau-Salins, where it only reached 8.5 per cent. The Francophone, rural 
populations there had little need or sympathy for the left wing or the Ligue, giving 
instead a resounding victory to the URL. Equally, the socialists gained votes from the 
Protestant communities around the region, who could not entertain the idea of voting 
for the Catholic URL. 
The backdrop for the socialist vote was the period of social unrest which had 
marked the region throughout 1919, in particular in the autumn of that year, when 
numerous strikes had affected industry, mining, and the railways. 33 The November 
vote reflected not so much a unity within the indigenous workforce in their struggle to 
33 Printz, La vallee usiniere, p. 168. 
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gain favourable wage settlements and improved conditions, but rather a general sense 
of post-war malaise which was evident throughout France. Likewise, there was a 
heightened sense of awareness of communist revolutionary activity to be found in 
Europe as a whole, which may have worked for or against the socialists. As has been 
shown above, the trade union and socialist movements in the Moselle were anything 
but organised. And it has already been suggested that many among the electorate 
would have shied away from voting socialist because of the German origins of the 
movement. In the same vein, the socialists would have attracted a number of votes 
from Protestants and Jews, many of whom were Germanophone, and unlikely to vote 
for the staunchly Catholic URL. 34 Furthermore, although the region contained a very 
high percentage of practising Catholics, there were undoubtedly those for whom the 
question of a local religious statute was of little personal interest. In this way, the 
URL, although the majority party in the region, was not the party of choice for every 
indigenous voter in 1919. 
The 1924 elections followed four years of unsettled politics on a regional and 
national level. Economic crises, social unrest, taxation, criticism of the region's 
administration, reduction in the length of military service, and concerns regarding the 
crisis brewing in the Ruhr, were all issues addressed by political parties in the run up to 
the elections. Overall, though, the election was fought on the question; was the 
electorate for or against the Bloc national? Only the URL, representing the Bloc, had 
fought in the previous general election; all other parties were new to the electorate. 
There was a dramatic drop in the particulariste party's vote from 64.2 per cent to 50.8 
per cent, as table 10 shows. Although all URL candidates won seats, they all did so by 
34 See table 3, p. 42. 
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the smallest of margins. The other three parties formed a largely left-wing opposition 
group under the title of the Cartel des gauches. What was most shocking, though, for 
supporters of the right-wing URL, aside from the loss of their massive majority, was 
the size of the communist vote which was larger than that of either the UNRD or the 
Entente des gauches. The communists gained 23.2 per cent of the overall vote, and 
48.6 per cent of the left-wing vote. The geographical pattern of strength for the 
communists was similar to that of the socialists in the previous elections. The 
arrondissements of Thionville (33.1 per cent of the total vote), Sarreguemines (28.6 
per cent), and Forbach (27.8 per cent) were where communist support was strongest. 
The railway workers of Montigny-16s-Metz helped to increase the success of the left 
wing parties in the arrondissement of Metz-Ville, to the detriment of the URL. And 
again, the left-wing vote was weakest in Chateau-Salins, where the URL won 69 per 
cent of the votes. 
Table 10: Results of general elections, 11 May 1924, in the Moselle. 
Political Party Percentage of total vote 
Union Republicaine Lorraine 
Liste Communiste 
50.8 
23.2 
Union Nationale Republicaine Democratique 17.8 
Entente des Gauches 1.8 
So, why did the URL lose so much support between 1919 and 1924 to the 
benefit of the left-wing parties? Firstly, the change in the actual number of votes cast 
in favour of the URL dropped between 1919 and 1924 by only 4,075 votes, or by 6.6 
per cent. This was disappointing, in view of the increase in the size of the electorate, 
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an increase of roughly 20,000,35 especially as many of those gaining the right to vote 
were Franpais de l'interieur, who might have been persuaded to support the URL in 
the face of the threat posed by the communists. 
36 However, several thousand of them 
were also German immigrants who had been successful in their bids for naturalisation. 
It is highly unlikely that many of these newly enfranchised voters would have favoured 
the URL, despite the fact that many of them were married to indigenes. As with the 
socialists in the 1919 elections, the communists appear to have gained support from 
the Protestant community, who were again motivated less by ideological reasons than 
by a dislike for the URL. But was the move away from the URL indicative of a move 
away from particularisme? In fact, only the Entente des gauches specifically rejected 
the idea of a religious statute for the region, promoting in its programme the 
introduction of the laic laws, 37 whilst the communists continued to support certain 
regional, versus national, issues, notably the linguistic question, whilst keeping quiet 
about religion. 38 
Undoubtedly, the URL lost votes between 1919 and 1924 to the UNRD. Jean- 
Pierre Jean, formerly an elected candidate of the URL, and Victor Demange, were 
among those on the latter's list who may have attracted former URL supporters. 
Upon reflection, such men might have possibly found the party too bourgeois, 
Francophone, right-wing. Both won the largest number of votes for the UNRD, 
3s The electorate rose from 116,409 in 1919 to 137,701 in 1924. The number of votes cast rose from 
96,971 in 1919 to 116,409 in 1924. 
36 Likewise, there was no equivalent to the Ligue's list presented in the 1924 elections which meant 
the choice for the Franfais de l'interieur was fairly restricted. 
37 Printz, La vallee usiniere, p. 171. 
38 Particularly in Alsace, the communists lent their support to the autonomists. See Samuel 
Goodfellow, `From Communism to Nazism', JCH, Vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 231-258, April 1992. 
Goodfellow suggests that Alsatian autonomists borrowed support for regional issues in the late 1920s 
from the communists before turning to the Nazis in the 1930s, producing a number of crudely named 
'Beefsteak Nazis' - Nazis in brown uniforms who had once been red communists. 
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compared to others on the party's list. Demange's newspaper, the Metzer Freies 
Journal, which was branded by the new administration `1'organe radical de Metz', 
survived the initial witch-hunt and enjoyed a wide readership among indigenous 
workers in Germanophone and industrial areas, as well as the suburbs of Metz 
39 The 
paper reflected Demange's awareness of the frustrations affecting his readers in the 
early 1920s, in the light of integration into France. The least successful party of the 
1924 elections was the Entente des gauches, which polled 1.8 per cent of the 
votes, again following the geographical pattern of the socialists during the 1919 
elections. 
Whether or not the URL lost votes directly to the communists is not clear, and 
although it should not be ruled out, is unlikely. The fact that there was no Communist 
Party at the 1919 elections (the French Parti Communiste was formed at the end of 
1920), distorts the picture somewhat. Likewise, the absence in 1924 of a specifically 
socialist party (of the type many had become accustomed to during annexation, in the 
form of the SPD) had its impact, drawing some hitherto socialist voters to support the 
communists 40 This change might have made the communist vote appear more 
extremist than it actually was. The increasing organisation of workers followed the 
initial period of post-war disruption right up to the Congres de Tours (which saw the 
split between socialists and communists) allowing better dissemination of propaganda. 
Additionally, the failure of the Bloc national to resolve social issues on a regional and 
national level, the representation of the patronat on the URL electoral lists (notably 
Guy de Wendel), might all have sent some voters in search of an alternative to the left 
39 Roth, Le temps des journaux, p. 214. 
40 This is the interpretation of the commissaire special de Sarreguemines in his report of 13 May 
1924. CARAN, AJ/30/232. However, the opposite had been the case in 1919 when communists may 
have been forced to vote for the socialists in the absence of a communist list. 
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of the URL. However, the existence of protest voters does not automatically imply 
that the communists were the direct beneficiaries. What is undoubtedly clear is that 
the relative success of the communists in the 1924 elections sent a shock wave through 
the Moselle's Francophone middle classes. Concerns about integration into France, 
the suppression of the commissariat general, the intricacies of rebuilding departmental 
status in the Lorraine region as a whole, all paled in the face of the perceived 
revolutionary threat, which was seemingly confirmed by the election results. In fact, 
the communists were not as organised as a fearful bourgeoisie thought. Neither did 
the communists enjoy a stable following. And although they went on to see some 
electoral success in the general elections of 1928, when one of their candidates was 
elected to the Chamber, this had more to do with discontent with the administration of 
the region, as well as social issues, rather than ideological motivation 4' The Moselle's 
communist movement remained, throughout the period, very German in character, 
which cramped its potential in terms of electoral and geographical success. 42 
Although the URL candidates managed to be re-elected in 1924, the Cartel des 
gauches successfully ousted the Bloc national in the rest of France, bringing to an end 
the Union sacree and the Chambre bleu horizon. However, it was one of the 
consequences of the Cartel des gauches' electoral success which was to create the 
biggest moral and political crisis in the Moselle since integration itself. 
41 Diwo, Le communisme en Moselle, p. 136. 
42 Roth, La vie politique, p. 138. 
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The crisis of the laic laws 
Upon his becoming premier at the head of the Cartel des gauches, Herriot lost no time 
in setting out his plans for the returned provinces, and announced them in his 
ministerial declaration of 17 June 1924. 
Le gouvernement est persuade qu'il interpretera 
fidelement le voeu des chores populations enfin rendues ä 
la France, en hätant la venue du jour oü seront effacees 
les derrieres differences de legislation entre les 
departements recouvres et l'ensemble du territoire de la 
R6publique. Dans cette we, il realisera la suppression 
du commissariat general et preparera les mesures qui 
permettront, en respectant les situations acquises, en 
menageant les interets materiels et moraux de la 
population, d'introduire en Alsace et en Lorraine 
1'ensemble de la legislation republicaine. 43 
According to Baechler, with the arrival in power of the Cartel des gauches and the 
announcement of the introduction of the laic laws in Alsace and Lorraine, `les 
conditions politiques sont totalement transformees'. 44 Herriot's policy to tighten up 
the application of republican laic laws throughout France, as well as accelerating 
measures which had already been put in place by the outgoing Bloc national 
government, brought an immediate and noisy response, emanating from the returned 
provinces. They were concerned, above all else, about losing the concordatory 
43 Quoted in Kieffer, L'enseignement primaire mosellan, p. 75. 
44 Baechler, Le parti catholique alsacien, p. 427. 
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regime. 45 Throughout the Moselle and Alsace, politicians, political leaders, and 
newspapers and publications expressed the depth of feeling among the populations. 
On 6 July 1924, a march was organised in Bitche to protest against the government's 
plans, and, on the same day, the women's branch of the Action Catholique Lorraine 
adopted a hostile stance to the introduction of laic laws in the region, stating they 
represented, `une atteinte aux droits formels de Dieu et de 1'Eglise' 46 
According to Printz, in the Moselle, only the Entente des gauches (with 1.8 per 
cent of the total vote) had openly declared itself in favour of applying the laic laws. 47 
Yet the Cartel des gauches leadership chose to interpret the May elections differently, 
believing that all those who had voted for the communists, the UNRD, as well as the 
Entente supported laicism. It is not clear whether this resulted from wishful thinking 
on the part of Herriot and his government, or ineptitude. Had the electorate been 
aware of the imminent danger to their religious statute, the URL might not have seen 
quite so many protest votes drift away in favour of the other parties. 
It is thanks to Robert Schuman that a much clearer picture emerges of the 
extent of feeling in the aftermath of Herriot's announcement. A practising Catholic, 
Schuman, acting as the spokesperson for the 21 elected Mosellan and Alsatian 
deputies, called for a referendum to be held in the provinces which would establish 
whether individuals were for or against the introduction of French republican 
legislation. At first glance, what is surprising about this referendum is that women 
were allowed to participate. However, Schuman and the architects of this public 
consultation were entirely aware of the strength of feeling to be found among women 
on the subject of religion, and the results of the exercise were to bear this out. In the 
°S Becker and Berstein, Victoire et Frustrations, p. 262. 
46 Kieffer, L'enseignement primaire mosellan, p. 76. 
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end, the referendum took the form of a petition signed by 196,726 signatories in the 
Moselle, among them 88,726 men and 108,000 women. 48 In the two Alsatian 
departments, a similar pattern emerged. 49 The response was clearly enthusiastic, 
although it is disappointing that there are no details concerning how the signatures 
were gathered, or the geographical distribution of the signatories. 
Despite the impressive number of signatures on Schuman's petition, Alapetite 
suggested in a report to the French Prime Minister that, 'd'une facon gen6rale, 
l'agitation est plus vive en Alsace qu'en Lorraine, et plus active dans les campagnes 
que dans les grandes villes. '50 Likewise, according to an extract from the Strasbourg 
despatch sent to the British Foreign Office on July 1924, its author believed the 
Moselle's representatives such as the Bishop of Metz, Mgr Pelt, to be `less energetic' 
with regard to the protest against the introduction of laic laws. " The report 
continued, `the clerical journal Le Lorrain, (June 27th) begins an article with the 
words: "En Alsace, le projet tendant 4 introduire les lois läiques dans les trois 
departements recouvres, souleve de vehementes protestations" - as if Lorraine were 
less perturbed'. Clearly, the imminent suppression of the commissariat general which 
was envisaged alongside the introduction of the laic laws, and which would separate 
the Moselle from Alsace once and for all, acted as a form of compensation for some 
who were less concerned about religion. However, there is little evidence to suggest 
that the Moselle's population was any less intractable on the subject of the local 
religious statute than the Alsatian population. If, as a later report sent to the British 
47 Printz, La vallee usiniere, p. 171. 
°B Defensor (abbe Nicolay), Elsaß-Lothringen im Kampfe um seine religiosen Einrichtungen, 
(Schwerdorff, 1926), p. 28. 
49 Ibid. In Bas-Rhin, 81,619 men and 99,993 women signed. In Haut-Rhin, 83,502 men and 108,201 
women. 
50 CARAN, AJ/30/207. Report of 11 July 1924. 
`' PRO, FO 371/10545. Report from Lord Crewe, 9 July 1924. 
319 
Foreign Office suggests, neither Protestants nor Jews in the provinces shared the 
Catholic community's determination to save the concordat, S2 then this puts both 
Alapetite's and the Strasbourg despatch's assumptions in a different light as the 
Moselle region contained a much higher proportion of Catholics in its population (92.4 
per cent) compared to the Haut-Rhin (86 per cent), and the Bas-Rhin (61.9 per cent). 53 
Equally, Schuman's efforts on behalf of the URL, as well as the three departments' 
elected deputies, indicate that the Moselle's politicians were, if anything, more 
involved in protecting the special religious statute of the provinces, than their Alsatian 
counterparts. 
Clearly, common interests between the Moselle and Alsace did not produce a 
united front. For example, according to Kieffer, when, on 16 March 1925, Alsatian 
Catholics succeeded in organising, with minimal success, a strike in the region's 
schools, `la Moselle ne bougea pas'. 54 Kieffer goes on to describe how members of the 
URL, in their participation in the protest movement against the introduction of laic 
laws, `garderent tout au long de la crise une attitude de fermetd courtoise vis-ä-vis du 
gouvernement Herriot'. ss Indeed, the manner of involvement of the URL deputies in 
the protest movement was not always to the satisfaction of all sections of society, and 
the mayor of Sarreguemines, Henri Nominr, was an example of one in favour of more 
extreme action. The Moselle's elected and religious leaders may indeed have appeared 
less aggressive in their efforts to defend the local religious statute. However, whether 
due to their collective efforts, or to a fervour claimed to be entirely Alsatian, the 
52 PRO, FO 371/10545. Report from Lord Crewe, 11 September 1924. In 1926 Protestants made up 
4.8 percent of the population and Jews 1.1 percent. 
s' Although such statistics do not indicate the numbers of Catholics who actually practiced their 
religion, the general evidence suggests that such a figure would have been extremely high in the 
Moselle. 
54 Kieffer, p. 77. 
15 Kieffer, p. 78. 
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introduction of laic laws to the Moselle and Alsace was abandoned, followed by the 
fall of the Herriot government, and the announcement by Painleve on 21 April 1925, 
`1'assimilation legislative ne saurait etre poursuivie qu'entouree de tour les conseils 
qualifies, dans le respect des droits acquis, dann le souci d'entente generale et d'unite 
nationale'. And a year after the first protest marches began against Herriot's 
government, a crowd of 12,000 assembled at a school in Metz to mark the 
anniversary. 56 Overall, though, the difference of approach between the Moselle and 
Alsace is indicative of a far wider difference of opinion, which was to dominate the 
regions' politics for the remainder of the 1920s, and was to manifest itself in the form 
of the autonomist movement. 
Autonomisme versus particularisme 
The origins of the Alsatian and mosellan autonomy movement are to be found in the 
period of annexation, when, out of the politics of protestation (the protest movement 
which opposed the initial annexation by Germany of the provinces in 1871), a desire 
for an increase in power over the regions' affairs was born among indigenous Alsatians 
and Mosellans. Before the war, an Alsatian called Rene Ley, a member of a group of 
Alsace-Lorrainer autonomists, was arrested and imprisoned by the Germans for 
expressing his autonomist sentiments. However, following the war, he was equally 
unpopular with the French administration. For France and Germany alike, autonomism 
of the kind adhered to by Ley, was regarded as dangerous, anti-nationalistic, and 
unpatriotic. The autonomist movement was, in fact, the product of the extremely 
nationalist approach of these two countries. Ley's proposed programme, which was 
56 Kieffer, p. 79. Kieffer points out that the administration's own commissaire special estimated the 
crowd to contain only 6,000. It was his duty, after all, to play down any continuing action against the 
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set out in an article in a Swiss newspaper and translated by the British Foreign Office, 
included the following points: no French officials in Alsace-Lorraine; a clear distinction 
between citizenship of France and of Alsace-Lorraine; no military service in the French 
army, and the creation of a militia in Alsace-Lorraine; an independent government in 
Strasbourg, and an ambassador in Paris and a Governor selected from the indigenous 
population s' Ley's programme was undoubtedly at the extreme end of the 
autonomist scale. Other, more moderate autonomists, were willing to remain part of 
the French nation, whilst accepting a high degree of regional autonomy. 
Although Ley's programme made no mention of the role of Germany in an 
independent Alsace-Lorraine, few underestimated the extent of financial support 
Germany was lending, if not to Ley and his compatriots, then to other autonomists in 
Alsace, such as the banker Emile Pinck (brother of abbe Louis Pinck of Hambach), 
Jean Keppi, as well as the abbe Xavier Haegy. 58 Germany was willing to support any 
political movement which could weaken the French grip on the provinces. The boot 
was on the other foot, and revanchism was now to be found in Germany, not France. s9 
However, funds which were sent to Alsatian autonomists have been hard to trace back 
to the German government itself. 
The Moselle's autonomist movement was almost exclusively dependent on 
Alsatians for support, initiative, and money. 60 Yet there was little contact between the 
introduction of the laic laws. 
57 PRO, FO 371/3748. Memorandum of 10 May 1919. 
58 See Baechler, Le pani catholique alsacien, pp. 591-594, for an indepth biography of this moderate 
autonomist. 
59 Many regard the Wissenschaftliches Institut der Elsaß-Lothringer im Reich, based in Frankfurt, as 
the nerve centre of German revanchism where academics and former civil servants of Alsace and the 
Moselle prepared and published studies illustrating Germany's right to sovereignty of the provinces, 
for example, Georg Wolfram, Das Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen 1871-1918, Frankfurt-am-Main, 
1931-1938, four volumes. 
60 Metzger, 'Relations entre autonomistes lorrains et alsaciens', in Actes du 103e Congri s Nationale 
des Societes Savantes Nancy-Metz, Paris, 1979, pp. 155-170. See also Roth, Le temps des journaux, 
p. 179. 
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leaders of the movement in Strasbourg, and those struggling to build up support in the 
Moselle. The example of Jean Dumser, one of the few, prominent Mosellan 
autonomists originally from the Pays Bitche, bears this out. In his memoirs, he 
described how, when he approached the abbe Haegy in order to offer his support to 
the Alsatian movement, he was told, `Avec cela, vous etes Lorrain et ici il faut que 
nous prenions avant tout les notres'. 61 The Alsatian autonomist movement had always 
functioned under the title of `Alsace-Lorraine', thereby including the Moselle region in 
all its endeavours and proposals for regional independence or separation. Yet, in view 
of the weakness of support in the Moselle, it is not clear why they did this. Dumser, 
who went on to form the Lothringer Volksbund in Metz and bought the newspaper Le 
Sarregueminois as a propaganda tool, used funds traced back to the Alsatian 
autonomists 62 However, according to Metzger, most of Dumser's projects failed due 
to the inertia and indifference of the Mosellans, as well as the successful counter- 
propaganda of the government, and the Francophile population and its representatives. 
Whilst Herriot's efforts in the region led to the downfall of his government, 
they also gave a boost to support for the autonomists in both Alsace and the Moselle, 
and the publication of the Heimatbund manifesto in 1926 was a key moment in the 
autonomist movement. The manifesto was deeply critical of the French for their 
broken promises, and particularly their failure to treat the returned provinces with 
respect. It was signed by a total of 75 Alsatians from the Bas-Rhin and the Haut-Rhin, 
and 27 Mosellans, a significant achievement in view of Dumser's failures in the 
preceding years. However, whilst this event took the Alsatian movement from 
61 Quoted in Metzger, 'Relations entre autonomistes lorrains et alsaciens', in Actes du 103e Congres 
Nationale des SocietEs Savantes Nancy-Metz, Paris, 1979, pp. 155-170. See also Roth, Le temps des 
journaux, p. 162. 
62 Roth, Le temps des journaux, p. 179. 
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strength to strength, leading to well publicised clashes with the government in the late 
1920s, the movement in the Moselle ran out of steam, leaving a few `hot spots' in 
Germanophone areas around Forbach, Sarreguemines, Sarrebourg, Bitche, and, to a 
lesser extent, Thionville. Support was strongest among the rural middle classes in 
these areas. This support illustrates the concerns of the Germanophone populations 
compared to that of Francophone populations who were happier with the status quo. 
Middle class support can almost certainly be put down to the feeling that opportunities 
had been lost as a result of the French administration's linguistic policy in the region. 
Equally, the economic drawbacks of integration may have hit hardest in these areas. 
Even before the Heimatbund manifesto had been published, the particulariste URL 
had distanced itself from the autonomist movement, its members voting for a motion in 
October 1925 against autonomism, deeming it unpatriotic, anti-nationalist, and 
unconstitutional. 63 
The evidence presented here suggests that the autonomist movement in the 
Moselle was largely unsuccessful due to a lack of leadership, unity, and popular 
support. However, this lack of success was not for want of a sense of grievance. For 
example, in 1922, a school teacher of French origin working in the small village of 
Schweyen near Sarreguemines neglected to teach religion to his class. He was 
physically attacked by three local inhabitants, including the priest 
64 The failure of 
autonomism to develop significantly in the Moselle, though, stemmed from a variety of 
factors, including a distrust of Alsace65, a total lack of support for the movement 
63 Delbriel, 'Les democrates-cr&iens en Lorraine', in Les Cahiers Lorrain, No. 4 December 1987, 
pp"419-447, p. 442. 
64 Metzger, 'Relations entre autonomistes lorrains et alsaciens', in Actes du 103e Congres Nationale 
des Sociftes Savantes Nancy-Metz, Paris, 1979, pp. 155-170. See also Roth, Le temps des journaux, 
p. 158. 
65 It is not surprising that support for the autonomist movement was strongest in the areas 
surrounding Sarreguemines, Bitche, and Sarrebourg, in other words, the areas closest to Alsace 
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among the Francophone populations, and, according to Roth, a slower cultural and 
social evolution of the region. 66 Just as important in repelling Mosellans from the 
movement, though, was its German influence. In the same way as the `taint' of 
German origins on the socialist and trade union movement before the war were 
responsible for their failure to win popular support in the Moselle, the autonomists, for 
the same reasons, were hindered in their efforts to win widespread popularity. As long 
as autonomism implied even a hint of a return to German sovereignty, such as the use 
of the title Alsace-Lorraine, Elsaß-Lothringen implied, the majority of the Moselle's 
population would reject it out of hand. Why, though, was the same not the case in 
Alsace? Surely Alsace had also suffered at the hands of the Germans? Again, the 
contrasting experience of annexation, especially with regard to movements of 
population, as well as the greater cultural affinity of the Alsatian people to Germany, 
played their part in dictating attitudes towards the former sovereign. Although the 
Germanophone populations of the Moselle had not suffered the humiliation of 
linguistic and cultural oppression to the same extent as the Francophone populations, 
they had still become third class citizens, ranking below Germans and Alsatians, and so 
the same animosity had developed as a result. A closing of ranks occurred among the 
Moselle's population in the aftermath of desannexion, which largely shut out Germans 
and Alsatians, as well as Francais de 1'interieur and fellow Lorrainers, from the three 
other departments of the region, as the formation of political parties in 1919 shows. 
There was little chance, therefore, that an Alsatian autonomist movement, which 
purported to defend the rights of `Lorraine' or Lothringen, would ever gain 
bossue, the northern tip of the Bas-Rhin. Here, many (though not all) Germanophone Mosellans had 
far more in common with Alsatians than with Messins or Francophone Mosellans. Equally, in these 
areas, the particulariste URL vote was weakest whilst left-wing parties enjoyed relative success. 
" Presumably Roth is referring to the Moselle's slowness to overcome linguistic and cultural 
inconsistencies in the region and to create a distinctly mosellan identity. 
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widespread support in the Moselle. The movement implied too obviously a reassertion 
of Alsatian hegemony. The desire to escape the smothering effect of Alsatian, as well 
as German, culture, was far greater than the desire to see regional autonomy granted 
to the provinces. In any case, from the earliest stages of integration into France, 
Mosellans had believed the future success of their economy lay with France, not 
Germany. 
However, there is evidence that many individuals in the Moselle found certain 
aspects of autonomism appealing - such as the chance to retain control over issues of 
regional importance, and the curbing of decision-making from the national `centre' - 
even if this did not translate into open support for the movement. Well-respected and 
trusted figures, who adhered to autonomist politics, often attracted, through the power 
of their position and personality, support from the communities around them, for 
example, mayors, notables, and clergymen such as the abbe Louis Pinck, who was as 
much for autonomism as he was for the protection of local traditions and culture, 
something which can be seen through his work as a renowned folklorist. In fact, in 
place of autonomisme, particularisme developed as the necessary mosellan defence, 
not simply against France, but against the dominance of Alsace in purely mosellan 
affairs. 
In the Moselle, particularisme evolved to the extent that those political parties 
which did not openly subscribe to it, such as the Ligue and the Entente des gauches, 
experienced electoral disasters. Particularisme can be traced back to the 1870s when 
a candidate for elections to the regional council defined his idea of an 'dlu local lorrain' 
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as an `indigene' of the region, who should not `subir l'humiliation d'etre represente par 
un etranger' 67 Autonomism was born of the very same sentiment, it differed only 
from particulariste politics in the solutions it sought to the problem. The URL, the 
party of particularisme in the post-war period, sought a middle road between total 
domination by, and separation from, the national government. It sought to protect the 
region's fragile identity, and with it the traditions of the population, whilst, as the 
autonomists would see it, collaborating with the enemy in other areas: for example, the 
suppression of the commissariat general. Particulariste politics, therefore, were not 
such a distant relative of autonomist politics. Indeed, particularistes sought regional 
autonomy with regard to certain key issues: religion, education, language, and, to a 
lesser extent, social legislation. Assimilation with France on all other levels was 
acceptable, either out of necessity or patriotism. Which of these factors applied, 
depended upon the sentiments of the individual. To say that particularisme in the 
Moselle was a milder, less enthusiastic, political movement is firstly, to underestimate 
the depth of feeling among the Moselle's particularistes, and secondly, to overestimate 
the support for autonomism in Alsace. In any case, particularisme was almost entirely 
successful. Autonomism was not. 
Concluding remarks 
The extent to which the malaise lorrain dictated the pace of post-war politics in the 
Moselle can clearly be seen in the success of particulariste politics. The URL stood 
for the kind of regionalism which brought broad support from the region's admittedly 
small electorate. Equally, those parties which gained from the drop in URL support 
between 1919 and 1924, notably the communists, were obliged to take up regional 
67 Roth, La Lorraine annexee, pp. 180-182. 
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issues associated with the malaise, issues concerning language, education, religion, and 
local legislation, in order to make progress. Of similar importance in the Moselle's 
inter-war politics, was the continued distancing of the region from its neighbour 
Alsace. The creation of strictly mosellan parties, as well as the cool reception awarded 
to the Alsatian based autonomist movement, are all indicative of the indigenous 
population's desire to shake off the joug alsacien, make a fresh start, and fight its own 
battles in the French context. That fresh start was possible in some respects due to the 
mass clear-out of Germans, and German `collaborators', from the Moselle's 
administration and politics, making way for the likes of Robert Schuman, whose 
glorious career in European politics had its humble beginnings in Thionville-Est in 
1919. The arrival of emigres and their descendants in politics was viewed largely as 
inevitable, because of the need for a new French hierarchy. Yet there were some 
threads of continuity in the region's political arena, though perhaps not as many as can 
be found in Alsace during the same period. Ultimately, though, the politics of the 
Moselle featured a certain pragmatism, an attitude which was not so evident amongst 
its more excitable neighbours in Alsace. 
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Summary 
In 1919, the size of the Moselle's electorate, as a proportion of the total adult 
population, was remarkably small. It was greatly reduced by the exclusion of all 
German immigrants and foreigners in the region, but also by the continuing 
disenfranchisement of women, as in France as a whole. Election results, therefore, as a 
means of establishing sentiment or `public opinion', must be used with caution. The 
first elections, in November 1919, were hailed as a `plebiscite' in favour of French 
sovereignty. However, voters did not elect the party of assimilation, the Ligue 
Republicaine Lorraine Francaise. Instead, they voted in large numbers for the Union 
Republicaine Lorraine (URL), a party which took a particulariste stance on issues 
concerning language, religion, education, and social legislation, but was assimilation ist 
on all other levels. In the following elections, support for the URL slipped in favour of 
a new set of opposition parties on the left, in particular, the communist list. The 
success of the left in 1924 can be put down to a general sense of disillusionment with 
the Bloc national, to which the URL deputies had allied themselves, and to social and 
economic dissatisfaction as a result of regional and national factors, rather than to 
widespread ideological support for the communists. The announcement by the Cartel 
des gauches of the introduction of republican legislation in the returned provinces and 
the application of the laic laws resulted in an outcry from the regions. The 
overwhelming rejection of Herriot's plans in the Moselle, and elsewhere, forced him to 
back down and ultimately brought the downfall of the Cartel des gauches government. 
The crisis strengthened particulariste sentiment in the Moselle and briefly caused an 
upturn in interest in autonomism. However, overall, the Alsatian and German origins 
of the movement were responsible for the broad rejection of autonomism in the 
Moselle region throughout the inter-war period. 
Conclusion 
The centre of Metz today still retains traces of the dramatic historical events which 
unfolded at the end of the First World War. The clean-shaven statue of St Daniel still 
looks down upon visitors entering the Cathedrale St Etienne. Further along the 
cathedral wall is the plaque, celebrating Foch's delight on 26 November 1918 at seeing 
French troops enter the Place d'Armes, where only days before the revolutionaries had 
triumphantly flown the red flag from the Hotel de ville. A short walk through the now 
pedestrian streets, where K and her companions witnessed the looting of German 
owned shops and stores, is the `German quarter'. These streets, whose construction 
began under German architects, and was completed in the inter-war period by their 
French replacements, lead to Avenue Marechal Foch, once Kaiser Wilhelm-Ring. 
From there, the station can be reached, its imposing structure symbolic of the German 
desire to impose German culture and identity on the region and its indigenous 
population. It was from this station that the majority of the region's German expulses 
and rapatries departed once French epuration procedures had begun, many of them 
returning twenty years later as the second German annexation gripped the region. 
From Metz station today, the historian, curious to follow up the inter-war 
history of the Moselle, could choose a number of different destinations. Towards 
Thionville to the north, in the industrial and mining valleys, Baudin's 'gigantisme' no 
longer reigns, although the landscape still bears the scars. To the east of the Moselle 
towards St Avoid, Sarreguemines, and Bitche, the use of local dialects has survived, 
despite the best efforts of the methode directe. To the south east, Alsace is reached 
through the Vosges mountains where a milder form of the inter-war antagonism 
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between Mosellans and Alsatians can still be detected. Likewise, a journey into the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle and to Nancy further illustrates how such long-standing rivalries 
survive through the generations. The struggle for the title of capitale de fest has 
undoubtedly been won by Strasbourg, which now houses the Council of Europe. 
However, Metz has gained the title of administrative capital of Lorraine with the Hotel 
de region, nestled among the city's other municipal buildings. Finally, the historian 
could choose to travel west, to Paris, along the railway line which, in 1931, first linked 
the Gare de I'Est directly to the `German' station in Metz. Relations with Paris and la 
mere patrie are now strong. Yet, the local statute, defined in the 1920s, lives on, more 
or less intact, into the 1990s. Meanwhile, the Moselle and its people still insist it is the 
rest of France which should fall in line with their Bismarckian social legislation, not 
vice versa. 
* 
This thesis was started with the idea of working on the history of both Alsace and the 
Moselle in the inter-war period. When it became evident that much of the existing 
literature was, in practice, focused on Alsace and that the particularities of the history 
of the Moselle in this period had not been adequately analysed, the Moselle became the 
principal subject for investigation. The research presented above has sought to 
demonstrate, mainly from primary sources, the distinctive nature of the region's 
experience. Indeed, some of the history is paralleled in Alsace, but, upon closer 
examination, much is found to be different. From this, therefore, a number of 
conclusions and findings can be identified. 
It is clear the malaise lorrain resulted from a number of diverse causes: often 
the periphery was eclipsed by the immediate needs of the centre; leadership was 
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problematic, as can be seen in Mirman's tactlessness and in the premature departure of 
Millerand; and the methods of francisation succeeded in alienating many members of 
the indigenous population, rather than creating a sense of belonging within la mere 
patrie. If the malaise was at all inevitable, it was because of heightened expectations 
on both sides. French public opinion expected to find an essentially French population 
in the `liberated' provinces. In return, indigenes expected tolerance and acceptance of 
their particularismes from French public opinion. In the end, the French government 
succeeded in satisfying neither. 
The extent to which a chasm opened up between the rhetoric of both German 
and French nationalisms and the everyday reality of individuals' lives, is much in 
evidence. National identity is seen here at its most rigid in the minds of politicians, 
military personnel, and civil servants, but also at its most flexible, in the minds of 
individuals and in the context of their daily lives. In 1918, according to French policy, 
turning Mosellans into Frenchmen and women, could be achieved abruptly upon the 
application of francisation. Yet, the French were subscribing to a definition of identity 
which Eugen Weber describes as `rigid, hence too brittle'. ' Reality showed how 
selective individuals were as they accepted certain symbols of French patriotism and 
nationalism (the victory parades, the celebratory marches, the tricolore propaganda) 
and rejected others (the application of French republican legislation, most notably the 
laic laws, and the introduction of the French language). 
Ultimately, there was no `grand scheme' for the integration of the Moselle into 
France. Contrary to the impression created by the impressive array of wartime 
committees, conferences, and study groups, French administrators, just like their 
1 Weber, Eugen, Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914, London, 
1979, p. 113. 
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superiors in Paris, were, quite literally, obliged to make things up as they went along. 
They responded to immediate crises and broadly ignored the carefully considered 
conclusions of the likes of the Conference d'Alsace-Lorraine. Successive 
governments all shared the same aim in the returned provinces. They all wished to see 
the complete assimilation of the Moselle and Alsace into la mere patrie. It was only in 
their muddled efforts to achieve this that they differed. 
In the 1920s, the Moselle had to be reassembled after the second demographic 
rupture in fifty years. It literally had to be `put back together again' as epuration 
swept out the region's professional, administrative, and political notables, most of 
whom were German. The extent to which this process brought about a break in 
continuity was greater for the Moselle than it was for Alsace as the movements of 
population were more significant for the former. This was partially rectified by the 
arrival of replacements from the French interior, including the so-called Francais de 
1'interieur, but also a limited number of emigres and their descendants. There were 
also those who, although initially regarded with suspicion by the new authorities 
because of their dealings with the outgoing German administration, succeeded in re- 
establishing themselves in the revised circumstances. Alexis Weber was one of many 
who fell into this category. 
The final, and perhaps most disturbing finding is the scope and character of the 
francisation policy. I have hesitated to use the term ethnic cleansing, yet the 
documentation from the period clearly refers to epuration and to the sweeping 
measures employed to bring about the removal of all ethnic Germans from the 
province. The delicacy and sensitivity of this issue is largely responsible for the 
absence of any kind of serious, public debate. However, as a foreigner in the region, 
unconnected to either French or German versions of events, it has been possible for me 
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to explore this issue, as well as the whole topic of integration, from a non-partisan 
perspective. This `vue de 1'etranger', coupled with access to private documents and 
material pertaining to the lives of one family and one community, will hopefully 
provide the starting point for a debate on the inter-war history of the Moselle. This 
debate is now long overdue. 
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Appendix I 
Selection of place names in the Moselle with French and German equivalents in 
Germanophone sector: 
French German 
Amneville Stahlheim' 
Boulay Bolchen 
Hagondange Hagendingen 
Hambach Waldhambach 
Knutange Kneuttingen 
Sarreguemines Saargemiind 
Thionville Diedenhofen 
Selection of place names in the Moselle with French and German equivalents in 
Francophone sector from September 1914: 
2 
Jouy-aux-Arches Gaudach 
Scy Sigach 
Coin-16s-Cuvry Kubemach 
Stahlheim, an industrial town to the north of Metz, had not existed before annexation and emerged 
as a result of industrial development. Upon the region's return to France in 1918, the French named 
it Amneville. 
2 Roth, La Lorraine annexee, p. 604. 
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Appendix II 
The Treaty of Versailles 
28 June 1919 
ANNEX. to ARTICLE 79 
1. As from November 11,1918, the following persons are ipso facto reinstated in 
French nationality: 
(1) Persons who lost French nationality by the application of the Franco-German 
Treaty of May 10,1871, and who have not since that date acquired any nationality 
other than German; 
(2) The legitimate or natural descendants of the persons referred to in the immediately 
preceding paragraph, with the exception of those whose ascendants in the paternal line 
include a German who migrated into Alsace-Lorraine after July 15,1870; 
(3) All persons born in Alsace-Lorraine of unknown parents, or whose nationality is 
unknown. 
2. Within the period of one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty, 
persons included in any of the following categories may claim French nationality: 
(1) All persons not restored to French nationality under paragraph I above, whose 
ascendants include a Frenchman or Frenchwoman who lost French nationality under 
the conditions referred to in the said paragraph; 
(2) All foreigners, not nationals of a German State, who acquired the status of a 
citizen of Alsace-Lorraine before August 3,1914; 
(3) All Germans domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine, if they have been so domiciled since a 
date previous to July 15,1870, or if one of their ascendants was at that date domiciled 
in Alsace-Lorraine; 
(4) All Germans born or domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine who have served in the Allied 
or Associated armies during the present war, and their descendants; 
(5) All persons born in Alsace-Lorraine before May 10,1871, of foreign parents, and 
the descendants of such persons; 
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(6) The husband or wife of any person whose French nationality may have been 
restored under paragraph 1, or who may have claimed and obtained French nationality 
in accordance with the preceding provisions. 
The legal representative of a minor may exercise, on behalf of that minor, the right to 
claim French nationality; and if that right has not been exercised, the minor may claim 
French nationality within the year following his majority. 
Except in the cases provided for in No. (6) or the present paragraph, the French 
authorities reserve to themselves the right, in individual cases, to reject the claim to 
French nationality. 
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, Germans born or domiciled in Alsace- 
Lorraine shall not acquire French nationality by reason of the restoration of Alsace- 
Lorraine to France, even though they may have the status of citizens of Alsace- 
Lorraine. 
They may acquire French nationality only by naturalisation, on condition of having 
been domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine from a date previous to August 3,1914, and of 
submitting proof of unbroken residence within the restored territory for a period of 
three years from November 11,1918. 
France will be solely responsible for their diplomatic and consular protection from the 
date of their application for French naturalisation. 
The French Government shall determine the procedure by which reinstatement in 
French nationality as of right shall be effected, and the conditions under which 
decisions shall be given upon claims to such nationality and applications for 
naturalisation, as provided by the present Annex. 
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Appendix III 
Patriotic songs recited in schools and at celebrations by Francophone indigenes in 
the Moselle. (From documents given to the author by K's sister, G) 
'Qui a gagne la guerre? ' 
Words by Ch. L. Pothier 
C'est une question qui devient En faisant la queue au tabac, au 
populaire 
On entend partout sur des tons 
differents: 
"Quel est donc celui qui gagna cette 
guerre 
Dont le monde entier souffrait depuis 
longtemps? " 
Les uns disent c'est I'Amerique 
Aublocus, dit I'autre va I'honneur 
Moi je reponds: "Cessez vos 
charbon 
Le sucre a manque 
J'ai bu d'la saccharine 
J'ai gagnd la guerre avec mcs 
privations. " 
Du tout, dit une jolie marrainc 
C'est I'amour qui fit tenir jusqu'au 
bout 
Taisez-vous, dame un vieux capitaine, 
De tout temps qui donna le grand 
polemiques 
Car le vrai, le seul et grand vainqueur: 
C'est le Poilu soldat de France 
Qui, sans peur, marchait au combat 
Bravant la lutte et la souffrance 
Le Poilu &tait toujours lä! 
Le sac au dos, 
Couvert de terre 
Lui, c'est lui qui fit nos succes 
C'est lui qui I'a gagnee la guerre 
Le Poilu le soldat francais! " 
Le civil s'crie: "J'ai tenu j'imagine 
coup? 
Refrain 
C'est ä l'ouvrier quc r'vicnt toute la 
gloire 
Hurte un mdcano dc munitions 
L'deputd rdpond "J'ai force' la victoire 
Faisant des discours, votant des 
restrictions 
Partout on glorific Ic Tigre 
Et Wilson, Foch, P&ain ct Gouraud 
Tous ccs grands-lä faut pas qu'on Ics 
ddnigrc 
Et pourtant, le glorieux Ic plus beau... 
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`C'est un oiseau qui vient de France' 
Words by C. Soubise 
Sung to music by F. Boissiere 
Written 1875 and published in Paris 
Un matin du printemps dernier, Tous les matins et tous les soirs. 
Dans une bourgade lointaine, Epiant son retour peut-titre, 
Un petit oiseau printanier Une fillette au rubans noirs 
Vint montrer son aile d'ebene. 
Un enfant aux yeux jolis bleus 
Apercut la brune hirondelle. 
Et connaissant I'oiseau fidele, 
Le salua d'un air joyeux! 
Les coeurs palpitaient d'esperance, 
Et 1'enfant disait aux soldats: 
Sentinelles, ne tirez pas, 
C'est un oiseau qui vient de la France! 
La messagere du printemps 
Se reposait de son voyage, 
Quand un vieillard aux cheveux blancs 
Vint ä passer par le village. 
Un cri joyeux pousse l'air 
Lui fit soudain lever la tete, 
Et comme aux anciens jours de fete 
Son oeil brilla d'un regard fier! 
Au refrain 
Apparaissait ä sa fenetre. 
L'oisseau charmant vint s'y poser, 
En depit des soldats en armes, 
Et l'enfant essuyant ses larmes 
Mit sur son aile un long baiser! 
Au refrain 
II venait de la plaine en fleurs, 
Et tous les yeux suivaient sa trace, 
Car il portait nos trois couleurs 
Qui flottaient gaiment dans I'espace. 
Mais un soldat vise et fait fcu... 
Un long cri part, et I'hirondelle 
Tout ä coup refermant son alle, 
Tombe expirante du ciel bleu! 
II fait au coeur une esp6rance, 
Rayon divin qui ne mcurt pas, 
Mais I'oiscau qui chantait IN-bas 
Ne verra plus Ic ciel dc France! 
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